CourtListener opinion 10547867

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

Filed
 Washington State
 Court of Appeals
 Division Two

 August 27, 2024

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 DIVISION II
 In the Matter of the Domestic Partnership of: No. 57522-1-II

 JEAN M. WALSH,

 Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

 and UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 KATHRYN L. REYNOLDS,

 Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

 CHE, J. ⎯ Jean Walsh appeals the trial court's division of property as a result of their

domestic partnership dissolution. Kathryn Reynolds cross-appeals the trial court's valuation

decisions. This is the third appeal arising out of the dissolution of Walsh and Reynold's

domestic partnership. In the most recent appeal, the court remanded for the trial court to, among

other things, apply the community-like property presumption to the property acquired during the

committed intimate relationship, characterize the parties' property as community-like or separate

by, in part, considering whether the parties had a separate property agreement, and distribute the

property accordingly.

 On remand, the trial court found that Walsh failed to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that an oral separate property agreement existed. The trial court characterized the

parties' property as separate or community-like and determined the parties' share of the property.

The parties presented experts who had differing opinions on the present value of the parties'
 No. 57522-1-II

property. The trial court valued the property based on the opinion of Walsh's expert. Walsh

appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court violated the law of the case in a myriad of different ways,

(2) the trial court erred in determining that Walsh failed to prove a separate property contract,

and (3) Reynolds should have been judicially estopped from taking various positions that

Reynolds took on remand. Reynolds cross-appeals, arguing the trial court erred in its valuation

decisions.

 We hold the law of the case established that only property characterized as community-

like is subject to distribution if that property was acquired during the committed intimate

relationship. The trial court's legal conclusions to the contrary are erroneous. But such

conclusions are harmless because the trial court did not distribute any separate property. The

parties' other arguments fail. We affirm. Because Reynolds prevails on appeal, we grant her

attorney fees and costs on appeal for responding to Walsh's appeal, but not attorney fees related

to her cross appeal.

 FACTS

 In 1988, Jean Walsh, while working as an orthopedic surgeon, met Kathryn Reynolds in

California. In re Domestic P'ship of Walsh, No. 51125-8-II, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. June

25, 2019) (unpublished) (Walsh II), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2051125-8-

II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. After a few months of dating, Reynolds moved into

Walsh's home. Id. During this time, Walsh had a SEP-IRA account that was eventually

consolidated with other funds into a USAA SEP Account.

 2
 No. 57522-1-II

 Walsh worked as a doctor while Reynolds maintained the home. Id. Walsh compensated

Reynolds for the house work. Id. The two maintained separate finances during their

relationship. Id.

 Between 1992-96, Walsh gave birth to three children. Id. at 2-3. Walsh and Reynolds

raised them together and Reynolds adopted each of the children. In 2000, Walsh and Reynolds

registered as domestic partners in California. Id. That same year, Walsh sold her California

home and purchased one in Tacoma, Washington, where she began working as an orthopedic

surgeon in 2000. Id. at 4. Walsh "was able to trace all deposits made to her USAA SEP IRA to

dates pre-dating the California registered domestic partnership." Clerks Papers (CP) at 599.

 In 2003, Walsh sold the Tacoma home and brought a house in Federal Way, Washington.

Walsh II, slip op. at 4. The parties "both signed the deed but Walsh took out a mortgage solely

in her name." Id. "In August 2009, Walsh and Reynolds registered as domestic partners in

Washington. The parties separated seven months later on March 14, 2010. Walsh petitioned for

dissolution on March 11, 2011." Id. at 5.

 In the initial proceeding, the trial court determined "that the parties lived in a committed

intimate relationship from January 1, 2005 to August 20, 2009 when they registered as domestic

partners under Washington's Domestic Partnership Act, chapter 26.60 RCW." Id. (footnote

omitted). The court chose the 2005 date because that is the year California amended its domestic

partnership statute "expanding legal protections related to property available to married couples

to domestic partnerships." Id.

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 No. 57522-1-II

 "The court also found that the couple intended to maintain separate assets and liabilities

except for the Federal Way property and a van." Id. To that end, the court ruled that the parties

had both separate and community-like interests in the Federal Way house.

 The trial court also (1) found that the parties owned the Federal Way residence as
 tenants in common; (2) ordered the residence sold; (3) awarded Walsh an initial
 $40,834.42 from the sale of the house for mortgage payments on the home before
 January 1, 2005; and (4) divided the remaining proceeds 51.89 percent to Walsh
 and 48.11 percent to Reynolds.

In re Domestic P'ship of Walsh, 183 Wn. App. 830, 839-40, 335 P.3d 984 (2014) (footnote

omitted) (Walsh I). And "[t]he trial court also awarded Walsh $180,000 from her father's

contributions and $30,000 from inherited funds used to pay down the mortgage before Walsh

and Reynolds separated on March 2010." Id. at 840 n.6. The trial court also ruled that Walsh's

USAA SEP IRA was her separate property.

 I. WALSH I AND THE FIRST REMAND

 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed that the parties had lived in a committed intimate

relationship prior to registering as domestic partners in Washington, but it reversed and

remanded the matter because the trial court "should have extended application of the ‘equity

relationship' doctrine to the parties' relationship before 2005, including their registered domestic

partnership under California's act, an unimpeachable indicator of the intended nature of their

relationship." Id. at 848. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its broad

discretion in dividing the value of the parties' nonseparate properties, including the Federal Way

property, as the division was just and equitable based on the needs and contributions of the

parties. Id. at 855.

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 No. 57522-1-II

 The court remanded for the trial court "(1) to reconsider whether the parties had a

common law ‘equity relationship' before January 1, 2005; and (2) if so, to redistribute the

parties' community assets accordingly." Id. at 859.

 On remand, the trial court "found that the parties did not form a committed intimate

relationship prior to 2005 and declined to revise its previous distribution of their assets, despite

this court's opinion." Walsh II, slip op. at 7. Of note, the trial court also "found that even if the

parties were in a committed intimate relationship that began in 1988, ‘there is clear, cogent and

convincing evidence that [they] agreed to the characterization of all property acquired during

their relationship' as separate property, through something akin to an oral prenuptial agreement."

Id. at 8 (alteration in original). The trial court also found that "The parties clearly intended to

maintain separate assets and liabilities, with limited exceptions such as the Federal Way property

and the Sprinter Van."1 CP at 633.

 Relatedly, the trial court determined that the parties did not intend to create community-

like property prior to 2005. Walsh II, slip op. at 8.

 II. WALSH II

 On appeal, the appellate court held "that the trial court erred when it failed to follow the

law of the case and when it declined to find a committed intimate relationship existed prior to

2005." Id. at 1. It also held that the trial court erred by "conflating the issue of whether and

when a committed intimate relationship existed with the issue of the proper characterization of

1
 In Walsh II, the court noted that the first trial court's finding that "the parties intended to live
together as a family but maintain separate assets and liabilities, with limited exceptions such as
the Federal Way property and one family car" was supported by substantial evidence as we held
in Walsh I., slip op. at 20.

 5
 No. 57522-1-II

the parties' property as separate or community-like, and there is no constitutional barrier to

finding a committed intimate relationship prior to 2005." Id.

 The appellate court expressly held that, even if the parties were in a committed intimate

relationship that began in 1988 and intended to keep their property separate through something

like an oral prenuptial agreement, this was not an independent basis for upholding the trial

court's distribution. Id. at 28-29. The court reasoned that it "cannot affirm the trial court's

finding that the parties' property remains separate without proper application of the presumption

in favor of community-like property acquired during the committed intimate relationship." Id. at

29-30.

 The court remanded with the following instructions:

 for a different trial judge to enter findings consistent with the law of the case and
 the committed intimate relationship doctrine as articulated in this opinion. The trial
 court must determine when, prior to 2005, the committed intimate relationship
 began in accordance with our prior decision. The trial court must apply the
 presumption that all property acquired during the committed intimate relationship
 is community-like. The court must then characterize the parties' property as either
 community-like or separate by applying that presumption and by considering
 whether the parties had an agreement to maintain separate property. The trial court
 must do so with the understanding that there is no constitutional barrier to applying
 the presumption to community-like property acquired during the committed
 intimate relationship. The trial court must then distribute the property accordingly.

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).

 III. REMAND FOLLOWING WALSH II

 The trial court bifurcated the proceedings: first, the court determined the start date of the

committed intimate relationship, and second, the court decided the character and proper

distribution of the property. In September 2021, the trial court determined that the committed

intimate relationship began upon the parties' cohabitation in November 1, 1988. Walsh

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 No. 57522-1-II

presented evidence to show the existence of an oral separate property agreement to overcome the

community-like property presumption.

 In April 2022, the trial court ruled that Walsh failed to prove that there was a mutual

agreement to keep their property separate.2 The trial court recognized that (1) the parties

maintained separate financial accounts; (2) Walsh paid for the following out of her income: the

mortgage, taxes, insurance, and private school tuition; and (3) Walsh treated Reynolds as her

employee, paying her a salary for certain services. But the court explained that merely because

the parties kept their property separate does not prove that the parties had an agreement to keep

their property separate, concluding that such reasoning was circular. Additionally, the trial court

pointed out that certain parts of the parties' behavior to maintain separate assets—like that Walsh

treated Reynolds like an employee who is paid a salary to perform household duties and that

Reynolds filed income taxes claiming the money Walsh paid her as income—benefited only

Walsh for tax purposes.

 The trial court also emphasized that "Walsh's unilateral control over her earnings by

depositing them in accounts in her name only, paying the parties' shared expenses, and even

paying Reynolds a ‘salary' for keeping up the family home, is not clear and convincing evidence

that the parties entered into a separate property agreement." CP at 528. Finally, the trial court

pointed out, "While Reynolds' yield of any control over what would otherwise be community-

like property may show her intent that Walsh handle all of the finances while Reynolds

2
 The trial court heard testimony from the parties before making this determination. Walsh
testified that she and Reynolds orally discussed how they would share property before moving in
together. Walsh testified that she "said ‘Well, how about we keep it simple. If I buy it, it's mine.
If you buy it, it's yours. And we keep things separate.'" Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 78. Reynolds
denied having such a conversation.

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 No. 57522-1-II

maintained the home and cared for the children, it does not show an intent to transform the

character of property that would otherwise be community-like property [or] separate property."

CP at 528. Finally, the trial court ruled that even if a separate property agreement existed, it

would be unenforceable for being neither substantively nor procedurally fair.

 In August 2022, the trial court entered findings and conclusions about a registered

domestic partnership (F&C-RDP). The trial court categorized the parties' property as

community-like and separate. It determined that portions of the USAA SEP IRA and the USAA

investment account were separate property, and that the money Reynolds inherited from a family

trust were separate property. However, the trial court determined that all the property—even

separate property—was subject to distribution because this case arose from the dissolution of a

domestic partnership. The trial court further ruled, "even if the parties had a separate property

agreement, and it was enforceable, this Court's property division, as set forth in the decree

entered herewith, would remain the same, even if it were to result in awarding Walsh's separate

property to Reynolds" because its distribution was just and equitable. CP at 529.

 Walsh moved for reconsideration of certain findings of fact and conclusions of law in the

August 2022 F&C-RDP. The trial court granted the motion in part. In October 2022, the trial

court granted the reconsideration motion in part, determining the Federal Way property produced

$476,835.89 in community-like property and $142,270.53 in Walsh's separate property based

upon her payments to the principal mortgage balance following the parties' separation. The trial

court then awarded Walsh 50 percent of the remaining net sale proceeds.

 8
 No. 57522-1-II

 In December 2022, the trial court entered a distribution order, which determined the

present value of the parties' interest in the aforementioned assets based on expert testimony

presented by the parties.

 IV. CHALLENGED DISTRIBUTIONS

 In 2012, the trial court awarded Reynolds 50 percent of the GHP Pension and the 401k

salary deferral plan—$163,064.39—accumulated from January 1, 2005 to March 14, 2010. The

trial court determined that Walsh was entitled to 100 percent of the GHP Pension and 401k

salary deferral plan accumulated prior to January 1, 2005 and after March 14, 2010, appearing to

conclude that such property was separate.

 In 2017, the trial court issued a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) transferring

the aforementioned award, which had appreciated to $244,083, to Reynolds. In 2022, the trial

court redetermined that the parties had $471,656.68 of community-like property interest in the

GHP Pension and the 401k salary deferral plan and awarded Reynolds 50 percent of that interest.

 Walsh's expert Kessler relied on the 2012 decree of dissolution valuation of Reynolds'

community-like interest from the GHP Pension and 401k salary deferral plan. Reynolds argues

that this reliance was the central issue with Kessler's calculation; Reynolds asserts that Kessler

should have determined that Reynold's community-like property interest was half of $471,656—

the amount from the 2022 F&C-RDP. But the trial court agreed with Kessler, determining that

the award from the QDRO plus an additional $15,050 to Reynolds would give her 50 percent of

the community-like property interest in the GHP Pension and the 401k salary deferral plan.3

3
 Reynolds' expert Sarah Hussey produced her own present value determinations. For example,
Hussey concluded that the present value of Reynolds' remaining interest in the GHP Pension and
the 401k salary deferral plan was between $142,873 and $172,640.

 9
 No. 57522-1-II

 In 2012, the trial court determined the value of the USAA Investment Account was

$500,890.72 as of the parties' separation. In 2012, the trial court awarded Reynolds $43,046 in

that asset. In 2022, the trial court redetermined that the parties had a $410,891 community-like

interest in that asset and that Reynolds was entitled to 50 percent of that asset. The trial court then

awarded Reynolds, based on Kessler's calculations, an additional $77,756. The court concluded

that the $77,756 award plus the amount previously awarded to her constituted 50 percent of the

$410,891 in community-like interest in the asset.

 Reynolds moved for reconsideration of the distribution order, which the trial court

denied. Walsh appeals (1) the April 2022 order finding that Walsh failed to prove that there was

a mutual agreement to keep their property separate, (2) the August 2022 F&C-RDP

characterizing the parties' property, (3) the October 2022 reconsideration order. Reynolds

appeals the trial court's valuation of the parties' property.

 ANALYSIS

 I. LAW OF THE CASE

 "‘The law of the case principle relates to (a) the binding force of trial court rulings during

later stages of the trial, (b) the conclusive effects of appellate rulings at trial on remand, and

(c) the rule that an appellate court will ordinarily not reconsider its own rulings of law on a

subsequent appeal.'" Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn. App. 30, 56, 366 P.3d 1246

(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 66 So. 3d 438,

448 (La. 2011)). This law of the case "‘forbids, among other things, a lower court from

relitigating issues that were decided by a higher court, whether explicitly or by reasonable

implication, at an earlier stage of the same case.'" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

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 No. 57522-1-II

Mun. of San Juan v. Rullan, 318 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2003)). "The doctrine does not apply to

factual findings."4 Pac. Coast Shredding, LLC v. Port of Vancouver, 14 Wn. App. 2d 484, 503,

471 P.3d 934 (2020).

 The trial court "may exercise discretion where an appellate court directs it to ‘consider'

an issue," provided it adheres to the appellate court's instructions. In re Marriage of

McCausland, 129 Wn. App. 390, 399, 118 P.3d 944 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 159 Wn.2d

607 (2007) (quoting State ex. rel. Smith v. Superior Court for Cowlitz County, 71 Wash. 354,

357, 128 P. 648 (1912)). "[T]he trial court cannot ignore the appellate court's specific holdings

and directions on remand." Bank of Am., NA v. Owens, 177 Wn. App. 181, 189, 311 P.3d 594

(2013). We may deviate from our determination on a question of law in an earlier appeal if the

prior determination "was clearly erroneous and, if so, whether the erroneous decision works a

manifest injustice to one party." Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 8 Wn. App. 2d

672, 683, 440 P.3d 1009 (2019).

A. The Trial Court Characterized the Parties' Property as Either Community-Like or

Separate

 Walsh argues that the trial court failed to comply with our mandate by not characterizing

the parties' property as either community-like or separate. Because the trial court did engage in

such characterization, we disagree.

4
 Walsh asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the start date of the
parties' committed intimate relationship by relying on findings of facts that contradict earlier
factual findings in this case. But as stated above, the law of the case doctrine does not apply to
factual findings. So, the trial court did not err on this basis. And Walsh does not argue a
different ground to explain why the trial court abused its discretion in determining the start date
of the parties' committed intimate relationship.

 11
 No. 57522-1-II

 In Walsh II, the appellate court held that the trial court "must then characterize the

parties' property as either community-like or separate by applying that presumption." Slip op. at

2. And here, the trial court did characterize the parties' property as either community-like or

separate. This complied with the mandate.

 Walsh argues that the trial court did not characterize the parties' property as either

community-like or separate violating the law of the case by making the following legal

conclusions:

 31. As earlier stated, notwithstanding the alleged oral agreement, as this case
 arises from a dissolution of a domestic partnership, all property is before the court,
 community, community-like, and separate, for distribution. Thus, even if the parties
 had a separate property agreement, and it was enforceable, this Court's property
 division, as set forth in the decree entered herewith would remain the same, even if
 it were to result in awarding Walsh's separate property to Reynolds.

 32. In making its property division, this Court considered the factors under
 RCW 26.09.080. This Court finds its property division is a just and equitable
 division of the parties' property after a 22-year relationship and ensures that Walsh
 is not unjustly enriched by the fact that the bulk of the parties' relationship occurred
 as a committed intimate relationship prior to their short registered domestic
 partnership. While the Court had the character of the property in mind in dividing
 it, ultimately its division was intended to be just and equitable, and is just and
 equitable, even if it made any errors in characterizing the assets.

CP at 529.

 But the trial court did properly characterize the assets. The aforementioned legal

conclusions that Walsh challenges demonstrate that the trial court believed it could distribute

separate property. Those conclusions do not show that the trial court ignored the mandate to

characterize the assets. Walsh's argument fails.

 12
 No. 57522-1-II

B. The Law of the Case Does Not Allow the Distribution of Separate Property

 i. The Effect of RCW 26.09.080

 Walsh argues that Walsh II held that the registration of the domestic partnership did not

retroactively affect the rights of the parties' property accrued before the 2008 effective date of

the amendment to RCW 26.09.080, and, so, the trial court erred by determining all of the parties'

property, including separate property, is subject to distribution based on RCW 26.09.080. We

agree.

 Here, the trial court determined that all of the parties' property was subject to distribution

because this case arose from the dissolution of a domestic partnership. RCW 26.09.080 states,

"In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or domestic partnership, . . . the court shall,

without regard to misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of the

parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all

relevant factors."

 The law of the case establishes that "RCW 26.09.080 only applies to registered domestic

partnerships, and the parties did not register their partnership in Washington until 2009. See

RCW 26.60.080 (‘Any community property rights of domestic partners . . . shall apply from the

date of the initial registration of the domestic partnership or June 12, 2008, whichever is later.')."

Walsh II, slip op. at 23. While Reynolds contests the import of RCW 26.09.080, she does not

argue that the aforementioned language in Walsh II was clearly erroneous. And so, that language

remains the law of the case. Thus, the trial court's determination that all the property—including

separate property—was subject to distribution because the case arose from the dissolution of a

domestic partnership violates the law of the case.

 13
 No. 57522-1-II

 Walsh also argues the trial court's erroneous understanding of RCW 26.09.080 caused it

to improperly determine that Walsh's post-1988 SEP IRA was community-like property. It is

unclear how the trial court's understanding of RCW 26.09.080 impacted its characterization of

the SEP IRA. Walsh does not expound upon this argument or cite to the record to support her

argument. We decline to review this bold assertion. State v. Tinker, 155 Wn.2d 219, 224, 118

P.3d 885 (2005) ("‘Without adequate, cogent argument and briefing, this court should not

consider an issue on appeal.'") (quoting Schmidt v. Cornerstone Invs., Inc., 115 Wn.2d 148, 160,

795 P.2d 1143 (1990)).

 ii. Only Community-Like Property Acquired During the Parties' Committed Intimate

Relationship is Subject To Equitable Distribution

 More generally, Walsh argues that the law of the case is that only community-like

property acquired during the parties' committed intimate relationship is subject to equitable

distribution. We agree.

 In Walsh II, the court held, "[w]ith respect to property acquired during the parties'

committed intimate relationship, only property characterized as community-like property is

subject to equitable distribution." Slip op. at 23. This is the law of the case. Walsh is correct

that conclusions of law 28, 31, and 32 in the 2022 F&C-RDP contravene the law of the case—to

the extent they suggest that separate property acquired during the committed intimate

relationship is subject to equitable distribution. And so, the trial court erred by making those

conclusions.

 14
 No. 57522-1-II

 While the trial court did rule that it could award separate property to Reynolds, the trial

court only awarded Reynolds half of the community or community-like property, but none of

Walsh's separate property. Thus, any error is harmless.5

C. The Community-Like Property Presumption Applies to Property Acquired While the

Couple Lived in California

 Walsh argues that there is no community-like property presumption for the property the

couple acquired while living in California from 1988 to 2000—the SEP IRA.6 Rather, Walsh

argues, under California law, property acquired by the couple in California is presumptively

separate unless Reynolds proves a contract to the contrary. Reynolds argues that the law of the

case required the trial court to apply the community-like property presumption to property the

parties acquired in California. We agree with Reynolds.

 In Walsh II, Walsh argued "that we wrongly held that Washington common law applied

to property acquired before the parties moved to Washington, asserting that community property

principles did not apply to property acquired in California under California's statutory scheme at

the time." Id. at 14. The Walsh II court responded that the court in Walsh I held that the

committed intimate relationship doctrine applied to the property the parties acquired in

California. Id. And the Walsh II court concluded that Walsh failed to show that its application

5
 Walsh argues that the trial court erred in asserting authority over the parties' separate property.
But because the trial court did not award Reynolds any of Walsh's separate property, this
argument is of no import.
6
 This argument appears to implicate Walsh's assignments of error to conclusions of law 22(14)
and (16) in the 2022 F&C-RDP.

 15
 No. 57522-1-II

of the committed intimate relationship doctrine to the property the parties acquired in California

was clearly erroneous, so it declined to revisit its holding from Walsh I. Id. at 15.

 Finally, the Walsh II court held, "The trial court must apply the presumption that all

property acquired during the committed intimate relationship is community-like." Id. at 2. Thus,

the law of the case is that the community-like property presumption applies to property the

parties acquired in California. In the present appeal, Walsh does not argue that the prior

determination was clearly erroneous. Instead, Walsh fails to recognize that the court made this

holding in Walsh II, and Walsh attempts to reargue why such a presumption does not apply

under California law. Because Walsh fails to explicitly argue that the holding in Walsh II was

clearly erroneous and because Walsh has already argued in a prior appeal that the court wrongly

held that Washington common law applied to property acquired in California, we decline to

revisit the holding in Walsh II that the community-like property presumption applies to property

acquired in California.

D. The Trial Court's Determination That the Alleged Oral Separate Property Agreement

Would Be Substantively Unfair Did not Violate the Law of the Case.

 Walsh argues that the trial court violated due process by ruling that the alleged oral

separate property agreement would be substantively unfair.7 Walsh does not cite authority for

this proposition. Walsh's only argument to this end is that we rejected her due process

arguments in Walsh II because she would "‘have an opportunity [on remand] to overcome the

presumption that property acquired during the relationship is community-like.'" Corr. Reply

7
 At the trial court, Walsh agreed that part of the trial court's duty on remand was to determine
the "existence and fairness" of the alleged separate property agreement. RP at 6 (emphasis
added).

 16
 No. 57522-1-II

Br./Resp. Br. of Appellant/Cross-Resp't at 32 (quoting Walsh II, slip op. at 27). Thus, it appears

Walsh is arguing that the trial court's conclusion that the alleged oral separate property

agreement would be substantively unfair prevented her from having an opportunity on remand to

overcome the community-like property presumption. We disagree.

 On remand, Walsh argued and presented evidence to show the existence of an oral

separate property agreement to overcome the community-like property presumption. The trial

court ruled that she failed to prove a separate property agreement. This procedure complied with

due process. The remand proceedings gave Walsh the opportunity to overcome the community-

like property presumption.

 Our opinion in Walsh II does not suggest that concluding that the alleged oral contract

would be procedurally and substantively unfair violates due process.8 Indeed, our opinion

specifically states that "The trial court must also evaluate such an agreement for procedural and

substantive fairness." Slip op. at 11. And the trial court's determination that the alleged

agreement would have been substantively unfair did not prevent Walsh from attempting to prove

the existence of a mutual oral separate property agreement on remand.

 And more generally, Walsh failed to cite any authority to show that finding the alleged

agreement substantively and procedurally unfair would violate due process. DeHeer v. Seattle

Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) ("Where no authorities are cited in

support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that

counsel, after diligent search, has found none.").

8
 Thus, we reject Walsh's challenges to conclusions of law 25-28 in the 2022 F&C-RDP on this
basis.

 17
 No. 57522-1-II

 Thus, the trial court's determination that the alleged contract was neither substantively

nor procedurally fair did not violate the law of the case, and Walsh otherwise failed to

demonstrate that the determination violated her due process rights.

E. The Trial Court's Determination That Walsh Failed to Prove the Alleged Oral Separate

Property Agreement Did Not Violate the Law of the Case

 Walsh appears to argue that the trial court violated the law of the case by determining that

Walsh failed to prove the existence of a separate property agreement. In making this argument,

Walsh predominately relies on the 2017 factual finding of the trial court that Walsh proved by

clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to something akin to an oral prenuptial

separate property agreement, which the parties complied with throughout their relationship, and

the finding that the parties intended to maintain separate property with limited exceptions. We

disagree.

 Walsh contends that factual findings establish a law of the case. However, "[t]he [law of

the case] doctrine does not apply to factual findings." Pac. Coast Shredding, 14 Wn. App. 2d at

503. As Walsh bases her argument only on factual findings of the trial court to which the law of

the case doctrine does not apply to, her argument fails.

 Walsh also appears to argue that the trial court violated the law of the case because the

trial court relied on testimony from Reynolds that contradicted previous unchallenged findings in

this matter in determining that Walsh failed to prove a separate property agreement existed.

Walsh primarily argues that Walsh's testimony was not in line with previous factual

determinations in this case. But again, the law of the case does not apply to factual findings. So,

this argument is unpersuasive.

 18
 No. 57522-1-II

 Whether the trial court erred in finding that Walsh did not prove an oral separate property

agreement is a separate issue that we discuss below.

F. Federal Way Property Distribution

 i. The Walsh II Opinion Allowed the Trial Court to Redetermine the Percentage of the

Sale Proceeds Walsh Was Entitled to

 Walsh argues that the trial court violated the law of the case by changing the original

distribution of the proceeds of the Federal Way property from the first trial court's distribution,

which was affirmed on appeal as just and equitable.9 We disagree.

 As stated above, the trial court "may exercise discretion where an appellate court directs

it to ‘consider' an issue," provided it adheres to the appellate court's instructions. McCausland,

129 Wn. App. at 399.

 In the original dissolution action, the trial court "awarded Walsh an initial $40,834.42

from the sale of the house for mortgage payments on the home before January 1, 2005; and []

divided the remaining proceeds 51.89 percent to Walsh and 48.11 percent to Reynolds."

Walsh I, 183 Wn. App. at 839-40 (footnote omitted). The court affirmed the distribution of the

Federal Way property as the division was just and equitable based on the needs and contributions

of the parties. Id. at 855.

 In Walsh II, the appellate court remanded with the instructions for the trial court to apply

the community-like property presumption, characterize the assets, and "distribute the property

9
 This argument implicates (1) assignment of error to conclusion of law 22(38) in the 2022
F&C-RDP, which assigned the new distribution percentages for the Federal Way residence; and
(2) assignments of error to conclusions of law 9(7) and 10(3), which both dealt with the amount
of community property and separate property stemming from the sale proceeds of the Federal
Way property, in the October 2022 order on the motion for reconsideration.

 19
 No. 57522-1-II

accordingly." Slip op. at 2. On remand, the trial court determined the Federal Way property

produced $476,835.89 in community-like property and $142,270.53 in Walsh's separate property

based upon her payments to the principal mortgage balance following the parties' separation.

The trial court then awarded Walsh $142,270.53 and "50% of the remaining net proceeds at the

time of sale in 2013." CP at 666.

 Because the court in Walsh II remanded for the trial court to characterize the assets and

"distribute the property accordingly," the trial court had discretion to engage in a different

distribution of the community-like assets than the first trial court because the opinion directed it

to consider the distribution issue. Slip op. at 1-2. So, the law of the case did not prevent the trial

court from deviating from the percentage awarded in the first trial. And Walsh does not argue

that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that she was entitled to 50 percent of the

remaining net sale proceeds. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to award 50 percent

of the remaining net sale proceeds to Reynolds.

 ii. The Trial Court Did Not Violate the Law of the Case by Determining Walsh's

Separate Property Interest in the Federal Way Property

 Walsh argues that the trial court violated the law of the case in determining that Walsh

had only contributed $90,000 in separate property from the inheritance from her father to the

 20
 No. 57522-1-II

Federal Way property mortgage.10 Walsh also appears to argue that the trial court violated the

law of the case in determining that the $30,000 from inherited funds was not her separate

property. The basis of these arguments is that the trial court on remand should have been bound

by the 2012 trial court's findings and conclusions in this case. We disagree.

 In Walsh II, we remanded for the court to characterize the parties' property as either

community-like or separate after applying the community-like property presumption and then

distribute the property accordingly. Slip op. at 1-2. Because our remand ordered the trial court

to characterize and then distribute the parties' property, the trial court had discretion to do

exactly that. The trial court was necessarily not bound by the original trial court's

determinations regarding the character and proper distribution of the assets. Walsh's arguments

to the contrary fail.

10
 Related to this argument, Walsh argues the court erred in its conclusion of law 22(39) and (40)
in the October 2022 order on the motion for reconsideration. Conclusion of law 22(39)
provided, in pertinent part,

 This court also finds that the purchase of the 20 acres in Fresno County, CA took
 place during the committed intimate relationship. It is presumed a community-like
 asset. Dr. Walsh did not produce sufficient evidence that it be treated as her separate
 property. While Dr. Walsh deposited separate funds of $131,716.22 to the USAA
 investment account in 1995, those funds were commingled with the substantial
 funds already held in the account which are presumed community-like. Further,
 funds used for the 1997 purchase of the 20 acre Fresno property were in excess of
 Dr. Walsh's 1995 deposit. . . . [E]ven if Dr. Walsh could establish separate funds
 were used to purchase the Fresno property, it would have been a gift to the
 "community."

CP at 571-72. Walsh asserts that the trial court confused the "previously undisputed inheritance
. . . as being related to the purchase of 20 aces in Fresno, California." Amd. Br. of Appellant
/Cross-Resp't at 53. The import of Walsh's argument is not clear. And she does not develop it
further to present a cogent argument as to why conclusion of law 22(39) is erroneous. Thus, we
decline to review this argument except as addressed above. See RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche
Canyon Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

 21
 No. 57522-1-II

II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING THAT WALSH FAILED TO PROVE A SEPARATE

 PROPERTY AGREEMENT

 Walsh argues that the trial court erred by finding that no oral separate property contract

existed because Walsh submitted proof of such an agreement through 22 years of performance of

the alleged agreement.11 We disagree.

 We review de novo the trial court's characterization of property as community or

separate, but we review the factual findings supporting that determination for substantial

evidence. In re Marriage of Mueller, 140 Wn. App. 498, 504, 167 P.3d 568 (2007).

"Substantial evidence is that ‘quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded

person the premise is true.'" In Re Dependency of A.M.F., 23 Wn. App. 2d 135, 141, 514 P.3d

755 (2022), aff'd, 1 Wn.3d 407 (2023) (quoting Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d

873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003)). "Where the fact at issue must be shown by clear, cogent, and

convincing evidence, substantial evidence must demonstrate that fact is ‘highly probable.'" Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d

831 (1973)). We defer to the trial court's credibility determinations. Id.

 "The common law of committed intimate relationships can apply when the couple's

relationship preceded a marriage or when the parties were never married." Walsh II, slip op.

at 9. "Upon finding the existence of a committed intimate relationship, the court must presume

that all property acquired during the relationship is community property subject to equitable

distribution." Walsh II, slip op. at 29. Then the court must characterize the parties' property as

either separate or community-like property. Walsh II, slip op. at 9.

11
 This argument implicates conclusions of law 22(17-24) in the 2022 F&C-RDP.

 22
 No. 57522-1-II

 "[O]ne spouse's control over community funds does not change the character of the

property." Mueller, 140 Wn. App. at 504. "A spouse seeking to enforce an agreement, whether

oral or written, that purports to convert community property into separate property must establish

with clear and convincing evidence both (1) the existence of the agreement and (2) that the

parties mutually observed the terms of the agreement throughout their marriage." Id. (emphasis

added). Division One of this court has concluded a party that was in a committed intimate

relationship may rebut the community-like property presumption by making the clear and

convincing evidence showing of a separate property agreement. In re Parentage of G.W.-F., 170

Wn. App. 631, 634, 285 P.3d 208 (2012). If the party establishes that such an agreement exists,

the trial court must evaluate the agreement for procedural and substantive fairness. Id. at 645.

 In G.W.-F, the trial court found that the parties formed an oral agreement regarding their

separate and community-like property. Id. at 636. Division One affirmed, reasoning that there

was substantial evidence to support that finding because (1) both parties' testimony demonstrated

that they had agreed to contribute equally to paying for their household and childcare expenses

while maintaining separate assets; and (2) evidence showed how the parties avoided

commingling their individual and joint assets for their entire relationship. Id. at 640-41.

Notably, Division One emphasized that the trial court relied on the "‘highly credible'" testimony

of the husband regarding the existence and terms of the oral agreement. Id. And the wife "did

not deny that an oral agreement existed with [the husband]." Id. at 642.

 In Mueller, Division One held the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that an

oral agreement to divide the husband's income was an agreement to change the presumptive

character of the parties' property to community property. 140 Wn. App. at 503. Division One

 23
 No. 57522-1-II

emphasized that the husband failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a

separate property agreement, but he just showed "that they agreed to manage their community

income separately." Id. at 506.

 To show that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that Walsh

failed to meet her burden, Walsh relies on (1) the parties' efforts in keeping their income and

property separate over the course of the relationship, and (2) the related finding that the parties

generally intended to maintain separate assets. Walsh maintains that this information is relevant

to proving the existence of the alleged oral separate property agreement. Although we agree that

the information is relevant to proving the existence of an oral agreement,12 that does not mean

that the information is dispositive of whether such an agreement exists under the circumstances.

 Here, Walsh was the only party to testify to the existence of the separate property

agreement. Reynolds testified that no such agreement existed, unlike in G.W.-F. And the trial

court found Walsh's testimony regarding the alleged oral separate property agreement was not

credible, unlike in G.W.-F. We defer to the trial court's credibility determination.13 Evidence

that the parties separated their assets, while relevant to, is not dispositive of the existence of an

oral agreement.

 Additionally, the trial court rejected the existence of such an agreement for several

reasons. The trial court recognized that (1) the parties maintained separate financial accounts;

12
 See G.W.-F., 170 Wn. App. at 639.
13
 In an unrelated section of the appellant's brief, Walsh asserts that we should not defer to this
credibility determination because "the record demonstrates that finding in this case to be an
abuse of discretion." Amd. Br. of Appellant/Cross-Resp't at 50. But "We cannot review a fact-
finder's credibility determinations on appeal." In re Vulnerable Adult Petition for Winter, 12
Wn. App. 2d 815, 839, 460 P.3d 667 (2020).

 24
 No. 57522-1-II

(2) Walsh paid for the following out of her income: the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and private

school tuition; and (3) Walsh treated Reynolds as her employee, paying her a salary for certain

services. But the court explained that merely because the parties kept their property separate

does not prove that the parties had a mutual agreement to keep their property separate,

concluding that such reasoning was circular.

 The trial court also emphasized that "Walsh's unilateral control over her earnings by

depositing them in accounts in her name only, paying the parties' shared expenses, and even

paying Reynolds a ‘salary' for keeping up the family home, is not clear and convincing evidence

that the parties entered into a separate property agreement." CP at 528. Finally, the trial court

pointed out, "While Reynolds' yield of any control over what would otherwise be community-

like property may show her intent that Walsh handle all of the finances while Reynolds

maintained the home and cared for the children, it does not show an intent to transform the

character of property that would otherwise be community-like property [or] separate property."

CP at 528. Finally, the trial court ruled that even if a separate property agreement existed, it

would be unenforceable for being neither substantively nor procedurally fair.

 We find the trial court's reasoning on this matter persuasive. Substantial evidence exists

to support the finding that Walsh failed to prove a mutual oral separate property agreement by

clear and convincing evidence. Because we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Walsh failed

to prove a separate property agreement, we need not address whether the trial court's finding that

such an agreement would be substantively and procedurally unfair provides an alternative basis

for affirming. Likewise, we need not address Reynold's argument that we should affirm the trial

court's intended property division because the trial court found that its division was just and

 25
 No. 57522-1-II

equitable regardless of any asset mischaracterization because Walsh failed to show that the trial

court mischaracterized any assets.

 III. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL WAS NOT RAISED BELOW

 Walsh appears to argue that Reynolds is judicially estopped from taking various positions

that Reynolds took on remand.

 We may refuse to review claims of error which were not raised below, subject to certain

exceptions, under RAP 2.5(a); State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 94, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). Walsh

did not argue that Reynolds was judicially estopped in any capacity below. And Walsh does not

address RAP 2.5 on appeal. We decline to address Walsh's unpreserved arguments regarding

judicial estoppel on this basis.

 IV. CROSS-APPEAL

 Reynolds argues that the trial court erred in adopting Kessler's calculations for the

present value of the amount owed to Reynolds from the GHP Pension and the 401k salary

deferral plans—now T. Rowe Price Account—and the USAA Investment Account—now the

Schwab One Investment Account. We disagree.

 We review a trial court's disposition of property under RCW 26.09.080 for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d 616, 624, 259 P.3d 256 (2011). "The trial

court's paramount concern when distributing property in a dissolution action is the economic

condition in which the decree leaves the parties." In re Marriage of Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. 390,

399, 948 P.2d 1338 (1997).

 Methods for valuing assets of changing value vary widely. Farmer, 172 Wn.2d at 627.

We will not disturb the trial court's valuation if it was within the range of credible evidence. In

 26
 No. 57522-1-II

re Marriage of Sedlock, 69 Wn. App. 484, 490, 849 P.2d 1243 (1993); see also In re Marriage of

Mathews, 70 Wn. App. 116, 122, 853 P.2d 462 (1993). We are "hesitant to second-guess a trial

court's equitable distribution of other assets that pose difficult valuation problems." Farmer,

172 Wn.2d at 631.

 [E]xperts have developed a variety of highly complex models for valuing stock
 options. This is an evolving science that is properly addressed through expert
 testimony. To the extent parties desire to scrutinize and critique different valuation
 models through dueling expert testimony, we think the trial court provides the
 appropriate forum.

Id. at 633. Indeed, "It is the province of the trial court, and not this court, to weigh the expert

testimony." Sedlock, 69 Wn. App. at 498. To that end, "[t]he factfinder is given wide latitude in

the weight to give expert opinion." Id. at 491.

 Reynolds cites one case to support her arguments: Guard v. Town of Friday Harbor,

22 Wn. App. 758, 592 P.2d 652 (1979). In that case, Division One wrote, "a finding of fact

which is without any support in the record cannot stand." Id. at 766. That statement is the only

rule statement upon which Reynolds relies. The issue in Guard was whether there was sufficient

evidence to support a finding regarding policy duty training, which is completely unrelated to the

present matter. Id.

 Regarding both the GHP Pension and the 401k salary deferral plan and the USAA

Investment Account, we recognize there may have been errors in Kessler's determination of the

present-value of Reynold's interest in those accounts. But we do not disturb valuation decisions

if they are within the range of credible evidence. And here, the trial court relied on expert

testimony—Kessler's declaration, testimony, and exhibits—to determine the present value of

Reynolds's share of both of the challenged accounts. That expert testimony is generally within

 27
 No. 57522-1-II

the range of credible evidence. And so, we are reluctant to substitute our judgment for that of the

trial court. Reynolds invites us to do so, arguing that Kessler based his calculations on the wrong

information, made errors in determining the losses in account value, and made errors in tracing

certain portions of the account value, among other things. Walsh argues that we should defer to

the trial court determination on which expert was more credible. We agree. The trial court is the

appropriate forum to determine which expert is more credible and reliable. We affirm the trial

court's valuations of the GHP Pension and the 401k salary deferral plan and the USAA

Investment Account as they were within the range of credible evidence.14

 ATTORNEY FEES

 Reynolds asks us to award her attorney fees on appeal based on her need and Walsh's

ability to pay, citing RCW 26.09.140 and because of Walsh's intransigence in bringing a

frivolous appeal.

 RCW 26.09.140 provides, "the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay

for the cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys' fees in addition to

statutory costs." "Thus, we have discretion to award attorney fees after considering the relative

resources of the parties and the merits of the appeal." Walsh I, 183 Wn. App. at 858. Because

Reynolds prevails on appeal, we grant her attorney fees and costs relating to responding to

Walsh's appeal. But because Reynolds does not prevail on her cross appeal, she is not entitled to

14
 Reynolds also argues that Walsh failed to prove her separate interest in the USAA Investment
Account by clear and convincing evidence because she failed to produce the necessary
statements. But Walsh did not have a burden at this stage in the trial to prove her separate
property interest in that account. The trial court had already determined the community and
separate property interest in the USAA Investment Account as of the separation. At this stage,
the only dispute was the present value of those assets and the proposed distribution—not the
character of the assets. Thus, Reynolds argument fails.

 28
 No. 57522-1-II

attorney fees related to her cross appeal. We decline to award fees based on intransigence

because Reynolds failed to develop a cogent argument with citation to relevant legal authorities

regarding this basis. See RAP 10.3(a)(6).

 CONCLUSION

 We affirm and grant Reynolds attorney fees and costs on appeal for responding to

Walsh's appeal, but not attorney fees related to her cross appeal.

 A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

 Che, J.
 We concur:

 Maxa, J.

 Veljacic, A.C.J.

 29