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2024 UT App 160

 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

 JUSTIN THOMAS CHLARSON,
 Appellant,
 v.
 JACQUELINE NICOLE CHLARSON,
 Appellee.

 Opinion
 No. 20230742-CA
 Filed November 7, 2024

 Second District Court, Farmington Department
 The Honorable Michael S. Edwards
 No. 204700767

 Charles R. Ahlstrom and J Ed Christiansen,
 Attorneys for Appellant
 Deborah L. Bulkeley and James H. Woodall,
 Attorneys for Appellee

 JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
 JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 At issue in this case is a divorce decree that divides equally
the marital portions of retirement funds. But the question of what
the marital portions include implicates a host of complex federal
statutes when a military retirement is in play. When analyzed for
their plain meaning, the relevant statutes make clear that the
retirement pay of a military member who retires due to a
permanent disability cannot be considered a marital portion
divisible in a state court divorce action. As a result, we reverse the
ruling of the district court to the contrary.
 Chlarson v. Chlarson

 BACKGROUND

¶2 Justin and Jacqueline 1 were married in 2012. After a bench
trial in 2021, they were divorced. At the time of trial, Justin was
serving full time in the military, pending a possible disability
retirement.

¶3 In the divorce decree (the Decree), the district court
awarded Justin and Jacqueline equal shares of the "marital
portions" of all retirement and pension funds. Specifically, the
district court ordered,

 The parties will verify retirement/pension funds
 and equally share the marital portions of those
 funds (from September 1, 2012 through October 1,
 2021). Each party will be responsible for the Orders
 (including Qualified Domestic Relations Orders and
 military division Orders) to obtain their interest in
 the other party's retirement.

¶4 Not long after the Decree was entered, Justin was retired
from the military with a disability rating of 100% and nearly
twenty-one years of service credited toward retirement. At that
point, Justin began receiving two types of pay relevant to this
case. First, Justin began receiving disability compensation. 2
Disability compensation is the pay awarded under 38 U.S.C.
§ 1110, which compensates service members for any disability

1. Because the parties share a last name, we use their first names
for clarity.

2. All parties agree that Justin's disability compensation is not
subject to division in the divorce.

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

caused or aggravated by an injury suffered in the line of duty. 3 See
38 U.S.C. § 1110. Second, Justin began receiving disability
retirement pay. Disability retirement pay is retirement pay that is
specifically awarded and calculated under 10 U.S.C. § 1201
(Chapter 61) for service members who are retired due to a
disability. See 10 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(3).

¶5 When Justin began receiving his disability retirement pay,
he "[refused] to pay anything" to Jacqueline. At the end of 2022,
Jacqueline filed a motion to enforce the award of her share of
Justin's retirement pay. Justin responded to Jacqueline's motion
arguing that his retirement pay was "not subject to division."

¶6 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued an
order concluding that Justin must pay Jacqueline her share of his
disability retirement pay. 4 The district court's conclusion was
premised on the assertion that it was bound by a recent Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals' Claims Appeals Board (DOHA
CAB) decision. See DOHA CAB Decision, 2016-CL-091608.3
(March 1, 2022). 5 Under the reasoning of that decision, Justin's
disability retirement pay was no longer grounded in Chapter 61,

3. At first, Justin's monthly disability compensation payments
were $3,574.63, but they later increased to $3,885.62.

4. The court determined that Jacqueline was entitled to 21.71% of
Justin's disability retirement pay. This was based on the length of
their marriage (109 months) divided by the length of Justin's
service (251 months) divided between Justin and Jacqueline
equally.

5. The DOHA CAB publishes its decisions on the DOHA website.
This decision can be accessed at the following link:
https://doha.ogc.osd.mil/Claims-Division/DOHA-Claims-Appeals-
Board-Decisions/2022-DOHA-Claims-Appeals-Board-Decisions
/FileId/168697/ [https://perma.cc/B7N9-CHNG].

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

and thus his disability retirement pay no longer fell within the
exemption which prevents it from being divided at divorce. See id.
at 6–7. Accordingly, the district court concluded that Justin's
retirement income was divisible as a matter of law.

 ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 Justin appeals, asserting that the district court erred in
determining that his disability retirement pay was subject to
division as part of a divorce proceeding. This issue requires us to
determine whether 10 U.S.C. § 1408's allowance, see infra ¶¶ 9–11,
for concurrent receipt of disability retirement pay and disability
compensation impacts the exclusion of disability retirement pay
from the definition of disposable pay. This is an issue of statutory
interpretation reviewed for correctness. See State v. Poole, 2015 UT
App 220, ¶ 5, 359 P.3d 667.

 ANALYSIS

¶8 As stated, the issue presented by this appeal is whether
Justin's retirement pay contains any "marital portions." Again,
the Decree provides that the "parties will verify
retirement/pension funds and equally share the marital portions
of those funds." Had the court identified a particular amount that
was to be equally divided, this case might be easily resolved by a
decision simply enforcing the Decree. However, the district court
identified the funds to be divided only as "marital portions,"
leaving open the question of what falls within that definition.

¶9 The marital portions of a military retiree's pay can include
only the funds that state courts are authorized to divide under
federal law. Some time ago, the United States Supreme Court held
that federal law precluded state courts in divorce proceedings
from dividing military retired pay altogether. McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210, 232–33 (1981). In response to that holding, Congress

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
(USFSPA), which is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408. See Michel v.
Michel, 692 S.E.2d 381, 382 (Ga. 2010).

¶10 Section 1408 grants courts the authority to "treat disposable
retired pay . . . either as property solely of the member or as
property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the
law of the jurisdiction of such court." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)
(emphasis added). Thus, state courts can divide retirement
payments or other awards between a member and a spouse so
long as that award qualifies as disposable retired pay. As a result,
the district court's determination that the marital portions of
Justin's and Jacqueline's retirements be shared equally is limited
by § 1408. Only those funds that qualify as disposable retired pay
under § 1408 may be considered a marital portion under the
Decree.

¶11 Section 1408 defines disposable retired pay as "the total
monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled," subject to
certain exclusions, including, as relevant here, the receipt of
retirement pay by a member entitled to retired pay under Chapter
61. Id. § 1408(a)(4)(A). Justin is such a member.

¶12 Had Justin ended his military career sans his disability, he
would have likely retired under 10 U.S.C. § 7314. That section
governs the retirement of any enlisted member of the Army who
has served between twenty and thirty years. See id. § 7314. But
Justin did not retire under § 7314; instead, he was retired by the
Army under Chapter 61. Specifically, he was retired with a
disability rating of 100% and with nearly twenty-one years of
service credited toward retirement. In addition to his Chapter 61
disability retired pay, Justin also receives disability compensation
under 38 U.S.C. § 1110.

¶13 Until 2004, a retired military member could not receive
both disability compensation and disability retirement pay. But in

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

2004 Congress amended the relevant statute (§ 1414) to allow
qualifying members to receive both retired pay and disability
compensation. See id. § 1414; Taylor v. Commissioner, No. 7137-13S,
2017 WL 478286, at *2 n.5 (T.C. Feb. 6, 2017) (describing the change
in disability and retirement compensation structure). Section 1414
allows members to receive both types of pay, but it also contains
special rules for Chapter 61 retirees:

 The retired pay of a member retired under Chapter
 61 of this title with 20 years or more of service . . . is
 subject to reduction . . . , but only to the extent that
 the amount of the member's retired pay under
 Chapter 61 of this title exceeds the amount of retired
 pay to which the member would have been entitled
 under any other provision of law based upon the
 member's service in the uniformed services if the
 member had not been retired under Chapter 61 of
 this title.

10 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1).

¶14 Had Justin retired under § 7314, he would have been
eligible for $2,577 of monthly retirement pay. Under his Chapter
61 disability retirement, Justin is eligible for $3,696 of monthly
retirement pay. Because his disability retirement pay exceeds
what he could have received under a normal retirement, he must
waive the additional $1,119. As a result, he is receiving $2,577, the
very amount he would have received had he retired under § 7314.
Of course, this is no coincidence. The statute dictates that any
amount that exceeds a service member's normal retirement pay
must be waived if a retiring service member wishes to
concurrently receive both disability retirement pay and disability
compensation. Consistent with this statutory directive, Justin
waived that amount and decreased his retirement pay to the same
amount he would have received under § 7314.

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

¶15 The potential receipt of retirement pay does not, however,
alter the actual character of the retirement pay. To be clear, the
amount of the payment does not mean that Justin is receiving
retirement pay under § 7314. Justin is and always has been
receiving Chapter 61 disability retirement pay, with a portion of
it waived as required by § 1414.

¶16 The parties, the district court, and the DOHA CAB all use
the term CRDP (concurrent retired and disability pay)
inconsistently. And it is § 1414 that propelled the use of the
acronym. The term CRDP, however, does not appear in the
statute. As far as we understand, the acronym describes the
concept that members may now receive both their retired
disability pay and disability compensation. It is also used to
describe the payments received when members opt to waive some
of their retirement pay so that they may also receive their
disability compensation.

¶17 Jacqueline argues that CRDP is divisible upon divorce. On
the other hand, Justin argues that CRDP is not "some sort of new
category of pay or entitlement." Rather, he asserts, it is an
eligibility status that allows "qualified retirees" to concurrently
receive two kinds of already existing entitlements.

¶18 The Supreme Court of Alaska was faced with nearly these
exact arguments in Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432 (Alaska
2015). There, a husband and wife had divorced and were litigating
over the subsequent property division. Id. at 433. After the
divorce, the husband was retired from the military for permanent
disability under Chapter 61. Id. at 434, 438. The wife argued that
"CRDP is divisible upon divorce." Id. at 441 (cleaned up).

¶19 The court in Guerrero explained "CRDP does not change
the nature of [a member's] Chapter 61 retirement benefit. [His]
benefits come from two sources—Chapter 61 disability retirement
and VA disability payments. Neither source is divisible upon

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

divorce." Id. Such is the case here. Justin receives Chapter 61
disability retirement and disability compensation. Neither is
divisible.

¶20 The fact that § 1414 references Chapter 61 recipients does
not convert all Chapter 61 recipients into § 1414 recipients. A
statutory reference to Chapter 61 and a policy change that impacts
those recipients does not change the underlying fact that they are
receiving retirement pay under Chapter 61.

¶21 Issued seven years after Guerrero, the DOHA CAB decision
relied on by the district court concludes that because members
like Justin are allowed to receive both disability retirement pay
and disability compensation under § 1414, they are no longer
Chapter 61 recipients; instead, they are § 1414 recipients. DOHA
CAB Decision 2016-CL-091608.3 (March 1, 2022). The DOHA CAB
thus concludes that members like Justin are "no longer receiving
Chapter 61 retired pay as calculated under [Chapter 61]; but [are]
being paid CRDP based on the principles and calculations under
10 U.S.C. § 1414." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). In doing so, the
DOHA CAB purported to undertake a plain meaning analysis of
the statutes in play. Id. at 4.

¶22 We, however, do not adopt the approach of the DOHA
CAB for two reasons. First, we are not bound by it. Second, we do
not find its reasoning persuasive.

¶23 At oral argument, both parties acknowledged that state
courts are not bound by decisions of the DOHA CAB. And the
district court here did not explain why it would be bound by such
a decision. Further, our research has found no precedent or
authority to that effect.

¶24 Of course, we could adopt the DOHA CAB approach if it
was the most accurate and natural interpretation of the plain
language of the statute as it purports. But it is not. As discussed,

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

§ 1414 does not use the term CRDP. Nor does it make logical sense
to say, as the DOHA CAB does, that a person is "being paid
CRDP." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). CRDP is nothing more than an
acronym to capture the fact that under § 1414, a qualifying
member may receive both disability compensation and disability
retirement pay.

¶25 It is true that only through § 1414 can members receive
both disability retirement pay under Chapter 61 and disability
compensation under 38 U.S.C. § 1119. But that does not change
the fact that they are recipients under Chapter 61. Section 1414
merely alters the original policy that once barred concurrent
receipt. In other words, we think the holding of the Supreme
Court of Alaska in Guerrero was correct and remains so.

¶26 Section 1414 references the statutes that actually entitle
members to their pay. 10 U.S.C. § 1414. It says that "a member or
former member of the uniformed services who is entitled for any
month to retired pay and who is also entitled for that month to
veterans' disability . . . is entitled to be paid both for that month."
Id. § 1414(a)(1). The statute goes on to provide special rules for
Chapter 61 retirees. Id. § 1414(b). While § 1414 makes it possible
for retirees to receive two types of pay concurrently, it does not
itself award recipients any pay.

¶27 Thus, it cannot be said, as the DOHA CAB did, that
members receiving both disability compensation and disability
retirement pay are no longer Chapter 61 recipients but are instead
being paid "based on the principles and calculations under 10
U.S.C. § 1414." DOHA CAB Decision 2016-CL-091608.3, at 7
(March 1, 2022). It is Chapter 61 that entitles Justin to his
retirement pay. If Congress were to repeal Chapter 61 altogether,
recipients under that provision would no longer be able to receive
their retirement pay, even if § 1414 remained. Section 1414 applies
only to a member entitled to disability retirement pay. It is Chapter
61 that entitles these members to their pay.

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 Chlarson v. Chlarson

¶28 Accordingly, the district court erroneously divided Justin's
retirement pay. Because Justin is receiving Chapter 61 retirement
pay, which is excluded under the definition of disposable retired
pay as explained above, it cannot be considered a marital portion
and divided between Justin and Jacqueline.

¶29 We acknowledge the apparent inequity of this conclusion.
To leave a former spouse of a service member without any portion
of the retirement pay earned while they were married seems like
an unfair policy determination. But it is not a policy determination
that we made, nor is it one that we can change. This is strictly a
matter of statutory interpretation, which means that our role as
the court ends when we interpret the plain language of the law.

 CONCLUSION

¶30 Justin receives disability retirement pay under Chapter 61.
Under the plain language of § 1408, that pay does not qualify as
disposable retired pay. Accordingly, it cannot be considered part
of a marital portion. We therefore reverse the district court's
holding that part of Justin's retirement benefits can be divided
between the parties.

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