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CourtListener opinion 10490336

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Extracted case name
In re Marriage of Folley
Extracted reporter citation
pending
Docket / number
Third District No. 3-18-0427 Rule 23 order
QDRO relevance 5/5Retirement relevance 5/5Family-law relevance 5/5gold label pending
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Machine-draft public headnote: CourtListener opinion 10490336 is included in the LexyCorpus QDRO sample set as a public CourtListener opinion with relevance to pension / defined benefit issues. The current annotation is conservative: it identifies source provenance, relevance signals, and evidence quotes for attorney/agent retrieval. It is not a Willie-approved legal headnote yet.

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Draft retrieval summary: this opinion has QDRO relevance score 5/5, retirement-division score 5/5, and family-law score 5/5. Use the quoted text and full opinion below before relying on the case.

Category: pension / defined benefit issues

Evidence quotes

QDRO

penses were to be paid from the spousal maintenance payments; at the time of the dissolution of marriage in 2012, the parties had three minor children in Anne's care, but there was currently only one minor child in her care; at the time of the dissolution, qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) were entered, which equally divided Greg's retirement and deferred compensation plans between the parties; at the time of the parties' MSA, Greg had base gross income of $38,380 per month plus significant additional short-term and long-term incentive pay; on July 1, 2017, defendant opted to retire as the result of being forced to choose between

retirement benefits

d the equal division of the parties' checking, savings, and investment accounts (total approximate value of $1,365,155), as well as an equal division of Greg's retirement benefits—a pension plan, a supplemental pension plan, 401(k) ($1,449,386), individual retirement account (IRA) ($287,946), and Caterpillar stock options (valued at $604,464). The parties also had college savings plans for the children valued at $881,000, which they agreed to continue to maintain for the benefit of the children. ¶5 In 2012, at the time of the dissolution judgment, four of the parties' nine children were still minors. Under the MSA, Anne was

pension

d at $309,000 with a $245,000 mortgage). The property division also included the equal division of the parties' checking, savings, and investment accounts (total approximate value of $1,365,155), as well as an equal division of Greg's retirement benefits—a pension plan, a supplemental pension plan, 401(k) ($1,449,386), individual retirement account (IRA) ($287,946), and Caterpillar stock options (valued at $604,464). The parties also had college savings plans for the children valued at $881,000, which they agreed to continue to maintain for the benefit of the children. ¶5 In 2012, at the time of the dissolution ju

401(k)

e property division also included the equal division of the parties' checking, savings, and investment accounts (total approximate value of $1,365,155), as well as an equal division of Greg's retirement benefits—a pension plan, a supplemental pension plan, 401(k) ($1,449,386), individual retirement account (IRA) ($287,946), and Caterpillar stock options (valued at $604,464). The parties also had college savings plans for the children valued at $881,000, which they agreed to continue to maintain for the benefit of the children. ¶5 In 2012, at the time of the dissolution judgment, four of the parties' nine children

Source and provenance

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courtlistener_qdro_opinion_full_text
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public
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machine draft public v0
Review status
gold label pending
Jurisdiction metadata
US
Deterministic extraction
docket: Third District No. 3-18-0427 Rule 23 order
Generated at
May 14, 2026

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Clean opinion text

Digitally signed
 by Reporter of
 Decisions
 Reason: I attest
 Illinois Official Reports to the accuracy
 and integrity of
 this document
 Appellate Court Date: 2022.07.27
 10:52:36 -05'00'

 In re Marriage of Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427

Appellate Court In re MARRIAGE OF ANNE E.L. FOLLEY, Petitioner-Appellant,
Caption and GREGORY S. FOLLEY, Respondent-Appellee.

District & No. Third District
 No. 3-18-0427

Rule 23 order filed May 4, 2021
Motion to
publish allowed May 19, 2021
Opinion filed May 19, 2021

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 10-D-643; the
Review Hon. Kim L. Kelley, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Order vacated; cause remanded.

Counsel on Richard W. Zuckerman, of Peoria, for appellant.
Appeal
 David M. Lynch, of Lynch and Bloom, PC., of Peoria, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court, with
 opinion.
 Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Lytton concurred in the
 judgment and opinion.
 OPINION

¶1 The parties, Anne E.L. Folley (Anne) and Gregory S. Folley (Greg), divorced after 28 years
 of marriage. Under the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA), among other things,
 Greg was obligated to pay Anne maintenance in the amount of $20,000 per month. Five years
 later, after being forced to retire early by his employer, Caterpillar, Inc., Greg filed a petition
 to terminate or modify maintenance and terminate or reduce his obligation to maintain $3.3
 million worth of life insurance for the benefit of Anne. The trial court found that Greg's early
 retirement was a substantial change in circumstances and reduced Greg's maintenance
 obligation to $0, with Anne allowed to file a motion to review maintenance upon Greg
 obtaining reemployment and with Greg ordered to continue to seek reemployment in good
 faith. The trial court also reduced Greg's obligation to maintain life insurance for the benefit
 of Anne from $3.3 million to $500,000. Anne appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its
 discretion by reducing Greg's maintenance payments to $0 until further order of the court and
 by reducing Greg's life insurance obligation. We vacate the trial court's order and remand for
 further proceedings.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Greg and Anne were married on August 13, 1983. During their marriage, the parties had
 nine children. For the duration of the marriage, as agreed to by the parties, Anne cared for the
 children while Greg worked outside of the home. In April 2010, the parties separated. On June
 29, 2012, a judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered, which incorporated the parties'
 MSA.
¶4 At the time of the parties' dissolution of marriage, Greg was employed as a vice president
 with Caterpillar, Inc., earning a base monthly gross income of $38,880 plus additional short-
 term incentive pay (paid annually) of approximately $66,451.50 per month. Pursuant to their
 MSA, the parties equally divided their marital estate that was worth approximately $5 million.
 As part of their property division, Greg took sole ownership of the parties' marital home in
 Peoria, Illinois (valued at $550,000 with a $576,000 mortgage), and Anne took sole ownership
 of their second home in Peru, New York, which had been purchased during the dissolution
 proceedings in 2011 (valued at $309,000 with a $245,000 mortgage). The property division
 also included the equal division of the parties' checking, savings, and investment accounts
 (total approximate value of $1,365,155), as well as an equal division of Greg's retirement
 benefits—a pension plan, a supplemental pension plan, 401(k) ($1,449,386), individual
 retirement account (IRA) ($287,946), and Caterpillar stock options (valued at $604,464). The
 parties also had college savings plans for the children valued at $881,000, which they agreed
 to continue to maintain for the benefit of the children.
¶5 In 2012, at the time of the dissolution judgment, four of the parties' nine children were still
 minors. Under the MSA, Anne was to receive unallocated maintenance from which she was
 obligated to pay for the expenses of the minors living with her. 1 Greg was to pay Anne $20,000

 1
 The record is not clear as to how many of the minors lived with Anne at the time the dissolution
 judgment was entered in 2012, which incorporated the parties' unallocated maintenance agreement
 pursuant to the MSA. In his affidavit of December 5, 2011, Greg indicated that the two older minors
 (ages 16 and 17) lived with him. Therefore, presumably, the parties two youngest children (ages 9 and

 -2-
 per month in "permanent maintenance" and 25% of any short-term incentive payments (STIP).
 There was no separate child support allotted under the parties' MSA. The terms of the MSA
 indicated that Greg's obligation to pay, and Anne's right to receive, the maintenance payments
 agreed to by the parties "shall terminate" upon the first to occur: the death of Greg; the death
 of Anne; the remarriage of Anne; or "the cohabitation of [Anne] on a resident, continuing,
 conjugal basis." Additionally, under the MSA, Greg was also required to maintain health
 insurance for the benefit of the parties' children, with the parties' splitting any expenses not
 covered by insurance. Greg was also required to maintain $3.3 million in life insurance for the
 benefit of Anne for the duration of his maintenance obligation.
¶6 On July 14, 2017, Greg filed a petition to modify his maintenance obligation, his obligation
 to maintain life insurance for the benefit of Anne, and his obligation regarding the children's
 health insurance.On November 13, 2017, a hearing took place on Greg's petition.
¶7 At the hearing on November 13, 2017, Greg testified that he had worked at Caterpillar from
 August l, 1995, until his retirement on July 3l, 2017, and had been a vice president for the
 company since 2009. He earned over $2 million per year. On June 15, 2017, Greg had been
 given the option of retiring or being terminated due to restructuring within the company. At
 that time, Greg was 58 years old and had intended to continue to work until at least the age of
 62, which was the age he would have received full retirement benefits at an unreduced rate.
 Upon being told he would no longer be employed with Caterpillar, Greg chose to retire, with
 his retirement becoming effective on July 31, 2017. Greg testified that he received his regular
 pay through July 31, 2017. He also received a gross severance payment of $1.16 million (net
 $657,159.78). He would also be receiving a pro rata STIP payment in March 2018 for 2017,
 of which Anne would receive 25% pursuant to the MSA.
¶8 At the time of filing his financial affidavit in October 2017, Greg had approximately $12
 million worth of assets in various checking, savings, investment, and retirement accounts,
 which included 169,972 shares of Caterpillar stock with a fair market value of $7.3 million. At
 the hearing, Greg testified that a few weeks prior he had exercised about 70,000 of his
 Caterpillar stock options and received a net payout of approximately $1.9 million (after paying
 approximately 40% in taxes). He also testified that upon retiring he received a gross payout of
 $325,000 ($228,000 net) from a supplemental savings account.
¶9 Greg testified that if he had retired at the full retirement age of 62, his monthly pension
 benefits would have been $34,366.76 per month, but that amount was reduced to $28,981.49
 due to his early retirement. After an offset for the portion of the pension payments to be paid
 to Anne (approximately $11,000), Greg could have received pension payments of $17,852.60
 per month under a single life annuity option but opted for reduced pension payments of
 $16,233.37 per month during his lifetime (under the 50% joint and survivorship option) so that
 his current wife, Margo, could receive payments of $8115.69 per month after his death.
¶ 10 According to Greg's 2017 financial affidavit, Greg's gross retirement income was
 anticipated to be $23,500 per month (monthly pension benefits of $16,233, interest and
 dividend income of $3150, and supplement deferred compensation payments of $3624 per
 month (to start in February 2018)). Greg indicated on his financial affidavit that his monthly

 13) lived with Anne at that time. However, following the subsequent modification of maintenance
 proceeding in 2018, the trial court found that three of the minors were living with Anne at that time.

 -3-
 expenses of approximately $49,719 per month (not including Anne's $20,000 maintenance
 payments) exceeded his monthly income of $23,500.
¶ 11 Greg lived with his current wife, Margo, to whom he had been married since 2016. She did
 not contribute to their living expenses. They lived in a home that Greg had purchased in 2014
 for $2 million on North Prospect Road in Peoria, Illinois, with Greg still owing $1.6 million
 on that home. Greg also still owned the parties' marital home, which he was trying to sell. Greg
 paid almost $23,000 per month in relation to the two homes—$11,648 for the two mortgages,
 $5031 in property taxes, $1025 for homeowners' insurance, $4000 in necessary repairs and
 maintenance, $860 for gas, $565 for water and sewer, $290 for cable, and $450 for cleaning
 services. His other monthly expenses of almost $27,000 were for, among other things, car
 payments ($2600); entertainment/dining out/hobbies ($4500); donations ($4000); vacations
 ($3750); and $1880 of "minor and dependent child expenses," which included $1680 per
 month for "children only" vacations. Greg's monthly car payments were $2598 per month for
 two leases—one for a 2016 Porsche 911, and one for a Hyundai, with all but $190 being paid
 for the Porsche. Greg leased the Porsche in August 2016 and could not trade it in for a less
 expensive vehicle until September 2018.
¶ 12 Additionally, Greg indicated that he was paying for $5.5 million worth of life insurance,
 with $3.5 million allocated for the benefit of Anne. Greg indicated that he paid $1891 per
 month in premiums for term life insurance and $735 per month for whole life insurance,
 although he did not specifically indicate how much he paid for the portion of life insurance
 that was carried for the benefit of Anne.
¶ 13 As for looking for employment, Greg testified that he was seeking reemployment but had
 yet to be hired. If Greg could find a "suitable job," he would like to work. He had been looking
 for full-time work and had a couple of "significant" leads, but those leads concluded at the
 "headhunter stage." Greg indicated he had four telephone interviews with Amazon and
 anticipated having an in-person meeting, possibly at the end of January 2018.
¶ 14 Anne testified that she was 56 years old. According to her affidavit filed in October 2017,
 Anne had total assets of approximately $5.5 million, consisting of $4.25 million in various
 checking, savings, and investment accounts, a 401(k) retirement account of $477,160, two
 vehicles (valued at $48,000 with no outstanding loans), and a North Carolina home (valued at
 $695,000). In September 2017, Anne had sold her New York home for $301,500 and purchased
 the home in North Carolina for $695,000. Anne paid for her North Carolina home after cashing
 in some stock so she would not have a mortgage payment.
¶ 15 In addition to receiving her portion of the monthly pension payments (approximately
 $10,500 to $11,000 per month), Anne earned approximately $9600 per month from investment
 income and dividends, which she reinvested. In her affidavit, Anne indicated that her total
 monthly living expenses were $18,000 per month. Her monthly expenses included
 approximately $7000 per month in home expenses—$548 for property taxes; $145 for
 homeowners' insurance; $1000 in necessary repairs and home maintenance; $610 for utilities,
 cable, garbage services, and cleaning services; and $5046 for "additional upgrades to house
 and property." Anne's other monthly expenses included, among other things, groceries
 ($2000); car payments ($1425), which she testified were her "travel expenses"; entertainment,
 dining out, and hobbies ($1860); gifts ($2416); vacations ($625); and "travel/lodging for court
 and house, attorney fees, broker fees" ($650). She also indicated that she paid "minor and
 dependent children expenses" (presumably for the parties' minor 14-year-old daughter) in the

 -4-
 amount of $617 per month. Anne explained that she had estimated that she spent almost $2500
 per month on gifts in the past year as the result of spending $15,000 to help one of the parties'
 sons, spending $5000 on their other son who had gotten married, and giving other gifts "out to
 the kids." She also spent approximately $6000 per month on home improvements in preparing
 to sell her New York home, and she anticipated having extensive home improvement costs for
 her new home.
¶ 16 Anne testified that if her maintenance payments were terminated, she would have to spend
 her savings or sell stock. Anne also testified that she had paid for her expenses from her
 maintenance payments and had never taken money from her investments or investment income
 to pay bills (except for the purchase of her North Carolina home).
¶ 17 On November 17, 2017, the trial court issued a memorandum of its decision. The trial court
 found: under the MSA, Greg's maintenance obligation to Anne was $20,000 per month
 (commencing on June 30, 2012), plus 25% of any STIP pay he received; there was no separate
 child support provision under the MSA because the children's expenses were to be paid from
 the spousal maintenance payments; at the time of the dissolution of marriage in 2012, the
 parties had three minor children in Anne's care, but there was currently only one minor child
 in her care; at the time of the dissolution, qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) were
 entered, which equally divided Greg's retirement and deferred compensation plans between
 the parties; at the time of the parties' MSA, Greg had base gross income of $38,380 per month
 plus significant additional short-term and long-term incentive pay; on July 1, 2017, defendant
 opted to retire as the result of being forced to choose between retiring or being terminated
 without apparent cause and, as such, constituted a good faith change in circumstance; pursuant
 to the severance package Greg had negotiated with Caterpillar, Greg received gross severance
 pay of $1,161,000 (net of $657,159.58); the parties "have enjoyed and continue to enjoy [a]
 luxurious life style within the proverbial one percent of top wage earner"; the parties' financial
 affidavits each had " ‘fat' " in their budgets in regard to overstatements of current expenses
 (with the court noting, for example, Anne's house repair expenses for her sold home and car
 payment expense, which was actually $0) and discretionary expenses that were "clearly non-
 essential and could easily be reduced" (with the trial court noting, for example, Greg's
 donations, entertainment, and vacations); Greg was to receive pension payments of $16,233
 per month; and Anne was to receive pension payments between $10,500 and $11,000.
¶ 18 The trial court further found Greg's decision to retire was "forced by Caterpillar Inc and
 [was] in no way to avoid his obligation to his former spouse or [his] children" and constituted
 "a substantial change in circumstances which warrant[ed] a reduction in maintenance, but for
 [Greg's] severance package." The trial court found there had not been any change in
 circumstances at that time, though, because Greg was receiving his full wages plus benefits for
 at least 30 additional weeks as the result of his severance pay. The trial court found Greg would
 not be eligible for a reduction of maintenance until March 5, 2018, denied Greg's request for
 a reduction in maintenance, and indicated it would review the matter after March 5, 2018. In
 the meantime, Greg was ordered to continue his job search, report any job offers to Anne's
 attorney, and provide verification of his compensation upon reemployment.
¶ 19 On March 12, 2018, a hearing for a review of maintenance took place. According to his
 affidavit filed on March 2, 2018, Greg had approximately $12 million worth of assets. Greg's
 current gross monthly income was approximately $23,683.62 per month ($16,233.37 from his
 pension and $7450.25 in interest and dividend income; there was no reference to the

 -5-
 supplement deferred compensation pay of $3624 per month previously listed as income to start
 in February 2018 on his 2017 affidavit).
¶ 20 Greg testified as to his continued efforts to find employment. Greg indicated that younger
 colleagues with similar backgrounds and experience were having more success at securing
 employment. Greg was also prohibited from working for a competitor of Caterpillar under a
 noncompete agreement, which would expire in July 2018. Greg had been screened by
 headhunters for some jobs but did not pass beyond the screening process. Greg had interviewed
 for a law professor job for a salary of between $125,000 to $150,000 and was waiting to hear
 back. He was unable to secure any other job interviews.
¶ 21 Since the prior hearing, Greg sold the parties' marital home for $361,000 (the mortgage
 was "just under" $500,000 at the time of the sale). He was also trying to sell his home on North
 Prospect for $2.1 million, on which he owed approximately $1.6 million. On or around January
 23, 2018, Greg purchased a condominium in Florida (condo) for $3,050,000, paying for the
 condo outright with no outstanding loans.
¶ 22 As for his expenses, Greg's 2018 financial affidavit indicated living expenses of
 $47,455.18 (without the additional $20,000 paid in maintenance). Greg's "monthly household
 expenses" of approximately $22,522 per month (a $3588 decrease from the prior affidavit)
 included: $4765.18 for the mortgage on the North Prospect home (decrease in mortgage
 payments of $6883 after selling the marital home); $5916 for property taxes ($900 increase
 presumably due to the purchase of the condo); $1667 for condo association dues ($1667
 increase); $1257 for homeowners insurance ($222 increase); $1200 for gas ($340 increase);
 $290 for cable (no change); $565 for water and sewer (no change); $850 for house cleaning
 services ($400 increase); and $4000 for necessary repairs and maintenance (no change). Greg's
 other monthly expenses did not change from his 2017 affidavit, except as follows: $3018 for
 car payments ($420 increase after the prior lease on the Hyundai ran out and he began leasing
 a new Kia); $505 for auto insurance, license, and city stickers ($87 increase); $2500 for
 entertainment, dining out, and hobbies ($2000 decrease); $2000 in donations ($2000 decrease);
 $3750 for vacations ($1750 decrease); and $1500 in professional fees and association dues
 ($670 increase). Greg additionally indicated spending $6280 in "minor and dependent child
 expenses" per month (a $4400 increase), which included Greg paying $1000 for transportation
 and $2000 for rent and food for the parties' 25-year-old daughter, Catherine. Catherine's 529
 plan had been depleted. Greg anticipated that Catherine would graduate from college in
 December 2018. Greg also anticipated that he would be assisting the parties' 22-year-old son,
 who also would be graduating in December, because their son's 529 account was going to be
 depleted "fairly soon."
¶ 23 Greg had no debt other than the mortgage associated with the North Prospect home. Chase,
 Greg's stepson (Margo's son), lived in the North Prospect home and did not pay rent. The
 water and sewer expenses listed on Greg's affidavit were for the North Prospect home, and
 almost all of the $4000 per month Greg paid in "necessary repairs and maintenance" (listed on
 his affidavit) was for the North Prospect home. Greg testified that he had actually paid "way
 more" than $48,000 in repairs and maintenance for the North Prospect home in the last 12
 months. He estimated that he would spend about the same amount "going forward." Greg
 testified that selling the North Prospect home would "substantially" reduce his cost of living.
¶ 24 Anne testified that the parties' minor daughter lived with her. The parties' minor daughter
 was 15, would turn 18 in August 2020, and would graduate from high school in 2021. In

 -6-
 addition, a few months prior, in December 2017, the parties' 20-year-old daughter moved back
 into Anne's home.
¶ 25 Anne filed an updated financial affidavit on March 7, 2018. Anne's monthly income
 (without maintenance) was $20,410.38, which consisted of $10,796.13 in pension payments,
 $640.83 of interest income, $4024.92 of dividend income, and $4948.50 of investment income.
 Anne's total monthly expenses were listed as $17,814.73, with no substantial change to her
 expenses from her prior affidavit filed in 2017, except for a $400 per month increase in
 groceries and household supplies (presumably due to the parties' 20-year-old daughter moving
 in with Anne) and the removal of the "car payments" expense previously listed as $1425.83,
 which Anne had testified at the prior hearing were travel expenses. According to her 2018
 affidavit, Anne's total assets had increased to approximately $7.5 million, consisting of various
 checking, savings, and investment accounts (totaling $6.27 million), a 401(k) account
 ($557,877), two vehicles (valued at $48,000), and her North Carolina home (valued at
 $695,000).
¶ 26 Anne testified that when she agreed to permanent maintenance in the amount of $20,000
 per month she understood that to mean she would receive that amount until she or Greg died.
 Anne had graduated from Notre Dame in 1983. She testified that she did not plan to work
 because she was not qualified for anything above an entry level job and her income "would
 just get sucked into taxes." She also indicated that she could not do anything physical because
 she had an arthritic hip.
¶ 27 On March 16, 2018, the trial court entered a memorandum of its decision. The trial court
 found Greg's severance pay had been exhausted and Greg was, in good faith, continuing to
 seek re-employment but was unsuccessful "for a variety of reasons, including his age (almost
 59)"; although Greg sold one of his two homes (at a loss), he then purchased a $3.1 million
 home while still owning a $2.1 million home; Greg had "not appreciably improved his monthly
 cash flow situation in the face of his severance package becoming exhausted," which was a
 situation "of his own volition"; Anne had extensive liquid assets and income (from her portion
 of the pension and from investment income and dividends) "from which to meet most of her
 and the minor child's needs"; statutory maintenance guidelines were not applicable but were
 "instructive" in that those guidelines would not yield any spousal maintenance because the
 parties' "regular monthly income [was] relatively equal"; the parties were married over 27
 years (at the time of the filing of the dissolution petition), and they had negotiated a full MSA
 that provided for permanent maintenance; there was no provision in the parties' MSA
 indicating that maintenance was nonmodifiable; Anne was not anticipated to make efforts to
 secure employment under the MSA; any income she would be able to secure from employment,
 "likely entry level minimum wage," would not appreciably meet her reasonable needs; Greg
 had "extensive talents and business training" and "very marketable job skills," but "the present
 social economic environment was not favorable for the employment of an older white male in
 an executive or board of director capacity, making [Greg's] reemployment search more
 difficult"; Greg "demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial change in
 circumstances ha[d] occurred which warrant[ed] a modification of the spousal maintenance";
 and "maintenance should properly abate, until he obtains employment." The trial court further
 found that "[i]t would be inequitable to completely terminate maintenance" after over 27 years
 of marriage and given Greg's potential employability, but "abating the same (i.e., setting

 -7-
 current maintenance payments at zero, with no accumulating arrearage) is proper commencing
 in the month of March 2018 and thereafter until further order of the court."
¶ 28 Greg was ordered to submit his daily job search history to Anne "on quarterly basis until
 he obtains employment" and, when reemployed, submit proof of his employment and his
 compensation package to Anne. Upon Greg submitting proof of his employment and
 compensation, Anne "shall then have the option to revisit the issue of spousal maintenance
 upon filing a motion to review the same." The trial court also indicated that Greg similarly had
 the right to seek termination of maintenance if the circumstances warranted it.
¶ 29 Additionally, the trial court reduced Greg's obligation to provide life insurance for the
 benefit of Anne to $500,000. The trial court awarded Anne child support for the parties'
 youngest child in the amount of $1800 per month, from March 2018 through May 2021. The
 trial court noted that under the statutory guidelines, child support would have been $1157 per
 month, but it had deviated upward in light of Greg liquidating sizable assets to purchase a
 second home at $3.1 million (thereby reducing his income), the fact that "his Caterpillar option
 may and will likely yield greater income," the standard of living the child would have enjoyed
 if the parties had remained married, and the reasonable needs of the child.
¶ 30 Anne filed a motion to reconsider, requesting that the trial court clarify its order in regard
 to her 25% portion of Greg's 2017 STIP pay and for specific dates for the abatement of
 maintenance to begin and for the payment of $1800 per month in child support and for dates
 for Greg to produce quarterly job search reports. The trial court modified its prior order to
 clarify that Greg was still obligated to pay Anne 25% of the 2017 STIP payment that he had
 received in March 2018, the abatement of maintenance was to commence with the March 2018
 maintenance payment, child support payments were to commence on March 1, 2018, and Greg
 was to provide quarterly job reports to Anne on the fifteenth of the month following the end of
 each quarter.
¶ 31 Anne appealed.

¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 On appeal, Anne argues the trial court abused its discretion by reducing Greg's
 maintenance obligation to $0 until further order of the court and reducing Greg's life insurance
 obligation for her benefit from $3.3 million to $500,000. Anne does not contest the trial court's
 finding that Greg's forced early retirement constituted a substantial change in circumstances.
 Rather, Anne argues the trial court abused its discretion by granting the relief that it did in this
 case—modifying maintenance to $0 while Greg remained unemployed. Specifically, Anne
 argues that the trial court erred in abating maintenance despite Greg's ability to pay. Anne
 contends that reducing her maintenance to $0 until further order of the court constituted a
 de facto termination of her permanent maintenance award under the circumstances of this case.
 Greg argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in abating maintenance until further
 order of the court or by reducing his insurance obligation.
¶ 34 The decision to modify a maintenance award is within the trial court's discretion and will
 not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24.
 An abuse of discretion takes place when "the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful,
 unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court."
 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Also, a reviewing court will not reverse the court's
 factual findings unless they are against manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of

 -8-
 Micheli, 2014 IL App (2d) 121245, ¶ 21. "Findings are against the manifest weight of the
 evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the court's findings are
 unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence." Id.
¶ 35 Section 510(a-5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) provides
 that an order for maintenance may be modified or terminated "only upon a showing of a
 substantial change in circumstances." 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016). Where a party has
 shown a substantial change in circumstances, a court may modify a maintenance award but is
 not required to do so. In re Marriage of Anderson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 191, 204 (2011). After
 determining that a substantial change in circumstances occurred, a trial court will then consider
 whether a modification of maintenance is warranted under the factors listed in section 510(a-
 5) of the Act, as well the factors listed in section 504(a) of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West
 2016); Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 25. The movant who is seeking the modification or
 termination of a maintenance obligation bears the burden of establishing a substantial change
 in circumstances sufficient to warrant the relief requested. In re Marriage of Bernay, 2017 IL
 App (2d) 160583, ¶ 14; In re Marriage of Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 132; Anderson,
 409 Ill. App. 3d at 198; In re Marriage of Krupp, 207 Ill. App. 3d 779, 790 (1990).
¶ 36 In making a determination of whether to modify or terminate maintenance, the trial court
 is to consider the same factors set forth in section 504(a) of the Act that are to be considered
 at the time that maintenance is initially awarded, which include (1) the income and property of
 both parties; (2) the needs of each party; (3) the "realistic" present and future earning capacity
 of each party; (4) any impairment of the earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due
 to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or delayed education, training,
 employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage; (5) any impairment of the realistic
 present or future earning capacity of the party against whom maintenance is sought; (6) the
 time required for the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training, and
 employment, and whether that party is able to support himself or herself through appropriate
 employment or any parental responsibility arrangements and its effect on the party seeking
 employment; (7) the standard of living established during the marriage; (8) the duration of the
 marriage; (9) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
 skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and the needs of each of the parties; (10) all sources of
 public and private income (including disability and retirement income); (11) the tax
 consequences of the property division; (12) contributions and services by the party seeking
 maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;
 (13) any valid agreements of the parties; and (14) any other factor that the court expressly finds
 to be just and equitable. 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2016).
¶ 37 The section 510(a-5) factors that should also be considered when determining whether to
 modify or terminate maintenance include (1) changes in the employment status of either party
 and whether the changes were made in good faith; (2) the efforts, if any, made by the party
 receiving maintenance to become self-supporting and the reasonableness of those efforts;
 (3) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of either party; (4) the tax
 consequences of the maintenance payments; (5) the duration of the maintenance payments
 previously paid (and remaining to be paid) relative to the length of the marriage; (6) the
 property, including retirement benefits, awarded to each party under the judgment of
 dissolution of marriage and the present status of the property; (7) the increase or decrease in
 each party's income since the prior judgment or order from which a review, modification, or

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 termination is being sought; (8) the property acquired and currently owned by each party after
 the entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage; and (9) any other factor that the court
 expressly finds to be just and equitable. 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5)(1)-(9) (West 2016).
¶ 38 "Whether a spouse may rely on his retirement as a change in circumstances to justify the
 modification of maintenance depends on the circumstances of each case." In re Marriage of
 Schrimpf, 293 Ill. App. 3d 246, 251-52 (1997). In determining whether retirement is a
 change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of maintenance, the relevant
 factors a court considers include the payor spouse's age, health, and motives, the timing of the
 retirement, the payor spouse's ability to pay maintenance after retirement, and the former
 spouse's ability to provide for himself or herself. Id. Where a payor spouse has sufficient assets
 to continue to meet his or her maintenance obligation after retirement, a reduction in income
 does not, in and of itself, constitute a substantial change in circumstances to support a
 termination or reduction of maintenance. Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 19 (where the
 husband had sufficient assets to continue to meet his maintenance obligations after retirement,
 his decreased income after retirement did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances);
 Schrimpf, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 252-53 (affirming the trial court's denial of husband's request to
 terminate or reduce maintenance based on his retirement where he had sufficient assets to pay
 maintenance).
¶ 39 In this case, in determining that abating maintenance was appropriate, the trial court
 appeared to mainly focus on the fact that Greg's employment status had changed in good faith,
 which the record shows resulted in a decreased "income" from over $2 million per year down
 to approximately $280,000 per year. However, the record is also clear that Greg had the ability
 to pay Anne maintenance where his assets were worth approximately $12 million. Insofar as
 the trial court found that Greg did not have a present ability to pay maintenance, the finding
 was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Micheli, 2014 IL App (2d) 121245, ¶ 21.
¶ 40 Although Greg presented evidence that following his retirement his income was
 substantially reduced and his monthly expenses exceeded his monthly income, that evidence
 was insufficient to support a reduction in Greg's maintenance obligation to $0 where he had
 substantial assets from which to pay maintenance. See Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 19.
 Greg's expenses were not such that he did not have the ability to pay Anne's maintenance
 where he had assets of approximately $12 million. Greg's only debt was the mortgage on the
 $2.1 million North Prospect home. In fact, a large portion of Greg's total expenses were related
 to that home (mortgage payment, property taxes, utilities, house cleaning, etc.), and Greg
 testified that his financial situation would "substantially" improve upon the sale of that home.
 Also, Greg could opt to reduce his $2400 per month Porsche lease payment in September 2018.
¶ 41 We also note that Greg's "expenses" included $2000 per month in donations and $3000
 per month in support for the parties' adult daughter who would be graduating from college in
 December 2018. Greg also chose to receive reduced pension payments so that his current wife
 would receive survivor benefits upon his death. Additionally, Greg cashed out a large portion
 of his Caterpillar stock options to purchase a $3.1 million condo in Florida prior to selling the
 $2.1 million North Prospect home and allowed his adult stepson to live in the North Prospect
 home free of charge. These "expenses" were not evidence of a lack of an ability to pay the
 maintenance obligation. See In re Marriage of Kuper, 2019 IL App (3d) 180094, ¶ 24 ("[a]
 payor's voluntary acceptance of nonlegal obligations are not to be considered in deciding
 whether maintenance should be modified or terminated"). As the trial court found, it was of

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 Greg's "own volition" that Greg's monthly cash flow situation did not appreciably improve in
 the face of his severance package becoming exhausted. Consequently, the fact that Greg's
 monthly "expenses" exceeded his monthly income following his retirement was insufficient to
 support a reduction of his maintenance obligation to $0 where Greg had substantial assets from
 which to take funds if he had chosen to do so. Moreover, although the trial court found that the
 parties' "regular monthly income" was "relatively equal," the record shows the trial court
 considered Anne's earnings from her investments as "income" but did not appear to have
 equally considered evidence that Greg had an even greater potential earning capacity in that
 regard where Greg had approximately $5 million more in assets than Anne.
¶ 42 In this case, the trial court specifically found that termination of maintenance would not be
 appropriate in light of, among other things, Anne's reasonable needs and "the standard of life
 accomplished during the marriage." "An award of maintenance is generally determined by the
 needs of the spouse seeking maintenance and the ability of the other spouse to pay, in relation
 to the standard of living to which they were accustomed during the marriage." Anderson, 409
 Ill. App. 3d at 209; see also Shive v. Shive, 57 Ill. App. 3d 754, 760 (1978). A spouse is entitled
 to maintain a " ‘reasonable approximation of the standard of living established during the
 marriage.' " Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 17 (quoting In re Marriage of Dunseth, 260
 Ill. App. 3d 816, 833 (1994)).
¶ 43 Here, the record does not contain detailed information regarding the parties' standard of
 living during the marriage, undoubtedly because the parties had agreed to permanent
 maintenance in the amount of $20,000 per month under their MSA. Even so, the record is clear
 that the parties' "standard of living" included their ability to consistently save and invest
 money and accumulate assets. In its order of November 17, 2017, the trial court specifically
 found that "[t]he parties have enjoyed and continue to enjoy [a] luxurious life style within the
 proverbial one percent of top wage earners." The trial court also found that Anne's needs would
 be "mostly" met by relying on her investment and dividend income rather than Anne being
 able to reinvest that income as she had always done in the past. However, Anne was not
 required to lower her standard of living that was established during the marriage where Greg
 had sufficient assets to meet his needs as well as the needs of Anne. See Shen, 2015 IL App
 (1st) 130733, ¶ 87 (a former spouse is not required to lower his or her standard of living that
 had been established during the marriage where the payor spouse has sufficient assets to meet
 his or her needs and the needs of his or her former spouse).
¶ 44 Under the parties' MSA, Greg and Anne had agreed to permanent maintenance of $20,000
 per month, and the trial court found that a complete termination of maintenance would be
 "inequitable" given the length of the parties' marriage and Greg's potential employability. We
 agree. See Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 21 ("An award of permanent maintenance
 should not be lightly terminated."). Nonetheless, the trial court abated Greg's maintenance
 obligation "until he obtains employment," with the trial court essentially reserving its
 jurisdiction over the maintenance issue until after Greg became reemployed even though Greg
 had a present ability to pay maintenance. Cf. In re Marriage of Marriott, 264 Ill. App. 3d 23,
 41 (1994) ("[A] ‘reserved jurisdiction' approach to maintenance is appropriate where the
 responsible party's present ability to pay maintenance is limited."). Upon Greg obtaining
 employment, Anne would "then" have the option to revisit the issue of spousal maintenance
 "upon filing a motion to review the same." However, despite Greg's forced early retirement
 and substantial decrease of income, it is clear from the record that Greg had the present ability

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 to continue to pay maintenance in some amount and, arguably, the ability to meet his full
 maintenance obligation of $20,0000 per month as agreed to by the parties under their MSA.
 See In re Marriage of Bothe, 309 Ill. App. 3d 352, 356 (1999) (an award of maintenance must
 be made on the basis of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence and a trial court should
 not speculate as to the future condition of the parties in determining maintenance). Based on
 the evidence presented, we conclude that no reasonable person would have determined that
 Greg had an inability to pay at least some portion of the permanent maintenance award the
 parties had agreed to under their MSA. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by
 reducing Anne's maintenance to $0. See Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24.
¶ 45 Additionally, we note that under the trial court's order, the triggering event for Anne to file
 a motion for a review of maintenance was Greg securing reemployment. The trial court ordered
 Greg to provide Anne with quarterly employment search reports "until he obtains
 employment," so that "[w]hen he obtains employment," Anne "shall then" have the option to
 revisit the issue of spousal maintenance upon filing a motion to do so. The trial court placed
 no time limitation for review, essentially reserving its jurisdiction over the issue of
 maintenance indefinitely. As discussed above, the trial court abused its discretion by abating
 maintenance and reserving its jurisdiction on the issue of maintenance where the record is clear
 that Greg had the present ability to pay maintenance. See In re Marriage of Scafuri, 203 Ill.
 App. 3d 385, 396 (1990) (the trial court abused its discretion by reserving the issue of the
 wife's right to maintenance where the husband had the present ability to pay maintenance).
 The trial court's failure to set a reasonable and certain time for reviewing the maintenance
 issue was also an abuse of discretion. See Bothe, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 357 (although the trial
 court properly reserved the issue of maintenance, the trial court abused its discretion by doing
 so indefinitely; the trial court's failure to set a reasonable and certain time for review of the
 maintenance issue amounted to an abuse of discretion); see In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill.
 App. 3d 144, 168 (2005) (reserving the issue of the wife's right to maintenance was warranted
 where the husband was presently unable to pay maintenance, but the trial court abused its
 discretion by indefinitely reserving jurisdiction over the issue).
¶ 46 Therefore, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand with directions for the trial
 court to reexamine its modification of Greg's maintenance obligation in light of Greg's clear
 ability to pay maintenance and to calculate any arrearages. We also direct the trial court to
 reexamine its reduction of Greg's insurance obligation where there was no evidence presented
 as to the portion of insurance premiums paid for Anne's benefit and no evidence presented that
 Greg could not afford to pay that portion of the insurance premiums.

¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County
 and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this order.

¶ 49 Order vacated; cause remanded.

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