CourtListener opinion 10402876

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 

BRUCE L. CLARK, : 
 Plaintiff, : 
 : 
 v. : No. 5:21-cv-01855 
 : 
ALIGHT SOLUTIONS, LLC, : 
 Defendant. : 
____________________________________ 

 O P I N I O N 
 Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 44 – Granted 

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. March 11, 2022 
United States District Judge 

I. INTRODUCTION 
 Following Bruce Clark's divorce, the State Court issued a qualified domestic relations order, 
which split Clark's retirement payments between him and his ex-wife. According to Clark, the 
partial payments to his ex-wife should have stopped in January 2017. However, the payments 
continued, so he filed multiple lawsuits against his ex-wife in the State Court attempting to stop the 
payments to her. 
 Clark's efforts failed in the State Court, so he next sued the administrator of his retirement 
plan in this Court. This Court dismissed that suit without prejudice because Clark had not 
sufficiently alleged that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. 
 Clark then filed an amended complaint with this Court, again attempting to stop the 
payments to his ex-wife. However, the Court determines that it still does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over his claim. In addition, even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, it is barred 
from reviewing his claim, or would abstain from adjudicating his claim, under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine and domestic relations doctrine. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 a. Alleged Facts1 
 Clark is currently the beneficiary of a PECO Pension Plan. See Orig. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. 
Under the Plan, the Plan Administrator makes monthly payments to Clark. 2 However, in December 
2016, the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (the State Court) certified a qualified 
domestic relations order (the QDRO) that diverted a portion of the Plan's monthly payments to 

Clark's ex-wife. See generally QDRO, ECF No. 1-1. 
 The State Court entered the QDRO pursuant to "the applicable Domestic Relations Laws of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . as a result of the Order of divorce or dissolution between 
[Clark] and [his ex-wife], and/or as a result of the Postnuptial Agreement executed by the parties." 
Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. Regarding payments from the Plan, the QDRO "assigns to [the ex-wife] an amount equal 
to $782.20, commencing January 1, 2017, . . . and continuing to [the ex-wife] until the earlier to 
occur of her death or [Clark's] death." Id. ¶ 8. Another provision of the QDRO states, 
 [i]t is the intention of the parties that this QDRO continue to qualify as a QDRO under 
 Section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code, as it may be amended from time to time, 
 and that the Plan Administrator shall reserve the right to reconfirm the qualified status 
 of the Order at the time benefits become payable hereunder. 

1 The facts are taken largely from the Original Complaint and "exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputed authentic documents if the complainant's 
claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 For purposes of adjudicating Defendants' arguments under Rule 12(b)(6), all reasonable 
inferences are drawn in Clark's favor. See Lundy v. Monroe Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 3:17-
CV-2255, 2017 WL 9362911, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 
2018 WL 2219033 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2018). The Court's recitation of the facts does not include 
legal conclusions or contentions unless necessary for context. See Brown v. Kaiser Found. Health 
Plan of Mid-Atl. States, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-1190, 2019 WL 7281928, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 
2019). 
2 In the Original Complaint, Clark asserted that Alight was the Plan Administrator. See Orig. 
Compl. 3. However, the qualified domestic relations order, see ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 4, and the written 
Plan itself, see ECF No. 28-2 ¶ 8.1, state that Exelon is the Plan Administrator. Either way, the 
identity of the Plan Administrator does not alter the Court's analysis in this Opinion. 
Id. ¶ 13. Finally, the QDRO explains that "[t]he [State] Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to 
this Order to the extent required to maintain its qualified status and the original intent of the parties 
as stipulated herein." Id. ¶ 15. 
 According to Clark, the monthly payments of $782.20 to his ex-wife expired after thirty 
months. See Orig. Compl. 3. As a result, he wrote to Alight—who Clark alleges is the Plan 
Administrator—after thirty monthly payments had been made to his ex-wife, notifying it that the 
full monthly payment under the Plan should now go to him. See ECF No. 1 Exs. B–G. However, the 

Plan Administrator continued to make the monthly payments of $782.20 to the ex-wife instead of 
paying the full amount to Clark. See Orig. Compl. 3. 
 Believing that the continued payments to his ex-wife were "criminal," Clark filed a private 
complaint with the Lancaster County District Attorney, claiming that the payments to his ex-wife 
constituted "knowing theft." ECF No. 1 Ex. F. An Assistant District Attorney and County Detective 
reviewed Clark's private complaint and dismissed it for lacking prosecutorial merit. See id. 
 Next, Clark initiated a civil action in the State Court against his ex-wife regarding, in part, 
what payments were owed to his ex-wife. See docket for case CI-1979-MAY-262 in Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania. After Clark's requested relief was denied, he petitioned the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court for an allowance of appeal. See id. The petition was denied. See id. 

 Clark later initiated another civil action in the State Court against his ex-wife. See docket for 
case CI-18-08912 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Then, Clark sued his ex-wife for a third time 
in the State Court. See docket for case CI-19-00166 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. As in the 
prior lawsuits, Clark tried to reclaim payments made to his ex-wife pursuant to the QDRO, arguing 
that such payments belonged to him. See id. 
 Clark acted pro se in each of the suits brought in the State Court. None of his attempts to 
stop his ex-wife from receiving the monthly payments were successful. 
 b. Procedural History 
 Acting pro se once more, Clark filed his Original Complaint with this Court. The Original 
Complaint was yet another attempt by Clark to stop his ex-wife from receiving the monthly 
payments of $782.20. This time, however, Clark did not name his ex-wife as a defendant. Instead, 
the Original Complaint identified Alight as sole defendant. 
 In the Original Complaint, Clark argued that this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the case because it involved a "felony criminal action involving the willful and deliberate failure to 
follow the requirements of [the QDRO]," which raised a federal question according to Clark.3 Orig. 

Compl. 2. Clark asked this Court to order that payments under the Plan be made to him, not to his 
ex-wife. See id. at 4. He also asked the Court to order that he be reimbursed for all payments that 
had been made to his ex-wife that were made after the thirty-month mark. See id. Lastly, he asked 
that the Court award him his costs for bringing the suit and "a penalty" in the amount of $27,232. 
See id. 
 Exelon Corporation moved to dismiss the Original Complaint and argued that it was the 
proper defendant in the case, not Alight. See First Mot., ECF No. 24. Exelon's First Motion argued, 
in part, that this Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 
 The Court dismissed Clark's Original Complaint without prejudice primarily for two 

reasons. See ECF No. 37. First, the Court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over Clark's claim. Second, the Court determined that even if it did have subject matter jurisdiction 
over Clark's claim, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the Court from hearing the case because 
Clark had already litigated essentially the same claim in the State Court. 

3 In addition to checking a box on the Original Complaint that asserted this Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction because it raised a federal question, Clark also highlighted that the QDRO is 
"from another state" and therefore the case involved "interstate criminal activity." Orig. Compl. 2. 
Since the Court construed Clark's pleadings liberally, it assumed that Clark asserted in his Original 
Complaint that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case by way of diversity too. 
 Clark then filed an amended complaint. See Amend. Compl, ECF No. 40. In his Amended 
Complaint, Clark argues that the Court has diversity subject matter jurisdiction over his claim "due 
to the other parties residing in another state within the United States" and because the "settlement 
amount exceeds $156,000." Id. 4. He also argues that his claim has not already been litigated in the 
state courts because the litigation in the state courts "was between [him] and [his] ex-wife." Id. 5. 
He argues that this case is different because Exelon "has not been previously challenged by [Clark] 
in a Court of Law at any level for failing to fulfill its contractual obligations to "Clark" under the 

QDRO." Id. In addition to the above arguments, Clark also adds Alight as a second named 
defendant in his Amended Complaint. 
 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint under rules 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure. See Sec. Mot., ECF No. 44. 
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
 a. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) – Applicable Law 
 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may make a motion to dismiss a complaint for "failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion 
to dismiss, this Court must "accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 

2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (cleaned up). 
Only if "the ‘[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'" has the 
plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 
(2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all 
of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. (explaining that 
determining "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task 
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense"). The 
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr 
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). Additionally, when ruling on 
a motion to dismiss, the Court may "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, 
matters of public record, as well as undisputed authentic documents if the complainant's claims are 

based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F. 3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 b. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) – Applicable Law 
 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may make a motion to dismiss a complaint for "lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Unlike the standard for Rule 12(b)(6), "the 
standard to be applied to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is much more demanding." Hedges v. United 
States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 When a 12(b)(1) motion attacks the complaint on its face, without contesting its alleged 
facts, the Court treats it like a 12(b)(6) motion—accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true. Hartig 
Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016). However, a factual 12(b)(1) 
motion, or one that "attacks allegations underlying the assertion of jurisdiction in the complaint," is 

different. Id. When adjudicating a factual 12(b)(1) motion, the Court need not presume that the 
plaintiff's allegations are true. See Hedges, 404 F.3d, at 750. Instead, the Court "evaluates for itself 
the merits of the jurisdictional claims." Id. (cleaned up). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 Defendants contend that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for two reasons. First, 
under Rule 12(b)(1), they argue that this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over Clark's 
claim because the amount in controversy does not satisfy the minimum requirement. Second, under 
Rule 12(b)(6) they argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Court from reviewing the 
Amended Complaint for the same reasons it barred review of the Original Complaint. The Court 
agrees with both arguments and addresses them in turn. It then briefly discusses a third reason for 
dismissal. 
 a. Clark has not met his burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 
 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to hear certain types of cases. Federal 
courts have limited jurisdiction, and the "[plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating subject 

matter jurisdiction." Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d 625, 627 (3d Cir. 2009). Generally, there 
are two types of cases over which federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction: diversity cases or 
cases that raise a federal question. Clark argues that diversity jurisdiction exists here. 
 For diversity jurisdiction to exist, Clark must show two things. First, the amount in 
controversy must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Second, the suit must be between 
citizens of different states or "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
 Defendants contest the first element for diversity jurisdiction—the amount in controversy. 
Specifically, they argue that Clark "is asserting a breach of contract action and has not explained 
how he has any personal costs or penalties [that] would be recoverable under such an action." Sec 

Mot. 5. Defendants assert that Clark "merely made-up numbers in order to meet" the minimum 
requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Id. 
 Defendants' attack on Clark's subject matter jurisdiction claim is factual because they allege 
that the amount in controversy is actually less than $75,000. Since Defendants attack Clark's 
allegations underlying the assertion of jurisdiction in the Amended Complaint, the Court need not 
take Clark's allegations at face value. It may evaluate for itself whether Clark's jurisdictional claims 
have merit. In other words, it weighs whether the amount in controversy truly exceeds $75,000 
without taking Clark's word for it. 
 After reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court determines that Clark has not met his 
burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Clark simply states that "the settlement amount 
exceeds $156,000." He does not, however, support that conclusion with any data or further 
explanation. Clark asserts that payments of $782.20 per month to his ex-wife should have stopped 
in January 2017. That means, at the time of this Opinion, Clark's ex-wife has received 63 payments 
of $782.20, which totals $49,278.60.4 It is not clear from the Amended Complaint how Clark 

arrives at the much higher number that he puts forward as a "settlement amount." 
 Clark's Original Complaint contains additional computations of alleged damages. However, 
he cannot rely on allegations in his Original Complaint to support his claim now because it is 
superseded by his Amended Complaint. See Lazar v. Town of W. Sadsbury, PA, No. 5:20-CV-
05336, 2021 WL 2472253, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2021). Even if the Court did consider both 
complaints, Clark's argument that his claim meets the minimum requirement for diversity 
jurisdiction is not persuasive, and the burden is on him to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Even 
construing Clark's pleading liberally as a pro se plaintiff, he has not met that burden. As a result, the 
Court determines that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over his claim.5 

4 The Court notes that Defendants arrived at a different number, which is further proof that 
Clark's Amended Complaint is anything but clear. However, neither the Court's nor the 
Defendants' calculation meets the required minimum for diversity jurisdiction. 
5 As the Court stated in its prior opinion, Clark's claim does not satisfy federal question 
subject matter jurisdiction either. See Clark v. Alight Sols., LLC, No. 5:21-CV-01855, 2022 WL 
43285, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2022). The Plan is a corporate benefit program, and therefore Clark's 
claim that he is entitled to payments under the Plan does not involve the Constitution or any other 
federal law. If Clark has a claim, then it arises under the QDRO. 
 b. Even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
 bars this Court from reviewing the case. 

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars plaintiffs who have lost in state court proceedings from 
claiming that the state court judgment violates their rights and then re-litigating the same issues in a 
federal district court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). "Because the doctrine 
divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time by either party or by the 
court sua sponte." In re Madera, 388 B.R. 586, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Desi's Pizza, Inc. v City 
of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 When the Court dismissed Clark's Original Complaint, it advised him that he should only 
file an amended complaint "if he can sufficiently allege . . . why the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does 
not prohibit the Court from reviewing the Amended Complaint." ECF No. 38. In his Amended 
Complaint, Clark attempts to side-step the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by arguing that this claim is 
different because it doesn't involve his ex-wife. This argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
 The Court dismissed Clark's prior claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which wasn't 
against his ex-wife either. The "new" claim in his Amended Complaint is no different. Clark may 
have filed an amended complaint, but he did not amend the claim itself. Clark still asks this Court to 
interpret the QDRO. Naming a different defendant does not help Clark avoid the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine because the claim is essentially the same, regardless of the named defendant. 
 Clark has already litigated the interpretation of the QDRO and its terms three times in the 
State Court and lost each time. Even if Clark had a federal claim regarding the QDRO that he did 
not raise in the State Court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine still bars this Court from hearing such a 
claim now because it would be "inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication." In re 

Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005). The claim Clark brings here is inextricably intertwined 
with the prior State Court adjudications because the relief Clark seeks in this Court could only be 
given "if predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong." Id. 
 In other words, Clark asked the State Court to stop his ex-wife from receiving payments 
under the QDRO; the State Court declined. Clark now asks this Court to do the exact same thing. In 
order for this Court to give Clark what he asks for, it must first decide that the State Court was 
wrong. This is precisely the thing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits, and accordingly the 
doctrine divests this Court of jurisdiction over this case. 
 c. The domestic relations doctrine likely bars the Court from reviewing Clark's claim 
 too. 

 In addition to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court notes that the domestic relations 
doctrine likely applies too, which bars federal courts from hearing certain domestic cases. 
 The QDRO is "is a domestic relations order" explaining how certain property, payments 
from a pension plan, should be split between divorced parties. See Prol v. Prol, 935 A.2d 547, 549 
n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). Thus, Clark's claim "involve[s] the entry or terms of a qualified domestic 
relations order where state law would control." Holz v. Holz, No. CIV. A. 99-4918, 1999 WL 
1210835, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1999) (emphasis added). Under the domestic relations doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has held that federal district courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
domestic cases when there is an "agreement to litigate in the state courts" or when there is a "threat 
that a feuding couple would play one court system off against the other." Solomon v. Solomon, 516 
F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975). Both are present in this case. Clark and his ex-wife consented that 
"[t]he [State] Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to [the QDRO]," QDRO ¶ 15, and Clark 
has also already tried to get the same relief he seeks in this Court by bringing prior suits in the State 
Court. 
 Clark refers to his claim as many things, including a "criminal" action. However, it is really 

just an argument with his ex-wife over marital property (marital property in the form of retirement 
payments). "Even if subject matter jurisdiction lies over a particular matrimonial action, federal 
courts may properly abstain from adjudicating such actions in view of the greater interest and 
expertise of state courts in this field. A federal court presented with matrimonial issues or issues ‘on 
the verge' of being matrimonial in nature should abstain from exercising jurisdiction so long as 
there is no obstacle to their full and fair determination in state courts." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 
905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990). This case therefore does not belong in federal court.6 
V. CONCLUSION 
 This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Clark's claim because he did not 
meet his burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction. In the alternative, this Court is barred from 

reviewing Clark's claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because essentially the same claim has 
already been litigated in State Court. Further, the Court is also barred from reviewing the case, or 
abstains from reviewing the case, under the domestic relations doctrine. Accordingly, the Court 
dismisses the Amended Complaint with prejudice. 
 A separate Order follows. 
 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr._________ 
 JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR. 
 United States District Judge 

6 There is yet another reason for dismissal that the Court does not analyze in detail but that is 
worth noting. Clark's ex-wife is an indispensable party to this suit because she has an economic 
interest in its outcome. Indeed, if the Court gave Clark what he asks for, then she would miss out on 
monthly payments she currently receives. Thus, this case could not proceed without her, and 
according to Defendants, Clark's ex-wife is a resident of Pennsylvania. See First. Mot. 6. Adding 
her to the case would therefore defeat diversity jurisdiction because the suit would no longer be 
between citizens of different states or "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).