CourtListener opinion 10200666

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

 CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-11268-RGS 

DEBRA HASLAM, individually, and as the Personal Representative of THE 
 ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER SHEPPARD 

 v. 

WILLIAM D. MCLAUGHLIN, DAVID F. SHEA, JR., PAUL C. DIMINICO, 
DAVID B. MARR, JR., ANGELO COLASANTE, JAMES REGER, MICHAEL 
BOWES, SHANE O'NEILL, MICHAEL M. FOLEY, and CHRISTOPHER T. 
FOGARTY, in their representative capacities as Trustees and GREGORY A. 
 GEIMAN, in his capacity as the Administrator of the INTERNATIONAL 
UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 4 HEALTH & WELFARE, 
 ANUUITY & SAVINGS AND PENSION FUNDS; SYMETRA LIFE 
 INSURANCE COMPANY; and WENDY T. SHEPPARD 

 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

 November 8, 2022 

STEARNS, D.J. 
 Debra Haslam brought this action against the trustees of her late 
brother's retirement benefits plan: William McLaughlin, David Shea, Jr., 
Paul Diminico, David Marr, Jr., Angelo Colasante, James Reger, Michael 
Bowes, Shane O'Neill, Michael Foley, and Christopher Fogarty (Fund 
Trustees); the administrator of the plan, Gregory Geiman; the insurer of the 
plan, Symetra Life Insurance Company (Symetra); and her late brother's ex-
wife, Wendy Sheppard. Haslam alleges that the plan defendants wrongly 
paid over the plan benefits to Sheppard.1 

 The plan defendants now move to dismiss all claims brought against 
them. For reasons to be explained, the court will allow the motions to 
dismiss. 
 BACKGROUND 

 Haslam is the Personal Representative of her late brother Christopher 
Sheppard's Estate. Prior to his death, Christopher Sheppard received 
retirement benefits from the International Union of Operating Engineers 

Local 4 (IUOE Local 4) Health & Welfare, Annuity & Savings, and Pension 
Funds (ERISA Funds). The ERISA Funds were comprised of three smaller 
funds: (1) the Health & Welfare Fund; (2) the Annuity & Savings Fund; and 
(3) the Pension Fund. 

 1 The Complaint sets out nine Counts against the defendants in varying 
combinations: (1) declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 against all 
defendants; (2) violation of Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(3), against the Fund Trustees, Geiman, 
and Symetra; (3) breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA and common law 
against the Fund Trustees, Geiman, and Symetra; (4) breach of trust against 
the Fund Trustees and Geiman; (5) breach of contract against all defendants; 
(6) negligence against the Fund Trustees, Geiman, and Symetra; (7) unjust 
enrichment against Sheppard; (8) conversion against all defendants; and (9) 
a suit on a judgment against Sheppard. 
 The Sheppards divorced on June 1, 2015. In Addendum D of their 
separation agreement, they agreed that Christopher Sheppard would name 

Wendy Sheppard as the sole beneficiary of his life insurance policies for as 
long any alimony obligations remained outstanding. Compl., Ex. 3 (Dkt # 1-
3) at 12. The Sheppards' agreement was not subject to a qualified domestic 
relations order (QDRO). 

 Some two years later, on August 31, 2017, Christopher Sheppard listed 
Wendy Sheppard on his IUOE Local 4 Census Card as his primary and sole 
life insurance beneficiary. Compl., Ex. 2 (Dkt # 1-2) at 3. He also checked 

off the 100% option for the percentage amount to be paid to his ex-wife. Id. 
Directly above the designated blank space for listing the policy holder's 
beneficiaries, the card stated: 
 The person(s) named below as your life insurance beneficiary[] 
 will receive the proceeds from the Health and Welfare Fund Life 
 Insurance Policy in the event of your death if eligible for 
 coverage. . . . The person named below as your life insurance 
 beneficiary[] may also become entitled, in the percentages shown 
 below, to certain death benefits payable under the Pension Fund 
 and/or Annuity & Savings Fund. . . . [I]f a person named below 
 as your life insurance beneficiary was once your spouse, and your 
 marriage to that spouse ended in divorce, the Annuity & Savings 
 Fund and the Pension Fund will presume that your designation 
 of that spouse as beneficiary was terminated as of the final date 
 of divorce. If you want a former spouse listed below to remain 
 eligible for benefits for the Annuity & Savings and Pension 
 Funds, you must notify the Trustees of both the Annuity & 
 Savings Fund and the Pension Fund in writing that you wish to 
 continue this ex-spouse as a beneficiary. 
Id. 

 On July 20, 2020, the Sheppards entered a Stipulation for Judgment 
in the Probate and Family Court after it was determined that Christopher 
Sheppard had overpaid the alimony due his ex-wife. As a result, Addendum 
D of the separation agreement was vacated, and Christopher Sheppard 

retained the sole right, title, and interest in his retirement benefits. 
 On November 9, 2021, Christopher Sheppard died. On November 19, 
2021, his Union, IUOE Local 4, sent Haslam a package of ERISA claim forms. 
Haslam completed and returned them "shortly thereafter." Compl. (Dkt # 1) 

¶ 55. On December 9, 2021, an IUOE Local 4 employee, Amy Moreno,2 
assured Haslam that "your name is on everything" with respect to the ERISA 
benefits. On January 22, 2022, Wendy Sheppard filed her own claim for the 

same benefits. On February 10, 2022, IUOE Local 4 paid Wendy Sheppard 
all the remaining ERISA Funds, a total of $37,500. 
 Haslam alleges that the plan defendants breached their fiduciary duty 
under ERISA by disbursing the funds to Wendy Sheppard. She also alleges 

 2 Haslam's Complaint refers to both an Amy Moreno and an Ashley 
Moreno. Compl. ¶¶ 49, 106. The court refers to Moreno by "Amy" as she is 
identified as the responsible Union spokesperson in the Complaint. 
that Wendy Sheppard procured the funds for herself in violation of the terms 
of the Probate and Family Court Stipulation for Judgment. 

 DISCUSSION 
 The plan defendants move to dismiss Haslam's Complaint pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court will dismiss a complaint if, after accepting 
all well-pleaded facts as true and after drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the plaintiff, it determines that the complaint "fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To defeat 
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting the 
asserted claims. Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009), 
quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A plaintiff 
must plead "more than labels and conclusions," and the factual allegations 

must be sufficient to "raise a right [to] relief above the speculative 
level." Morales-Tañon v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 524 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 A. Claims Against Fund Trustees, Geiman, and Symetra 

 1. ERISA Claims (Counts II and III) 
 Haslam brings claims under Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) of 
ERISA, which entitle beneficiaries to receive benefits owed to them under 
the terms of an employment benefit plan and enjoin any act that violates a 
plan's terms. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(3). In discharging their 

duties, plan administrators must "manage ERISA ‘in accordance with the 
documents and instruments governing' them." Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for 
DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 288 (2009), quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1)(D). 

 This case is on all fours with Kennedy. In that case, the Supreme Court 
held that an ERISA plan administrator properly disbursed a decedent's funds 
to his ex-wife, notwithstanding the fact that she had foresworn any interest 

in her ex-husband's benefit programs in a non-QDRO divorce decree. 555 
U.S. at 299-300. The Court held that a plan administrator's duty under 
ERISA is to pay benefits "in conformity with the plan documents," which in 
Kennedy, as here, listed the decedent's ex-wife as the sole designated 

beneficiary. Id. at 300. As in Kennedy, the ERISA plan administrator had 
no obligation to turn to the Sheppards' Stipulation for Judgment in 
determining his proper beneficiary. 
 The only plan document of legal ERISA significance in this case is 

Christopher Sheppard's Union Census Card, completed over two years after 
his divorce from Wendy Sheppard. The card designated Wendy Sheppard as 
his primary and sole life insurance beneficiary. Compl., Ex. 2 (Dkt # 1-2) at 
3; see 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 299 
(1990) (noting that court will consider "items appearing in the record of the 

case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is 
unquestioned" at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Mem. of Law. Supp. 
Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt # 15) at 4. 
 Haslam insists that she completed and submitted the "Statement of 

Sole Surviving Heir" and "Symetra Beneficiary Statement" at the direction of 
an IUOE Local 4 employee. Compl. (Dkt # 1) ¶ 55. But this is of no import. 
The proper focus is on the existing plan document(s) at the time of the 

policyholder's death, and not on IUOE Local 4's after-the-fact interpretation 
of ERISA. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 299-300; see Boyd v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
636 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 2011) ("As in Kennedy, it is undisputed that the 
plan documents on file at the time of Emma's death declared Alsager to be 

the primary beneficiary of the plan, as Emma never took advantage of her 
option to designate a new beneficiary."). Haslam has not alleged the 
existence of any form involving the ERISA funds prior to her brother's death 
listing her as his beneficiary.3 Cf. Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 

 3 Haslam does allege that she was the designated beneficiary of the 
funds at issue, Compl. ¶ 64, but this statement is both implausible and 
conclusory. At most, Haslam offers a Designation of Beneficiary form listing 
her on a different non-ERISA life insurance policy. See Compl., Ex. 1 (Dkt 
#1-1). 
514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995) (ERISA "is built around reliance on the face of written 
plan documents"). 

 ERISA is predicated on ease of administrability. See Kennedy, 555 U.S. 
at 301 (internal citations omitted) ("ERISA forecloses any justification for 
enquiries into nice expressions of intent, in favor of the virtues of adhering 
to an uncomplicated rule: ‘simple administration, avoiding[ing] double 

liability, and ensur[ing] that beneficiaries get what's coming quickly, without 
the folderol essential under less-certain rules.'").4 This sensible principle 
leads to the conclusion that the plan defendants discharged their fiduciary 

duty under ERISA by faithfully adhering to the only documented designation 
of a beneficiary – Wendy Sheppard – that Christopher Sheppard made 
before his death. It also leads ineluctably to the entry of a judgment of 
dismissal on all claims against the plan defendants. 

 4 Haslam argues that the terms expressed on Mr. Sheppard's Census 
Card failed to provide straightforward instructions and that its unclear terms 
are "precisely the ‘folderol' Justice Souter cautioned against." Pl.'s Opp'n to 
Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt # 25) at 10. This is a misunderstanding of 
Kennedy. In Kennedy, the Supreme Court used the term "folderol" to 
describe the confusion that would come from the lack of a bright-line rule 
requiring ERISA administrators to strictly adhere to plan documents, not the 
complicated nature of the plan documents themselves. See 555 U.S. at 301 
("And the cost of less certain rules would be too plain. Plan administrators 
would be forced ‘to examine a multitude of external documents that might 
purport to affect the dispensation of benefits.'"). 
 2. State Law Claims (Counts III, IV, V, VI, and VIII) 
 Haslam's state law claims are expressly preempted by ERISA. 

ERISA "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any 
[qualified] employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Preempted state 
laws that reference ERISA plans include "common-law cause[s] of action 
premised on the existence of an ERISA plan." Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards 

Enf't v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997). A state law 
"relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan "if it [1] has a connection with or [2] 
reference to such a plan." Id. 

 Here, Haslam's state law breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, 
breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and conversion claims are 
all predicated on whether she, rather than Wendy Sheppard, was the proper 
beneficiary under Christopher Sheppard's benefit plan. See, e.g., Compl. 

¶ 175 ("By making disbursements from Mr. Sheppard's accounts that were 
not authorized and not properly distributed, the Trustees and Mr. 
Geiman . . . violated duties not only to Mr. Sheppard and his estate but those 
owed to the beneficiaries."). The determination of beneficiary status is "an 

area of core ERISA concern" and relates directly to Sheppard's benefit plan. 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001). Thus, the court will dismiss 
Counts III, IV, V, VI, and VIII. 
 3. Declaratory Relief (Count I) 
 Because none of Haslam's claims on which she seeks to base declaratory 

relief may proceed, this claim must also fall. 
 B. Claims Against Wendy Sheppard 
 Haslam's claims against Wendy Sheppard must also be dismissed 
because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Haslam's only federal 

claim against Sheppard is Count I, declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
However, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 is not an independent source of federal 
jurisdiction — it is only available as an "added anodyne for disputes that 

come within the federal courts' jurisdiction on some other basis." In re Fin. 
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 919 F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting 
Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 534 (1st Cir. 
1995); Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960). 

 Such a basis does not exist. The remainder of Haslam's claims against 
Ms. Sheppard are state-law claims (Counts V, VII, VIII, IX) over which this 
court does not have original jurisdiction. Because both Haslam and Wendy 
Sheppard are residents of Massachusetts, the parties lack diversity. The 

court will also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because this 
court has dismissed all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The court will therefore dismiss Counts VII and IX 
in their entirety and Counts I, V, and VII as they apply to Wendy Sheppard. 

 ORDER 
 For the foregoing reasons, the plan defendants' Motions to Dismiss are 
GRANTED and all Counts are dismissed. The Clerk will so notify the parties 
and close the case. 

 SO ORDERED. 
 /s/ Richard G. Stearns ___________ 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE