CourtListener opinion 10396361

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MARITTA ERICKSON, No. 3:22-cv-01208-HZ 

 Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER 

v. 

HILLSBORO MEDICAL CENTER and 
TRANSAMERICA RETIREMENT 
ADVISORS, LLC, 

 Defendants. 

Megan E. Glor 
John C. Shaw 
Megan E. Glor, Attorney at Law PC 
707 N.E. Knott Street 
Suite 101 
Portland, OR 97212 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Brian T. Kiolbasa 
Lane Powell, PC 
601 S.W. Second Avenue 
Suite 2100 
Portland, OR 97204-3158 

Attorneys for Defendant Hillsboro Medical Center 

Stanton R. Gallegos 
Markowitz Herbold PC 
1455 S.W. Broadway 
Suite 1900 
Portland, OR 97201 

Attorneys for Defendant Transamerica Retirement Advisors, LLC 
HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge: 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Hillsboro Medical Center's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Under Rule 52, ECF 30; Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 31; 
and Defendant Transamerica Retirement Advisor's Motion for Entry of Judgment Under Rule 
52, ECF 34. For the reasons that follow the Court grants in part and denies in part Hillsboro 
Medical Center's Motion for Entry of Judgment, grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and grants Transamerica Retirement Advisor's Motion for Entry 
of Judgment. 
 BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Maritta Erickson began working as a registered nurse with Defendant Hillsboro 
Medical Center ("HMC")1 on October 20, 1986. Plaintiff was a participant in the Tuality 
Healthcare Retirement Plan (the "Frozen Plan")2 from November 1, 1987, through August 31, 
2012, at which time the Frozen Plan was amended to freeze participation and benefit accruals. 
Plaintiff was a participant in the Tuality Healthcare Cash Balance Pension Plan (the "Cash 
Balance Plan") from September 1, 2012, through May 31, 2020. Plaintiff retired from HMC on 
June 15, 2020. 
On June 24, 2020, Plaintiff wrote to HMC and Defendant Transamerica Retirement 
Advisors ("TRA") asserting that HMC erred in the calculation of her retirement benefits under 
the Frozen Plan. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted HMC failed to properly credit her with a "year of 

benefit service" for each of four years: 1996, 1997, 2000, and 2001. On June 26, 2020, Plaintiff 

1 HMC was Tuality Medical Center at the time Plaintiff was hired until November 2019. 
2 It is undisputed that HMC is the plan sponsor and administrator of the Frozen Plan and a 
fiduciary under the provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 
sent a second letter to HMC and TRA noting she had received employer-matched benefits from 
her 403(b) retirement account3 in 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, therefore, she believed she also met 
the Frozen Plan 1,000-hour threshold to be credited with a year of benefit service in each of 
those years. Plaintiff attached some of her paystubs and asserted they suggested that Defendants 
failed to include Plaintiff's "low census"4 hours when calculating Plaintiff's hours of service for 

the years in question. 
On September 24, 2020, HMC advised Plaintiff that it had "treat[ed] [her] inquiry as a 
formal claim for benefits" pursuant to ERISA and had reviewed the Frozen Plan documents, 
Plaintiff's pay records, and Plaintiff's 403(b) contribution records. Tr. 266.5 HMC noted 
Plaintiff's 403(b) records indicated she did not receive employer-matched benefits in 1996, 1997, 
2000, or 2001 because she did not have 1,000 hours of service in those years. In addition, records 
in HMC's "HR information system" either matched the paystubs Plaintiff provided or "exceeded 
the number of low census hours on [Plaintiff's] paystubs," but "in no instance did the paystubs 
[Plaintiff] provided reflect low census hours that [HMC's] records did not," therefore, HMC 

could not establish that Plaintiff's low census hours were incorrect. Tr. 267. Finally, HMC's 
records reflected Plaintiff had 959.71 hours of service in 1996, 937.92 hours of service in 1997, 
934.25 hours of service in 2000, and 749.50 hours of service in 2001. Tr. 266. Plaintiff, 
therefore, did not have 1,000 hours of service entitling her to a year of benefit service under the 

3 The 403(b) plan required participants to have 1,000 hours of service per benefit year in order to 
receive employer-matched benefits. 
4 Low census occurs when a hospital has more nurses scheduled for work than are needed due to 
low numbers of patients. 
5 Citations to "Tr." refer to the page(s) indicated in the administrative record, filed herein as 
Docket No. 28. 
Frozen Plan in any of those years. Accordingly, HMC denied Plaintiff's claim for retirement 
benefits for years 1996, 1997, 2000, and 2001. 
Plaintiff requested copies of the documents related to her 403(b) contributions; copies of 
the policies and procedures relating to "how [HMC] counted vacation, sick, standby and low 
census toward the accumulation of the hours necessary to meet both employee match and 

pension accumulations of the 1000 hours"; "a breakdown of all of [her] hours by pay period from 
1986 to 2020"; and an independent review of the denial. Tr. 273-74. On December 24, 2020, 
HMC provided Plaintiff with the requested documents and advised Plaintiff that it had begun the 
requested independent review. 
On January 28, 2021, the HMC Fiduciary Committee conducted an independent review 
of the denial of Plaintiff's claim. On February 5, 2021, HMC advised Plaintiff that the fiduciary 
committee concluded HMC's denial was appropriate. Specifically, HMC's conclusion that 
Plaintiff did not have 1,000 hours of service in 1996, 1997, 2000, or 2001 and, therefore, was not 
entitled to a year of benefit service for any of those years was correct. Tr. 437-38. HMC advised 

Plaintiff that the independent review decision was "final and binding" and that Plaintiff had the 
right to bring "legal action under ERISA Section 502(a)." Tr. 438. 
On April 9, 2021, TRA advised Plaintiff that during an audit of its benefit calculation 
system it discovered that the monthly amount of retirement benefits that Plaintiff had been 
receiving under the Frozen Plan had "been overstated [by $258.09 per month]6 since the 
commencement of [her] benefits on July 1, 2020." Tr. 167. TRA explained: "The portion of your 
Normal Retirement Benefit derived from your employment through December 31, 1987 was 
incorrectly applied as an annual value instead of a monthly value, causing your overall benefit to 

6 Plaintiff had received $1,636.26 per month; the corrected amount was $1,378.17 per month. 
be overstated." Tr. 167. TRA advised HMC of the overpayment and was directed "to adjust 
[Plaintiff's] monthly benefit payments," but Plaintiff would not be required to return the 
overpaid amounts to the Frozen Plan. Id. 
On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff wrote HMC disputing TRA's calculations. HMC treated 
Plaintiff's letter as a formal claim for benefits. On May 20, 2021, HMC denied Plaintiff's claim 

explaining: 
 Under section 6.2(C) of the Plan, the pre-1988 benefit is equal to: "For 
 each year . . . of Benefit Service . . . before January 1, 1988, 1 percent of 
 the Participant's Monthly Earnings during each Plan Year." 

 According to our records . . . your annual pre-1988 benefit was $249.57, 
 which equates to $20.80 per month. The full annual benefit of $249.57 
 was mistakenly applied as a monthly benefit by [TRA], resulting in an 
 overpayment of benefits. 

Tr. 180. HMC also noted that § 8.4 of the Frozen Plan stated, "In the event a Participant or 
Beneficiary receives an overpayment from the Plan, the Plan Administrator shall make 
reasonable efforts to recover the overpayment . . . includ[ing], but . . . not limited to, [repayment 
or] reducing future Plan benefits payable to the Participant or Beneficiary." Id. HMC did not 
request that Plaintiff repay the overpayments, but instead reduced Plaintiff's future monthly 
benefit payment to the corrected amount. 
On August 9, 2021, Plaintiff appealed the pre-1988 plan benefits claim to HMC. Tr. 184-
85. On October 8, 2021, the HMC fiduciary committee denied Plaintiff's appeal. The fiduciary 
committee noted that Article IV of the Frozen Plan set out the benefit formulas, TRA's internal 
audit revealed that Plaintiff had been overpaid due to a calculation error in applying the Frozen 
Plan formula, and the Frozen Plan provided authority for HMC to reduce Plaintiff's pre-1988 
benefits in order to remedy the overpayment. Tr. 244-46. HMC advised Plaintiff that the 
independent review decision was "final and binding"; that Plaintiff had the right to bring "legal 
action under ERISA Section 502(a)"; and that "any further review, judicial or otherwise, . . . 
shall be based on the record before [HMC] and limited to whether . . . [HMC] acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously in the exercise of its discretion. In no event shall any such further review . . . be on a 
de novo basis." Tr. 246. 
On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed an action in this Court against HMC and TRA 

asserting claims for payment of benefits, enforcement of the terms of the Frozen Plan, and 
clarification of future benefit rights pursuant to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and 
1132(a)(3). 
On May 26, 2023, HMC and TRA filed Motions for Entry of Judgment Under Rule 52 
and Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, The Court took the matter under advisement 
on June 23, 2023. 
 STANDARDS 
I. Proper Procedural Mechanism 
The parties agree the standard of review in this matter is abuse of discretion rather than 

de novo. The parties, however, disagree as to the proper procedural mechanism to bring the 
dispute before the Court. As noted, Defendants filed Motions for Entry of Judgment pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
Whether the Court proceeds under Rule 52 or 56 "depends on what standard of review 
the court applies." Rabbat v. Standard Ins. Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1311 (D. Or. 2012). The 
Ninth Circuit has held that "in an ERISA benefits case, [when] the court's review is for abuse of 
discretion, summary judgment is a proper ‘conduit to bring the legal question before the district 
court.'" Id. (quoting Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled 
on other grounds by Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(When "the decision to grant or deny benefits is reviewed for abuse of discretion, a motion for 
summary judgment is merely the conduit to bring the legal question before the district court and 
the usual tests of summary judgment, such as whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, 
do not apply.")). See also Harlick v. Blue Shield of Ca., 686 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 2012)("In 

the ERISA context, a motion for summary judgment is merely the conduit to bring the legal 
question before the district court and the usual tests of summary judgment, such as whether a 
genuine dispute of material fact exists, do not apply.")(quotation omitted)). 
As noted, the parties agree that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
The Court, therefore, proceeds under Rule 56 as applied in the ERISA context in which "the 
usual tests of summary judgment, such as whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, do 
not apply." Harlick, 686 F.3d at 706. 
II. Level of Review 
The abuse-of-discretion standard is "deferential" and "a plan administrator's decision 

‘will not be disturbed if reasonable.'" Stephan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 697 F.3d 917, 929 
(9th Cir. 2012)(quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 512 (2010)). "The standard 
requires deference to the administrator's benefits decision unless it is ‘(1) illogical, (2) 
implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the 
record.'" Id. (quoting Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 676 (9th Cir. 
2011)(internal quotation marks omitted)). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, an 
administrator's denial of benefits must be upheld ‘if it is based upon a reasonable interpretation 
of the plan's terms and if it was made in good faith.'" Moyle v. Liberty Mut. Ret. Ben. Plan, 823 
F.3d 948, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Aug. 18, 
2016)(quoting McDaniel v. Chevron Corp., 203 F.3d 1099, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)). "The analysis 
is not based on ‘whose interpretation of the plan documents is most persuasive, but whether the 
[administrator's] interpretation is unreasonable.'" Moyle, 823 F.3d at 958 (quoting Canseco v. 
Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 93 F.3d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 1996)(internal quotation marks 
omitted)). "The court must look to the plain language of the [Retirement Plan] to determine 

whether the [administrator's] interpretation of that plan is ‘arbitrary and capricious." Moyle, 823 
F.3d at 958 (quotation omitted). 
The Ninth Circuit, however, has also noted "the degree of skepticism with which [the 
court] regard[s] a plan administrator's decision when determining whether the administrator 
abused its discretion varies based upon the extent to which the decision appears to have been 
affected by a conflict of interest." Stephan, 697 F.3d at 929. Although the existence of a conflict 
of interest does "not alter[] the standard of review itself," it "is a factor to be considered in 
determining whether a plan administrator has abused its discretion." Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008)). "The weight of this factor depends upon the likelihood 

that the conflict impacted the administrator's decisionmaking." Stephan¸ 697 F.3d at 929. For 
example, the "level of skepticism with which a court views a conflicted administrator's decision 
may be low if a structural conflict of interest is unaccompanied . . . by any evidence of malice, of 
self-dealing, or of a parsimonious claims-granting history." Abatie, 458 F.3d at 968–69. On the 
other hand, a "court may weigh a conflict more heavily if, for example, the administrator 
provides inconsistent reasons for denial, fails adequately to investigate a claim or ask the 
plaintiff for necessary evidence, fails to credit a claimant's reliable evidence, or has repeatedly 
denied benefits to deserving participants by interpreting plan terms incorrectly or by making 
decisions against the weight of evidence in the record." Id. (citations omitted). 
HMC's "dual role as plan administrator, authorized to determine the amount of benefits 
owed, and [as] insurer, responsible for paying such benefits, creates a structural conflict of 
interest." Stephan, 697 F.3d at 929. HMC, however, consistently provided the same reasons for 
denial of Plaintiff's benefits claims, obtained and reviewed the evidence necessary to evaluate 
Plaintiff's claims, and considered Plaintiff's evidence including employer contributions to her 

403(b) plan and pay stubs provided by Plaintiff. In addition, there is not any evidence in the 
record that HMC repeatedly denied benefits to plan participants or acted with malice. The Court, 
therefore, gives little weight to HMC's structural conflict of interest. 
 DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff asserts HMC violated its duties under ERISA when it arbitrarily failed to credit 
Plaintiff with years of benefit service for 1996, 2000, and 20017; arbitrarily computed Plaintiff's 
average monthly compensation under the Frozen Plan; and arbitrarily computed Plaintiff's pre-
1988 monthly accrued benefit under the Frozen Plan. HMC contends its records of Plaintiff's 
hours of service for 1996, 2000, and 2001 are accurate and, therefore, Plaintiff was not arbitrarily 

denied benefits for those years under the plan and Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies as to her average monthly compensation claim and her pre-1988 monthly accrued 
benefit claim.8 
TRA incorporates all of HMC's arguments against Plaintiff's claims and additionally 
asserts it is entitled to entry of judgment in its favor because it is not a proper defendant under 
ERISA. 

7 Although Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that HMC failed to properly credit her with a 
benefit year of service in 1997, Plaintiff withdrew that claim in her Response to Defendants' 
Motions. 
8 Plaintiff refers to this as her monthly accrued benefit part C claim. 
I. TRA 
As noted, TRA asserts it is entitled to judgment in its favor because it is not a proper 
defendant in this matter under ERISA. 
"[P]roper defendants under § 1132(a)(1)(B) for improper denial of benefits at least 
include ERISA plans, formally designated plan administrators, insurers or other entities 

responsible for payment of benefits, and de facto plan administrators that improperly deny or 
cause improper denial of benefits." Spinedex Physical Therapy USA Inc. v. United Healthcare of 
Az., Inc., 770 F.3d 1282, 1297 (9th Cir. 2014). "Suits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits 
may be brought ‘against the plan as an entity and against the fiduciary of the plan.'" Id. (quoting 
Hall v. Lhaco, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1998)(emphasis omitted)). In the ERISA 
context a fiduciary is "any entity that ‘exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets . . . [or] has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan.'" Spinedex, 770 F.3d at 1298 (quoting ERISA, 

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)). 
TRA asserts it is merely the recordkeeper of HMC's plans. TRA did not fund the plans 
and was not responsible for denying Plaintiff's claims for benefits and, therefore, according to 
TRA, it is not a proper ERISA defendant. Plaintiff, relying on the Pension Services Agreement 
("PSA") between TRA and HMC, asserts TRA has fiduciary duties "for retiree payment 
administration services in identifying and correcting in a timely manner transaction processing 
errors," and, therefore, it is a proper defendant under ERISA. Pl. Resp., ECF 37, at 15. TRA 
points out, however, that the PSA sets out limited fiduciary duties for TRA. Specifically, the 
PSA provides TRS "agrees to assume fiduciary responsibility only for the proper execution of 
the specific and agreed-upon administrative procedures for the outsourcing services as outlined 
in this Section II. TRS does not assume fiduciary responsibility for services that are not 
described in . . . Section II." Tr. 1127, ECF 29. Section II of the PSA does not indicate TRA 
agreed to assume fiduciary responsibility for payment of benefits, management of the plans, or 
administration of the plans, nor does it provide TRA with authority to manage the plans or to 

administer the plans' assets. Rather, Section II reflects TRA agreed to assume fiduciary 
responsibility for things such as reviewing and evaluating domestic relations orders, preparing 
benefit election forms, reviewing benefit election forms for accuracy, conducting "weekly death 
audits for retirees," and notifying "terminated vested participants." Tr. 1227-28. The provision of 
the PSA that Plaintiff relies on for her assertion that TRA had relevant fiduciary duties is 
contained in the portion of the PSA addressing "float income and error correction policy" and is 
outside of Section II. As such, pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the PSA, TRA did not 
assume any fiduciary duties or responsibilities in that provision. 
The Court, therefore, concludes on this record that Plaintiff has not established that TRA 

is a proper defendant. Accordingly, the Court grants TRA's Motion for Entry of Judgment and 
denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the issue of TRA's liability. 
II. Years of Benefit Service 
In calculating Plaintiff's frozen retirement plan benefit amount HMC credited Plaintiff 
with 21 years of benefit service. HMC did not credit Plaintiff with a year of benefit service for 
years 1996, 2000, and 2001 based on HMC's conclusion that Plaintiff did not have 1,000 hours 
of service in those years. Plaintiff alleges HMC's conclusion that Plaintiff did not have 1,000 
hours of service in those years was arbitrary and, therefore, HMC's failure to credit Plaintiff with 
a year of benefit services for years 1996, 2000, and 2001, was also arbitrary. 
The Frozen Plan provides a plan participant "shall receive one year of Benefit Service for 
each Plan Year . . . in which the Participant has 1,000 or more Hours of Service" through 
December 31, 2012. Tr. 31. The Frozen Plan defines hour of service in pertinent part as: 
 Each hour for which an Employee is directly or indirectly paid or entitled 
 to payment by an Employer for performance of duties during a Plan Year 
 . . . and each hour during a Plan Year for which an Employee is directly or 
 indirectly paid or entitled to payment on account of a period of time 
 during which no duties are performed . . . because of vacation, holiday, 
 illness, incapacity (including disability), layoff, jury duty, military duty, or 
 leave of absence. 

Tr. 22. The Frozen Plan does not specifically address low census, but states: 
 [A]n Employee shall also receive Hours of Service credit for mandatory 
 days off without pay. . . . [F]or each mandatory day off, the Employee 
 shall be credited with Hours of Service in an amount equal to the Hours of 
 Service the Employee would have earned for that day under his or her 
 regularly scheduled hours had he or she not had a mandatory day off. 

Tr. 23. 
The Summary Plan Description ("SPD") states participants "receive Hours of Service for 
time off without pay due to low census. . . . [F]or each mandatory day off, you will be credited 
with the Hours of Service you would have received for that day had you not had a mandatory day 
off." Tr. 123. 
As noted, HMC's records reflected Plaintiff had 959.71 hours of service in 1996, 934.25 
hours of service in 2000, and 749.50 hours of service in 2001. Tr. 266. HMC, therefore, 
concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to a year of benefit service for those years. 
Plaintiff asserts that although HMC's records of Plaintiff's hours of service in the 
relevant years include credits for low census hours, see, e.g., Tr. 325, 327, 329, Plaintiff had 
additional low census hours that HMC did not include in the calculation of her hours of service. 
To support her assertion Plaintiff testifies in her Declaration that she "frequently volunteered to 
return home without pay (‘low census' hours) and not work [her] regular scheduled hours if the 
Hospital patient census was low and the Hospital had scheduled more nurses than were needed 
for patient care." Erickson Decl., ECF 33, at ¶ 4. Plaintiff explains that she 
 volunteered for "low census" hours initially for 2 reasons: 1) it allowed the 
 Hospital to reduce the number of nurses scheduled to work when the 
 patient census was low and the hospital was overstaffed, without having to 
 impose a \mandatory day off' on one of my fellow nurses who needed the