LexyCorpus case page
CourtListener opinion 10730596
Date unknown · US
- Extracted case name
- pending
- Extracted reporter citation
- 545 U.S. 546
- Docket / number
- pending
Machine-draft headnote
Machine-draft public headnote: CourtListener opinion 10730596 is included in the LexyCorpus QDRO sample set as a public CourtListener opinion with relevance to pension / defined benefit issues. The current annotation is conservative: it identifies source provenance, relevance signals, and evidence quotes for attorney/agent retrieval. It is not a Willie-approved legal headnote yet.
Retrieval annotation
Draft retrieval summary: this opinion has QDRO relevance score 5/5, retirement-division score 5/5, and family-law score 2/5. Use the quoted text and full opinion below before relying on the case.
Category: pension / defined benefit issues
Evidence quotes
QDRO“F No. 36. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss and DENIES AS MOOT both Defendants' and Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment. This case involves a dispute regarding the application of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to certain pension benefits earned by Defendant Christopher Jackson and disbursed by Defendant Huntington Police Pension Board (the Board). Initially, Plaintiff brought this action seeking injunctive relief against the Board and asked the Court to order the Board to make payments to her in the amount she believed she was entitled to receive. After heari”
pension“IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA HUNTINGTON DIVISION CAMELA JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-0570 HUNTINGTON POLICE PENSION BOARD and CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the Court are Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment by Defendant Christopher Jackson and Defendant Huntington Police Pension Board (ECF Nos. 29, 31, 41, & 44) and a cross Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Camela Jackson. ECF No. 36. For t”
Source and provenance
- Source type
- courtlistener_qdro_opinion_full_text
- Permissions posture
- public
- Generated status
- machine draft public v0
- Review status
- gold label pending
- Jurisdiction metadata
- US
- Deterministic extraction
- reporter: 545 U.S. 546
- Generated at
- May 14, 2026
Related public corpus pages
Deterministic links based on shared title/citation terms and QDRO / retirement / family-law retrieval scores.
Clean opinion text
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
CAMELA JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-0570
HUNTINGTON POLICE
PENSION BOARD and
CHRISTOPHER JACKSON,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary
Judgment by Defendant Christopher Jackson and Defendant Huntington Police Pension Board
(ECF Nos. 29, 31, 41, & 44) and a cross Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Camela
Jackson. ECF No. 36. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss and
DENIES AS MOOT both Defendants' and Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment.
This case involves a dispute regarding the application of a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (QDRO) to certain pension benefits earned by Defendant Christopher Jackson and
disbursed by Defendant Huntington Police Pension Board (the Board). Initially, Plaintiff brought
this action seeking injunctive relief against the Board and asked the Court to order the Board to
make payments to her in the amount she believed she was entitled to receive. After hearing
arguments by Plaintiff and the Board, the Court directed Plaintiff to either join Mr. Jackson as a
defendant in this matter or explain how the case can proceed without him being a party. Order
(Feb. 23, 2022), ECF No. 16. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to join Mr. Jackson as an indispensable
party and to amend her Complaint. ECF Nos. 18, 20. The Court granted both motions. ECF Nos.
19, 21.
In their Motions to Dismiss, both Mr. Jackson and the Board argue that this Court
lacks diversity jurisdiction because Plaintiff's claim does not exceed the sum or value of $75,000.
It is axiomatic that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy before it can
render any decision on the merits. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction raises
the fundamental question of whether a court is competent to hear and adjudicate the claims brought
before it and requires dismissal if the court lacks such jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),
federal diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between the parties and an amount in
controversy exceeding $75,000.
Although the parties disagree as to whether the jurisdictional dollar amount is met,
it is unnecessary for the Court to address that issue. Here, Plaintiff has alleged in her Complaint
that both she and Defendant Jackson are residents of Boyd County, Kentucky. Compl. at ¶¶1, 3. In
an action based on diversity jurisdiction, "the presence in the action of a single plaintiff from the
same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over
the entire action." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005)
(citations omitted). Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and
must dismiss.1
1In paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that the Board's decision to cease
her payments violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Although
the parties do not directly argue federal question jurisdiction, the Court recognizes that the Full
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 29, 31), DENIES Defendants' and Plaintiff's Motions for Summary
Judgment (ECF Nos. 36, 41, 44), and DISMISSES this action from the Court's docket.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER: August 22, 2022
: JZ,
Yh
ROBERT C. CHAMBERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Faith and Credit Clause cannot invoke federal question jurisdiction. See Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 182-83 (1988) ("the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in either its constitutional or
statutory incarnations, does not give rise to an implied federal cause of action") (citing Minnesota
v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904) (The Full Faith and Credit Clause "only
prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state, are to be guided . . . the clause has nothing to
do with the conduct of individuals or corporations; and to invoke the rule which it prescribes does
not make a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.")).
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