CourtListener opinion 10233414

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
 EASTERN DIVISION 
COLUMBUS DURHAM, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
vs. ) Case No.: 4:18CV1184 HEA 
 ) 
LABORERS' BENEFITS ST. LOUIS, ) 
INC., et al., ) 
 ) 
Defendants. ) 

 OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, [Doc. No. 22]. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Also pending before the 
Court is Plaintiff's April 27, 2020 filing requesting various actions of the Court 
[Doc. No. 31]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment 
is granted, and Plaintiff's requests in Doc. No. 31 are denied. 
 Facts 
Defendants have, in accordance with the Court's Local Rules, submitted a 
Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts. Plaintiff has failed to respond to these 
facts. Local Rule 4.01(E) provides: 
Rule 4.01 Motions and Memoranda. 

(E) A memorandum in support of a motion for summary judgment shall 
have attached a statement of uncontroverted material facts, set forth in a 
separately numbered paragraph for each fact, indicating whether each fact is 
established by the record, and, if so, the appropriate citations. Every 
memorandum in opposition shall include a statement of material facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Those matters in dispute 
shall be set forth with specific references to portions of the record, where 
available, upon which the opposing party relies. The opposing party also 
shall note for all disputed facts the paragraph number from movant's listing 
of facts. All matters set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed 
admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted 
by the opposing party. 
Plaintiff failed to follow this rule. Pro se litigants are not excused from complying 
with substantive and procedural law, including the Court's Local Rules. 
Farnsworth v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 863 F.2d 33, 34 (8th Cir. 1988); Bunch v. 
Univ. of Arkansas Bd. of Trustees, 863 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2017). 
Defendants' facts are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Local Rule 4.01(E). 
The undisputed facts are as follows: 
Construction Laborers' Pension Trust of Greater St. Louis ("the Trust") is a 
Taft-Hartley employee benefit plan that is jointly administered by a Board of 
Trustees comprised of six union-appointed trustees and six employer-appointed 
trustees. Defendants Gary Elliott, Don Willey, David Gillick, and William L. Luth 

are four of the Trustees of the Trust. Jeanette Scopino ("Scopino") is the Pension 
Director of the Trust. The Trust is an employee benefit plan as defined in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et 
seq., and is subject to that Act. The Trust is financed by contributions from 
employers who are signatory to collective bargaining agreements with Laborers 
Locals 42 and 110 and the Eastern Missouri Laborers' District Council. Signatory 

employers make contributions to the Trust for each hour of work performed by an 
employee who performs work covered by the collective bargaining agreement 
("covered work"). The eligibility requirements for a benefit from the Trust are set 

forth in Article 3 of the Plan Document. The procedure for calculating the amount 
of the pension benefit for an eligible employee is also set forth in Article 3 of the 
Plan Document. 
Plaintiff Columbus Durham ("Plaintiff") performed covered work for 

approximately 17 years. For that work, his employers paid contributions on his 
behalf to the Trust. When Plaintiff retired in 2011, he was entitled to a pension 
benefit from the Trust. He began receiving a monthly pension benefit from the 

Trust in June 2011. At retirement, Plaintiff elected the Single-Life Annuity/36-
month Guarantee, Level Income Option pension, which provides a higher benefit 
until age 62 or 65 (the participant's choice,) at which point the benefit is reduced. 
At retirement, Plaintiff had two Qualified Domestic Relations Orders ("QDROs") 

in favor of his two ex-spouses that the Trust was required to account for in 
determining the amount of the Plaintiff's monthly pension benefit. On July 20, 
2011, then-Pension Coordinator Alicia Schonaerts-Difani, on behalf of the Trust, 

informed Plaintiff that he would be receiving a monthly pension benefit of 
$3,432.00 per month, which would decrease to $2,608.26 per month after he 
reached 65 years of age. 

Subsequently, Schonaerts-Difani left her job with the Trust. Sometime later, 
several mistakes in pension benefit calculations were brought to the attention of the 
Trust's Administrative Manager, Kevin Schell. Schell then instructed Scopino to 

review recently granted pension applications. After review, Scopino determined 
that the pension benefit calculations for Plaintiff and four other retirees had been 
incorrectly calculated by Schonaerts-Difani, who used incorrect actuarial factors 
and failed to apply early retirement factors. Schonaerts-Difani also did not account 

for Plaintiff's two QDROs when calculating Plaintiff's benefit. The Trust asked its 
actuaries, Segal Consulting, to recalculate the pension benefit for the five retirees 
with miscalculated benefits. Due to the miscalculation, between June 2011 and 

August 2012 Plaintiff received $6,232.50 of overpaid pension benefits to which he 
was not entitled. Plaintiff's revised pension benefit was $2,971 per month. The 
revised pension benefit included an actuarial adjustment lowering Plaintiff's 
payment to account for the overpayment; that is, rather than demand immediate 

repayment, the Trust would recoup the overpayment over Plaintiff's expected 
lifetime. 
Schell sent Plaintiff a letter dated September 17, 2012 informing Plaintiff of 

the overpayment and monthly benefit reduction. Schell requested that Plaintiff 
meet with the new Pension Coordinator to discuss the repayment of the $6,232.50 
and the pension options available to Plaintiff, should he choose to elect a different 

option. In October 2012, Plaintiff met with Trust staff for this purpose. Plaintiff 
walked out of that meeting. He did not make a different benefit election. 
On October 20, 2012, a second letter was sent to Plaintiff reminding him of 

his right to elect a different benefit option. On November 26, 2012, Schell sent a 
third letter to Plaintiff, again reminding him to make a benefit election. Again, a 
list of the available pension options was also included. Again, Plaintiff did not 
make a new benefit election. The Trust continued to pay benefits in accordance 

with the pension option originally elected by the Plaintiff, i.e. Single-Life 
Annuity/36-month Guarantee, Level Income Option. In November 2016, Plaintiff 
turned 65. In accordance with his pension option, Plaintiff's monthly pension 

benefit was reduced to $1,528 effective December 2016. 
The Plan Document provides a procedure for participants to appeal benefit 
decisions to the Board of Trustees ("the Board"). On March 5, 2014, after a phone 
conversation with the Plaintiff, Scopino sent Plaintiff a letter explaining that he 

could appeal to the Board his claim that he was entitled to continue to receive the 
monthly pension benefit he had been awarded at the time of his retirement. The 
letter explained that the appeal had to be received within 180 days of the date of 

the letter. 
In May 2014, an attorney representing Plaintiff, Clyde Cahill, called the 
Trust asking about a decision on the appeal. Schell and Scopino left Cahill a 

voicemail stating that the Trust had not received an appeal from Plaintiff. The 
Trust received a letter from Cahill dated June 2, 2014 asking for certain 
information. Schell responded by letter dated June 20, 2014, providing the 

requested information and a copy of the Trust's Summary Plan Document. No 
appeal was received within 180 days of the March 5th letter. 
On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff's new attorney, Sandra Moore-Dyson, requested 
Plaintiff's "file" from the Trust. In response, Scopino emailed Moore-Dyson a 

copy of the "right to appeal" letter that was sent to Plaintiff in March 2014 and 
informed her that the Trust had not received a written appeal from Plaintiff as of 
June 4, 2015. Eleven months later, on May 10, 2016, Moore-Dyson sent a letter to 

the Trust requesting an appeal of Plaintiff's pension determination. With this letter, 
Moore-Dyson enclosed a letter from a different lawyer dated March 12, 2014 and 
an affidavit from Plaintiff dated August 7, 2014 that had purportedly been 
submitted in 2014 as an appeal of Plaintiff's benefit determination to the Trust in 

2014. Prior to its receipt of Moore-Dyson's May 10, 2016 letter, the Trust had not 
received the March 2014 letter or August 2014 affidavit. Moore-Dyson stated in 
her letter that she had received the requested records from the Pension Trust and 

did not request any additional documents from the Pension Trust in this letter. 
Though the appeal was untimely, the Trust agreed to process the 2016 
appeal as if it was timely filed. The Board of Trustees denied the appeal. The trust 

sent a letter to Plaintiff's lawyer on July 22, 2016 explaining the denial. 
Throughout this process, the Trust received multiple requests for information and 
documentation from Plaintiff and his attorneys. In response to each request, the 

Trust promptly provided the requested information. 
In her role as Pension Director, Scopino does not have or exercise any 
discretionary or decision-making authority over the management of the Trust; she 
does not have any discretionary or decision-making authority over the Pension 

Fund's assets; and she does not have the authority to, nor does she give, investment 
advice regarding the Trust's assets. 
 Procedural Background 

Plaintiff's Claims 
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he "brings this action under Section 
502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. [1132]."1 Plaintiff asserts that this action is "to recover 
pension due" to him "pursuant to a retirement agreement entered between 

Defendants and Plaintiff." Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have "refused or 
omitted to furnish information concerning benefits to" him, a pension plan 

1 The complaint references "29 U.S.C. 1131." This is very likely a typo, as Section 1131 
addresses criminal penalties, while it is Section 1132 that addresses civil actions under ERISA. 
participant, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §1025. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants willfully failed to provide him with "information regarding the formula 

used to calculate the correct amount of Plaintiff's pension." 
Plaintiff also makes repeated statements, both in his Complaint and other 
pleadings, about his reliance on Schonaerts-Difani's statements regarding his 

pension benefit. Plaintiff states that he relied on Schonaerts-Difani's statements 
regarding early retirement and the pension benefit amount she calculated in 
deciding to retire early and to get a surgery that has rendered him unable to go 
back to work. Construing Durham's pro se Complaint liberally, as the Court does 

under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), Plaintiff's statements could be 
read as a claim of equitable estoppel. 
As for relief, Plaintiff requests the Court award him "an amount equal to the 

amount originally calculated as Plaintiff's award amount," that is, the monthly 
pension benefit amount calculated by Schonaerts-Difani. 
Discovery 
The Case Management Order entered May 13, 2019 dictated that discovery 

be completed by August 16, 2019. On May 23, 2019, Plaintiff moved for an 
extension of time to hire an attorney. On May 24, the Court entered an order 
stating "Plaintiff has a continued duty to secure counsel. The case management 
order is still in effect and Plaintiff is still required to meet deadlines whether with 
or without counsel." 

On June 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed a document asking the Court to subpoena 
Defendants for records of the audit mentioned in one of the Trust's letters to 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff also asked the Court to subpoena non-party Schoneaerts-Difani. 

Plaintiff did not serve any discovery requests on the Defendants, nor did he comply 
with Local Rule 3.04 which requires a party to confer with the other party in a 
good faith effort to resolve any discovery issues before filing a motion to compel 
with the Court. Plaintiff's request for the Court to subpoena Schonaerts-Difani was 

not only improper but also vague as to the type of subpoena sought. Accordingly, 
the Court denied Plaintiff's requests and directed Plaintiff to the District Court 
Clerk's Office for resources regarding the issuance of subpoenas. 

It should also be noted that Defendants, through counsel, averred that "[a]t 
no time prior to (or after) the discovery deadline of August 16, 2019, has plaintiff 
served any discovery requests on defendants." Plaintiff does not dispute that he 
never served Defendants with any discovery requests. 

Motion for Summary Judgment 
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants deny that 
they failed to provide Plaintiff with information at any time, argue that they are 

obligated under ERISA to reduce Plaintiff's benefit to the correct amount allowed 
by the Trust's Plan Document and have a duty to recover mistakenly paid benefits, 
and argue that Scopino should be dismissed as a defendant to this action because 

she is not a fiduciary of the Trust2. 
Defendants also submitted their statement of undisputed material facts in 
support of their motion, as well as exhibits thereto. These exhibits include the Plan 

Document and correspondence between the parties. Plaintiff did not properly 
respond to Defendants' statement of facts nor submit his own statement of facts. 
In his memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff does not dispute any of the facts asserted by Defendants. 

Rather, Plaintiff argues that he relied on the information provided to him by 
Schonaerts-Difani and that he did not suspect that the information she gave him 
was erroneous. Plaintiff states that he relied on the benefit amount calculated by 

Schoenaerts-Difani in deciding to get the neck surgery that has rendered him 
unable to work, and that his now-reduced benefit has caused him a hardship. 
Plaintiff also argues that he is "not in agreement with" the "summary judgment that 
was motioned by [defendant's attorney] Janine M. Martin" because his lawsuit is 

directed at Defendants. To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that an attorney cannot 
file motions for their clients, Plaintiff is wholly incorrect. 

2 The Court, finding that each of Plaintiff's complaints fail as a matter of law against all 
Defendants, does not reach the issue of Scopino's fiduciary status. 
Plaintiff ends his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment with 
text apparently copied from a British organization called The Pensions 

Ombudsman.3 The Pensions Ombudsman is "an independent organisation set up by 
law. We can help if you have a complaint or dispute about a pension scheme 
provided by your employer or a pension you have set up yourself."4 Of course, the 

Pensions Ombudsman's decision summaries that Plaintiff includes in his 
memorandum are based in British law and have no precedential value in this Court. 
Plaintiff's Requests for Various Relief [Doc. No. 31] 
Plaintiff filed another document on April 27, 2020 which can be construed 

as several motions to the Court. First, Plaintiff accuses Defendants of spoliation of 
evidence and obstruction regarding records of an audit, submits a letter from Kevin 
Schell that mentions an audit, and requests "[his] day in court" on the issue. 

Second, Plaintiff asks the Court to subpoena non-party Schell to testify as to the 
existence of an audit, disregarding the Court's earlier directive involving 
subpoenas. Plaintiff then argues that Defendants cannot support their contention 
that his original benefit was erroneously calculated without records of an audit, 

again complains of not receiving records of an audit, and states that he relied on 
Schonaerts-Difani's statements that there was no early retirement penalty in 

3 See www.pensions-ombudsman.org.uk. 
4 Id. (last visited July 15, 2020). 
electing to retire early. Finally, Plaintiff states "I'm just trying to prove my point 
that I have been lied to and mislead (sic) with wrong information." 

First, there is no evidence of spoliation. Second, the discovery deadline in 
this case was August 16, 2019. Plaintiff never served requests for discovery on 
Defendants and now is out of time to do so. Similarly, he is out of time to 

subpoena Schell. Third, Plaintiff fails to state any reason that he should be entitled 
to a hearing on his theory that his original benefit was correct and that no audit 
ever happened. Accordingly, Plaintiff's requests in Doc. No. 31 are denied. 
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff's request for his "day in court" and 

assorted arguments might be construed as arguments against summary judgment, 
the Court will generously construe them as such, even though the time for briefing 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment has long passed. 

 Summary Judgment Standard 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court may grant 
a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court 
demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden is on the moving 
party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 

273 (8th Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving 
party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 

L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth 
affirmative evidence and specific facts by affidavit and other evidence showing 
that there is a genuine dispute of a material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 
324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "A dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine' only ‘if the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.' " Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). A party resisting summary 
judgment has the burden to designate the specific facts that create a triable 
controversy. See Crossley v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 

2004). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment. Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 
276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993). 
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts 

in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the 
benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 
475 U.S. at 587; Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 

2005). The Court may not "weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record, 
decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual issue." 
Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000). 

 Discussion 
Claim for Failure to Provide Information 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not provide him with the underlying 

calculation used to determine his pension benefit or records of the "audit" 
mentioned in Schell's September 17, 2012 letter. The ERISA civil enforcement 
provision provides: 
Any administrator who fails or refuses to comply with a request for 
any information which such administrator is required by this 
subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary ... may in the 
court's discretion be personally liable to such participant or 
beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day from the date of such 
failure or refusal.... 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (emphasis added). The documents which a plan administrator 
is required to furnish to an employee on written request are listed in 29 U.S.C. § 
1024(b)(4). 
Plaintiff's claim that Defendants' failed or refused to provide information as 
required under ERISA fails because the underlying calculations of a participant's 
benefit amount and audit records are not listed in in 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). See 

also Aliff v. BP Am., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 178, 188 (S.D.W. Va. 1993), aff'd, 26 F.3d 
486 (4th Cir. 1994) (ERISA "does not require the plan administrator to supply a 
copy of the pertinent actuarial report.") Accordingly, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) is not 
triggered and Plaintiff is not entitled to civil damages thereunder. Defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that they failed to provide 

information. 
Claim to Recover Pension Due 
Plaintiff's pleadings can be construed as a claim that the benefit originally 

quoted by Schonaerts-Difani was correct, and that Defendants now are wrongfully 
withholding part of the pension benefit to which Plaintiff is entitled. However, this 
claim also fails as a matter of law. 
The undisputed facts are that Schonaerts-Difani miscalculated Plaintiff's 

pension benefit by failing to apply appropriate actuarial and early retirement 
factors and by failing to account for Plaintiff's two QDROs. Plaintiff did not 
dispute these facts. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' statement of material 

facts as required by F.R.C.P. 56 and Local Rule 4.01(E), nor did he contend that 
his original pension benefit amount was correct in his memorandum in opposition 
to summary judgment. In that memorandum, Plaintiff argued only that he had 
detrimentally relied on the information given him by Schonaerts-Difani. 

In his most recent filing, [Doc. No. 31], Plaintiff states "with no records of 
the audit where are the facts that support there was an error? . . . The 
administration cannot say there is an error when there are no facts to support their 
accusation."5 This statement is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment because 
it is self-serving, conclusory, and it is not supported by any affirmative evidence. 

Armour and Co., Inc., 2 F.3d at 279. 
Plaintiff also does not dispute Defendants' asserted right to recoup the 
benefits that were overpaid to him. Defendants have met their burden on summary 

judgment by presenting facts showing that Plaintiff had received money to which 
he was not entitled from the Trust, and that the Trust could recoup that money by 
deducting an portion of Plaintiff's benefit payments each month until the total sum 
was recovered. Plaintiff did not offer any law or facts in opposition to Defendants' 

assertions regarding this recoupment. 
There is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit 
amount originally calculated by Schonaerts-Difani. There is no genuine dispute 

that Defendants are entitled to reduce Plaintiff's monthly benefit payment to 
recover the prior overpayments made to him. Defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on Plaintiff's claim that he is owed pension due. 

5 Defendants have stated sufficient facts regarding the discovery of Plaintiff's erroneous benefit. 
Defendants explained in their response to Plaintiff's first motion to compel audit records that the 
"audit" was a "review" of recently granted pension applications by Scopino when she began 
working for the Trust in June 2012. Defendants cited specific paragraphs of Scopino's affidavit 
in which she averred that Schell tasked her with the review because of mistakes found in several 
of Schonaerts-Difani's benefit calculations. Scopino averred that she found five incorrectly 
calculated benefits, one of which was Plaintiff's. Scopino added that the Schonaerts-Difani erred 
by not using an early retirement factor and not accounting for Plaintiff's QDROs when 
calculating Plaintiff's benefit. 
Estoppel Claim 
Plaintiff repeatedly states in his filings, particularly in his motion in 

opposition to summary judgment, that: he relied on the benefit amount quoted by 
Schonaerts-Difani in deciding to retire early, he did not suspect any errors in his 
benefit calculation, he would have not have retired early had he known the true 

benefit amount, he had a disabling neck surgery in reliance on the benefit 
calculated by Schonaerts-Difani, and he has endured a hardship as a result of the 
incorrectly calculated benefit. These statements can be construed as an estoppel 
claim. 

Courts are understandably reluctant to permit estoppel claims against a 
multiemployer benefit plan like the Trust because "estoppel can have the adverse 
effect of allowing an improper depletion of plan assets to benefit one employer and 

its employees at the expense of others." Slice v. Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630, 633 
(8th Cir. 1994) (citing Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114–15 (7th Cir. 
1990)). 
The Eighth Circuit has stated specifically that when a plaintiff "[seeks] to 

enforce his employer's erroneous written statement of what his early retirement 
benefits would be" an estoppel claim is "not actionable where the plaintiff had 
failed to establish that the estoppel would merely hold his employer to a plausible 

interpretation of the retirement plan, rather than a modification of the plan." Slice, 
34 F.3d at 635 (citing Law v. Ernst & Young, 956 F.2d 364, 367–68 (1st 
Cir.1992)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible interpretation of the Trust 

that would allow it to pay him a benefit without the proper early retirement and 
QDRO adjustments. Rather, the Plan Document plainly sets out the early 
retirement reduction factors for any participant who retires before age 62. Under 

ERISA and the Plan Document, the Trust must also adjust a participant's benefit to 
account for any QDROs. In short, the Trust cannot pay Plaintiff an unadjusted 
pension benefit which is clearly not based on any plausible interpretation of the 
Trust's governing documents. Plaintiff's estoppel claim fails as a matter of law. 

 Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on each of Plaintiff's claims. 

Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, [Doc. No. 22], is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requests set forth in Plaintiff's April 

27, 2020 filing [Doc. No. 31] are DENIED. 
A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and 
Order is entered this same date. 
 Dated this 20° day of July, 2020. 

 HENRY i ae Lab) 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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