CourtListener opinion 10492258

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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
 STATE OF FLORIDA
 _____________________________

 No. 1D2023-0413
 _____________________________

ROBERT WELLS,

 Appellant,

 v.

MICHELLE WELLS,

 Appellee.
 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.
Darlene F. Dickey, Judge.

 July 31, 2024

TANENBAUM, J.

 Robert Wells purports to seek direct appellate relief from a
variety of orders regarding the dissolution of the marriage between
him and his wife, Michelle. His notice of appeal lists these orders,
claiming they are being "appealed" as "final judgments." Michelle
moved to dismiss this appeal as untimely, and she in part is
correct. Of the orders identified in Robert's notice, only two are
timely: a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") and an order
denying the former husband's motion for relief from a previously
rendered recommended dissolution judgment. The initial brief,
however, fails to demonstrate any "preliminary basis for"
reversing or vacating either one. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a)
(authorizing summary affirmance in such circumstances). We
affirm as to those two orders without reaching the underlying
 merits, and we dismiss the rest as untimely. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.110(h). There appearing to have been some confusion in the trial
court stemming from the 2022 amendments to the Florida Family
Law Rule of Procedure 12.490, we write to address procedural
aspects of the case that likely led to the untimeliness of most of
Robert's appeal.

 In 2015 Michelle petitioned to dissolve the couple's marriage.
The chancery matter filed with the circuit court was tried and
heard by a general magistrate under rule 12.490—upon the court's
referral and the parties' consent. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P.
12.490(b)(1) ("No matter shall be heard by a general magistrate
without an appropriate order of reference and the consent to the
referral of all parties."); see also id. (b)(2) (requiring clear
notification to the parties that they "are entitled to have this
matter heard before a judge" and allowing for a written objection
to the referral). The hearing and the resulting magistrate's report
and recommended final judgment came after the effective date
(April 1, 2022) of an amendment to rule 12.490. See In re Amends.
to Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.490 & 12.491, &
Forms 12.920(a)-(c), 346 So. 3d 1053, 1054–55 (Fla. 2022).

 Under the prior version of the rule, the magistrate would have
submitted a report that made factual findings and legal
conclusions and included recommendations, and a party could file
exceptions, which had to be heard by the circuit court before it
acted on the magistrate's report and recommendations. Id. at 1054.
The amendment set out a new process, one under which the
magistrate files a "recommended order[,]" and the circuit court
must "review" it and promptly enter it "unless the court [itself]
finds that the recommended order is facially or legally deficient."
Id. at 1055. So now, instead of filing exceptions before the circuit
court renders an enforceable order based on the magistrate's
report, a party affected by the rendered recommended order "may"
seek "review" by moving to vacate the order within ten days after
the circuit court's entry of the order, the new version of the rule
anticipating that the circuit court would effectuate the
magistrate's proposed order by issuing it as its own final order.
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(b)(2), (b)(4), (e)(3), (e)(5).

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 The rule uses the permissive "may" rather than the
imperative "must," presumably to allow an avenue for
preservation similar to that available by way of a motion for
rehearing under Florida Family Law Rule 12.530, at the option of
the pleader, depending on the issue the party intends on
preserving. Cf. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(a) ("To preserve for appeal
a challenge to the failure of the trial court to make required
findings of fact in the final judgment, a party must raise that issue
in a motion for rehearing under this rule."); id. (e) ("When an action
has been tried by the court without a jury, the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the judgment may be raised on appeal whether
or not the party raising the question has made any objection to it
in the trial court or made a motion for rehearing, for new trial, or
to alter or amend the judgment."). 1 Like with a motion for
rehearing, a motion to vacate is directed to an already enforceable
order. Cf. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(e)(6) (providing that a timely
motion filed under this rule "stays the enforcement of the
recommended order rendered by the court" until disposition of the
motion) (emphasis supplied). Where the recommended order
serves as a final disposition—like the one here—the recommended
order becomes an appealable, final order upon ratification by the
circuit court.

 The magistrate filed her report and recommended order on
August 16, 2022. Contrary to the new version of rule 12.490, the
former husband filed his (mistitled) "exceptions" on August 26,
2022, rather than a motion to vacate—even though the circuit
court had not yet entered the order as its own. The magistrate had
proposed a recommended final judgment in conformity with the
new rule, but the circuit court acted as if it were operating under
the old version of the rule: The circuit court ordered the former
husband to file the transcript of the hearing held before the
magistrate within forty-five days of the date of that order under
rule 12.490(f) and (g) (2021), something the former husband failed
to timely submit into the correct court file. On October 25, 2022,

 1 Rule 12.530 is written to apply in cases where the circuit

court itself has rendered a final disposition following a trial held
directly before it, not before the magistrate, so that rule could not
apply in a case like this one.

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 the circuit court then "denied" the "exceptions," "ratified and
approved" the magistrate's "Report and Recommendation," and
"adopt[ed] all findings and recommendations contained therein as
this Court's Order." At all events, this October 25 order was
appealable as a final order as of that day, but the former husband
failed to file a timely tolling motion or a notice of appeal directed
to that order. Cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1). 2

 Instead, on November 4, 2022, the former husband filed an
emergency motion to vacate "pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540" and
the U.S. and Florida Constitutions. 3 The former husband sought
relief, noting the transcript's inadvertent misfiling, arguing that
the circuit court should not have rendered the recommended final
order without considering the transcript of the proceeding before
the magistrate. This procedural maneuver poses a problem for
Robert because a motion for relief from judgment is not a tolling
motion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h),
thereby keeping the thirty-day period for appealing the adopted
final order running from October 25, 2022. Oddly, though, that
same day, the circuit court "temporarily vacate[d] the Order
Denying Exceptions" rendered on October 25, but not the final
judgment also rendered on October 25, and provided Robert an
opportunity to set a hearing on his "exceptions."

 Set a hearing Robert did. Following that hearing, on February
1, 2023, the circuit court rendered an order that "denied" the
former husband's "exceptions" once again and "reinstated nunc pro
tunc to October 25, 2022," the final judgment, directing that the
judgment itself thereby would be treated as "unenforceable from
November 4, 2022, through January 23, 2023." We do not read too

 2 Even if the former husband's "exceptions" were treated as a

motion to vacate under the new rule, that type of motion was not
added to the list of tolling motions until January 1, 2024. See In re
Amends. to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020 & 9.400,
382 So. 3d 597, 598 (Fla. 2023).
 3 Presumably, the former husband meant Florida Family Law

Rule 12.540, which, like Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540,
allows for motions for relief from judgments and orders under a
variety of circumstances, including "mistake."

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 much into this language, though, pointing simply to an intent to
treat the November 4 order as staying the effect of the final
judgment until the court could consider the motion for relief. Cf.
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b) ("A motion under this subdivision does
not affect the finality of the judgment or suspend its operation.").
The February 1, 2023, order denying the "exceptions" itself was the
denial of Robert's request for relief from the underlying judgment,
by that time having become final and unappealable. That is, the
October 25, 2022, final judgment was not resurrected as a new
judgment dated February 1, 2023, no fresh, thirty-day period for
filing a notice of appeal as to the October 25 judgment being re-
captured. That same day—February 1, 2023—the circuit court also
rendered the QDRO.

 Robert filed a notice of appeal on February 17, 2023. As we
already highlighted, the time for taking an appeal of the October
25, 2022, final order had already run in the absence of any tolling
motion, so we agree with Michelle that to the extent Robert's
appeal is from that order, it is untimely. The notice, however,
mentions and attaches several other orders, including the
February 1, 2023, order denying the November 4, 2022, motion for
relief from judgment and the QDRO.

 The February 1, 2023, order denying the motion for relief from
judgment is a post-decretal final order, independently appealable
under article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution and in
accordance with the "method prescribed by" Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.130. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(5). We
could generously treat the notice of appeal as applying to this final
order, which we do, and as to that order, the appeal is timely. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h) (allowing for multiple final orders to be
reviewed under a single notice, provided "the notice is timely filed
as to each such order"). Same with the QDRO, also a post-decretal
final order, but appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.110. Even so, the initial brief does not assert an
argument at all as to why either February 1, 2023, post-decretal
final order was erroneous to an extent entitling him to appellate
relief. The merits of those two orders having not been addressed,
we likewise can affirm without the need to reach their merits. Cf.
Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a) (allowing for summary affirmance, after
service of the initial brief, "if the court finds that no preliminary

 5
 basis for reversal has been demonstrated"). To the extent Robert
appeals the October 25, 2022, final judgment, we dismiss it as
untimely. Any other orders attached to his notice are not final and
not independently appealable, so we dismiss the appeal as to those
for lack of jurisdiction.

 AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

B.L. THOMAS, J., concurs; BILBREY, J., concurs in part and dissents
in part with opinion.

 _____________________________

 Not final until disposition of any timely and
 authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
 9.331.
 _____________________________

BILBREY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 I agree with the majority opinion that Robert Wells, the
former husband, is not entitled to relief in his appeal. But rather
than dismiss the part of the appeal concerning the October 25,
2022, final judgment, I would affirm it and the other orders on
appeal. I therefore concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.

 In October 2022, the trial court denied the exceptions to the
general magistrate's report and entered a final judgment.
Following an emergency motion to vacate by the former
husband, the trial court entered an order temporarily vacating
the order denying the exceptions. The trial court did not
explicitly vacate the final judgment, but with the exceptions still
unresolved, the final judgment was not operative. "An order is
final and ripe for appeal when it completes the judicial labor of
the lower tribunal." Blue v. Covington Cty. Bank, 77 So. 3d 909,
910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d
371, 375 (Fla. 2002)). Because the former husband's exceptions
to the magistrate's report were not resolved, the "final" judgment
had no effect.

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 Ultimately, in February 2023, the trial court denied the
exceptions, and it ratified and reinstated the final judgment.
The reinstatement of the final judgment shows that the trial
court thought the judgment was not in effect after the order
temporarily vacating the exceptions was entered. This appeal
was then filed sixteen days later, well within the 30 days
required by rule. See Fla. R. App. P. App. P. 9.110(b). As a
result, we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the final
judgment.

 Turning to the merits, the former husband claims error in the
final judgment because the thirteen-year durational alimony term
exceeds the length of the marriage by two months. See § 61.08(7),
Fla. Stat. (2022). Because the former husband failed to preserve
this issue for appellate review by including it in his attempt to
vacate the magistrate's report and recommendation, we need not
address it. See Fluhart v. Rasmussen, 383 So. 3d 889, 890 (Fla.
5th DCA 2024) (en banc) (holding that a party's "failure to move to
vacate the [general magistrate's] recommended final judgment
adopted by the trial court" on a particular issue "resulted in a
failure to preserve for appellate review" that party's "claimed
error" on the issue); see also Eaton v. Eaton, 293 So. 3d 567 (Fla.
1st DCA 2020).

 The former husband also challenges the sufficiency of the trial
court's findings of the former wife's need for, and his ability to pay,
the alimony awarded. See § 61.08(7), Fla. Stat. The magistrate's
recommended order, ratified by the trial court, included specific
findings of the former wife's need and the former husband's ability
to pay. And there was sufficient evidence to support the award of
$1000.00 per month in durational alimony as ratified by the trial
court. We should therefore affirm the final judgment.

 Finally, I agree with the majority opinion that we are correct
to affirm the qualified domestic relations order and the order
denying the motion for relief from judgment.

 _____________________________

Ross A. Keene of Ross Keene Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.

Hadley Sanders of Hadley Sanders, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee.

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