CourtListener opinion 10645008

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 ROCK ISLAND DIVISION 

BRENDA J. BROWN, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) Case No. 4:23-cv-4190-SLD-JEH 
 ) 
DAVID L. VANCIL, JR., HEIDI A. ) 
BENSON, WILLIAM E. PONCIN, ERIC G. ) 
ICENOGLE, DENNIS G. WOODWORTH, ) 
JAMES R. STANDARD, JEFF M. ) 
O'BRIEN, RODNEY G. CLARK, JAMES ) 
G. BABER, JERRY J. HOOKER, SANDRA ) 
D. GALLANT-JONES, JOSEPH N. VAN ) 
VOOREN, KIRK W. LAUDEMAN, ) 
TALMADGE G. BRENNER, and JOHN C. ) 
WOLLEYHAN, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 

 ORDER 
 Pro se Plaintiff Brenda J. Brown, dissatisfied with how her state-court cases have gone 
thus far, seeks to bring her disputes to new turf—federal court. She names fifteen defendants 
drawn from two related cases. See generally Compl., ECF Nos. 1–1-3.1 Defendants can be 
divided into two overlapping categories: (1) attorneys and judges involved in her state-court 
divorce case ("Divorce Proceeding");2 and (2) attorneys and judges involved in a state-court 
mandamus action she filed based upon the Divorce Proceeding ("Mandamus Proceeding").3 
Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant Dennis G. Woodworth's Motion for Summary 

1 Citations to Brown's complaint use page numbers instead of paragraphs due to its inconsistent numbering. 
2 See In re the Marriage of Brown, 2020-D-36, Hancock County, Illinois, 
https://www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_information.jsp?court=IL034015J&ocl=IL034015J,2020D36,IL034015JL
2020D36P1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2024) 
3 See Brown v. Vancil, 2022-MR-37, Hancock County, Illinois, 
https://www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_information.jsp?court=IL034015J&ocl=IL034015J,2022MR37,IL034015
JL2022MR37P1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2024). 
Judgment, ECF No. 30; (2) Defendant Joseph N. Van Vooren's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
ECF No. 32; (3) Defendant Kirk W. Laudeman's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF 
No. 50; (4) Defendants Judges David L. Vancil, Jr., Heidi A. Benson, William E. Poncin, James 
R. Standard, Rodney G. Clark, James G. Baber, Jerry Hooker, Talmadge Brenner, and John 

Wooleyhan (collectively "Judge Defendants") and Assistant Attorney General Sandra Gallant-
Jones's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Support, ECF No. 46; and (5) 
Defendants Eric Icenogle and Jeff O'Brien's Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF 
No. 48. For the reasons that follow, claims for money damages against Judge Defendants and 
Woodworth are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, all claims for injunctive relief are 
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the remainder of the case is STAYED pending 
resolution of Brown's state court case. 
 BACKGROUND4 
 Brown's complaint is long, chronologically inconsistent, and peppered with unsupported 
legal conclusions. The Court recounts in detail only the alleged original defect in this series of 
lawsuits—her attorney negotiating with opposing counsel before a judge in his chambers—

before broadly summarizing her other allegations and state-court filings. 
 Brown retained Woodworth in July 2020 to represent her in the Divorce Proceeding. She 
alleges that Woodworth conspired with her soon-to-be-ex-husband's ("Respondent") counsel, 
Icenogle, to harm her interests and usurp the court's role when they reached certain 
agreements—for example, who would be responsible for paying for certain marital bills. E.g., 
Compl. 34–35 ("Void of jurisdiction or judicial power, Woodworth and Icenogle usurped the 
judicial power of the court, and adjudicated the Plaintiff's case themselves . . . ."). Brown 
wanted Woodworth to seek certain injunctive relief and to challenge the veracity and 
completeness of Respondent's discovery disclosures. See id. at 35–37 (asserting that she 

4 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in the 
complaint, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in [the nonmovant]'s favor." Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 
277 (7th Cir. 2016). Where a motion to dismiss challenges a court's jurisdiction, the "court may properly look 
beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue 
to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Penny v. Pelosi, 538 F. Supp. 3d 850, 855 (C.D. Ill. 
2021) (citing Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2008)), aff'd, No. 21-2039, 2021 WL 6102166 (7th 
Cir. Dec. 23, 2021). At summary judgment, a court must "constru[e] the record in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant." Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). The summary judgment record is not drawn 
exclusively from the complaint but is instead shaped by the parties' statements of undisputed material fact and their 
compliance or lack thereof with the Court's Local Civil Rules. See Civil LR 7.1(D). These rules state that "[e]ach 
claim of disputed fact must be supported by evidentiary documentation referenced by specific page." Id. 
7.1(D)(2)(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Courts are entitled to require that pro se litigants adhere to local rules, 
despite the litigant's lack of legal counsel. E.g., Penny v. Lincoln's Challenge Acad., 822 F. App'x 497, 500 (7th 
Cir. 2020). Brown was given notice that her "response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact for trial." E.g., R. 56 Not., ECF No. 34. In response to Woodworth's motion for summary 
judgment, Brown fails to adhere to the procedure laid out in Local Civil Rule 7.1(D), instead rehashing her legal 
arguments. See generally Brown's Statement Undisputed Facts, Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 69-1. 
Brown failed to respond at all to Van Vooren's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the Court deems the 
material facts recited in both summary judgment motions to be undisputed, yet still views those facts in the light 
most favorable to Brown. See Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 2–8; Van Vooren Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 2–6. Unless 
otherwise specified, the facts set forth in the background section are drawn from Brown's complaint and the 
undisputed summary judgment facts. 
"advised Woodworth that Respondent stated that his Financial Affidavit was prepared by 
someone else . . . adding that he did not read the Financial Affidavit before he signed it"). 
 On January 11, 2021, at a hearing in the Divorce Proceeding, Woodworth, Icenogle, and 
Judge Poncin discussed the Divorce Proceeding in Judge Poncin's chambers instead of open 

court. Brown describes this hearing as rife with unethical and improper ex parte 
communications. Woodworth emerged from chambers a handful of times to consult with her 
and give advice, such as advising her to withdraw certain petitions so that those petitions could 
be presented to a different judge, per local practice. Brown asserts that Woodworth failed to 
withdraw a petition and that led to an unfavorable ruling, although Woodworth "insisted that the 
Petition for Payment of Marital Bills had not been ruled on and that he had withdrawn it." Id. at 
38, 40. 
 On June 10, 2021, Brown filed a complaint about Woodworth with the Attorney 
Registration & Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC") regarding the January 11, 2021 hearing. On 
June 25, 2021, Woodworth responded to Brown's allegations, providing his "entire legal file"5 to 

Brown, including the handwritten notes which he made during the January 11, 2021 hearing. Id. 
at 40–41; see also June 25, 2021 Letter from ARDC to Brenda Brown, Resp. Woodworth Mot. 
Summ. J. Ex. H, ECF No. 79; Attorney Notes, Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. I, ECF No. 
80. She asserts that those notes constitute Woodworth's confession that Judge Poncin had not 
made a determination about who would be responsible for certain marital bills but instead 
Woodworth had conspired with Icenogle to fraudulently change Judge Poncin's order when they 
drafted a submission for the court's January 14, 2021 order and purportedly made her 
responsible for the marital bills. Compare Attorney Notes 2 (tabulating bills that Woodworth 

5 Brown asserts that this was a false statement because certain emails were not included in Woodworth's 
submission, and that Woodworth therefore engaged in "multiple lies of omission" with the ARDC. Compl. 42–45. 
wanted Respondent to pay), with Jan. 14, 2021 Order in Divorce Proceeding ¶ 3, Resp. 
Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J, ECF No. 81 (authorizing Brown "to pay marital bills from the 
cash reserves that she is maintaining"). 
 Brown argues that because Woodworth allegedly defrauded the court, Judge Poncin's 

January 14, 2021 order was itself the product of fraud, and "[f]raud deprives a judge of subject 
matter jurisdiction and vitiates the entire proceeding." Compl. 47. She takes issue with other 
statements made by Woodworth, characterizing them as false and fraudulent as well, e.g., id. at 
48–49 (alleging that Woodworth lied to her about attorney's fees), and further argues Judge 
Poncin exceeded his authority and thereby deprived himself of jurisdiction, e.g., id. at 50 
(arguing Judge Poncin unlawfully granted her exclusive possession of the marital home). She 
asserts that Woodworth failed to comply with the January 14, 2021 order's instruction that 
Woodworth research an issue related to the State Employee Retirement System, thereby causing 
her over two million dollars in damages. Id. at 52; see also Jan. 14, 2021 Order in Divorce 
Proceeding ¶ 5. 

 Brown's other allegations that she has been wronged by her experiences in state court 
strike a similar chord: (1) judges ignored her evidence that Respondent was using "WORLD 
REMIT, an international money transfer company" and refused to compel more fulsome 
discovery that would reveal further evidence of "bribery, wire fraud and many other criminal 
acts perpetrated by officers of the court," Compl. 56–57; see also Bank Records, Resp. 
Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. F, ECF No. 96; (2) it is unfair that she had to attend case 
management conferences while Respondent was allowed to send counsel to attend in his stead; 
(3) attorneys deprived her of "due process and equal protection under the law" by opposing her 
motions and interfering with the "judge's adjudicative responsibilities," Compl. 61; (4) the 
judges' stated disagreements with her legal conclusions were false statements and therefore those 
judges engaged in fraud which vitiated the entire proceeding and rendered their orders void; (5) 
judges and attorneys violated their duties to report misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary 
bodies when they disagreed with Brown and concluded that they had not witnessed any 

reportable misconduct in her cases; and (6) judges "defrauded [Brown] of multiple default 
judgments" when they disagreed with her assertion that defendants had defaulted, id. at 74. 
 Brown began to avail herself of Illinois's procedures for substituting a judge. See, e.g., 
735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(i) ("Each party shall be entitled to one substitution of judge without 
cause as a matter of right."). On May 19, 2021, Brown filed a "petition for substitution of judge" 
in the Divorce Proceeding. Compl. 53. Judge Poncin recused himself, and Woodworth 
withdrew from representing her that same day. This was the first in a long series of fights about 
whether any judge was sufficiently free from bias to preside over the Divorce Proceeding. 
Brown alleges that they were not sufficiently unbiased and instead violated her rights. For 
example, she alleges that Judge Benson, who replaced Judge Poncin, deprived her "of a hearing, 

a fair and impartial tribunal, full-disclosure discovery and equal protection under the law, to 
conceal the evidence of bribery, wire fraud, and other acts of criminal conduct perpetrated by 
officers of the court" when Judge Benson sua sponte struck a 94-page motion—excluding 
attachments—to compel discovery in the Divorce Proceeding. Id. at 55–56; see also Apr. 1, 
2022 Order in Divorce Proceeding 1, Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. E, ECF No. 76 
(describing Brown's motion to compel discovery as "unintelligible" and devoted to issues 
stemming from the January 11, 2021 hearing before Judge Poncin); id. at 3 (striking that motion 
sua sponte).6 Brown filed a motion to replace Judge Benson, which was heard by then-Chief 

6 Judge Benson explained to Brown why she could not address Brown's litany of complaints about the January 14, 
2021 hearing: 
Judge Vancil. According to Brown, Chief Judge Vancil falsely stated that "bias and allegations 
of criminal conduct are not reasons to grant a substitution of judge for cause," this false 
statement was "a fraud upon the court," "[f]raud vitiates everything," and therefore the Divorce 
Proceeding was again vitiated that day. Compl. 58–59. In subsequent motions, she argued that a 

judge was forbidden from reviewing motions or responses submitted by counsel regarding her 
filings which were intended to get a new presiding judge and that a judge could never hear a 
motion when that judge was the target of that motion. E.g., id. at 61–62, 77–78. 
 On September 29, 2022, Brown initiated the Mandamus Proceeding, filing a 133-page—
excluding exhibits—complaint seeking injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus against Chief 
Judge Vancil, Judges Benson and Poncin, Icenogle, and Woodworth. See generally Pet. 
Emergency App. Writ Mandamus Inj. Relief in Mandamus Proceeding, Icenogle & O'Brien's 
Joint Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1, ECF No. 49-1. The judges were represented by Gallant-Jones, 
Woodworth was represented by Van Vooren, and Icenogle was represented by Laudeman. 
 On April 4, 2023, Brown filed a motion to add additional defendants to the Mandamus 

Proceeding, namely Judges Standard, Clark, and Baber, as well as an attorney, O'Brien. Joinder 
New Defs., Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. S, ECF No. 88. Brown alleged that Judge 
Clark was responsible for Judge Benson being assigned to the Divorce Proceeding; Judge 

 Knock it off with the attorney malpractice and the ARDC complaint and Judge Poncin. I don't have 
 the power to do anything about any of that. I can't do it, so quit asking. There is—as I indicated to 
 you several times, temporary relief is always reviewable and modifiable. I already modified the 
 temporary relief from Judge Poncin. I'm not the appellate court on Judge Poncin. I am not vested 
 with the authority to say he did anything wrong. I wasn't there. I can't say Mr. Icenogle or Mr. 
 Woodworth did anything wrong. Quit bringing it up. I don't have the authority to do that. You 
 took it to the ARDC. They found no wrongdoing. Maybe they were wrong. I don't know. I'm not 
 the ARDC. But I can't punish them for that. 

Apr. 1, 2022 Divorce Proceeding Case Mgmt. Conf. Tr. 4:12–5:2, Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. D, ECF No. 
75. 
Standard presided over the Divorce Proceeding after Judge Benson; Judge Baber had failed to 
disqualify Judge Standard for cause from the Divorce Proceeding; and O'Brien was 
Respondent's new attorney. Weeks later, Brown subsequently filed an addendum to join more 
defendants: The attorneys opposing her in the Mandamus proceeding—Gallant-Jones, Van 

Vooren, and Laudeman—as well as Judge Hooker, who heard one of her many motions to 
substitute a judge presiding over one of her cases and denied her requests for a venue change and 
that a judge from another circuit be assigned to her case. Her mandamus complaint was 
dismissed in a May 30, 2023 order authored by Judge Brenner. Brown was given leave to file an 
amended complaint related to her allegations against Woodworth and Icenogle, but she was 
prohibited from refiling her claims against Chief Judge Vancil, Judge Benson, and Judge Poncin 
because those claims were barred by judicial immunity. See generally May 30, 2023 Order in 
Mandamus Proceeding, Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C, ECF No. 74. Her amended 
complaint was docketed on June 14, 2023. See Am. Compl. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Mandamus 
Proceeding, Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, ECF No. 31-2. 

 On August 15, 2023, she filed a new complaint against Judge Brenner, which was 
assigned to Judge Wooleyhan. Shortly thereafter, Judge Wooleyhan concluded that her 
complaint against Judge Brenner was frivolous and therefore struck it. Judge Wooleyhan also 
struck a petition addressed to Chief Judge Vancil regarding the alleged criminal enterprise 
operating in the Ninth Judicial Circuit. Judge Wooleyhan's order stated that Brown did "not 
have the right to unreasonably harass and abuse other litigants, attorneys, and judges by 
repeatedly filing pleadings which have no factual basis, are frivolous in nature, and have no 
purpose other than to delay [the Divorce Proceeding]." Sept. 6, 2023 Order in Mandamus 
Proceeding 1, Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. L, ECF No. 83. Judge Wooleyhan struck 
some of Brown's filings, and found that sanctions were appropriate and necessary because 
Brown: (1) had failed to reasonably inquire into the factual and legal basis underpinning her 
claims; (2) engaged in a pattern of bringing "unsupported allegations against a judge who made 
rulings with which she d[id] not agree"; and (3) repeatedly attempted to relitigate issues which 

had already been resolved. Id. at 2. Judge Wooleyhan enjoined her from engaging in this course 
of conduct, requiring "prior leave of court" to submit new filings related to the Divorce 
Proceeding or Mandamus Proceeding. Id. at 3. She was also ordered to pay the defendants' 
attorneys' fees and costs. Id. 
 Brown's amended complaint in the Mandamus Proceeding was dismissed with prejudice 
by Judge Brenner. See Sept. 25, 2023 Handwritten Order in Mandamus Proceeding, Resp. 
Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, ECF No. 72; Oct. 10, 2023 Order in Mandamus Proceeding, 
Resp. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, ECF No. 73. Judge Brenner found that the amended 
complaint failed to state a cause of action and further found that the amended complaint was 
"filed without a good faith basis in fact or law" and "was filed for the purpose of harassing these 

Defendants and to frustrate the expeditious resolution of [the Divorce Proceeding]." Oct. 10, 
2023 Order in Mandamus Proceeding 2. Judge Brenner also found that Brown had filed three 
additional pleadings without prior leave of court in defiance of the sanctions imposed by Judge 
Wooleyhan, and he struck those pleadings sua sponte. Judge Brenner subsequently awarded 
Woodworth, Icenogle, and O'Brien attorneys' fees. Nov. 1, 2023 Min. Order in Mandamus 
Proceeding; Nov. 2, 2023 Order in Mandamus Proceeding 3, Woodworth Aff. Ex. D, ECF No. 
31-4. No notice of appeal was filed with respect to either the October 10, 2023 or November 2, 
2023 orders. 
 Brown filed this case on October 30, 2023. See Compl. 1. She asserts claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants' alleged violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 11. 
She seeks injunctive relief "from the criminal enterprise operating in the Eighth and Ninth 
Judicial Circuits" in the form of having "her two cases moved to a proper court," as well as 

preventing Judges Standard and Brenner from presiding over her cases. Id. at 95. She also seeks 
relief from their orders, such as the sanctions restricting her filings and ordering her to pay 
attorneys' fees. She seeks further relief "from the unconstitutional 40 ILCS 5/1-119 Qualified 
Illinois Domestic Relations Order [("QILDRO")] of which not one Judge who presided over 
Plaintiff's case has taken the time to look into." Id. at 96. She asserts that the unconstitutionality 
of the QILDRO should be the basis of injunctive relief to prevent any judge from finalizing the 
Divorce Proceeding. She asks that the Court enter a default judgment for a permanent legal 
separation because Respondent has not had to attend case management conferences. She 
requests that the Court give her "full-disclosure discovery." Id. at 97. She seeks compensatory 
damages—$2.3 million due to the QILDRO issue,7 $240,710 plus interest due to Judge Poncin's 

January 11, 2021 order which supposedly obligated her to pay the marital bills, $135,218 plus 
interest for maintenance payments of which she has been deprived, and another $237,300 plus 
interest for her time and labor in running her business because the January 11, 2021 order 
deprived her of maintenance payments. Finally, she also seeks punitive damages totaling 
$2,445,752. 
 DISCUSSION 
 Defendants raise multiple grounds for dismissing Brown's federal complaint. Judge 
Defendants and Gallant-Jones assert that: (1) claims against Judges Poncin and Clark are barred 

7 The Court presumes that Brown's inclusion of an extra zero was a typo. See Compl. 96 ("Plaintiff is seeking not 
less than $ 2,300,0000.00 in the loss of her lifetime pension annuity . . . ."). 
by the statute of limitations, Judge Defendants Mot. Dismiss 4–5; (2) Rooker-Feldman deprives 
the Court of jurisdiction for the claims stemming from final state-court judgments, id. at 5–9; (3) 
Younger abstention deprives the Court of jurisdiction for the claims related to ongoing state-
court proceedings, id. at 10–12; and (4) judicial immunity and prosecutorial immunity preclude 

the claims against Judge Defendants and Gallant-Jones respectively, id. at 12–14. Woodworth 
seeks summary judgment based upon res judicata. Woodworth Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 9–16. Van 
Vooren seeks summary judgment because Brown has failed to show that he acted under color of 
law. Van Vooren Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 7–18. Woodworth and Van Vooren filed a notice which 
stated that they join the Judge Defendants' arguments regarding Rooker-Feldman, Younger, and 
the statute of limitations. See generally Not. Adoption Arguments, ECF No. 56. Icenogle and 
O'Brien seek dismissal of Brown's federal complaint because they did not act under color of 
state law, Mem. Supp. Icenogle & O'Brien's Joint Mot. Dismiss 7–9, ECF No. 49, and they join 
Judge Defendants' Rooker-Feldman and Younger arguments, as well as the statute of limitations 
argument with respect to claims against Icenogle, id. at 9–10. Finally, Laudeman argues that 

Brown has failed to allege that he acted under color of law and joins the arguments regarding 
Rooker-Feldman and Younger. Mem. Supp. Laudeman Mot. Dismiss 6–9, ECF No. 51. 
I. Legal Standards 
 When presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 
key inquiry is whether the complaint is "sufficient to provide the defendant with ‘fair notice' of 
the plaintiff's claim and its basis." Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 
934 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). While "detailed 
factual allegations are unnecessary, the complaint must have ‘enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.'" Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009). "[M]ere ‘labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action'" are not sufficient to satisfy the plausibility standard. Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 
736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A court must take "[t]he complaint's 
well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions, . . . [as] true," Phillips v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013), and "draw all inferences in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
 "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) tests the jurisdictional sufficiency of the 
complaint . . . ." Bultasa Buddhist Temple of Chi. v. Nielson, 878 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2017). 
When resolving such a motion, the court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations 
and draw[s] reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs." Id. The court may look beyond the 

complaint's jurisdictional allegations and view other evidence submitted by the parties to 
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656–57 (7th 
Cir. 2008). "[A] plaintiff faced with a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss bears the burden of 
establishing that the jurisdictional requirements have been met." Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin 
Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 Finally, summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant, Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003), "resolving all factual disputes 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of [the nonmovant]," Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 
870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). The nonmovant "is not entitled to the benefit of inferences 
that are supported by only speculation or conjecture." Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Plan. Dep't, 
755 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). "[T]he mere existence of some 

alleged factual dispute is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment," Dawson v. 
Brown, 803 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted), as "there must be evidence 
on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
II. Analysis 
 The Court first addresses Judge Defendants' arguments that they enjoy absolute judicial 
immunity from Brown's claim for monetary damages against them. The Court then turns to the 
various abstention doctrines and principles implicated by her sweeping requests for injunctive 
relief. After concluding that abstention is warranted with respect to the injunctive relief, the 
Court addresses the claims for monetary damages asserted against attorneys involved in Brown's 

state-court proceedings. The bottom-line conclusion is that Brown must allow the Divorce 
Proceeding to run its course. 
 A. Monetary Damages Against Judge Defendants 
 Judge Defendants argue that Brown's claims against them are barred by judicial 
immunity. Judge Defs. Mot. Dismiss 12–13. Judges are protected from personal liability for 
their decisions from the bench and are immune from lawsuits that seek monetary damages based 
on those judicial decisions. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226–27 (1988) ("If 
judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of 
them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering 
decisions likely to provoke such suits."). "[A] judge will not be deprived of immunity even if 
the action was in error, was done maliciously, was in excess of his authority, and even if his 
exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Brokaw v. 
Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). "[J]udicial immunity is 

an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 
U.S. 9, 11 (1991). 
 There are two exceptions to absolute judicial immunity. First, a judge is not entitled to 
absolute immunity for non-judicial acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978). 
"[W]hether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i. e., 
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, 
i. e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Id. at 362. For example, 
employment decisions related to court personnel, such as a probation officer, may be non-
judicial acts not entitled to absolute immunity. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229–30. Second, "[a] 
judge does not enjoy immunity if he or she is acting in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" 

Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d 987, 997 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 357). Such 
clear absence is contrasted with an act "in ‘excess of [the judge's] authority.'" Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). The judge in Kowalski acted in the clear absence of 
all jurisdiction when she attempted to interfere "in a case to which she was never assigned and 
over which she had no responsibility." Id. at 998. 
 Brown's claims for monetary damages against Judge Defendants are barred by absolute 
judicial immunity. First, the only basis for these claims are judicial acts. She complains about 
the denials of her motions, the granting of motions for sanctions against her, the manner in which 
hearings were held or not held, and a litany of allegedly grave procedural errors—all acts which 
are judicial in their function and therefore may not be the basis for a suit for monetary damages. 
See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1015. She dealt solely with Judge Defendants 
in their capacities as judges, not employers or private citizens. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229–
30. Second, she complains about Judge Defendants' actions in their capacities as circuit court 

judges, and the Eighth and Ninth Judicial Circuits are courts of original, general subject-matter 
jurisdiction. See Ill. Const., art. VI, § 9. In other words, they had jurisdiction over both the 
Divorce Proceeding and Mandamus Proceeding. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Yelton, 676 N.E.2d 
993, 997 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) ("[D]issolution proceedings are within the general jurisdiction of 
the circuit courts."); Oliver v. Kuriakos-Ciesil, 163 N.E.3d 1207, 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) 
(concluding that the circuit court had jurisdiction over a mandamus petition). 
 Brown's discursive arguments to the contrary—largely consisting of inaccurate 
quotations from a smattering of caselaw and secondary sources—mostly miss the mark. E.g., 
Mem. Supp. Resp. Judge Defs. Mot. Dismiss 25–27, ECF No. 63-1. Yet she references the 
Supreme Court's decision in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984), which "conclude[d] 

that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting 
in her judicial capacity." The Court considers Brown's requested injunctive relief in the context 
of its abstention analysis, which varies based upon whether the claim at issue is based upon the 
Divorce Proceeding or Mandamus Proceeding. However, the Court need not delve into case-
specific details to conclude that Brown's claims for monetary damages from Judge Defendants 
are barred by absolute judicial immunity and are therefore dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Thompson-Smith, 203 F. Supp. 3d 895, 903–04 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (dismissing with 
prejudice a claim for monetary damages asserted against a defendant who was entitled to 
absolute judicial immunity), aff'd, 700 F. App'x 535 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 B. Abstention 
 The conduct of which Brown complains relates exclusively to her state-court lawsuits, 
raising the specter of many abstention doctrines. Yet the blend of both private and public actors, 
both legal and equitable relief sought, and both pending and final proceedings complicates the 

doctrinal picture. Brown's pro se submissions present further complications—they are too long, 
confused, and legally unsound. At a minimum, Brown may not use this Court to "in effect seek[] 
to take an appeal of" the underlying state-court decisions. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 
466 (2006). In this section, the Court analyzes the following abstention doctrines: (1) the 
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction; (2) Rooker-Feldman abstention; (3) Younger 
abstention; and (4) the general abstention principles discussed in the Seventh Circuit's decision 
in J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2021). 
 1. Domestic Relations Exception 
 The domestic relations exception "covers a ‘narrow range of domestic relations issues 
involving the granting of divorce, decrees of alimony,' and child custody orders." Kowalski, 893 

F.3d at 995 (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701–02 (1992)). The exception 
applies to federal-question suits, id., and as it is a matter of jurisdiction, the Court must raise it 
sua sponte, Evergreen Square of Cudahy v. Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., 776 F.3d 463, 465 
(7th Cir. 2015); Miller v. Rokita, No. 3:22-CV-883 JD, 2023 WL 4491213, at *6 (N.D. Ind. July 
12, 2023) (applying this principle to the domestic relations exception). The exception is 
construed narrowly, focusing upon "the need to prevent federal courts from ‘disturb[ing] or 
affect[ing] the possession of property in the custody of a state court.'" Kowalski, 893 F.3d at 995 
(quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006)). If a plaintiff's claims require a court 
to disturb a state court's adjudication of family-law matters, the exception applies. Id. at 996. 
Yet the exception "does not bar suits seeking damages against individuals who interfered with a 
plaintiff's rights in a tortious manner." Miller, 2023 WL 4491213, at *6 (citing Kowalski, 893 
F.3d at 996). 
 Here, Brown requests three forms of relief that squarely implicate the domestic relations 

exception. First, she asks that the Court grant her "a default judgment for a permanent legal 
separation" from Respondent. Compl. 97. A judgment of legal separation is a remedy a plaintiff 
can seek under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. See 750 ILCS 5/402. 
Entering such a judgment is plainly beyond the Court's jurisdiction. Cf. Kowalski, 893 F.3d at 
996 (holding that the plaintiff's suit did not implicate the domestic relations except where he did 
"not seek to alter an in rem custody award or to undo a divorce decree"). Second, she requests 
"injunctive relief from the unconstitutional 40 ILCS 5/1-119" QILDRO entered in her case. 
Compl. 96. A QILDRO is "an Illinois court order that creates or recognizes the existence of an 
alternate payee's right to receive all or a portion of a member's accrued benefits in a retirement 
system" that is "is issued pursuant to" 40 ILCS 5/1-119 "and Section 503(b)(2) of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act." 40 ILCS 5/1-119(a)(6). It is not clear from the 
record what the QILDRO order in Brown's case says, but regardless, the Court cannot disturb an 
order that impacts Brown's right to payment in a divorce proceeding. Third, she seeks an 
injunction that would prevent any judge "from finalizing the Plaintiff's dissolution case due to 
the interpolated QILDRO which has caused 40 ILCS 5/1-119 Qualified Illinois Domestic 
Relations Order to be unconstitutional." Compl. 96. The Court cannot interfere with or prevent 
entry of a divorce decree. The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant these forms of requested relief, 
and therefore dismisses the requests without prejudice. See, e.g., Lauderdale-El v. Ind. Parole 
Bd., 35 F.4th 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2022) ("Dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are 
necessarily without prejudice . . . ."). 
 2. Rooker-Feldman Abstention 
 Rooker-Feldman applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi 
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). All Defendants invoke Rooker-
Feldman to argue that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear Brown's claims against them. 
See, e.g., Judge Defendants Mot. Dismiss 5–9. The Seventh Circuit interprets Exxon Mobil to 
require that four elements be present for Rooker-Feldman to apply, with its own caselaw adding 
a fifth element: (1) "the federal plaintiff must have been a state-court loser"; (2) "the state-court 
judgment must have become final before the federal proceedings began"; (3) "the state-court 
judgment must have caused the alleged injury underlying the federal claim"; (4) "the claim must 

invite the federal district court to review and reject the state-court judgment"; and (5) the 
plaintiff must have had "a reasonable opportunity to raise her federal issues in the state courts." 
See Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 766 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc). 
 At first blush, Brown's Complaint seems like an ideal candidate for the application of 
Rooker-Feldman, at least with respect to any claims arising out of the Mandamus Proceeding—
the Divorce Proceeding remains ongoing, so clearly Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable.8 The 
paradigmatic example of relief which is forbidden by Rooker-Feldman arises when "a plaintiff 

8 See In re the Marriage of Brown, 2020-D-36, Hancock County, Illinois, 
https://www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_history.jsp?court=IL034015J&ocl=IL034015J,2020D36,IL034015JL2020
D36P1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2024). 
extends the invitation to undo, reverse, or overturn the state court judgment." See Gilbank, 111 
F.4th at 795 (Kirsch, J., concurring in part).9 Here, Brown explicitly requests that the Court 
grant her "relief from multiple void court orders issued by Judges[] Wooleyhan, Brenner, and 
Standard," Compl. 95, and wants relief from the sanctions imposed in orders issued by Judges 

Brenner and Wooleyhan, such as requiring her to pay her opponents' attorneys' fees, id. at 96. 
Some of Brown's other claims, while not explicitly seeking reversal of a state court judgment, 
could be considered to have been caused by a state court judgment. For example, she complains 
that three attorneys in the Mandamus Proceeding violated her rights and acted under color of law 
when they opposed her attempts to substitute a presiding judge, engaged in ex parte 
communications with Judge Hooker, and perpetrated a fraud upon the state court by providing 
unspecified "fraudulent facts" when requesting an extension of time. Compl. 26–28, 59, 62. 
Assuming these actions injured Brown, such injuries were caused by the orders in the Mandamus 
Proceeding which dismissed her amended complaint and imposed sanctions upon her because the 
allegedly improper motion practice, ex parte communications, and improper extension of time 

would have been harmless errors had she obtained a writ of mandamus directing that the Divorce 
Proceeding be conducted according to her preferences. See Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 768 (holding 
that where a plaintiff claimed, in part, that the defendants violated her due process rights by 
failing to provide notice prior to a hearing, the alleged injuries were caused by the state court 
judgment because "the failure of notice would have been harmless if the . . . hearing had gone 
her way"). 

9 Part I of Judge Kirsch's concurrence in part and dissent in part constitutes a majority opinion of the en banc 
Seventh Circuit. See Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 760 ("A different majority of the court . . . joins Part I of Judge Kirsch's 
opinion, making that portion also an en banc majority opinion."). 
 But it appears that the Mandamus Proceeding was not quite final at the time, making 
Rooker-Feldman technically inapplicable to claims arising out of it. "State law determines the 
finality of a state judicial decision" for purposes of Rooker-Feldman. Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 
62 F.4th 394, 400 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). Under Illinois law, "[a] judgment 

or order is ‘final' if it disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire case or on some 
definite and separate part of the controversy." Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 687 N.E.2d 
871, 874 (Ill. 1997). Dismissal of a complaint with prejudice generally counts as a final order or 
judgment, "as it indicates that the plaintiff will not be allowed to amend his complaint, thereby 
terminating the litigation." Fabian v. BGC Holdings, LP, 24 N.E.3d 307, 311–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2014). However, "[i]n determining whether an order that does not resolve a claim for fees 
constitutes a final, appealable order, courts have made a distinction between a claim for fees 
brought as part of the principal action and a claim made after the principal action has been 
decided." Goral v. Kulys, 21 N.E.3d 64, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). A 
proceeding for attorneys' fees imposed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 is "within and a 

part of the underlying civil action" which "must be resolved before the action becomes 
appealable." In re Est. of Kunsch, 794 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 Judge Wooleyhan's order imposing sanctions on Brown invoked Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 137. Sept. 6, 2023 Order in Mandamus Proceeding 2–3 ("As a further sanction against the 
plaintiff pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137, plaintiff is ordered to pay the reasonable attorney 
fee and costs of counsel for the defendants incurred in defending their clients against the filings 
by plaintiff herein . . . ."). Attorneys' fees were not awarded in the Mandamus Proceeding until 
November 1, 2023 at the earliest—two days before Brown filed her federal complaint. See Nov. 
1, 2023 Min. Order in Mandamus Proceeding; Nov. 2, 2023 Order in Mandamus Proceeding; 
Compl. 1. No party analyzes whether Judge Brenner's October 10, 2023 order dismissing 
Brown's amended complaint with prejudice but reserving the issue of the amount of attorneys' 
fees, see Oct. 10, 2023 Order in Mandamus Proceeding, effectively ended the case, cf. Bauer v. 
Koester, 951 F.3d 863, 867 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that an order was "effectively final" for 

purposes of Rooker-Feldman despite the at-issue order being unappealable under state law). The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that Rooker-Feldman occupies "narrow ground," Exxon Mobil, 
544 U.S. at 284, and this case appears to be an imperfect candidate for its application because 
Brown reached the federal courthouse just before the Mandamus Proceeding was finalized, cf. 
Stewart v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 23-cv-3731, 2024 WL 554281, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 12, 2024) (noting that there is not "much difference between a state court loser and a state 
court soon-to-be loser" but still finding that Rooker-Feldman did not apply to the instant case). 
 3. Younger Abstention 
 "Younger v. Harris, [401 U.S. 37 (1971)], and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy 
against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary 

circumstances." Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 
(1982). All Defendants argue that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear Brown's claims 
against them as they are barred by Younger abstention. E.g., Judge Defs. Mot. Dismiss 10–12. 
Younger abstention is applicable only to certain state-court proceedings, namely "state criminal 
proceeding[s]," "particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions," or 
proceedings "that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." 
Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013); see also Smith & Wesson Brands, 
Inc. v. Att'y Gen. of N.J., 27 F.4th 886, 890 (3d Cir. 2022) ("[F]ederal courts expanded Younger 
and abstained too frequently, so the Supreme Court reined in that expansion." (citing Jacobs, 571 
U.S. at 81–82)). If a state-court proceeding falls within one of those categories, then Younger 
abstention—which is rooted in federalism concerns and respect for a state-court system's ability 
to hear and adjudicate cases—requires a court to abstain from hearing claims that would interfere 
with the proceeding when three conditions are satisfied: "(1) the judicial or judicial in nature 

state proceedings must be on-going; (2) the proceedings must implicate important state interests; 
and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state court proceeding to raise constitutional 
challenges." Tr. & Inv. Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1994). But even if 
the three conditions are established, a court should decline to abstain where there are 
extraordinary circumstances, such as "bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute." 
Jacobs, 571 U.S. at 77. 
 Here, a threshold issue prevents applying Younger to this case: no Defendant has pointed 
the Court to any authority holding that a divorce proceeding or a mandamus proceeding are one 
of the three types of proceedings Younger applies to under Jacobs. Judge Defendants point to 
Parejko v. Dunn County Circuit Court, 209 F. App'x 545, 546 (7th Cir. 2006), in support of their 

argument that domestic relations litigation implicates significant state interests. Judge Defs. 
Mot. Dismiss 10. In Parejko, the Seventh Circuit collected caselaw establishing that "federal 
courts have long recognized that domestic relations litigation—from marriage to divorce—is an 
area of significant state concern from which the federal judiciary should generally abstain under 
Younger." Parejko, 209 F. App'x at 546. But this case is both unpublished and was decided 
before the Supreme Court in Jacobs clearly limited Younger's scope. Judge Defendants do not 
analyze whether the Divorce Proceeding implicates "a state's interest in enforcing orders and 
judgments of its courts," such that it would fit within one of the three categories of cases 
identified in Jacobs. See Woodard, 997 F.3d at 722. They do point to a post-Jacobs case, Doe v. 
Lindell, No. 22-1666, 2023 WL 196467, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 17, 2023), which they assert is 
"strikingly similar" to this case, Judge Defs. Mot Dismiss 11–12. There, the plaintiff sued her 
ex-husband and other individuals "involved in her state-court divorce and custody proceedings," 
alleging under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 that "the defendants conspired with the state-court 

judge to limit her parental rights." Lindell, 2023 WL 196467, at *1–2. There are obvious 
similarities between Lindell and this case, but one key distinguishing feature is that the plaintiff 
in Lindell filed a petition for a contempt order against the defendants based on their unlawful 
conspiracy, and such contempt petitions fell within "one of the three types of proceedings in 
which Younger applies." Id. at *2–3 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977)). It is less 
clear in this case whether some aspect of the Divorce Proceeding neatly matches one of those 
three types of proceedings. 
 4. General Abstention Principles 
 Thus far, the Court has concluded that: (1) claims for monetary damages asserted against 
Judge Defendants must be dismissed with prejudice based upon judicial immunity; (2) the 

domestic relations exception precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction over Brown's 
request that this Court adjudicate her family-law issues but that exception does not affect the 
majority of her other requests; (3) Rooker-Feldman is probably an imperfect fit for claims 
stemming from the finalized Mandamus Proceeding due to unbriefed issues of Illinois law; and 
(4) Younger abstention is a similarly problematic fit for claims stemming from the ongoing 
Divorce Proceeding as that proceeding does not neatly fit the categories of cases identified in 
Jacobs. In other words, the gravamen of Brown's case does not belong in federal court, but the 
narrow and technical doctrines used to weed out impermissible claims are not up to the task. 
 The Seventh Circuit confronted a similar dilemma in Woodard. There, the plaintiff filed 
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit on his own behalf and behalf of his children after his then-wife 
successfully sought a court order suspending his parenting time, "alleging violations of their First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights and claiming that [Illinois Department of Children and Family 

Services] employees' conduct set off a series of events culminating in a state court order 
infringing on his and his kids' right to familial association." Woodard, 997 F.3d at 717. The 
Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff was "probably right" that "none of the abstention 
doctrines—if examined and applied in isolated fashion—appl[ied] to his claims." Id. at 722. It 
noted that the plaintiff's case did not "fit[] exactly" with the three types of cases covered by 
Younger abstention, and that Rooker-Feldman abstention and the domestic-relations exceptions 
were not exactly on point as well. Id. at 722–23. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit found that 
abstention was warranted because the plaintiff's complaint sought to "compel the adjudication of 
claims that would inject a federal court into a contested and ongoing family court custody 
dispute," and thereby disregard the "underlying principles of equity, comity, and federalism 

foundational to our federal constitutional structure" which motivate the various abstention 
doctrines. Id. at 722. The plaintiff's "complaint ma[de] plain" that the plaintiff's goal was "to 
receive a favorable federal constitutional ruling that c[ould] be used affirmatively or offensively 
to shape—or perhaps change—the direction and course of the state court proceedings." Id. at 
723. Because granting the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff could give him "an offensive 
tool to take to state court to challenge that judge's orders," the "federal court[] need[ed] to stay 
on the sidelines." Id. 
 The same considerations that motivated the Seventh Circuit in Woodard apply with equal 
if not greater force in this case. Based on conclusory assertions of denials of due process and 
equal protection, Brown seeks a ruling from this Court to "have her two cases moved to a proper 
court," wipe out "multiple void court orders," undo the imposition of sanctions, prevent the 
judge who is currently presiding over the Divorce Proceeding—Judge Standard—"from 
presiding over [her] case," order the turnover of "full-disclosure discovery," and prevent any 

judge who previously refused her discovery requests from presiding over her case. See Compl. 
95–97. She goes even farther than the plaintiff in Woodard in that she asks that the Court 
directly effectuate her requests instead of merely giving her a ruling which she could herself in 
the Divorce Proceeding. Even if the technical parameters of Rooker-Feldman and Younger are 
not satisfied, the policies of equity, comity, and federalism underpinning those doctrines' 
commands are obviously implicated. Brown failed to appeal in her Mandamus Proceeding and 
instead asks this Court to essentially act as a reviewing court. Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 
U.S. 592, 611 & n.22 (1975) (holding that the district court should not have "entertained" an 
action "seeking pre-appeal interference with a state judicial proceeding" and that even if his time 
to appeal had passed before the district court had issued its permanent injunction, the plaintiff 

could "not avoid the standards of Younger by simply failing to comply with the procedures of 
perfecting its appeal"). And she directly asks the Court to meddle in the still ongoing Divorce 
Proceeding.. As adjudicating Brown's sweeping requests for injunctive relief would require this 
Court to overstep its proper role in our federalist system, the Court must abstain. See Woodard, 
997 F.3d at 724; see also Jenkins v. McHaney, No. 22-cv-2128-DWD, 2023 WL 3320147, at *7 
(S.D. Ill. May 9, 2023) (applying Woodard as an additional basis to abstain from plaintiff's 
section 1983 which asked the court to review the "constitutionality of the presiding judge's 
decisions and actions," find certain state-court decisions to be void, and "enjoin the state court 
proceedings"); Doe v. Lake County, No. 21-cv-3262, 2022 WL 874651, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 
2022) (holding that "[e]ven if Younger [were not] a perfect fit, under [Woodard] abstention 
remains the appropriate course"), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Lindell, No. 22-1666, 2023 WL 196467 
(7th Cir. Jan. 17, 2023); Bush v. Carr, No. 20 C 6634, 2021 WL 4552555, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 
2021) ("[A]bstention surely is warranted here, where Bush sues Judge Carr himself and asks this 

court to directly decide the constitutionality of the judge's rulings and actions [in a parental 
rights case]."). 
 It is not clear whether the bad faith and harassment exceptions to Younger apply to this 
nebulous Woodward-style abstention, but assuming they do, Brown fails to show that her state 
cases have been conducted in bad faith or to harass or retaliate against her. A plaintiff "must 
allege specific facts to support her inferences of bad faith, bias, and retaliation." Crenshaw v. 
Sup. Ct. of Ind., 170 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 1999). And Brown's allegations of bias are 
conclusory, amounting to pointing out that various judges ruled against her on various issues. 
But mere reliance on judicial rulings, at least here, cannot suffice to prove bias. See Lindell, 
2023 WL 196467, at *3. Finding no extraordinary circumstances warrant declining to abstain, 

Brown's requests for injunctive relief are dismissed without prejudice. See Lauderdale-El, 35 
F.4th at 576. 
 Brown's requests for compensatory damages from the attorneys are another matter. If 
her claims for compensatory damages would interfere with the ongoing state proceedings, the 
Court must abstain from hearing them as well. See Woodard, 997 F.3d at 724. The only non-
Judge Defendants Brown arguably seeks compensatory damages from are Woodworth and 
Icenogle. The only requests she makes for compensatory damages (other than those related to 
the QILDRO order, which the Court has already dismissed) arise out of Judge Poncin's January 
14, 2021 order. See Compl. 97 (seeking reimbursement of "$240,710.00 plus interest at the 
highest legal rate" "for payment of marital bills plaintiff has been forced to pay after officers of 
the court changed the language of the court's decision," which is a reference to Judge Poncin's 
January 14, 2021 order which she alleges Woodworth and Icenogle fraudulently altered); id. at 
98 (seeking "reimbursement for the fraud perpetrated upon the court when Woodworth, Icenogle 

and Poncin deprived the Plaintiff of $ 3,927 per month that she was rightly awarded by the 
Court," again referring to that same January 14, 2021 order); id. (seeking "compensatory 
damages to compensate the Plaintiff for the criminal conduct of Poncin, Woodworth and 
Icenogle in changing the language of the Court's decision" based upon the value of her time and 
labor in running her bed and breakfast business as well punitive damages, calculated as four 
times the amount of compensatory damages she seeks). As any claims for injunctive relief 
against them are dismissed under abstention principles and Brown seeks no other relief from 
them, Van Vooren, Laudeman, O'Brien, and Gallant Jones are dismissed from this suit without 
prejudice. 
 The Court reiterates that Brown's pleadings are long and often conclusory. As best the 

Court can tell, Brown claims that Woodworth and Icenogle violated her due process and equal 
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in the following ways: participating in a 
hearing with Judge Poncin in Judge Poncin's chambers, Compl. 17 (both Woodworth and 
Icenogle); tampering with Judge Poncin's January 14, 2021 order to make her liable for marital 
bills that she was not supposed to be liable for, id. at 18–19 (both Woodworth and Icenogle); 
withholding discovery from Brown, id. (Icenogle only); filing an "unlawful petition for exclusive 
possession of the marital residence," id. at 19 (Woodworth only); allowing the state court to 
consider "a fraudulent and un-filed Financial Affidavit to be used during" a January 11, 2021 
hearing, id. (Woodworth only). Presumably, these claims would interfere with the ongoing 
Divorce Proceeding because a finding that Brown's procedural due process rights were violated, 
for example, would undermine the state's ability to finally resolve the Divorce Proceeding. Cf. 
Woodard, 997 F.3d at 724 ("As for Edwin's request for compensatory damages, he would have 
to first establish a constitutional violation of his right to familial association, and he could then 

use that judgment to interfere with ongoing state court proceedings."); Majors v. Engelbrecht, 
149 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[A] federal damages suit, although not interfering with the 
state proceeding to the same degree as an injunction, could beat the state action to judgment and 
either undermine or preclude the State's consideration of some issues." (citations omitted)). 
Thus, abstention from these claims would typically be warranted, achieved either by dismissing 
the claims without prejudice or staying them pending resolution of the state case. Cf. Green v. 
Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 But the Court finds that abstention from the claim against Woodworth is unnecessary 
because it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations.10 See Not. Adoption Arguments 2–3. 
"The limitations period for § 1983 claims is based in state law, and the statute of limitations for 

§ 1983 actions in Illinois is two years." O'Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th 
Cir. 2015); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (noting that federal law looks to 
state law for the relevant statute of limitations for section 1983 claims). "The date at which the 
claim accrues and thus starts the running of the limitations period is a matter of federal law, and 

10 The Court perceives no jurisdictional bar to dismissing this claim on the merits as barred by the statute of 
limitations. The case is clearly within the Court's federal question jurisdiction as Brown complains of federal 
constitutional violations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And the Court's understanding is that a stay of damages claims 
under Younger essentially acts as a retention of jurisdiction over the case so it can resume once there is no chance 
resolution of the claim would interfere with the state proceeding; staying the case allows the court to comply with its 
"virtually unflagging obligation[] to exercise [its] jurisdiction." Cf. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) 
(quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the often-stated reason for staying a money damages claim that falls within 
Younger rather than dismissing it without prejudice is "to avoid losing the plaintiff's claim to the statute of 
limitations without adjudicating it." Majors, 149 F.3d at 714. Where the claim is within the Court's subject matter 
jurisdiction and clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the Court sees no reason to stay it. The Court would 
simply make the same decision once the Divorce Proceeding was finalized. 
generally occurs when a plaintiff knows the fact and the cause of an injury." O'Gorman, 777 
F.3d at 889. "If a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to establish a statute of limitations defense, the 
district court may dismiss the complaint on that ground." Id. 
 Here, Brown asserts that she learned of the fact and cause of the injury which she 

attributes to Woodworth on June 25, 2021, when she received the letter from the ARDC. Compl. 
41 ("It was not until Plaintiff received a copy of Woodworth's 6/25/21 response to the ARDC 
regarding her complaint that she learned of the criminal conduct perpetrated by the three officers 
of the court, upon the court, and upon the plaintiff, in the seizure and deprivation of Plaintiff's 
property."). Woodworth withdrew from representing her on May 19, 2021, and she does not 
allege that Woodworth harmed her after June 25, 2021. She filed her complaint in this case on 
October 30, 2023, more than two years after June 25, 2021. Therefore, by her own allegations, 
her claim against Woodworth is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See O'Gorman, 
777 F.3d at 889. 
 Brown's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She asserts that federal law, not 

state law, governs the characterization of a section 1983 claim for statute of limitations purposes 
and that state-law statutes of limitations must give way to federal law if they are inconsistent 
with federal law. Mem. Supp. Resp. Icenogle & O'Brien's Joint Mot. Dismiss 25–26, ECF No. 
61-1 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)); see also Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269 ("[S]tate 
law shall only apply ‘so far as the same is not inconsistent with' federal law." (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988)). In part, the Court agrees—section 1983 is a federal cause of action, but to determine 
the statute of limitations for a section 1983 cause of action, "federal law looks to the law of the 
State in which the cause of action arose." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387. However, Brown then 
argues that the two-year statute of limitations is inconsistent with federal law because "[f]raud 
upon the court is not subject to any statute of limitations." Mem. Supp. Resp. Icenogle & 
O'Brien's Joint Mot. Summ. J. 25–26. Brown's argument that her section 1983 claim is not 
subject to any statute of limitations because she invokes the word "fraud" is unsupported by any 
competent legal authority. 

 Though Icenogle also argues that the claim against him is barred by the statute of 
limitations, see Mem. Supp. Icenogle & O'Brien's Joint Mot. Dismiss 9–10, he fails to mention 
that one of Brown's allegations against him is that he participated in depriving her of discovery 
in 2022, see Compl. 56–57. Accordingly, the Court will stay consideration of the claim against 
Icenogle pending resolution of the Divorce Proceeding. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Accordingly, Defendant Dennis G. Woodworth's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 
No. 30, is MOOT. His request for dismissal of any claim against him under the statute of 
limitations in his adoption of his co-Defendants' arguments, ECF No. 56, is GRANTED. 
Defendant Joseph N. Van Vooren's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 32, is MOOT. His 

request for abstention in his adoption of his co-Defendants' arguments, ECF No. 56, is 
GRANTED. Any claim against Van Vooren for injunctive relief is DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. No claim for monetary damages was stated against Van Vooren. Defendant Kirk 
W. Laudeman's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 50, is GRANTED IN PART. 
Any claim for injunctive relief against Laudeman is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. No 
claim for monetary damages was stated against Laudeman. Defendants Judges David L. Vancil, 
Heidi A. Benson, William E. Poncin, James R. Standard, Rodney G. Clark, James G. Baber, 
Jerry Hooker, Talmadge Brenner, and John Wooleyhan ("Judge Defendants") and Assistant 
Attorney General Sandra Gallant-Jones's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in 
Support, ECF No. 46, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. All claims for monetary 
damages against Judge Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All claims for 
injunctive relief against Judge Defendants and Gallant-Jones are DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. No claim for monetary damages was stated against Gallant-Jones. Defendants 

Eric Icenogle and Jeff O'Brien's Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 48, is 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. All claims for injunctive relief against Icenogle 
and O'Brien are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. No claim for monetary damages was 
stated against O'Brien. The only remaining claim is the claim for money damages against 
Icenogle. This case is STAYED pending the resolution of the Divorce Proceeding. Plaintiff 
Brenda J. Brown is DIRECTED to provide the Court with a status report by December 23, 2024. 
Failure to provide such a status report will result in the dismissal of this case for failure to 
prosecute. 

 Entered this 24th day of September, 2024. 

 s/ Sara Darrow 
 SARA DARROW 
 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE