CourtListener opinion 10578537

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COURT OF APPEALS
 DECISION NOTICE
 DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
 published, the official version will appear in
 the bound volume of the Official Reports.
 July 16, 2024
 A party may file with the Supreme Court a
 Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
 Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
 and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP21 Cir. Ct. No. 2021FA149

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
 DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

ROMERO COLEMAN,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

REBECCA A. COLEMAN,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

 APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Brown County:
THOMAS J. WALSH, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause
remanded with directions.

 Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

 Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
 No. 2023AP21

 ¶1 PER CURIAM. Rebecca Coleman appeals a judgment of divorce
from her former spouse, Romero Coleman.1 Rebecca raises seven arguments
regarding the circuit court's determination of child support and its division of the
parties' property.

 ¶2 We reject each of Rebecca's arguments regarding the property
division, and we therefore affirm the circuit court's judgment in part. We agree
with Rebecca, however, that the court erred by failing to explain why it calculated
child support using an annual income of $63,300 for Rebecca, rather than $50,000.
We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment setting Romero's child support
obligation, and we remand for the court to readdress that issue. We also agree
with Rebecca that the court erred by failing to address which party would be
permitted to claim the parties' minor child as a dependent for income tax purposes,
and we direct the court to address that issue on remand.

 BACKGROUND

 ¶3 The parties were married in October 2004. Romero petitioned for
divorce on February 22, 2021. At the time of filing, the parties had two minor
children, ages seventeen and fourteen.

 ¶4 A contested final divorce hearing took place over three days during
June, August, and September of 2022. By that time, the parties' older child was
no longer a minor. The parties reached an agreement as to the legal custody and
physical placement of their remaining minor child, and the circuit court adopted

 1
 Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names throughout
the remainder of this opinion. Although Romero was initially represented by counsel in the
circuit court, both parties are self-represented on appeal.

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that agreement. The disputed issues at the contested hearing pertained to
maintenance, child support, and the division of the parties' property.

 ¶5 The circuit court entered a written decision and order addressing
those issues on December 15, 2022, and it subsequently entered a judgment of
divorce incorporating that decision. As relevant to this appeal, the court ordered
Romero to pay Rebecca $124 per month in child support, commencing on
January 1, 2023. The court equally divided the parties' assets and debts and
ordered Romero to make an equalization payment of $48,304.25 to Rebecca.

 ¶6 Rebecca now appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in seven
ways with respect to calculating the amount due to her for child support and the
division of the parties' property. Additional facts are included below as necessary
to our discussion of Rebecca's arguments.

 DISCUSSION

 ¶7 Both the division of property at divorce and the setting of child
support are committed to the circuit court's discretion. Modrow v. Modrow, 2001
WI App 200, ¶9, 247 Wis. 2d 889, 634 N.W.2d 852. "We will uphold the circuit
court's discretionary decision if the court makes a rational and reasoned decision
and applies the correct legal standard to the facts of record." Id.

I. Down payment for the marital home

 ¶8 The circuit court awarded the parties' marital home to Romero in the
property division. Rebecca contends that when the parties purchased the marital
home, they used as a down payment the proceeds from the sale of a different
residence, which Rebecca had purchased prior to the marriage. Rebecca asserts

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that the court should have awarded the entire amount of that down payment to her
in the property division.

 ¶9 The circuit court specifically addressed and rejected Rebecca's
argument regarding the down payment. The court correctly noted that the funds
that Rebecca received from the sale of the prior home were "clearly marital"—i.e.,
subject to division. See WIS. STAT. § 767.61(2)-(3) (2021-22) (providing that all
property, whether acquired before or during the marriage, is subject to a
presumption of equal division at divorce, except property acquired by gift or
inheritance or property purchased with funds acquired by gift or inheritance).2

 ¶10 Although a circuit court may deviate from the presumption of equal
division based on, among other things, "[t]he property brought to the marriage by
each party," see WIS. STAT. § 767.61(3)(b), the court declined to do so here. The
court reasoned that: (1) the prior residence was sold in 2008, "which was
approximately four years after the parties had been married and [were] sharing
their household"; and (2) the check from the sale of the prior residence was made
out to both Rebecca and Romero. Under these circumstances, the court stated it
was "satisfied that [the sale proceeds were] joint money and no unequal division
will occur as a result." The court's refusal to deviate from the presumption of
equal division was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.

 2
 There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Rebecca acquired the prior residence
by gift or inheritance or purchased that residence using funds acquired by gift or inheritance, nor
does Rebecca argue that she did so.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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II. Rebecca's 401(k)

 ¶11 The circuit court divided Rebecca's 401(k) equally between the
parties via a qualified domestic relations order. Rebecca contends that "[d]uring
the divorce process, both parties agreed to no changes to the [401(k)]," and "[a]ll
property division sheets turned [in to] the court by both parties throughout the
entire duration of this case show the [401(k)] staying whole and with Rebecca."
Rebecca therefore asserts that "[t]his issue was agreed upon and did not require
ruling from the court." In response, Romero asserts that there was "never any
agreement to this plan" and that the division of the 401(k) "was considered a
contested issue."

 ¶12 The record supports Romero's position. Although Romero's
property division worksheet assigned the full value of the 401(k) to Rebecca, his
worksheet, overall, reflected an equal division of the parties' assets and debts,
resulting in an equalization payment from him to Rebecca. There is nothing in the
record indicating that Rebecca and Romero reached any specific agreement with
respect to the division of the 401(k) or that they informed the circuit court of any
agreement regarding that asset.

 ¶13 Regardless, Rebecca cites no legal authority in support of the
proposition that a circuit court is required to follow the parties' agreement
regarding the division of a particular asset. Nor does Rebecca cite any legal
authority in support of her claim that the circuit court erred by equally dividing the
401(k), particularly given the presumption of equal division set forth in WIS.
STAT. § 767.61(3). We need not consider arguments that are unsupported by
references to legal authority. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

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III. Dave's Auto Repair debt

 ¶14 Rebecca's property division worksheet listed a debt to Dave's Auto
Repair in the amount of $2,741.68. Rebecca's worksheet divided that debt equally
between the parties. In its written decision, the circuit court did not divide the
Dave's Auto Repair debt, stating instead that it was "already paid using marital
funds." Rebecca asserts that this statement was inaccurate because her father paid
the Dave's Auto Repair debt and expects to be repaid for that amount. Notably,
however, Rebecca does not provide any record citations in support of this
argument.

 ¶15 In response, Romero asserts that while Rebecca listed the Dave's
Auto Repair debt on her property division worksheet, she did not "present[]" this
issue "in court or on record." Romero also argues that the debt was for repairs
made to Rebecca's "personal vehicle," that there was "no discussion of or any
verbal or written agreement between him, Rebecca … and her father … regarding
repairs or any advancement of funds for those repairs," and that Romero is "not
responsible for any funds Rebecca … may have received from her father … and/or
any arrangement that may have been made between" Rebecca and her father.

 ¶16 In her reply brief, Rebecca "maintains [that] the auto repair bill
should be split between both parties as it is a debt that is owed and was incurred
on marital property during the marriage." Rebecca also asserts that her "true
argument" regarding the auto repair bill is that the circuit court's decision "stated
[the bill] was previously paid off by marital funds [but it] was not. It was paid by
[Rebecca's father] as a loan so the primary vehicle could be returned."

 ¶17 We conclude that Rebecca forfeited her current argument regarding
the Dave's Auto Repair debt by failing to adequately raise that argument in the

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circuit court. See Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 320,
786 N.W.2d 810 ("Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally
deemed forfeited."). Our review of the record shows that Rebecca attached to her
property division worksheet two photographs of what appear to be two pages of an
invoice from Dave's Auto Repair. The second page of the invoice includes a
handwritten notation stating, "Paid $3,000." We can find no other evidence in the
record regarding this invoice. There is nothing in the record to support Rebecca's
current argument that the invoice was paid with funds loaned to her and Romero
by her father. Thus, the only evidence before the circuit court regarding the
Dave's Auto Repair debt consisted of Rebecca's property division worksheet
stating that the debt existed and the attached photographs of the invoice showing
that the debt had been paid.

 ¶18 To preserve an issue for appellate review, a litigant must raise the
issue "with sufficient prominence such that the [circuit] court understands that it is
being called upon to make a ruling." Bishop v. City of Burlington, 2001 WI App
154, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d 879, 631 N.W.2d 656. Rebecca failed to do so here. Instead,
she submitted evidence to the circuit court showing that the debt to Dave's Auto
Repair had been paid. Rebecca never presented any evidence—or raised any
argument—that the debt was paid using funds loaned by her father for which he
expected repayment. Under these circumstances, we decline to consider
Rebecca's argument regarding the Dave's Auto Repair debt. See State v.
Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 144, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997) ("As a general rule,
this court will not address issues for the first time on appeal.").

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IV. Contempt finding

 ¶19 In March 2021, a court commissioner entered a temporary order
finding that, because the parties continued to live together in the marital residence,
"they should split household bills and other marital expenses" during the pendency
of the divorce proceedings. The temporary order required both parties to deposit
their paychecks into a joint account and required Rebecca to pay specified marital
bills out of that account.

 ¶20 Rebecca asserts that between March 16, 2021, and October 12, 2021,
Romero "shorted" $20,122.36 from the joint account by failing to deposit his
paychecks as ordered. As a result, Rebecca contends that Romero was "found in
contempt" on October 12, 2021. Due to this contempt finding, Rebecca asserts
that the circuit court should have ordered Romero to repay her $20,122.36. In
response, Romero asserts that the court commissioner did not find him in
contempt.

 ¶21 The record shows that on October 12, 2021, the court commissioner
entered an order amending the March 2021 temporary order. The amended order
provided that the parties were no longer required to deposit their paychecks into
the joint account, and it made each party responsible for the payment of specified
household expenses. The amended order further stated: "Husband is in contempt
for disobeying the Temporary Order entered on March 31, 2021. He shall purge
the contempt by making all payments as outlined in this Amended Temporary
Order." Rebecca does not develop any argument—or cite any evidence
showing—that Romero did not satisfy the purge condition by failing to make the
payments required by the amended temporary order.

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 No. 2023AP21

 ¶22 Thus, while the October 12, 2021 order shows that the court
commissioner did find Romero in contempt, the court commissioner did not order
Romero to pay back any funds that he had failed to deposit into the joint account.
In her reply brief, Rebecca concedes that the court commissioner did not order
Romero "to pay back the funds." She asserts, however, that the court
commissioner "clearly stated at the end of the hearing [that] this contempt finding
would be resolved at the end of the divorce proceedings," and that Rebecca
therefore expected the issue to be addressed in the circuit court's final order.

 ¶23 Again, we conclude that Rebecca forfeited this argument by failing
to adequately raise it in the circuit court. During the first day of the contested
hearing, when the court asked Rebecca whether there was "anything else about
this case that you want to tell me," Rebecca informed the court of Romero's
purported violation of the March 2021 temporary order. When the court asked
Rebecca for documentation corroborating her assertions, Rebecca provided a
"summary" that she had prepared and presented to the court commissioner, in
which she asked the court commissioner to order Romero "to pay $20,122.36 back
into the account by Friday, October 15, 2021." In response to the court's follow
up question—"Where can I go to find the order that ordered him to pay
$20,122.36 into an account?"—Rebecca confirmed that Romero had never been
ordered to pay that money back. She further stated, "[T]hat was my desired
outcome for the day."

 ¶24 The circuit court then stated: "So I'm not sure that I understand
what you're saying then, because you said he was ordered to deposit a certain
amount of money and didn't do it. What happens to that money? I think that's
how you launched into this. What happens to that?" Rebecca responded, "Yeah,"
and she and the court then moved on to discuss another topic. Rebecca never

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followed up on her argument regarding Romero's purported violation of the
temporary order.

 ¶25 On this record, we conclude that Rebecca failed to raise this issue
with sufficient prominence that the circuit court understood that it was being
called upon to make a ruling, and we therefore do not address the issue further.3
See Bishop, 246 Wis. 2d 879, ¶8. In addition, Rebecca has failed to develop a
cohesive argument on this issue in her appellate briefs. See Papa v. DHS, 2020
WI 66, ¶42 n.15, 393 Wis. 2d 1, 946 N.W.2d 17 (declining to address an
underdeveloped argument).

V. Student loans

 ¶26 The record shows that at the time of divorce, Rebecca had two
outstanding student loans—a Great Lakes loan and a Navient loan. In her
brief-in-chief, Rebecca asserts that the circuit court intended to divide these loans
equally between the parties, but the property division balance sheet attached to the
court's decision has an "X" under only the "Wife" column for the Great Lakes
loan. According to Rebecca, Romero "is interpreting the order that he is not
accountable for the Great Lakes loan due to the missing ‘X'" in the "Husband"

 3
 While Rebecca asserts that the court commissioner "clearly stated" at the end of the
October 12, 2021 hearing that "this contempt finding would be resolved at the end of the divorce
proceedings," the appellate record does not contain a transcript of that hearing, and we therefore
have no way to verify the veracity of Rebecca's assertion. It is the appellant's burden to ensure
that the record is sufficient for us to review the issues he or she raised on appeal, and we assume
that any missing materials support the circuit court's decision. See State Bank of Hartland v.
Arndt, 129 Wis. 2d 411, 423, 385 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1986). In any event, even if the court
commissioner told Rebecca that this issue would be addressed in the circuit court's final decision,
it was incumbent upon Rebecca to raise the issue with sufficient prominence such that the court
understood that Rebecca expected it to make a ruling. See Bishop v. City of Burlington, 2001 WI
App 154, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d 879, 631 N.W.2d 656. As explained above, Rebecca failed to do so.

 10
 No. 2023AP21

column. Rebecca asks this court to "update the order to clearly show
Romero … is 50% accountable for the Great Lakes loan."

 ¶27 Romero disputes Rebecca's assertion that the circuit court intended
to divide the student loans equally, and he instead contends that the court ordered
an unequal division of the student loan debt. Romero is correct. In its written
decision, the court expressly stated that it "chose to divide up the student debt
unequally." Consistent with that statement, the property division balance sheet
attached to the court's decision shows that the court chose to split the Navient loan
equally between the parties but to make Rebecca solely responsible for the
Great Lakes loan. Thus, the court clearly ordered an unequal division of the total
amount of the student loan debt. Rebecca's argument that the court intended to
divide the student loan debt equally therefore fails.

 ¶28 In her reply brief, Rebecca appears to argue for the first time that the
circuit court erred by dividing the student loan debt unequally. We need not
address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See A.O. Smith Corp.
v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998).

 ¶29 Regardless, Rebecca's argument on this point is undeveloped. See
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646-47 (court of appeals need not address undeveloped
arguments). The circuit court provided multiple reasons for dividing the student
loan debt unequally, noting that: (1) Rebecca will continue to benefit from her
education following the divorce, whereas "[a]ny benefit [Romero] gets from this
education will end with the divorce"; (2) Rebecca is eleven years younger than
Romero; (3) Rebecca's earning capacity is increasing, due in part to her education;
and (4) Romero will likely retire sooner than Rebecca, and "her ability to take her
education and use it over a period of years to increase her earnings is greater than

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his." Thus, the court provided a reasoned explanation for its decision to divide the
student loan debt unequally, and Rebecca has failed to present a developed
argument showing how the court erroneously exercised its discretion.

VI. Child support

 ¶30 On the first day of the contested hearing in June 2022, Rebecca
submitted a financial disclosure statement showing an annual gross income of
approximately $63,300. Thereafter, on the final day of the contested hearing in
September 2022, Rebecca testified that her annual salary had been reduced by
$13,000 as of August 1, 2022. She asked the circuit court to take note of that fact
for purposes of its decision. However, when calculating child support, the court
used $63,300 as Rebecca's annual income. Rebecca asserts that the court erred in
this regard because it "did not take [her] income change into account."

 ¶31 In response, Romero does not dispute that Rebecca's income was
reduced to approximately $50,000 per year shortly before the final day of the
contested hearing. Instead, he asserts—without any supporting citations to the
record—that the circuit court properly calculated child support using an annual
salary of $63,300 for Rebecca because: (1) Rebecca's work history, work
experience, and "the degrees earned from her education" show that she is capable
of earning more than $50,000 per year; and (2) Rebecca "willingly accepted" a
change of position from her employer with a reduced salary one month before the
last day of the contested hearing, such that her change in income was "by her
choice." In her reply brief, Rebecca disputes these assertions—again, without any
citations to the record—claiming that she was forced by her employer to either
accept a lower-paying job or be terminated.

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 ¶32 Our review of the record shows that no evidence was presented to
the circuit court regarding the reasons for Rebecca's reduction in income.
Rebecca merely testified that her annual income had decreased by $13,000, and
she asked the court to take note of that fact for purposes of its decision. The court
did not find Rebecca's testimony regarding her reduction in income to be
incredible. Instead, when addressing the parties' respective incomes for purposes
of determining maintenance, the court simply stated that it was using the income
amounts shown on the parties' respective financial disclosure statements. The
court further stated, "Each party provided testimony about their current earnings
and the court is satisfied that each party is currently employed and working at a
level that is productive and appropriate." Yet, the court did not explain why it
discounted Rebecca's testimony regarding her reduction in income.

 ¶33 When setting child support, a circuit court must consider "the
circumstances existing at the time of the divorce." Wallen v. Wallen, 139 Wis. 2d
217, 223, 407 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1987). Here, there was evidence in the
record that Rebecca's actual income at the time of the divorce was approximately
$50,000 per year, and Romero does not dispute that Rebecca's income decreased
to that amount shortly before the final day of the contested hearing. The court,
however, used Rebecca's previous, higher income when calculating child support,
without any explanation for its decision to do so. The court did not, for instance,
conclude that it should use Rebecca's earning capacity rather than her actual
income when calculating child support based on a determination that Rebecca was
"shirking." See Chen v. Warner, 2005 WI 55, ¶20, 280 Wis. 2d 344, 695 N.W.2d
758.

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 ¶34 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion when calculating child support. 4 We therefore
reverse that portion of the court's judgment setting Romero's child support
obligation and remand for the court to readdress that issue. On remand, the court
should specifically consider the amount of Rebecca's income at the time of the
parties' divorce. If the court decides to use Rebecca's earning capacity, rather
than her actual income, it must explain its reasons for doing so.5

 4
 At the end of its written decision, the circuit court stated:

 Many other assertions and claims were made during the course
 of the trial in this matter. As referenced above, each party was
 afforded an opportunity to submit a balance sheet outlining their
 various claims upon the marital estate. Any other claims by
 either party that the court has not addressed herein [are] denied
 based upon an insufficient record to support such claims. The
 court will not address each insufficient claim specifically, but
 references them here generally.

 This statement—which appears to reference claims made by the parties specifically with
respect to the property division—does not excuse the court's failure to explain why it discounted
Rebecca's testimony regarding her reduction in income. "[T]he proper exercise of discretion
contemplates that the circuit court explain its reasoning." Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98,
¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737. Although we may search the record to determine whether it
supports a discretionary decision, see id., here, there is nothing in the record to suggest why the
court may have discounted Rebecca's testimony.
 5
 On appeal, Rebecca also argues that the circuit court erred by ordering that Romero's
child support obligation would commence on January 1, 2023. Rebecca contends that Romero
paid no child support from March 16, 2021, through December 31, 2022, and she argues that she
is entitled to back child support for that time period.

 (continued)

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VII. Claiming the parties' minor child as a dependent for tax purposes

 ¶35 Finally, Rebecca asserts that the parties had a "verbal agreement"
that they would alternate claiming their minor child as a dependent for income tax
purposes, beginning with Rebecca claiming the child as a dependent in 2020.
Rebecca contends, however, that the circuit court did not address this issue in its
decision and that, since the divorce, Romero has refused to comply with their
verbal agreement. In response, Romero asserts that there was no verbal agreement
as to who would claim the minor child as a dependent.

 ¶36 During the first day of the contested hearing, Romero testified that
he and Rebecca had agreed that he would claim their minor child as a dependent in
odd years and Rebecca would claim the child as a dependent in even years.
Rebecca, in turn, testified that she did not agree with Romero's recitation of their
"agreement," but she wanted the circuit court to order that the parties would claim
the minor child as a dependent in alternating years, and she had no preference as to
whether she claimed the child in odd or even years.

 ¶37 The circuit court did not address which party would be permitted to
claim the minor child as a dependent for tax purposes, and we agree with Rebecca
that the court erred by failing to do so. See WIS. STAT. § 767.511(1)(b) (requiring

 Rebecca forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the circuit court. See Tatera v.
FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810. Notably, during the
pendency of the divorce proceedings, both parties continued residing in the marital residence, and
a court commissioner entered two temporary orders addressing each party's responsibility for
various financial obligations. Neither temporary order required either party to pay child support.
Rebecca never sought de novo review of either temporary order, nor did she argue to the circuit
court during the contested hearing that Romero should have been ordered to pay child support
during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. As noted above, this court need not consider
arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 144, 569
N.W.2d 577 (1997).

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a circuit court to "ensure that the parties have stipulated which party, if either is
eligible, will claim each child as an exemption for" tax purposes and, in the
absence of such an agreement, to "make the decision in accordance with state and
federal tax laws"). Consequently, we direct the court to address this issue on
remand.

 CONCLUSION

 ¶38 In summary, we affirm that portion of the circuit court's judgment
addressing the division of the parties' marital estate. However, we reverse that
portion of the judgment setting Romero's child support obligation, and we remand
for the court to readdress that issue, specifically considering the amount of
Rebecca's income at the time of the divorce. On remand, the court shall also
address which party may claim Rebecca and Romero's minor child as a dependent
for income tax purposes.

 ¶39 No costs to either party.

 By the Court.—Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause
remanded with directions.

 This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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