CourtListener opinion 10671899

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
 FORT WORTH DIVISION 

CONGHUA YAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. No. 4:23-cv-00758-P 

THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ET AL., 

Defendants. 
ORDER ACCEPTING THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
 MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND INDEPENDENTLY 
 ASSESSING ADDITIONAL MOTION 

The United States Magistrate Judge issued findings, conclusions, 
and a recommendation ("FCR") in this case on December 28, 2023. See 
ECF No. 121. The FCR evaluated motions to dismiss filed by five 
groups of defendants: 
 • Defendant Lori DeAngelis ("Judge DeAngelis") (ECF No. 69); 
 • Defendant Tarrant County (ECF No. 70); 
 • Defendants State Bar of Texas, Luis Marin, Daniel Martinez, 
 and Rachel Craig (the "State Bar Defendants") (ECF No. 83); 
 • Defendant Samantha Ybarra (ECF No. 75); and 
 • Defendants Leslie Barrows and the Barrows Firm (the 
 "Barrows Defendants") (ECF No. 90).1 
Plaintiff Conghua Yan objected to the FCR, see ECF Nos. 122, 125, so 
the Court conducted a de novo review. Having done so, the Court 
adopts the FCR's findings as the findings of the Court, endorses the 
FCR's conclusions, and accepts the FCR's recommendation in part. 
Accordingly, the above motions to dismiss are GRANTED and Yan's 
claims against those defendants are DISMISSED. In addition, the 

1The Court adopts the FCR's nomenclature and collectively calls 
Samantha Ybarra and the Barrows Defendants the "Attorney Defendants." 
Court reviewed a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant U.S. Bancorp 
("U.S. Bank") after the FCR was entered. See ECF No. 126. Having 
considered that Motion and related briefing, the Court concludes U.S. 
Bank's Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED, and Yan's claims 
against that defendant are also DISMISSED. 
 BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Conghua Yan sued a small army of defendants last July. 
His lawsuit "originates from allegations against certain DFW family 
court attorneys/judges" implicated in his 2021 divorce proceeding. 
Liberally construed, Yan's Original Complaint alleged numerous 
constitutional and civil-rights deprivations, an antitrust claim, and 
claims for fraud and civil conspiracy (among other more nebulous 
causes of action). From the pleadings, it appears that Mr. Yan's divorce 
got ugly fast, and Yan was saddled with a sizeable bill for attorneys' 
fees. He says the family court lacked authority to issue orders 
regarding attorneys' fees, spousal support, and several other matters of 
import. Beyond this constitutional problem, Yan alleges that key 
players within the Texas State Bar and Texas judiciary conspired 
against him with other public and private persons/entities. Three 
amended complaints later, Yan seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, 
but his factual allegations are none clearer. This case's abstruse 
procedural history is otherwise well documented in prior FCRs and the 
Court's orders accepting each. 
 LEGAL STANDARD 
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" that "possess only 
that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to 
be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). "A court must have the power to decide 
the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power over the 
parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case." 
Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (2017). When a 
claim is moot, the former is absent, and a defendant may move to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Am. Precision Ammunition, LLC. v. City 
of Mineral Wells, 90 F.4th 820, 824 (5th Cir. 2024); see also FED. R. CIV. 
P. 12(b)(1). "When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 
motions, the court first considers its jurisdiction." McLin v. Twenty-
First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2023). 
When evaluating subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court may 
consider "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by 
undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint 
supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of 
disputed facts." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 
2001). In doing so, the Court "accept[s] all well-pleaded factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and view[s] them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff." Abdullah v. Paxton, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th 
Cir. 2023). Still, "the burden of proof [is] on the party asserting 
jurisdiction." McLin, 79 F.4th at 415 (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 
161). 
Even where jurisdiction is established, a complaint must state a 
plausible claim to relief. Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 279 (5th 
Cir. 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see 
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring "a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"). The 
complaint's factual allegations suffice if they allow the Court to "draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If they don't, dismissal is proper under 
Rule 12(b)(6). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
At the pleadings stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as 
true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. City of 
Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 154–55 (5th Cir. 
2010). And federal courts have long held that "however inartfully 
pleaded," the complaint of a pro se litigant "must be held to ‘less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 520–21 (1972)). But the Court's assumption of truth does not 
extend to conclusory allegations or "a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007). For this requirement, a plaintiff's pro se status is no 
aegis. See Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 ANALYSIS 
As noted above, the FCR evaluates five different motions to 
dismiss. See ECF No. 121 (analyzing ECF Nos. 69, 70, 75, 83, 90). The 
Court addresses them in the same order as the FCR, evaluating Yan's 
objections on a Motion-specific basis. As explained below, Yan's claims 
against Judge DeAngelis and Tarrant County, along with most of his 
claims against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants, 
should be dismissed for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1). His 
remaining claims against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney 
Defendants, along with his claims against U.S. Bank, should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 
As a preliminary point, the Court notes that it deviates from the 
FCR's recommendation with respect to dismissal of certain claims with 
prejudice. Given Yan has had multiple bites at the apple and is now on 
his fourth amended complaint, the Court agrees with the FCR that 
"Yan has [had] adequate opportunities to plead his best case and 
further amendments to his complaint would not serve to further this 
litigation." ECF No. 121 at 9; see Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding dismissal with prejudice is proper under Rule 
12(b)(6) if plaintiff has been afforded ample opportunities to plead his 
best case); see generally Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 
1998) ("Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the 
plaintiff an opportunity to amend."). 
But "[o]ur precedents also make clear that a jurisdictional dismissal 
must be without prejudice to refiling in a forum of competent 
jurisdiction." Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021). 
Thus, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate for Yan's claims 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6); his claims dismissed under Rule 
12(b)(1) must be dismissed without prejudice. The Court shares the 
FCR's skepticism that any court would have jurisdiction over Yan's 
largely untenable claims. Nevertheless, a dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(1) signals this Court's lack of jurisdiction. Thus, a dismissal with 
prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1) would function as an improper exercise 
of non-existent jurisdiction. See Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe of La., 79 
F.4th 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (noting "to dismiss with prejudice under 
Rule 12(b)(1) is to disclaim jurisdiction and then exercise it" (cleaned 
up)). Having noted this distinction, the Court now turns to the motions 
to dismiss. 
A. Yan lacks standing to sue Judge DeAngelis and Tarrant 
 County and lacks standing to assert certain claims 
 against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney 
 Defendants. 
As explained in the FCR, Yan lacks standing to assert his claims 
against Judge DeAngelis and Tarrant County. See ECF No. 121 at 5– 
12, 13–16. He also lacks standing for most of his claims against the 
State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants, though he may 
have standing with respect to certain racketeering allegations against 
those Defendants. The Court must address standing before evaluating 
any argument on the merits or any attack on the pleadings' sufficiency. 
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992); United 
States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807, 811 (5th Cir. 2022) ("Standing is a 
matter of jurisdiction, and courts must assess their jurisdiction before 
turning to the merits."). Doing so here, the Court agrees with the FCR 
that Yan lacks standing vis-à-vis the above Defendants. 
Yan alleges a wide array of claims against the above Defendants. 
See ECF Nos. 60 at 18–24, 32–35, 35–64; 121 at 5, 9–10. Broadly 
speaking, he alleges that Judge DeAngelis acted beyond the scope of 
her authority at various junctures in his divorce proceeding. See ECF 
No. 60 at 18, 35–64. He further avers that Tarrant County should be 
liable for DeAngelis's impropriety because DeAngelis is a public official 
operating within the County. See ECF No. 121 at 9; see also ECF No. 
60 at 32–33. He also brings claims under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), alleging that DeAngelis was in 
cahoots with the State Bar Defendants to restrict market competition 
for legal services, launder money, and cover up ultra vires orders. See, 
e.g., ECF No. 60 at 38–40 (detailing the various "conspirator roles in 
these RICO racketeering activities"). Finally, he asserts similar 
racketeering/antitrust allegations against the Attorney Defendants, 
alleging that they willingly participated in the above scheme and 
committed various improprieties in his divorce proceeding to effectuate 
their illicit plan. See id. While all of Yan's claims would be vulnerable 
to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the analysis need not progress that 
far for most claims because Yan fails to establish standing. 
1. Judge DeAngelis 
The FCR correctly concluded that Yan lacks standing to sue Judge 
DeAngelis, who is judicially immune from this lawsuit. See ECF No. 
121 at 5–8. The Court ADOPTS the FCR's conclusion and 
DISMISSES Yan's claims against DeAngelis without prejudice. 
With a conspicuous dearth of facts, Yan alleges that Judge 
DeAngelis "assumed the role of a judge to obtain the authority to issue 
unlawful orders that facilitated the extraction of money from clients by 
other conspirators." ECF No. 60 at 39. What's more, Yan says 
DeAngelis issued many orders in that proceeding "without any 
jurisdiction or authority." Id. The "orders" referenced in Yan's 
pleadings appear to be (1) "an interim order compelling Plaintiff to 
directly pay his own attorney fees" and (2) a "spousal support order" 
Judge DeAngelis issued "while there [was] neither a motion nor a 
hearing for the matter of spousal support." Id. at 39; see also id. at 55–
64 (chronicling various disputed orders DeAngelis issued in Yan's 
divorce proceeding). The FCR rightly notes that "[w]hile Yan's 
pleadings evidence an amalgam of exceptional allegations, his 
arguments are all predicated on the untenable position that he has 
standing to sue in federal court for unfavorable outcomes in a state 
court proceeding. Fifth Circuit precedent is clear that he does not." 
ECF No. 121 at 7 (collecting cases). 
Yan objects to the FCR's conclusion regarding DeAngelis's 
immunity. See ECF No. 122 at 18–20. The Court OVERRULES his 
objection because the FCR correctly applies Fifth Circuit precedent to 
Yan's allegations. See Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(finding no case or controversy exists to confer standing where 
lawsuit's allegations hinge on state court judge acting in "adjudicative 
capacity"). Sure, Yan couches his allegations in constitutional terms by 
ostensibly challenging DeAngelis's "jurisdiction or authority." See ECF 
No. 60 at 39. If his pleadings set forth bona fide allegations of a 
constitutional violation, DeAngelis may not be entitled to immunity 
from this lawsuit. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). 
But the FCR is correct in noting Yan never substantively alleges the 
purported lack of jurisdiction/authority. See ECF No. 121 at 7 
(observing that "Yan does not actually allege that Judge DeAngelis 
lacked jurisdiction or authority to hear the case or to issue the orders, 
only that he disagrees with her application of the law"). Thus, without 
more, Judge DeAngelis is judicially immune from Mr. Yan's lawsuit. 
See Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284. And her immunity extends equally to Yan's 
RICO claim. See Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985) 
("It is a well-established rule that where a judge's absolute immunity 
would protect him [or her] from liability for the performance of 
particular acts, mere allegations that he [or she] performed those acts 
pursuant to a bribe or conspiracy will not be sufficient to avoid the 
immunity.").2 
Despite the clarity of case law on this point, Yan insists the FCR 
got it wrong. In particular, Yan raises two categorical objections. First, 
he reiterates clearly established case law that "no excuse is 
permissible" for judicial determinations rendered in excess of authority 
or jurisdiction. See ECF No. 122 at 6–7 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 
435 U.S. 349, 356 n.6 (1978)). Second, he says the FCR applies 
incorrect immunity precedents because "DeAngelis is not at elected 
judge." ECF No. 122 at 18. Neither persuades. 
The FCR preempted Yan's first objection by observing that the 
factual predicate for Yan's argument is unfavorable outcomes in a 
state-court proceeding, not a purported absence of authority on 
DeAngelis's part. See ECF No. 121 at 7. Without a clear articulation of 
how Judge DeAngelis exceeded her judicial authority, Yan's pleadings 
leave the Court with little more than the grievances of a disgruntled 

2Though the analysis need not progress to Yan's pleadings, the Court 
notes that his RICO claim would also be dismissible under Rule 12(b)(6) 
because it rests on speculative allegations of would-be facts. See, e.g., ECF 
No. 60 at 39 (noting DeAngelis "would have utilized a division of the award, 
ensuring that both conspirators on each side would maintain silence") 
(emphasis added). 
litigant. Compare, e.g., Machetta v. Moren, 726 F. App'x 219, 219–20 
(5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting similar lawsuit based on judicial-capacity 
actions of state family-court judge). The Court sympathizes with Yan 
and understands the financial and emotional toll contentious divorce 
proceedings can have for those involved. However, litigants may not 
turn to federal court to challenge a state court's decrees under the 
banner of "jurisdiction and authority" without plainly explaining how 
the aggrieving orders were unlawful. See McKinley v. Abbott, 643 F.3d 
403, 406 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that state judges who are sued 
"because of [their] office as judge" are entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity unless the pleadings clearly articulate an independent 
constitutional violation).3 Thus, the Court OVERRULES Yan's first 
objection, and his claim lives or dies with DeAngelis's disputed 
immunity. 
Yan notes that elected judges are "on the State of Texas payroll" 
and thus entitled to judicial immunity. ECF No. 122 at 18. But he 
argues DeAngelis does not enjoy such immunity because her "payroll is 
on the county bill." Id. He's wrong. Texas law is clear that Judge 
DeAngelis is absolutely immune from suit for judicial actions taken in 
her capacity as associate judge of the 324th District Court. See TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.017 (noting "[a]n associate judge . . . has the 
judicial immunity of a district judge"); see generally Daves v. Dall. 
County, Tex., 22 F.4th 522, 532–42 (5th Cir. 2022) (explicating this 
point). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Yan's objections to the 
FCR regarding Judge DeAngelis's judicial immunity. 
Doctrines like judicial immunity can be difficult for laypersons to 
understand (and sometimes for legal professionals). As a general rule, 

3The Court notes that even if DeAngelis was not entitled to judicial 
immunity, the Court would still abstain from ruling on Yan's claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief under the Younger doctrine. See Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). The underlying dispute is still ongoing, the 
proceedings implicate Texas's strong family-law interests, and Yan has 
avenues to raise his challenges in Texas state court. Thus, abstention is 
clearly appropriate. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The County's Motion to Dismiss chronicles ad 
nauseum the myriad cases from this District and Circuit which have reached 
that conclusion for cases like this. See ECF No. 69 at 12–13 (collecting cases). 
a litigant should come to court with strong assertions of fact 
supporting a constitutional violation if they intend to sue a judge in a 
lower court's proceeding. Simply arguing a certain order was wrong, 
even really wrong, won't cut it. Further still, plaintiffs must show the 
relevant judicial official acted without authority or jurisdiction, not 
merely that they acted in excess of otherwise lawful jurisdiction. That 
distinction is nuanced but critical. See, e.g., Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 
92, 99 (5th Cir. 1980) ("If a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only 
wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the 
clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability 
for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should 
convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting 
in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune."). Because Yan's 
allegations do not overcome Judge DeAngelis's judicial immunity, the 
Court GRANTS her Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 69) and DISMISSES 
Yan's claims against DeAngelis without prejudice. 
2. Tarrant County 
The FCR correctly concluded that Yan lacks standing to sue 
Tarrant County for Judge DeAngelis's actions, whether under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 or otherwise. See ECF No. 121 at 9–10. The Court 
ADOPTS the FCR's conclusion and DISMISSES Yan's claims against 
Tarrant County without prejudice. 
For his claim against Tarrant County, Yan seeks compensatory, 
punitive, and treble damages, as well as "a preliminary and permanent 
injunction enjoining [] Tarrant County, Texas, represented by 
Defendant Lori L. DeAngelis in her official capacity, from continuing to 
engage in ultra vires actions beyond its legal authority." ECF No. 60 at 
64. To this end, Yan avers that Tarrant County deprived him of "his 
Equal Protection and Due Process constitutional rights," see id., but 
provides no facts to support those remarkable constitutional 
allegations. As a general matter, Yan is right that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
sanctions lawsuits against counties under certain circumstances. See 
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n.54 (1978) (noting 
municipalities and counties can be "persons" for purposes of lawsuits 
under Section 1983). But as the FCR rightly notes, those 
circumstances are not applicable here. 
Yan objects to the FCR on this point, arguing Tarrant County may 
be held liable for DeAngelis's acts and omissions under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. See ECF No. 122 at 9, 18. The Court OVERRULES this 
objection because it is incorrect as a matter of law. 
Yan cannot establish standing to sue Tarrant County unless his 
alleged injury is clearly traceable to acts or omissions of the County. 
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–60. For lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
this is satisfied if the municipal defendant exercised authority over the 
person or entity responsible for a plaintiff's harm. See Monell, 436 U.S. 
at 690 & n.54. On this point, the County argues: 
 The fundamental flaw in Plaintiff's analysis is that a 
 state appointed associate judge of a state district court 
 handling family matters does not act on behalf of, or 
 subject to the control or supervision of, the County when 
 presiding over family law cases and making judicial 
 decisions related thereto. 
ECF No. 70 at 4–5 (collecting cases). They're right, as only supervisory 
judicial officials may exercise control over family-court judges in Texas. 
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 201.001, 201.004. Put differently, 
DeAngelis reports to the 324th District Court, not Tarrant County, 
with respect to her actions in Yan's divorce proceeding. That undercuts 
Yan's standing to sue the County here. 
Under Section 1983, Yan can only sue "those officials or 
governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for 
the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have 
caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue." 
Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). Yan's 
objections insist that is the case here. See ECF No. 122 at 18. But 
"[w]hether state sovereign immunity as signified by the Eleventh 
Amendment applies to bar suit and whether an official is acting for the 
state and thus exempt from suit under Section 1983 involve different 
analyses." Daves, 22 F.4th at 532. Here, the Fifth Circuit has made 
clear that entities like Tarrant County cannot be held liable under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of persons like Judge DeAngelis, who 
neither answered to Tarrant County nor received directives from 
Tarrant County with respect to Yan's divorce proceeding. See id. at 
532–39. As the court explained in Daves: "if the issue were the 
removal, replacement, or required residence of statutory county judges, 
the laws about county officers would control. Instead, we are concerned 
with decisions made in a judicial capacity within the States' judicial 
hierarchy." Id. at 540 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, even if Judge DeAngelis cognizably harmed Yan, Tarrant 
County would not be liable for that harm. 
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Tarrant County's 
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 70) and DISMISSES Yan's claims against 
the County without prejudice. 
3. The Attorney Defendants 
The FCR correctly concluded that Yan lacks standing to sue the 
Attorney Defendants over allegations contained in the pleadings. See 
ECF No. 121 at 13–15. The only exceptions to this jurisdictional defect 
are Yan's claims against the Attorney Defendants under RICO. 
Excepting those claims, the Court ADOPTS the FCR's conclusion and 
DISMISSES Yan's other claims against the Attorney Defendants 
without prejudice. 
Yan sues the Attorney Defendants over their conduct in his divorce 
proceeding and over ill-defined allegations of racketeering and 
chicanery. See ECF No. 60 at 22–45. The FCR correctly notes that the 
Attorney Defendants are immune from any allegations related to their 
zealous advocacy in Yan's divorce proceeding. See ECF No. 121 at 13– 
14. The attorney-immunity doctrine is "properly characterized as a 
true immunity from suit, not as a defense to liability." Troice v. 
Proskauer Rose, LLP, 816 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2016). Thus, 
assertions of attorney immunity should be analyzed under Rule 
12(b)(1), as they function as a complete bar to jurisdiction. See id. The 
FCR correctly applied attorney immunity to Yan's allegations, as the 
doctrine applies to "the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages 
when discharging his duties to his client." Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 
467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). As explained in the FCR, almost all of 
Yan's allegations against Ybarra or the Barrows Defendants involve 
their actions in his divorce litigation. See ECF No. 121 at 14–16. 
In his objection, Yan rightly notes that attorney immunity is not 
absolute. See ECF No. 122 at 19. However, his ad hominem attacks 
that the Magistrate Judge "has failed to weight [sic] the scales of 
justice equally" miss the mark. See id. This case typifies why the 
attorney-immunity doctrine exists, which protects the zealous 
advocacy of clients by legal professionals. See Troice, 816 F.3d at 346. 
While not comprehensive, the attorney-immunity doctrine is wide-
ranging and robust. See generally Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 
681 (Tex. 2018) (explaining the doctrine's contours for various 
allegations). Because the FCR correctly applied the doctrine to Yan's 
claims, Yan's objections to the immunity analysis as a whole are 
OVERRULED. To the extent Yan objects to the immunity analysis 
vis-à-vis his RICO claim, see ECF No. 122 at 18–20, those objections 
are SUSTAINED. 
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Attorney 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 75, 90) and DISMISSES 
Yan's non-RICO claims against them without prejudice. 
4. The State Bar Defendants 
The FCR also determined that Yan lacks standing to sue the State 
Bar Defendants, finding them immune from this lawsuit. See ECF No. 
121 at 10–13. Excepting Yan's racketeering allegations against the 
State Bar Defendants, the Court otherwise ADOPTS the FCR's 
conclusion and DISMISSES Yan's other claims against them without 
prejudice. 
The FCR correctly noted that Fifth Circuit precedents entitle the 
State Bar Defendants to immunity from Yan's lawsuit. See ECF No. 
121 at 10–13 (collecting cases). The clarity of germane precedents 
places that beyond dispute. See, e.g., Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 
F.3d 315, 318 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994); Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319, 
1320–21 (5th Cir. 1985); Bishop v. State Bar of Tex., 791 F.2d 435, 
437–38 (5th Cir. 1986). Yan broadly objects to the FCR's analysis on 
this point, but the only objection that holds water concerns the State 
Bar Defendants' immunity from antitrust/racketeering allegations. See 
ECF No. 121 at 12–13; see also N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. 
F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494, 505 (2015) (holding immunity may not extend to 
circumstances where "a State delegates control over a market to a 
nonsovereign actor"); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 
(1975) ("The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited 
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster 
anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members."). 
Controlling precedent presents a bit of a mixed bag when it comes 
to the immunity of entities like the State Bar of Texas. In most cases, 
the State Bar Defendants enjoy absolute immunity from suit. See, e.g., 
Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 318 n.2; Krempp, 775 F.2d at 1320–21; Bishop, 791 
F.2d at 437–38. Depending on the nature of a plaintiff's allegations, 
this immunity also extends to antitrust/racketeering claims. See Green 
v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994). But other cases 
suggest this immunity does not automatically extend to allegations 
like those in Yan's pleadings. See, e.g., Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. 
Ordinarily, Yan's claim would survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), 
triggering more robust standards for subsequent dispositive motions 
on this granular issue. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 799 
(5th Cir. 2014) (noting the standing inquiry "becomes gradually 
stricter as the parties proceed through ‘the successive stages of the 
litigation" (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996)). But that's 
not the case here. Indeed, Yan's survival under Rule 12(b)(1) is a 
Pyrrhic victory. The Court was dutybound to address the State Bar 
Defendants' 12(b)(1) arguments first. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th at 811. Had 
Yan's claim been defeated on jurisdictional grounds, dismissal without 
prejudice would be proper. See Atwood, 18 F.4th at 498. But as 
explained below, Yan's racketeering/antitrust allegations do not 
survive the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Consequently, rather than living to 
fight another day, those claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 
For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the FCR's conclusions 
and DISMISSES Yan's non-racketeering/antitrust claims against the 
State Bar Defendants without prejudice. 
B. Yan's fails to state a plausible RICO claim against the 
 State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants and 
 fails to state any plausible claim against U.S. Bank. 
Having dealt with standing, the Court now turns to Yan's 
remaining claims. First, the Court addresses Yan's RICO/antitrust 
claims against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants. 
After that, the Court independently assesses Yan's claims against U.S. 
Bank. As explained herein, the pleadings fail to establish a cognizable 
claim against any of the above Defendants. As such, the Court 
DISMISSES Yan's remaining claims with prejudice. 
1. The Attorney Defendants & State Bar Defendants 
Yan objected to the FCR's Rule 12(b)(1) analysis vis-à-vis the 
Attorney Defendants and the State Bar Defendants. See ECF No. 122 
at 11–12. For the Attorney Defendants, Yan argues the attorney-
immunity doctrine doesn't apply to claims brought pursuant to a 
federal statute like RICO. See ECF No. 122 at 19. While that objection 
has some merit, the Court roundly rejects his broader accusation that 
"[t]his Court has erroneously and excessively broadened attorney 
immunity to cover any conduct ‘during the scope of proceedings,' 
contrary to federal law." ECF No. 122 at 11. The FCR applies 
controlling precedents that apply attorney-immunity to actions taken 
in the scope of legal representation in a court proceeding. See ECF No. 
121 at 14–16. And the FCR clearly explained that Yan's pleadings do 
not trigger one of the doctrine's rare exceptions. See id. For the State 
Bar Defendants, Yan similarly argues the State Bar isn't immune from 
his racketeering/antitrust claims. See id. at 12–13. Without reaching a 
conclusive determination on these doctrinal questions, the Court 
proceeded to evaluate Yan's pleadings and Defendants' arguments 
under Rule 12(b)(6). Having done so, the Court finds Yan's allegations 
against both the Attorney Defendants and the State Bar Defendants 
fail to state a cognizable claim entitling Yan to relief. See generally 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (noting dismissal is proper if the pleadings 
"fail[] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"). 
 Liberally construed, Yan alleges that the Attorney Defendants 
were privy to a larger conspiratorial scheme to launder money and 
protect against market competition, along with Judge DeAngelis and 
the State Bar Defendants. He further alleges that the United States 
Magistrate Judge acted in desperation to protect this scheme, since he 
is also "a member of the State Bar of Texas." ECF No. 122 at 20. Why 
else would the FCR recommend dismissal of certain claims with 
prejudice? As Yan sees things, the FCR is further evidence of "the 
State Bar of Texas' role of engaging in fees obtained from the income of 
its members' racketeering activities." Id. at 5. The Court understands 
Yan's frustration, having failed to find success in his divorce 
proceeding or this action. Yet the bottom line is simple: Yan fails to 
furnish facts to support his allegations of "large-scale racketeering 
activities, shielded by the State Bar of Texas." ECF No. 60 at 35. His 
fanciful, conclusory allegations suggest the Attorney Defendants 
laundered money from Judge DeAngelis's attorneys' fees orders to 
purchase real estate (id. at 40) and communicate about Yan's finances 
with U.S. Bank (id. at 41–43), among other acts of impropriety. To 
cover their tracks, Yan alleges that the State Bar Defendants 
"established an extremely effective shield system under the guise of a 
self-regulated disciplinary system." Id. at 46. Yet his allegations are 
conclusory and utterly devoid of factual support. 
At this stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and 
views them in Yan's favor. See Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d at 154–
55. Because Yan appears pro se, the Court holds his pleadings to an 
extremely lenient standard, "however inartfully pleaded" they may be. 
See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. But no amount of lenient construction 
could manufacture a legally cognizable claim from Yan's pleadings. At 
best, liberal construction shows Yan has a policy grievance regarding 
the State Bar Defendants role in governing the Texas legal market. See 
ECF No. 60 at 58 (arguing "there is no worse monopoly than the 
monopoly of legal justice service" which "prevent[s] justice from being 
served"). Yet federal court is not the forum to raise one's concerns 
regarding the legal profession's protectionist tendencies. And with 
respect to Yan's actual allegations, vehemence cannot substitute for 
facts. Neither the Original Complaint nor any amendment thereof has 
furnished a "short and plain statement" showing Mr. Yan is "entitled 
to relief" for racketeering or antitrust causes of action. See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 8(a). And Yan cannot keep a factually-devoid RICO claim on life 
support merely because he sues pro se. See Atkins, 999 F.2d at 100. 
There may well be cases where a plaintiff has a correct hunch 
regarding largescale schemes or acts of institutional impropriety but 
can't furnish enough facts to state a plausible claim in federal court. 
That's an unfortunate byproduct of a system that exists to render 
justice to as many viable claims as possible. It's a hard row to hoe 
when attempting to allege a plausible claim that members of the Texas 
judiciary teamed up with attorneys, federal judges, members of the 
Texas State Bar, and private entities to launder money via various 
court orders. But it's not impossible, particularly at the pleadings 
stage. At this juncture, the Court only requires enough facts "to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because the Court cannot draw that 
reasonable inference based on Mr. Yan's pleadings, and because he has 
had multiple chances to plead his best case, the Court DISMISSES his 
RICO/antitrust claims against the Attorney Defendants and the State 
Bar Defendants with prejudice. See Greninger, 188 F.3d at 327. 
2. U.S. Bank 
Yan's claims against U.S. Bank fare no better. The Court 
independently assessed U.S. Bank's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed 
after the Magistrate Judge entered his FCR on the above motions. See 
ECF No. 126. Yan's claims against U.S. Bank vary widely and appeal 
to an astonishing array of federal statutes. See ECF No. 127 at 7–9. As 
explained below, none come close to presenting a plausible claim that 
entitles Yan to relief. 
First, Yan attempts to sue U.S. Bank under 18 U.S.C. §§ 664, 1027, 
1341, 1343, and 1349. See ECF Nos. 127 at 7; 60 at 27–38. Those are 
criminal statutes and do not create civil causes of action. Thus, those 
claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
Second, Yan asserts yet another RICO claim against U.S. Bank, but 
the claim falls victim to the same factual paucity discussed above. Yan 
discusses isolated instances of nebulous alleged impropriety, but he 
fails to show the required "pattern of racketeering activity," let alone 
that his allegations are "connected to the acquisition, establishment, 
conduct, or control of an enterprise." See Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. 
J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1988). Rather, he merely 
asserts that U.S. Bank acted improperly by providing certain 
information as his 401(k) administrator in the underlying divorce 
proceeding. See ECF No. 60 at 24. Yan says he was never informed of a 
court order for U.S. Bank to divulge this information, a fact which he 
contends supports RICO liability for U.S. Bank. See id. at 26. But a 
release of spousal support funds is not a RICO violation. Indeed, time 
and again the Fifth Circuit has affirmed dismissal of RICO claims 
based on "a single, discrete and otherwise lawful" transaction. Delta 
Truck & Tractor, 855 F.2d at 242. Accordingly, Yan's RICO claims 
against U.S. Bank are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
Third, Yan sues U.S. Bank under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the 
Bank violated what he calls "the ‘Liberty' clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." See ECF No. 60 at 67. Because the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not, by its text, apply to private entities like U.S. 
Bank, Yan must show that the Bank acted "under color of law" to 
deprive him of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 
5123 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Because he does not make this required showing, Yan fails to 
state a legally cognizable constitutional claim against U.S. Bank. 
Accordingly, this cause of action is also DISMISSED with prejudice. 
Fourth, Yan appears to allege various breaches of U.S. Bank's 
fiduciary duty. He appeals to certain fund-sequestration statutes, e.g., 
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i), but never articulates any facts that would 
suggest U.S. Bank violated its fiduciary duty (under that statute or 
otherwise). In essence, he seems to base this allegation on U.S. Bank's 
release of funds pursuant to the family court's order. See ECF No. 60 
at 25. Tabling the question of whether such a breach, if found, would 
violate U.S. Bank's fiduciary duty, the pleadings do not support Yan's 
claim. 
Under family court orders like those at issue here, "the alternate 
payee is considered a beneficiary of the relevant plan" and "may be a 
‘spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant.'" 
Miletello v. R M R Mechs., Inc., 921 F.3d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K)). As U.S. Bank's Motion notes, Yan 
was not identified as an alternate payee under the family court's 
orders. See ECF No. 127 at 23. Nor do the pleadings set forth any other 
facts that would suggest U.S. Bank violated a duty to Yan or otherwise 
failed to comply with applicable laws.4 Because the pleadings contain 
no facts that suggest U.S. Bank improperly distributed funds or 
otherwise deviated from its fiduciary obligations, Yan's claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty against U.S. Bank are DISMISSED with 
prejudice. 
 CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS all remaining motions 
to dismiss in this case. See ECF Nos. 69, 70, 75, 83, 90, 126. Because 
all other Defendants have been terminated at this juncture, the Court 
ORDERS that this civil action is DISMISSED. 
SO ORDERED on this 23rd day of April 2024. 

4U.S. Bank's Motion preempted a liberally construed ERISA claim from 
Yan's pleadings. See ECF No. 127 at 23 ("To the extent Plaintiff intended to 
plead an ERISA fiduciary claim irrespective of a supposed violation of 29 
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i), that claim fails as a matter of law as well."). Yan's 
pleadings passingly reference "ERISA guidelines" and "concealment of facts 
in relation to documents required by the ERISA" but never allege an 
independent fiduciary claim under that statute. See, e.g., ECF No. 60 at 32, 
35. Though the Court's liberal construction of Yan's pleadings does not find 
enough fodder for an ERISA claim, the Court notes that U.S. Bank's 
invocation of the Plan Document Rule for this point persuades. See generally 
ECF No. 127 at 23–26 (collecting cases). Accordingly, had Yan pleaded such a 
claim, that claim would also be dismissible under Rule 12(b)(6).