CourtListener opinion 10746599

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

J-A01039-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TIMOTHY MOHEN, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 Appellant :
 :
 v. :
 :
CHRISTINE MOHEN, :
 :
 Appellee : No. 835 EDA 2020

 Appeal from the Order Entered February 3, 2020
 in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
 Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015-10855

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2021

 Appellant, Timothy Mohen, ("Husband") appeals from the February 3,

2020 order, which amended a January 8, 2020 order and decree that both

dissolved the marriage between Husband and Appellee, Christine Mohen,

("Wife") and provided for equitable distribution of their assets. For the

following reasons, we affirm, in part, and vacate, in part. Specifically, we

vacate the portion of the January 8, 2020 order that erroneously charges

Husband with $4,360,158.00 in unaccrued interest on marital assets Husband

fraudulently dissipated from the marital estate. Because this disposition of an

issue raised on appeal alters the overall calculations and distribution of the

equitable distribution award, we remand for the trial court to issue a new order

in accordance with this memorandum.

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
 J-A01039-21

 We provide the following overview of this case as derived from the trial

court's opinion and certified record. The parties married in 1986 and had

three children together, all of whom are now adults. The parties separated

after 27 years and 9 months of marriage in December 2013. Subsequently,

Husband became engaged to Chelsea Hardy ("Fiancée"), with whom he lives

in Pennsylvania along with their three minor children. Wife resides in New

Jersey.

 Both Husband and Wife have accounting degrees. In 1990, Wife left the

paid workforce due to an agreement between the parties that she would tend

to the family while Husband would be the wage earner. As such, Wife's

present monthly earning capacity is only $1,071.79, while Husband's monthly

net income is $64,000.00. During the marriage, Husband purchased and

operated various business entities and real estate companies. Between the

parties' personal and business interests, they amassed marital assets worth

millions of dollars.

 On October 4, 2011, Husband had the first of a series of meetings with

an estate attorney to create trusts for the parties' children and update his

estate plan. Husband did not include Wife in the meetings. In August 2012,

Husband gave Wife a copy of his will, which he had newly executed on August

3, 2012. The will named Wife as the beneficiary of Husband's estate.

 Meanwhile, after a series of extramarital affairs with other women,

Husband began a relationship with Fiancée in mid-2012. In October 2012,

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Wife found suspicious emails and a bill regarding tutoring costs with Fiancée's

name. Husband denied being in an extra-marital relationship with Fiancée

and told Wife he was helping a woman in Pennsylvania with her daughter's

tutoring costs.

 On October 5, 2012, Husband executed trust documents that

transferred common shares of stock from two of his multi-million-dollar

business entities into trusts for the benefit of the parties' children, who were

21, 20, and 17 years of age at the time. The corpus of each of the three trusts

was approximately one million dollars. Husband named his business partner

as trustee.

 The parties separated on December 1, 2013. According to Wife, she did

not learn about Husband's creation of the trusts until after they separated.

Around February or March 2014, Wife discovered the trust documents in

Husband's paperwork alongside a 2012 federal gift tax return, which Husband

filed individually. Wife found that to be unusual because Wife typically

prepared the parties' taxes and filed them jointly.

 On March 17, 2015, Husband changed his will to include Fiancée and

the three minor children he shared with her. Husband filed for divorce from

Wife on May 26, 2015.1 Wife filed an answer and counterclaim. On January

16, 2018, Wife filed a petition for special relief, seeking to set aside Husband's

1 At some point, Husband filed a lawsuit in New Jersey, where Wife now
resides, in an attempt to declare Wife incapacitated due to her mental health,
but that lawsuit was dismissed.

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October 2012 transfer of marital assets into the three trusts. Wife argued

that Husband took these actions without her knowledge or consent as part of

divorce planning. She averred that the transfer was fraudulent and/or a

dissipation of their mutual marital assets, and the value of the trusts should

be charged against Husband in the parties' equitable distribution scheme.

Husband filed an answer and counterclaim to the petition, claiming that he

told Wife about the trusts prior to their creation and Wife acquiesced in their

creation. He also asserted that he arranged for the trusts as part of estate

planning, not divorce planning. On April 10, 2018, the trial court conducted a

hearing on Wife's petition. It deferred ruling on the petition until after the

master's equitable distribution hearing.

 On August 27, 2018, the parties stipulated to the values of certain

marital assets, including the trusts. The parties agreed that the trusts held a

combined asset value of $9,291,372.00. The master conducted a hearing on

December 11, 2018, and issued a report and recommendation on January 3,

2019. Wife timely filed exceptions and requested a hearing de novo before

the trial court.

 Prior to the de novo hearing, the trial court granted Wife's petition for

special relief. Specifically, by way of a June 6, 2019 order, the trial court

deemed Husband's transfer of marital property into trusts for the children to

be fraudulent and void. As such, the court considered any funds owed or paid

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to the trusts as marital assets and chargeable against Husband in equitable

distribution.

 The trial court conducted the de novo equitable distribution hearing on

June 17, 2019. It deferred its ruling until after the parties submitted proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law. On September 20, 2019, the trial court

entered a divorce decree and equitable distribution order. Wife moved for

reconsideration of the order as to logistics of payment, the failure to explain

its reasoning, and the valuation amount. The trial court granted Wife's motion

and vacated the September 20, 2019 order and decree.

 On January 8, 2020, the trial court entered a new equitable distribution

order and accompanying findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial

court determined the value of the parties' total marital estate to be

$31,505,968.00, comprised of $24,418,964.00 in non-business-related assets

and $7,087,004.00 in business-related assets. It awarded Wife 57% of the

non-business-related assets, worth $13,918,809.00. The trial court charged

Wife and Husband with certain assets in their possession. Based on the earlier

finding that Husband dissipated assets from the marital estate, the trial court

charged Husband with $14,642,475.00, representing the stipulated value of

the trusts plus interest. The trial court determined Husband owed Wife

$9,292,283.00, to be paid in 60 days with (1) $3,292,283.00 coming from

Husband's AXA Account; (2) $3,292,283.00 transferred from Husband's

retirement account into a retirement account for Wife's benefit via a qualified

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domestic relations order; and (3) $3,292,283.00 in a cash payment to Wife.

Finally, the trial court awarded Wife 30% of the parties' business-related

assets, which amounted to $2,126,101.00. As many of the business-related

assets were not liquid, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $17,717.00

in 120 equal monthly installments along with three percent interest.

 Wife again moved for reconsideration, this time requesting that the trial

court expand the language of the order to permit Husband to make the

payments to Wife within 60 days from any source, not just the specified

accounts. On February 3, 2020, the trial court granted Wife's motion and

amended the January 8, 2020 decree to specify that Husband needed to

satisfy the amount "via any accounts/funds necessary." Amended Decree,

2/3/2020, at 1.

 Husband timely filed a notice of appeal. Both Husband and the trial

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

 On appeal, Husband raises the following issues.

 1. Did the lower court err in overriding this Court's decision in
 Balicki v. Balicki, 4 A.3d 654 (Pa. Super. 2010), and in
 declining to deduct taxes associated with the sale of Husband's
 business and business real estate holdings?

 2. Where Husband created trusts for his children as part of estate
 planning that began at the suggestion of his estate planning
 attorney [26] months before the parties separated, did the trial
 court err in:

 a. Concluding that Husband's creation of trusts for the parties'
 children constituted a fraudulent transfer and/or a
 "disposition to defeat obligations" under 23 Pa.C.S.

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 § 3505(e) and charging Husband with receipt of the trust
 assets in equitable distribution?

 b. Valuing the trust assets at $14,642,475[.00] where the
 parties had stipulated to a value of $9,291,372[.00] and
 where the record contains no basis for the trial court's
 finding that additional interest of $4.36 million had accrued
 on the trust assets from December 31, 2016 to April 2019?

 c. Declining to deduct taxes from the value of the trust assets
 where the [trial] court had charged Husband with receipt of
 those assets and where it is undisputed that taxes will be
 paid on the trust assets when distributed?

 3. Did the [trial] court err in ordering Husband to pay Wife $9.8
 million within [60] days despite finding that Husband did not
 have even a third of that amount in cash and retirement assets
 combined and in fashioning an overall equitable distribution
 award that awarded virtually all of the non-business assets to
 Wife and left Husband with illiquid and volatile business
 interests and, after Husband turns over all of his cash and
 retirement assets, a remaining $9 million obligation that is
 impossible for him to satisfy?

Husband's Brief at 6-8 (suggested answers omitted).

 Husband challenges the trial court's equitable distribution award. We

review such challenges using the following well-established principles.

 A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of
 equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the
 propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of
 marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
 a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal
 procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which
 requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court
 will not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been
 overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was
 manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
 bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.
 In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award,
 courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We
 measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of

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 effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a
 just determination of their property rights.

 Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
 evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
 those determinations so long as they are supported by the
 evidence.

Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455-56 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

 The Divorce Code instructs the trial court to divide marital assets

equitably "in such manner as the court deems just after considering all

relevant factors." 23 Pa.C.S. §3502(a) (setting forth specific factors for

consideration). Marital property generally includes all property acquired by

either party during the marriage and the increase in value of certain

non-marital property during the marriage. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a).

Regarding valuation of assets, "[t]he Divorce Code does not set forth a specific

method for valuing assets, and consistent with our standard of review, the

trial court is afforded great discretion in fashioning an equitable distribution

order which achieves ‘economic justice.'" Mundy v. Mundy, 151 A.3d 230,

236 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). "[I]n determining the value of

marital property, the court is free to accept all, part or none of the evidence

as to the true and correct value of the property." Id.

 We also bear in mind that the Divorce Code provides full equity power

and jurisdiction to the court in matrimonial causes. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f). It

authorizes the court to "issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary

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to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this

part." Id. The court may grant such "relief or remedy as equity and justice

require against either party" or against certain third persons. Id.

 Issue 1: Tax Ramifications of Sale of Business Assets

 In his first issue, Husband argues that the trial court disregarded

subsection 3502(a)(10.1) when it calculated the value of the business assets

awarded to Husband. Husband's Brief at 31. In terms of governing the

equitable division of marital assets, the Divorce Code tasks the trial court with

considering "[t]he Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated with

each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which ramifications need not

be immediate and certain." 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(10.1).

 According to Husband, he could not meet the equitable distribution

payment schedule ordered by the trial court without liquidating his businesses.

Husband's Brief at 34. Husband contends that liquidating the business assets

would have large tax implications, thereby reducing the value of these assets

by almost two million dollars. Id. He argues that case law requires the trial

court to consider the tax ramifications of a sale of an asset regardless of

whether a sale is likely. Id. at 35, citing Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127

(Pa. Super. 2017).

 In its findings of fact following the de novo equitable distribution

hearing, the trial court offered the following analysis of Husband's claim.

 The court finds that the parties' marital property in the form of
 Husband's business interests is illiquid and non-transferable to

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 Wife. The court found credible and weighed Husband's testimony
 that there are no potential sales for the above-cited businesses,
 and that, the real-estate associated with same is under long-term
 lease, and therefore, unlikely to be sold. The court weighed
 Husband's partial interest or co-owner status in the businesses
 and likewise weighed Husband's testimony concerning his role in
 said businesses as a chief negotiator with the banks, all of which
 makes the sale of his interest in any of the businesses problematic
 for equitable distribution purposes. The court likewise weighed the
 undisputed fact that 3 of Husband's 9 business ventures have
 failed, and that 3 of the businesses are pass-through companies
 when fashioning the equitable distribution award.

 The court finds that it was not persuaded by the proposed tax
 implications for sale of the businesses and/or associated real
 estate given the speculative nature of any such sale, and given
 the unknown tax rates at the time of any such future sale. Thus,
 the court finds that any tax implications for the sale of any of the
 businesses or real estate will not be factored into the value of the
 property for equitable distribution.

Findings of Fact, 1/8/2020, at ¶¶ 28-29 (record citations omitted).

 Recently, this Court recognized that pursuant to the Divorce Code,

consideration of the tax ramifications of marital assets is mandatory.

Llaurado v. Garcia-Zapata, 223 A.3d 247, 252 (Pa. Super. 2019), citing

Carney, 167 A.3d at 133. "However, as this Court has explained, ‘the statute

requires us only to consider the tax ramifications ... along with numerous

other listed factors, but the Divorce Code does not make a deduction for them

mandatory.'" Llaurado, 223 A.3d at 252, citing Carney, 167 A.3d at 133-134

(quotation omitted).

 As Husband recognizes, in Balicki and Carney, this Court determined

that the deduction of taxes would be equitable because of the illiquid nature

of one spouse's award compared to the cash awarded to the other spouse. In

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Llaurado, however, this Court affirmed a trial court's valuation of retirement

investment accounts, a marital asset, based upon the gross amounts without

deduction of taxes. In doing so, we observed that "[t]he trial court plainly

considered the tax ramifications," but declined to deduct taxes based upon

the husband's actions. Llaurado, 223 A.3d at 252. In Llaurado, the husband

unilaterally and prematurely liquidated his retirement investment accounts

without the knowledge or permission of the wife. Although the husband

claimed he did so because of financial dire straits and to meet his support

obligations, he did not demonstrate he made a good-faith effort to find

employment or that he used the proceeds to meet his support obligations.

Accordingly, this Court declined to disturb the trial court's award. Id.

 Likewise, we decline to disturb the trial court's valuation of Husband's

business assets in this case. The trial court was fully aware of the illiquid

nature of Husband's business assets and the potential tax consequences of a

sale. Thus, the court considered the tax ramifications of a sale, as it was

required to do under the law, but elected not to deduct taxes. In a marital

estate as large and complex as this one, Husband has not convinced us that

we should interfere with the trial court's ample discretion to value the assets.

See Mundy, 151 A.3d at 236. Accordingly, no relief is due.

 Issue 2: Trusts

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 Husband's second issue relates to his contentions surrounding the trusts

he created for the parties' adult children and contains three subparts. We

address each seriatim.

 Issue 2a: Fraudulent Transfer

 Husband first assails the trial court's decision to grant Wife's petition for

special relief and deem Husband's creation of the trusts as a fraudulent

transfer pursuant to subsection 3505(e) of the Divorce Code. Section 3505

of the Divorce Code is entitled "Disposition of property to defeat obligations."

23 Pa.C.S. § 3505. It contains a subsection entitled "Encumbrance or

disposition to third parties." Id. at § 3505(e). That subsection provides that

"[a]n encumbrance or disposition of marital property to third persons who paid

wholly inadequate consideration for the property may be deemed fraudulent

and declared void." Id.

 In the instant case, Husband asserts the creation of the trusts was a gift

to the children in reliance upon the advice of his estate planning attorney that

had nothing to do with the parties' eventual separation. Husband's Brief at

37-39. Husband contends his attorney advised him to shelter some of his

assets from estate taxation based upon the prospect that estate tax

exemptions might be lowered. Id. at 41. According to Husband, Pennsylvania

cases construing subsection 3505(e) are inapposite because they involved

transfers made after the parties had separated or a divorce action was

pending, suggesting that the spouse intended to defeat an extant obligation

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to the other spouse.2 Id. at 44. In contrast, Husband stresses that he began

creating the trusts 26 months before the parties separated and completed the

process 14 months before the separation. Id. at 45. Husband emphasizes

that he retained no control over the assets, the trusts were gifts to his

children, and the transfer was a fraction of his substantial estate. Id. at 50.

Husband argues he did not have an equitable distribution obligation to Wife

throughout the marriage and the legislature did not intend courts to examine

retroactively all gifts and transfers made prior to separation. Id. at 51.

 The trial court offered the following explanation for its ruling in its

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. The trial court gave great weight to the fact that

Husband had a series of meetings with an estate planning lawyer without Wife

present. Trial Court Opinion, 7/27/2020, at 10-11. The court also emphasized

that, by the time Husband executed the trusts, he had begun a relationship

with Fiancée. Id. at 12. After executing a new will and the trust documents,

Husband gave Wife a copy of the will but did not provide her a copy of the

trust documents. Id. at 11-12. The trial court was skeptical of Husband's

excuses as to why he did not include Wife in meetings with the estate attorney

and found his testimony to be inconsistent. Id. at 9-11. Husband claimed

they had defined roles: Wife cared for the children while he covered business

duties. Husband believed Wife was not interested in business matters because

2
 We observe that notwithstanding Husband's statement, only one case cited
by Husband actually relies upon subsection 3505(e), and it is a
non-precedential court of common pleas case.

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she was too busy attending to the children. He also claimed that the estate

planning activities were too sophisticated for Wife and her mental capacity

was erratic. On the other hand, Husband admitted Wife was responsible for

handling the parties' personal taxes, handled many matters pertaining to the

household and children, and was highly functioning in parts of her life. Id.

 On several matters, the trial court credited Wife's testimony instead of

Husband's. It found Wife's testimony credible that she did not learn about

Husband's creation of the trusts until February or March 2014, when she

discovered a 2012 gift tax return filed by Husband individually. Id. at 7-8.

Husband insisted that he had told Wife about the trusts in June 2012 during a

five-to-ten minute walk back from a lunch in Wildwood, New Jersey. Wife

denied that any such conversation occurred, and the trial court found her

denial to be convincing. Id. at 7, 9. Husband also claimed he had a

conversation with Wife at a Houlihan's Restaurant in 2013 wherein Wife

objected to the appointment of his business partner as trustee. Two of the

parties' children also testified regarding this conversation. However, the trial

court credited Wife's testimony that the conversation was about her opposition

to appointment of Husband's business partner as executor of Husband's will,

not anything to do with the trusts. Id. at 9-10.

 After receiving evidence from both parties regarding the trusts, the trial

court found that Husband did not create the trusts for the purpose of estate

planning and instead created the trusts to dissipate the parties' marital assets.

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Id. at 7, 11-12. The trial court found that Husband never discussed the trusts

with Wife. Id. Even if he had, in the trial court's assessment,

 [t]here was absolutely no evidence that Wife ever agreed to the
 formation of the trusts. That is, even assuming that Wife knew
 about the trusts, but opposed the choice of trustee, then Husband
 still went forward and formed the trusts, and named that trustee
 over Wife's objection. After assessing and weighing credibility,
 the trial court, as fact finder, properly determined that Husband
 dissipated marital assets. The facts and equities of the case
 mandate such a conclusion.

Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).

 The premise of Husband's argument is that the trial court abused its

discretion by declining to accept Husband's testimony that he was engaged in

estate planning instead of divorce planning at the time he made the transfers.

The trial court's analysis relies upon its decision to credit Wife's testimony and

to reject Husband's testimony. This credibility assessment is clearly within

the province of the trial court. This Court will not re-weigh the evidence and

disrupt credibility findings supported by the evidence. Childress, 12 A.3d at

456; accord Nagle v. Nagle, 799 A.2d 812, 819 (Pa. Super. 2002) (rejecting

argument that husband transferred his company stock to the parties' son as

part of a valid estate plan because husband transferred stock without wife's

knowledge or consent, and concluding that imposition of constructive trust

pursuant to Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act was warranted).

 Furthermore, Husband's additional arguments are unpersuasive.

Husband maintains that he could not have intended to defraud Wife because

the three-million-dollar trusts paled in comparison to the 10.9 million dollars

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he intended to leave Wife as sole beneficiary of his will. Husband's Brief at

50. Subsection 3505(e) places no limits on the value of the marital property.

Moreover, Husband's argument invoking proportionate values ignores the

reality that the property at issue was not solely owned by him; it was marital

property to which Wife also had rights. Marital property includes all property

acquired by either party during the marriage regardless of how the title is

held. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a), (b). Property which a party has sold, granted,

conveyed, or otherwise disposed of prior to the date of final separation must

have been sold, granted, conveyed, or disposed of in good faith and for value

to be excluded from marital property. Id. at § 3501(a)(5); see DeMasi v.

DeMasi, 530 A.2d 871, 885 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding trusts husband

created for the parties' minor children in good faith must be included as marital

property because husband did not establish the trusts in exchange for value).

Furthermore, it also does not matter that the beneficiaries of the trusts are

the parties' children. For purposes of subsection 3505(e), children are "third

persons." See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(e).

 A closer question is whether subsection 3505(e) applies to any transfer

throughout the marriage or only post-separation transfers as Husband argues.

In considering the issue, we observe that subsection 3505(e) does not place

any temporal restriction on the declaration of an encumbrance or disposition

of marital property as fraudulent. In fact, the legislature's use of nonspecific

sweeping terms in subsection 3505(e) suggests that invocation of the

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subsection falls within the trial court's broad discretion to fashion an equitable

distribution award that effectuates economic justice and achieves a just

determination of the parties' property rights. See Childress, 12 A.3d at

455-456. Moreover, Husband's attempt to minimize the transfer as a casual

gift to his children for estate planning purposes long before he filed a divorce

action belies the trial court's specific rejection of his professed intent. Simply

put, the trial court found that Husband concealed the transfer from Wife as

part of an overall plan to separate from Wife and to dissipate the assets

available to Wife upon their eventual separation.3 Accordingly, in lieu of

voiding the trust transfer, the trial court deemed the value of the trusts as

marital assets to be charged against Husband in equitable distribution. We

discern no abuse of discretion in this determination.

 Issue 2b: Interest

 Husband next questions the trial court's valuation of the trusts by

including accrued interest. As discussed, at their creation in 2012, collectively

the trusts were worth approximately three million dollars. The parties

stipulated that on December 31, 2016, the value of the trusts was $9,291,372.

Stipulation, 8/27/2018, at ¶ 3. The trial court's June 6, 2019 order directed

3 Spousal concealment was often deemed an important factor in adjudicating

the propriety of pre-divorce asset transfers in the cases cited in Husband's
brief. Generally speaking, proof of concealment or the exclusion of a spouse
from the transfer process militated against finding that such transfers were
proper. Given the trial court's precise factual assessment in this case, its
decision substantially aligns with the cited appellate precedents from our sister
states.

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that any funds owed and/or paid to the trusts should be considered marital

assets and charged against Husband in equitable distribution. Order,

6/6/2019, at 1. Accordingly, when calculating the amount to charge Husband,

the trial court included $990,945.00 that had been paid to the trusts between

December 31, 2016, and April 2019. Findings of Fact, 1/8/2020, at ¶ 40. The

trial court also found that "additional interest payments" had "accrued in the

amount of $4,360,158[.00], making the total value of the trusts as of April

2019[,] $14,642,475[.00]." Id.

 Husband asserts that the trial court erred by finding that the trusts had

accrued an additional $4,360,158.00 in interest as of April 2019. Husband

claims this valuation was not based on evidence of record and the trial court

should have applied the parties' stipulated value without adding additional

interest. Husband's Brief at 53-55.

 The latter part of Husband's argument is belied by the record. The

stipulation of the parties was simply as to the value of the trusts, not an

agreement that no further payments to or interest accrued on the trusts

should be assessed. See Stipulation, 8/27/2018, at ¶ 3. Pursuant to the June

6, 2019 order, any funds owed or paid to the trusts were to be added to the

value of the trusts. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its

discretion by not using the stipulated $9,291,372.00 figure.

 Husband is correct, however, that the record does not support the trial

court's addition of $4,360,158.00 in interest. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,

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the trial court offered no further explanation for its decision and referred this

Court to its findings of fact and conclusions of law. As noted supra, those

findings indicated that the court included $4,360,158.00 as "additional

interest payments" that "accrued … making the total value of the trusts as of

April 2019[,] $14,642,475." Findings of Fact, 1/8/2020, at ¶ 40. To support

this finding, the trial court relied upon the following testimony of Wife's

financial expert, Stephen Juska.

 [Wife's counsel:] With respect to the issue of monies paid to the
 trust[s] or [their] beneficiaries, since the additional $482,901[.00
 in interest paid to the trusts], have you done a calculation of that
 amount?

 [Juska:] I have done a calculation of the interest that was due to
 the trust[s] from that date through April 2019, correct.

 [Wife's counsel:] And how much was that?

 [Juska:] $990,945[.00].

 ***

 [Wife's counsel:] In addition, have you done a calculation of the
 interest due to the trust[s] through maturity in 2035?

 [Juska:] Yes, I have.

 [Wife's counsel:] And how much is that?

 [Juska:] $4,360,158[.00].

N.T., 6/17/2019, at 16-17.

 It is clear from Juska's testimony that the $4,360,158.00 had not

accrued as of April 2019. Instead, that figure represented the amount of

projected interest that would accrue through the trusts' maturity in 2035.

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Only $990,945.00 of interest had accrued between December 31, 2016, and

April 2019. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's inclusion of

$4,360,158.00 of interest was manifestly unreasonable and an abuse of

discretion.

 Issue 2c: Taxation of Trusts

 The third subpart of Husband's second issue concerns taxation of the

trusts. The trial court declined to deduct taxes from the value of the trusts,

finding that there would be no tax ramifications to Husband or Wife. Findings

of Fact, 1/8/2020, at ¶ 41.4 Husband disagrees, arguing that taxes will need

to be paid upon distribution of the assets regardless of who owns them, which

reduces the value of the asset. Husband's Brief at 57-58. In his view, failing

to include taxes creates a windfall for Wife because the valuation of the asset

is inflated. Id. Husband maintains that once the court pulled the value of the

assets back into the marital estate and charged Husband the value of the

assets in equitable distribution, the trial court should have considered the

taxes associated with the assets. Id.

 Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure

to deduct taxes from the valuation of the trusts. The trial court's order did

not change the ownership of the trusts or divest the children of their interests.

Instead, to effectuate economic justice and right Husband's wrong of

4 Alternatively, the trial court found that any tax ramifications would be too

speculative to address. Based on our disposition, we need not address this
alternate rationale.

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dissipating the assets of the marital estate to create the trusts, the trial court

simply made Husband live with the consequences of his decision to set up the

trusts unilaterally. Because Husband alone made the decision to deplete the

marital estate when he set up the trusts, the court charged Husband for the

value of the corpus of the trusts and any additional accrued value. The trust

distributions would be taxed to the beneficiaries whether Husband and Wife

stayed married or got divorced. Without an actual change of title, neither

Husband nor Wife would pay any taxes now or in the future regarding the

trusts. Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the trial court's order.

 Issue 3: Timing of Payments

 In his last issue, Husband argues that because he only had three million

dollars in cash and retirement assets combined, the trial court erred and

abused its discretion by ordering him to pay Wife over three times that amount

— $9,876,849.00 — within 60 days. Husband's Brief at 59-64. According to

Husband, even after he liquidates his retirement accounts and uses all his

cash, he still would be $6.8 million short. Id. Husband argues that because

the trial court found his minority business interests to be illiquid, it should

have recognized that he did not have the ability to liquidate those interests by

the deadline to pay Wife. Id.

 The $9,876,849.00 owed to Wife was derived in part from the trial

court's valuation of the trusts at $14,642,475.00, which, as discussed above,

erroneously included $4,360,158.00 in unaccrued interest. Our vacation of

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this portion of the decree reduces the amount Husband owes Wife and may

affect the structure of how the trial court ordered the distribution of the

equitable distribution award. Accordingly, Husband's third issue is moot.

 Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part and vacate in part. We vacate

the portion of the order that includes $4,360,158.00 in interest in the

valuation of marital assets Husband fraudulently dissipated and remand for

the trial court to issue a new order in accordance with this memorandum.

 Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for issuance

of a new order in accordance with this memorandum. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

 Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision

of this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2021

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