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 Appellate Court Date: 2022.01.04
 11:27:00 -06'00'

 In re Marriage of Wig, 2020 IL App (2d) 190929

Appellate Court In re MARRIAGE OF DAVID WIG, Petitioner-Appellee, and
Caption JUDITH WIG, n/k/a Judith Progo, Respondent-Appellant.

District & No. Second District
 No. 2-19-0929

Filed December 29, 2020

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 17-D-1444;
Review the Hon. Timothy J. McJoynt, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Chantelle Porter, of A. Traub & Associates, Ltd., of Lombard, for
Appeal appellant.

 Richard Ian Conner, of Kollias P.C., of Winfield, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with
 opinion.
 Presiding Justice Bridges and Justice McLaren concurred in the
 judgment and opinion.
 OPINION

¶1 The marriage of petitioner, David Wig, and respondent, Judith Wig, n/k/a Judith Progo,
 was dissolved in August 2018. Incorporated into the dissolution judgment was the parties'
 marital settlement agreement. The agreement provided a calculation to determine the amount
 of maintenance that respondent would pay petitioner. The agreement also provided that, if a
 change in the law affected the tax consequences of the maintenance ordered in the agreement,
 the parties could negotiate a change in the agreement. If those efforts failed, the parties would
 submit the matter to the trial court for resolution. A few days after the parties' marriage was
 dissolved, respondent lost her job. In September 2018, under the terms of the dissolution
 judgment, petitioner submitted a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) to his former
 employer. Garnishment of petitioner's pension began in October 2018. Respondent obtained
 new employment in November 2018, and in December 2018, petitioner moved to set
 maintenance. Effective January 1, 2019, section 504(b-1)(1)(A) of the Illinois Marriage and
 Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West 2018)) (the 2019
 version) was amended as to its formula for the initial setting of maintenance. 1 The former
 version of section 504(b-1)(1)(A) was added by Public Act 100-520, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018),
 and is found in the 2017 supplement to West's Illinois Compiled Statutes (the former version)
 (see 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2017)).
¶2 In February 2019, the QDRO concerning petitioner's pension was entered in the trial court.
 Thereafter, the parties disagreed over which version of section 504(b-1) the trial court should
 apply in setting the specific dollar amount of maintenance. The court chose the 2019 version
 but applied the provision on modification of maintenance, rather than the provision governing
 the initial setting of maintenance. Compare 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A-1) (West 2018), with
 id. § 504(b-1)(1)(A).
¶3 Respondent timely appeals from that order. 2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 After almost 29 years of marriage, the parties' marriage was dissolved. The agreement
 incorporated into the August 22, 2018, dissolution judgment stated the parties' annual incomes,
 divided the parties' marital assets and debts, and provided petitioner with maintenance.
 Concerning the parties' incomes, the agreement indicated that respondent earned an annual
 salary of $54,000 and that petitioner, who was retired, received $19,260 in annual social
 security benefits and $18,123.96 in annual pension benefits. The parties' marital property and
 debts, which were not large, were divided essentially equally. The section of the agreement
 addressing maintenance provided:

 1
 The section amended by Public Act 100-923, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2019) is found in the 2018 version
 of West's Illinois Compiled Statutes.
 2
 Respondent initially appealed while other matters remained pending in the trial court. Those
 matters have since been resolved, allowing us now to exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. See In re
 Marriage of Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1050 (2007) (if the trial court's jurisdiction has lapsed, such
 that it is too late to file a timely notice of appeal, the appellant may invoke the savings provision of
 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. May 1, 2007), and the appellate court will give effect to the
 appellant's premature notice of appeal once the last pending claim is resolved).

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 "(a) Beginning immediately upon [respondent] receiving pension benefits from
 [petitioner's] pension (pursuant to QDRO), [respondent] shall pay maintenance to
 [petitioner] pursuant to statutory guidelines, subject to the 40% cap, based upon the
 following formula: Thirty percent (30%) of [respondent's] gross income, inclusive of
 benefits received from [petitioner's] pension minus twenty percent (20%) of
 [petitioner's] gross income, inclusive of Social Security benefits and pension benefits
 received by [petitioner] (exclusive of pension benefits paid to [respondent]). *** Upon
 entry of the QDRO dividing [petitioner's] pension, the attorneys for the parties shall
 immediately determine the parties' incomes and the dollar amount of maintenance and
 enter an order setting the dollar amount of maintenance.
 (b) Payments for maintenance shall be modifiable upon a showing of a substantial
 change in circumstances.
 ***
 *** It is agreed and understood by the parties that all of the payments made by
 [respondent] to [petitioner] pursuant to this [s]ection *** of this [a]greement shall
 constitute maintenance payments which are imposed on or incurred by [respondent]
 under a written instrument within the meaning of Section 71 of the Internal Revenue
 Code, as amended, and as of now in effect, and of similar provisions of future laws,
 and that such payments will be includable in [petitioner's] gross income and deductible
 by [respondent] for federal, state, and local (if any) tax purposes. Inasmuch as this
 [a]greement has been negotiated and executed on the assumption that the payments
 made by [respondent] to [petitioner] pursuant to this [s]ection *** of this [a]greement
 will be deductible by [respondent] and taxable to [petitioner], if any or all of such
 payments are not so includable and deductible as a result of a final and binding judicial
 or administrative determination, or because of amendment or repeal of the applicable
 statutory provisions or their authoritative interpretation, then any such payment(s)
 otherwise due [petitioner] pursuant to this [s]ection *** of this [a]greement may be
 adjusted by an amount to be negotiated by the parties. In the event that the parties are
 unable to agree upon a readjustment of these provisions to take account of the changed
 tax impact, then this matter shall be submitted to the [trial court] for final and binding
 determination of the payments from [respondent] to [petitioner]."
¶6 The 30%-20% calculation in the agreement mirrored the formula in the former version of
 section 504(b-1)(1)(A) of the Act for the initial setting of maintenance. See 750 ILCS 5/504(b-
 1)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2017).
¶7 Ten days after the parties' marriage was dissolved, respondent was fired from her job. At
 the end of September 2018, petitioner delivered the required QDRO to his former employer.
 In the beginning of October 2018, petitioner's former employer began garnishing petitioner's
 pension. At the end of November 2018, respondent obtained new employment, with an annual
 income of $53,000. On December 11, 2018, after learning that respondent had obtained new
 employment, petitioner petitioned to set the dollar amount of maintenance.
¶8 Effective January 1, 2019, before the trial court's hearing on the petition to set
 maintenance, section 504 was amended in two respects pertinent here. First, an amendment to
 section 504(b-1)(1)(A) (750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West 2018)) altered the formula for the
 initial setting of maintenance. This amendment was in response to a change in federal law that

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 eliminated the deductibility of maintenance for federal tax purposes. See Pub. L. No. 115-97,
 131 Stat. 2089 (2017) (repealing 26 U.S.C. § 71).
¶9 Second, section 504(b-1)(1)(A-1) (750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A-1) (West 2018)) was added.
 This section provided that the 30%-20% formula in the former version for the initial setting of
 maintenance (which, again, was mirrored in the parties' agreement) would generally apply to
 "[m]odification of maintenance orders entered before January 1, 2019 that are and continue to
 be eligible for inclusion in the gross income of the payee for federal income tax purposes and
 deductible by the payor." Id.
¶ 10 On January 9, 2019, after the 2019 version of section 504 of the Act went into effect,
 respondent answered the petition to set the dollar amount of maintenance. Respondent asserted
 that she had not received any of petitioner's pension benefits to which she was entitled. The
 trial court continued the proceedings for the entry of the QDRO. On February 5, 2019, the
 QDRO was entered in court. On April 1, 2019, respondent began receiving her share of
 petitioner's pension pursuant to the QDRO.
¶ 11 At the hearing on the petition, the parties disagreed over whether the former or 2019 version
 of section 504(b-1) applied to the calculation of maintenance. The parties did agree that, under
 the former version, petitioner would receive $423 in monthly maintenance, but under the 2019
 version, he would receive only $3 in monthly maintenance. Petitioner asked the court to apply
 the agreement's maintenance formula, which, in effect, would be to apply the former version
 of section 504 because the agreement's formula was borrowed from that version. See 750 ILCS
 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2017). Petitioner also noted that applying the 2019 version of
 the Act would leave him with an absurdly small amount of maintenance. Respondent urged
 the court to apply the 2019 version of section 504.
¶ 12 The trial court held that our decision in In re Marriage of Carstens, 2018 IL App (2d)
 170183, required the court to apply the 2019 version of section 504. The court then considered
 whether to follow section 504(b-1)(1)(A), which governed the initial setting of maintenance,
 or section 504(b-1)(1)(A-1), which governed the modification of maintenance. The court
 decided to apply section 504(b-1)(1)(A-1), reasoning that this was "the better move" because
 "that's what [the parties] intended and [the court has] to give credence *** to the ***
 agreement." The court continued:
 "[I]f the IRS says no, you're back, *** then it would seem to me the only alternative
 left for this Court is to apply [section 504(b-1)(1)(A)] of the maintenance statute, which
 provides for a formula without deductibility and deals with that income, but that's for
 another day and maybe a day we don't have to worry about if the IRS goes along with
 this provision."
¶ 13 In October 2019, the trial court, in line with its decision, awarded petitioner $423 in
 monthly maintenance. The court also ordered that respondent pay petitioner $705.87. This sum
 represented the difference between $5076 in retroactive maintenance owed to petitioner from
 October 1, 2018, to October 1, 2019, and respondent's right to $4370.13 in pension benefits
 accrued between October 1, 2018, and April 1, 2019.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 At issue in this appeal is what law governs the calculation of maintenance that petitioner
 sought in his December 2018 petition. This issue involves contract and statutory construction,

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 both of which are pure questions of law that we review de novo. In re Application of the County
 Treasurer & ex officio County Collector of Kane County, 2018 IL App (2d) 170418, ¶ 22.
 Moreover, we may affirm the judgment of the trial court on any basis found in the record. In re
 Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24.
¶ 16 As we explain below, the change in the law did not affect the parties' agreement. Under
 section 502(b) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/502(b) (West Supp. 2017)), the agreement is enforceable
 because neither party argued, nor did the trial court find, that the agreement is unconscionable.
 The agreement provides unambiguous terms for the calculation of maintenance. Because
 petitioner asked the trial court to set maintenance under that formula rather than to modify the
 agreement, the agreement controls exclusive of statutory provisions on maintenance.
¶ 17 Before we address the agreement, we acknowledge the relevant differences between the
 former and 2019 versions of section 504(b-1). The versions differ on how to set guideline
 maintenance, which is an award of maintenance based on the Act's delineated calculations.
 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West 2018); 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2017). The
 former version of section 504(b-1)(1)(A) provides that "[t]he amount of [guideline]
 maintenance *** shall be calculated by taking 30% of the payor's gross annual income minus
 20% of the payee's gross annual income." 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2017). The
 2019 version of section 504(b-1)(A) changed this, providing that "[t]he amount of [guideline]
 maintenance *** shall be calculated by taking 33⅓% of the payor's net annual income minus
 25% of the payee's net annual income." 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West 2018). As noted,
 this amendment was in response to a change in federal law that eliminated the deductibility of
 maintenance for federal tax purposes. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2089 (2017) (repealing
 26 U.S.C. § 71). The 2019 version also added section 504(b-1)(1)(A-1), which provides that
 "[m]odification of maintenance orders entered before January 1, 2019 that are and
 continue to be eligible for inclusion in gross income of the payee for federal income
 tax purposes and deductible by the payor shall be calculated by taking 30% of the
 payor's gross annual income minus 20% of the payee's gross annual income." 750
 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A-1) (West 2018).
 This 30%-20% formula was identical to the formula specified in the former version of section
 504(b-1)(A) and adopted by the agreement.
¶ 18 In August 2018, when the dissolution judgment was entered, section 502(a) of the Act
 provided that "[t]o promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage
 attendant upon the dissolution of their marriage, the parties may enter into an agreement
 containing provisions for *** maintenance of either of them." 750 ILCS 5/502(a) (West Supp.
 2017). Section 502(b) provided:
 "The terms of [an] agreement, except those providing for the support and parental
 responsibility allocation of children, are binding upon the court unless [the court] finds,
 after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant
 evidence produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, that
 the agreement is unconscionable." Id. § 502(b).
¶ 19 The parties' agreement pertained to spousal maintenance, not child support or parental
 responsibility. Therefore, the agreement was binding absent a finding of unconscionability.
 Unconscionability is assessed based on the facts existing immediately after the agreement is
 made (In re Marriage of Nilles, 2011 IL App (2d) 100528, ¶ 13) and "involves at least two
 separate considerations: one, the conditions under which the agreement was made, and two,

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 the economic circumstances of the parties resulting from the agreement" (In re Marriage of
 Riedy, 130 Ill. App. 3d 311, 313-14 (1985)). Under the second consideration, an agreement is
 unconscionable if "no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make [it], on the one hand,
 and *** no fair and honest man would accept [it] on the other." Id. at 317.
¶ 20 Neither party has contended that the agreement is unconscionable, and the trial court did
 not so find. Interestingly, although no one is claiming that the agreement is unconscionable,
 we note that interpreting the agreement consistent with section 504(b-1)(1)(A) of the 2019
 version would render the agreement unconscionable. Both parties agreed that, under the 2019
 version, petitioner would receive monthly maintenance of only $3. No sensible person would
 offer, and no fair-minded person would accept, $3 in monthly maintenance.
¶ 21 We recognize that section 504(a) lists "any valid agreement of the parties" as one of a
 multitude of factors for the trial court to consider in setting the amount and duration of
 maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/504(a)(13) (West 2018); 750 ILCS 5/504(a)(13) (West Supp. 2017).
 However, as noted, the 2018 version of section 502(b) clearly states that an agreement not
 pertaining to child support and parenting is enforceable if it is not unconscionable. If an
 agreement governing maintenance is just a factor for the court to consider in setting
 maintenance, parties would have little incentive to enter into such agreements. Thus, making
 agreements enforceable, unless they are unconscionable, advances section 502's stated goal of
 fostering settlement of disputes in connection with marital dissolution.
¶ 22 Given the validity of the agreement, we turn now to interpreting its maintenance terms.
 Interpreting an agreement involves principles of contract construction. In re Marriage of
 Dundas, 355 Ill. App. 3d 423, 425-26 (2005). Courts must give effect to the parties' intent,
 which is best determined by examining the language used in the parties' agreement. Id. at 426.
 When the language used in the agreement is unambiguous, the agreement's terms must be
 given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
¶ 23 Here, the parties' agreement unambiguously provides that respondent shall pay petitioner
 maintenance amounting to 30% of her gross income minus 20% of petitioner's gross income.
 The agreement also unambiguously provides that the maintenance payments are includable in
 petitioner's gross income and deductible by respondent for any tax purposes. Given that the
 agreement clearly and unambiguously provides how maintenance is calculated, it must be
 followed. 750 ILCS 5/502(b) (West Supp. 2017); see also Olson v. Olson, 58 Ill. App. 3d 276,
 279 (1978) ("Only if [an] agreement, when taken as a whole, fails to sufficiently define [the
 parties'] rights and duties is it necessary or indeed justifiable to determine the form of
 [maintenance] involved and the corresponding rights and duties which the law prescribes for
 that form.").
¶ 24 In two respects, the agreement contemplates modifications of its terms. First, the agreement
 states that "[p]ayments for maintenance shall be modifiable upon a showing of a substantial
 change in circumstances." Second, the agreement provides that, if the tax consequences of
 maintenance payments are changed, "payment(s) otherwise due to [respondent] *** may be
 adjusted by an amount to be negotiated by the parties" or by court order if negotiations fail.
 Since the agreement provides no criteria for modification of the agreement, a court considering
 a request for modification would resort to the maintenance factors of sections 504 and 510 of
 the Act (750 ILCS 5/504, 510 (West 2018); 750 ILCS 5/504, 510 (West Supp. 2017); Blum v.
 Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 31-32 (2009)). This, of course, would raise the question of which version
 of those sections would apply.

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 ¶ 25 However, we need not decide which statutory version applies because the petition to set
 maintenance did not seek a modification of the agreement's maintenance formula, but rather a
 calculation using that formula. Under the agreement, respondent would begin paying
 maintenance immediately upon receiving petitioner's pension benefits. Before respondent
 began receiving her share of petitioner's pension benefits (in April 2019), respondent lost her
 job and started a new one. Since respondent's duty to pay maintenance was not yet triggered,
 her change in employment was not a "change in circumstances" contemplated by the
 agreement but rather a revised baseline for the initial calculation of maintenance.
¶ 26 Respondent, however, contends that because maintenance was not calculated until April
 2019, when petitioner began receiving her share of the pension, the 2019 version of section
 504(b-1) should apply here. We disagree. The parties set a formula for maintenance in August
 2018, when the agreement was executed and incorporated into the dissolution judgment. See
 In re Marriage of Maher, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1042 (1981) (agreement binding when
 approved by trial court). What remained undetermined in August 2018 was the dollar amount
 of monthly maintenance that petitioner would receive based on the parties' income. That
 calculation was not a contingency that had to occur before respondent became entitled to
 maintenance. See id. (agreement not effective when entered if parties "subjected [agreement's]
 effectiveness to the occurrence of other contingencies"). Because respondent's entitlement to
 maintenance was not in question when the 2019 version of the Act became effective, that
 version does not govern here.
¶ 27 The trial court relied on Carstens in applying the 2019 version of section 504(b-1). The
 parties discuss Carstens, as well as In re Marriage of Cole, 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, and
 In re Marriage of Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838. All three cases differ materially from
 the facts here.
¶ 28 In Cole, the parties secured a judgment of legal separation in 2009 and incorporated into
 that judgment a separation agreement, which required the husband to pay the wife
 maintenance. Cole, 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, ¶ 3. Thereafter, the husband petitioned to
 dissolve the parties' marriage, and the wife asked that the terms of the legal separation be
 incorporated into the judgment dissolving the marriage. Id. ¶ 4. The trial court held a hearing
 on the dissolution petition in 2014, but it did not enter its order until February 2015. Id. In that
 order, the court found that the agreement's provision making maintenance nonmodifiable was
 unconscionable, and the court reduced maintenance due to an increase in the wife's income.
 Id. The husband moved the court to reconsider, arguing that the court failed to apply the
 statutory guidelines that went into effect on January 1, 2015. Id. ¶ 5; see Pub. Act 98-961 (eff.
 Jan. 1, 2015) (adding 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)). Under these guidelines, the husband's
 maintenance obligation would be further reduced. Cole, 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, ¶ 5. The
 court found that those guidelines did not apply because, among other things, the hearing on
 maintenance was held, and all evidence was received, in 2014. Id.
¶ 29 The appellate court agreed. Id. ¶ 7. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that the
 mere fact that the case was taken under advisement and not ruled on until 2015, after the law
 changed, did not warrant the application of the 2015 version of the law, as "[t]he rights of the
 parties should be determined by the facts of the case, not by the timing of the final order." Id.
 ¶ 9.
¶ 30 This court had the opportunity to consider Cole in Carstens. There, the parties executed an
 agreement that was incorporated into the 2004 judgment dissolving their marriage. Carstens,

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 2018 IL App (2d) 170183, ¶ 4. The agreement provided that the husband would pay the wife
 maintenance. Id. The Act's provisions on maintenance were amended effective January 1,
 2016. Id. ¶ 29. Almost two months after the amendments went into effect, the husband
 petitioned to terminate or reduce maintenance. Id. ¶ 10. In ruling on the petitions, the trial court
 found, among other things, that it was not bound to follow the Act's amendments. Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 31 We reversed the trial court and held that the Act's amendments applied. Id. ¶ 36. We noted
 that, though the husband's petition sought modification of an order entered before the
 amendments went into effect, his petition was filed after the effective date. Id. ¶ 29. Thus, the
 husband's petition fell squarely within section 801(c) of the Act. Id. (citing 750 ILCS 5/801(c)
 (West 2016) (the Act applies to "all proceedings commenced after its effective date for the
 modification of a judgment or order entered prior to the effective date of this Act ")). We found
 the analysis in Cole flawed, in that the court there failed to consider the impact, if any, that
 section 801 of the Act had in that case. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
¶ 32 In Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838, ¶¶ 3, 6, the parties' 25-year marriage was
 dissolved in 2014. In the order dissolving the marriage, the trial court awarded the wife two
 years of maintenance, but it determined that the wife could seek to extend maintenance before
 that two-year period expired. Id. ¶ 7. In 2016, the legislature added guidelines for trial courts
 to consider in setting the duration of maintenance. Id. ¶ 28. That same year, the wife petitioned
 to extend maintenance. Id. ¶ 8. In 2017, the court held a hearing and granted the wife's petition
 based on the 2016 amendments to the Act. Id. ¶¶ 9, 16. The husband moved to reconsider,
 arguing that the trial court should not have applied the 2016 version of the law. Id. ¶ 17. The
 trial court denied the motion, noting that "there had ‘been a finality and then there [are] new
 circumstances that arrive[d].' " Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
¶ 33 On appeal, the court characterized the wife's proceeding as one for review, rather than
 modification, of maintenance; both review and modification proceedings are avenues for
 reconsideration of maintenance. Id. ¶ 23 (distinguishing review and modification proceedings).
 The court considered Cole and Carstens in deciding whether the new or old version of the law
 applied. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. In following Carstens, the court observed that Cole involved an initial
 maintenance award, while Carstens involved proceedings seeking to modify a maintenance
 award. Id. ¶¶ 31-34. As in Carstens, the wife in Kasprzyk asked the trial court to reconsider
 the terms of a maintenance award entered before the new law's effective date. However, she
 filed her petition to extend after the new law's effective date, the evidence supporting her
 petition concerned matters arising after the new law's effective date, and the hearing on her
 petition was held after the new law went into effect. Id. ¶ 34. As in Carstens, the court found
 that the case fell within section 801(c) of the Act. Thus, the new version of the law applied in
 considering the wife's petition to extend maintenance. Id. ¶ 38.
¶ 34 Cole, Carstens, and Kasprzyk are all distinguishable from the present case. Carstens
 involved a modification proceeding, and Kasprzyk involved a review proceeding. In each case,
 the parties had an agreement on maintenance that did not provide criteria for modification or
 review; hence, the question was not whether statutory criteria applied to fill the void, but rather
 which version applied. See Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 31-32 (statutory factors govern proceedings for
 modification or termination of maintenance unless the parties' agreement provides specific
 terms to govern such proceedings). As for Cole, even if that case is rightly described as
 involving "an initial maintenance award" (Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838, ¶ 31), it was

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 an award that the trial court determined by applying statutory factors after declaring the parties'
 agreement unconscionable.
¶ 35 By contrast, the proceeding here was for an initial calculation of maintenance using a
 specific formula provided in the parties' agreement, which neither party claimed, nor the trial
 court found, was unconscionable.
¶ 36 We note that, if we were to entertain the question of which version of the Act applies, we
 would hold that the former version applies. The formula for calculating maintenance was set
 in 2018. Moreover, petitioner executed his QDRO in 2018, his pension was garnished in 2018,
 respondent obtained new employment in 2018, and petitioner moved to set the dollar amount
 of maintenance in 2018. All that occurred in 2019 was the filing in court of the already effective
 QDRO, the hearing on petitioner's petition, and the trial court's ruling on that petition. These
 2019 events were not pivotal in calculating the dollar amount of maintenance that petitioner
 was owed pursuant to the parties' agreement.
¶ 37 In reaching this conclusion, we must comment on this court's determination in Carstens
 that the reasoning in Cole was flawed because the court failed to address the pertinence of
 section 801 of the Act. Section 801 controls the applicability of amendments to the Act. See
 750 ILCS 5/801 (West 2018). We do not comment on how, if at all, section 801 applied in
 Cole. We are content simply to hold that section 801 does not apply here because the setting
 of maintenance is controlled entirely by contractual terms; hence, there is no need to determine
 whether the former or 2019 version of the maintenance factors applies. And if that question
 were pertinent here, we would hold that the former version of section 504(a) applies. Section
 801(b), which has remained unchanged since January 1, 2016 (see Pub. Act 99-90, § 5-15 (eff.
 Jan. 1, 2016)), states that the Act applies "to all pending actions and proceedings commenced
 prior to its effective date with respect to issues on which a judgment has not been entered."
 750 ILCS 5/801(b) (West 2018). Courts considering this language have determined:
 " ‘[T]he legislature attempted through section 801(b) to allow only those issues which
 had not been fully litigated prior to the effective date of the new [A]ct to be decided
 under the new law. It is not this section's intent to require the relitigation of issues
 already decided under the previous law simply because post-trial motions are pending
 or filed after the effective date of the new [A]ct.' " West v. West, 76 Ill. 2d 226, 234
 (1979) (quoting Staub v. Staub, 67 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1007 (1978)).
¶ 38 The issue of maintenance was determined in August 2018 when the trial court issued its
 dissolution judgment incorporating the agreement, which specified a formula for calculating
 maintenance. What remained as of January 1, 2019, was the calculation of that maintenance.
 Thus, the former version of section 504 would apply here.
¶ 39 Moreover, even if the 2019 version applied, the trial court's judgment could be seen as a
 proper award of nonguideline maintenance. Under either the former or the 2019 version of
 section 504(b-1)(2) of the Act, the trial court was allowed to impose nonguideline maintenance
 if it found, after considering the delineated factors, that imposing guideline maintenance under
 the specified calculations was inappropriate. 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(2) (West 2018); 750 ILCS
 5/504(b-1)(2) (West Supp. 2017). Here, although the trial court may not have properly stated
 that it was deviating from awarding guideline maintenance under the 2019 version of the law
 (750 ILCS 5/504(b-2) (West 2018)), it was apparent that the trial court gave great deference to
 the delineated factor that the parties had a valid agreement (id. § 504(a)(13), (b-2)(1)). The

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 court recognized that following section 504(b-1)(1)(A) of the 2019 version of the law would
 result in petitioner receiving only $3 in monthly maintenance (id. § 504(b-2)(2)).
¶ 40 For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the 2019 version
 of section 504(b-1)(1)(A-1) in calculating maintenance. The error, however, was harmless
 because the court ultimately applied the same 30%-20% formula that was specified in the
 parties' agreement. See id. § 504(b-1)(1)(A-1).

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.

¶ 43 Affirmed.

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