CourtListener opinion 10668307

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

LYNN-MARIE DAWN MURPHY, 

 Plaintiff, 24cv0784 
 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 
 v. 

HUB PARKING TECHNOLOGY USA, INC., 

 Defendant/ Third-Party Plaintiff. 

 v. 

BRANDON MURPHY, 

 Third-Party Defendant 

 Memorandum Order on Motion to Dismiss 

 This is an action brought under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Pending before this Court is Third-Party Defendant Brandon 
Murphy's Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party Amended Complaint filed by HUB Parking 
Technology USA, Inc. (HUB), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 12(b)(6), on the basis that the 
equitable claims advanced by Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff HUB against Third-Party 
Defendant Murphy, are not cognizable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).1 

1 ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism, available to Plan Fiduciaries, states that: A civil action 
may be brought—(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice 
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan; 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 
248, 253 (1993) (Equitable relief under must not be based upon violations of state court orders, 
but instead must be based upon a violation of the ERISA statute or the Plan). 
 Plaintiff, Lynn-Marie Dawn Murphy, the ex-wife of Third-Party Defendant, filed a one- 
count Complaint before this Court on May 29, 2024, under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, alleging a 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) against Defendant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff HUB Parking Technology USA, Inc., the Plan Administrator for HUB Technology USA 
(Third-Party Defendant's former employer) for alleged unauthorized distribution of the proceeds 

of Third-Party Defendant's Retirement Savings Plan (401(k)) in the amount of $121,000.00, 
which was the subject of a Domestic Relations Order (DRO). Under a Marriage Settlement 
Agreement in the divorce proceedings in state court, Third-Party Defendant was to distribute a 
lump sum payment of the proceeds of the 401(k) in the $121,000.00 to his ex-wife, Plaintiff. On 
March 22, 2022, a Domestic Relations Order was sent to HUB and HUB then had two years to 
evaluate the Order and determine it if was a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). 
During the evaluation period, on July 25, 2022, Third-Party Defendant wrongfully withdrew the 
entire amount of his 401(k), which, according to Plaintiff, was in breach of HUB's fiduciary duty 
as Plan Administrator. Third-Party Defendant Murphy was subsequently Ordered in his divorce 

proceedings to pay Plaintiff the $121,000.00 he wrongfully withdrew from the 401(k) (after a 
Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement was granted by State Court, which was amended 
on April 4, 2024, to allow Third-Party Defendant to make monthly payments in the amount of 
$1,250.00 until all proceeds were paid) for his violation of the terms of the Marriage Settlement 
Agreement. Five installments have been made by Third-Party Defendant to Plaintiff to date. 
ECF Nos. 18-2 and 18-3. 
 Plaintiff contends in its one-count Complaint that HUB acted in violation of ERISA when 
it allowed the unauthorized distribution of the 401(k) to Third-Party Defendant, that it had a 
fiduciary duty to administer the Fund, which it failed to do in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104, and 
that she has been damaged as a result thereof. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, 
including pre and post judgment interest, attorney's fees and costs, and all relief to which she is 
entitled under ERISA Section 1132(a). Defendant HUB filed an Answer on July 25, 2024, and 
on August 8, 2024, HUB filed a Third-Party Complaint against Third-Party Defendant Murphy 
alleging a claim of unjust enrichment based upon 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 

 Third-Party Defendant Murphy has now filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 
18), claiming that HUB's claim for unjust enrichment is not based upon ERISA, but is instead 
based upon the violation of the State Court, where the action belongs; that HUB owes an 
independent duty to Plaintiff for which Third-Party Defendant Murphy is not liable, and 
paradoxically, that because the DRO was not "qualified," HUB has no liability to Plaintiff. 
 For its part, in its responsive briefing, HUB concedes that it should have segregated the 
funds until a determination was made as to whether the DRO was a QDRO, but that if HUB is 
held liable, Third-Party Defendant Murphy would be unjustly enriched if he is not required to 
"make HUB whole by repaying any amounts he wrongfully removed from the Plan." ECF No. 

23. HUB further argues that the claim for unjust enrichment is not merely based upon violation 
of a State Court Order, and that the existence of a valid QDRO does not negate the potential for 
liability in this matter. This Court further notes that Plaintiff has not taken a position or filed a 
brief on the pending Motion to Dismiss. 
 In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Courts require notice pleading, as 
opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only "‘a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds on which it rests.'" Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957)). Building upon the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
explained that a District Court must undertake the following three steps to determine the 
sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead 
to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than 

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded 
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 
212 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The third step requires this Court to consider the specific 
nature of the claims presented and to determine whether the facts pled to substantiate the claims 
are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved 
Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a Complaint, they must be 
supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. This Court may not dismiss a 

Complaint merely because it appears unlikely or improbable that Plaintiff can prove the facts 
alleged or will ultimately prevail on the merits. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. Instead, this Court 
must ask whether the facts alleged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at 556. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides 
adequate facts to establish "how, when, and where" will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 212 (3d Cir. 2009). In short, a Motion to Dismiss should not be 
granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at trial, entitle him/her to relief. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. 
 "In evaluating a motion to dismiss, [courts] may consider documents that are attached to 
or submitted with the complaint, Id. at 560, and any "matters incorporated by reference or 
integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items 
appearing in the record of the case." 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
& Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.2004). Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 

2006). Third-Party Defendant Murphy requests, and this Court, has considered Exhibits 1 and 2 
attached to the Motion to Dismiss, the exhibits attached to the Third-Party Complaint at ECF 
Nos. 10-1, 10-2 and the original Complaint at ECF No. 1-2, which are matters of public 
record/court orders. 
 There exists a dispute regarding whether Third-Party Plaintiff's claim for unjust 
enrichment pursuant to Section 1132(a)(3) is ultimately recoverable. See Unum Life Ins. Co. of 
America v. Grourke, 406 F.Supp.2d 524, 530-534 (M.D.Pa. 2005) (Thus, for restitution to lie in 
equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to 
restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant's possession); Great-W. Life 

& Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002). In Grourke, the Court set forth the 
unsettled state of the law on this issue: 
 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Knudson, a split among the circuits 
 has developed over how to determine the true nature of restitution sought in an 
 ERISA action. In the minority view, the United States Courts of Appeals for 
 the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have read Knudson to establish a broad 
 prohibition under § 1132(a) (3) (B) on claims for restitution derived from the 
 provisions of ERISA plans. See, e.g., Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 
 638, 650 (6th Cir.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1639, 161 L. 
 Ed. 2d 510 (Mar. 21, 2005). For the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, \the fact that the