CourtListener opinion 10753069

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
 FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

HIEN TRAN, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
 v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:24-cv-00121-HAB-SLC 
 ) 
VEOLIA UTILITY RESOURCES LLC, ) 
et al., ) 
 Defendant. ) 

 OPINION AND ORDER 

 Before the Court is a motion by Defendant Sun Life Assurance of Canada ("Sun Life") seeking 
to join a new party to this matter and bifurcate claims into separate trials. (ECF 36). On March 15, 
2024, Plaintiff Hien Tran filed this suit, claiming relief against Sun Life for an ERISA benefit 
regarding her now deceased husband, or in the alternative, breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants 
Veolia Utility Resources LLC and Lincoln Life Assurance Company of Boston. (ECF 1). Sun Life 
has since received a competing claim1 for the ERISA benefit from the decedent's former wife, Sally 
Ann Lombardo, causing Sun Life to request that Lombardo be joined to this case. (Id. at 1). Further, 
Sun Life asks the Court to bifurcate the ERISA benefit claim from the alternative breach of 
fiduciary duty claim—arguing that a bifurcation of the two claims would promote judicial economy, 
avoid prejudice to any parties, and avoid violation of the Seventh Amendment. (ECF 37 at 6). For 
the following reasons, Sun Life's motion will be GRANTED as to joinder but DENIED as to 
bifurcation. 

1 There is some dispute between the parties as to when Sun Life became aware of Lombardo's interest in the ERISA 
benefit. (See ECF 40 at 1). Tran argues that Sun Life was aware that Lombardo expressed an interest in the ERISA 
benefit as early as September 2023—before this action was filed. (Id.) No parties dispute, however, that Lombardo 
waited until September 2024 to file a formal claim with Sun Life. (See ECF 42 at 1). 
 A. Procedure 
 The deadline for Sun Life to amend its pleadings passed on June 15, 2024. (ECF 32 at 2). A 
party seeking to amend a pleading after the date specified in a scheduling order must show "good 
cause" for the amendment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Alioto v. Town of 

Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 719-20 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). If a party demonstrates good cause 
for the delay, the motion must also pass scrutiny under Rule 15, which instructs the Court to "freely 
give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Having said that, leave to amend is 
"inappropriate where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of the amendment." Perrian v. 
O'Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 
 B. Joinder 
 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, a person is a required party in a cause of action if: 
 that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
 situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may . . . as a 
 practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest[,] 
 or . . . leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
 multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B); see also Davis Cos. v. Emerald Casino, Inc., 268 F.3d 477, 481 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing the considerations in determining a "necessary party" for the purposes of 
joinder). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that when deciding whether a non-
party is a necessary party, the trial court must consider (1) whether complete relief can be accorded 
without joinder, (2) whether the non-party's ability to protect her interest will be impaired, and (3) 
whether the existing parties will be subjected to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent 
obligations unless she is joined. See Davis Cos., 268 F.3d at 481. Substantial risk of inconsistent 
obligations may occur when a party receives a demand letter from a non-party asserting entitlement 
to the subject matter of the litigation. See Arcelormittal Ind. Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, 194 
F. Supp. 3d 804, 815 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (concluding that a non-party was a necessary party because 
the non-party expressed interest in the subject matter of the litigation through a demand letter). "The 

purpose of Rule 19 is to ‘permit joinder of all materially interested parties to a single lawsuit so as 
to protect interested parties and avoid waste of judicial resources.'" Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 
568 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Moore v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 901 F.2d 1445, 1447 (7th 
Cir. 1990)). 
 Here, Lombardo is a necessary party.2 See cf. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Aecon Grp., Inc., 436 F. 
Supp. 2d 931, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (reasoning that a non-party must claim an interest in the 
subject matter to qualify as a necessary party). Complete relief cannot be accorded without 
joinder given that Lombardo is a competing claimant to the same ERISA benefit. (See ECF 37 at 
4). Further, Lombardo's ability to protect her interest would be impaired. See e.g., Republic of 
Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 870 (2008) (analyzing Rule 19(b) factors and stating 

"[c]onflicting claims by beneficiaries . . . present a textbook example of a case where one party 
may be severely prejudiced by a decision in his absence" (citation omitted)). 
 Further, Sun Life would be "subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). "A person 
may . . . be considered a required party if ‘that person claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action' and that interest will . . . threaten to whipsaw an existing party with inconsistent 

2 The Court sees no dilatory motive on behalf of Sun Life in moving for joinder on September 17, 2024. Though 
Lombardo may have inquired into the ERISA benefit with Sun Life as early as September 2023, she did not file a 
formal claim with Sun Life seeking the ERISA benefit until September 3, 2024. (See ECF 42 at 1-2). As such, the 
Court is satisfied that Sun Life moved with reasonable urgency by filing its motion to join Lombardo when it did. 
See e.g., Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 759 (7th Cir. 2009) (indicating a party's motive is a 
factor in determining whether joinder is proper). What is more, Tran fails to provide a cognizable argument as to 
what ulterior motive Sun Life could have in seeking joinder of Lombardo. 
obligations." J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. McDonald, 760 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)). This is a case wherein "the Court is . . . aware of an[] absent 
party that brought its own claims based on the same claims or ‘same contract at issue' in this 
litigation." Su v. Su, 672 F. Supp. 3d 573, 590 (N.D. Ill. 2023) (quoting Davidson Well Drilling, 

Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 09 Civ. 1431(SAS), 2009 WL 2135396, at *2, *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 16, 2009))3; see also Taylor v. Chater, 907 F. Supp. 306, 309 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (reasoning that 
two claims to a social security benefit, between step-children and natural children, "might 
effectively subject the [social security administration] to double and inconsistent obligations"); 
Davis Cos., 268 F.3d at 485 (concluding that inconsistent or multiple obligations may arise where 
the subject matter of dispute, between the non-party and a party to the cause of action, concern an 
interdependent4 agreement). It follows that the dispute over the ERISA benefit in question can 
undoubtedly lead to inconsistent obligations on the part of Sun Life—for example, paying the 
benefit to both Lombardo and Tran. 
 Lastly, Tran argues that joinder of Lombardo would be futile because Lombardo's 
competing insurance claim lacks merit. (ECF 40 at 4-5).5 Futility, in the context of Federal Rule of 

3 Though that court is outside of the Seventh Circuit, its analysis is persuasive to this Court's analysis. In deciding 
that there was a significant risk that both parties would be subject to inconsistent obligations, that court stated: 

 [I]f the Puerto Rico court finds Davidson to have improperly terminated the agreement, but 
 this Court finds that BMS is liable to Davidson, then Davidson will be required to pay 
 damages to one entity while it is entitled to receive payment from another. Such a result is 
 exactly what Rule 19(a)(1) seeks to avoid. 

Davidson Well Drilling, Ltd., 2009 WL 2135396, at *6. Similarly, if a court hearing Lombardo's case finds that Sun 
Life improperly terminated the life insurance policy in question, and if this Court also finds that Sun Life is liable to 
Tran, then Sun Life could be required to pay damages to Tran and Lombardo in two different cases. 

4 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that there was no interdependent agreement in that case because there was no overlap 
in the property (shares) in dispute. Davis Cos., 268 F.3d at 485. In assessing whether the risk of additional litigation 
was substantial, the court gathered that the nonparty was disinclined to sue. Not so, here. Lombardo and Tran contest 
a claim to the same ERISA benefit and Lombardo is incentivized to file suit. 

5 Specifically, Tran argues that the divorce decree supporting Lombardo's claim to the ERISA benefit is 1) not a 
colorable claim because the maintenance and support obligations to Tran terminated on June 5, 2019, and 2) fails to 
Civil Procedure 15, "refers to the inability to state a claim, not the inability of the plaintiff to prevail 
on the merits." Reardon v. Short-Elliott Hendrickson, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-154-JVB-PRC, 2018 WL 
1603381, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2018) (citation omitted). "Ordinarily, courts will defer 
consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend 

is granted and the amended pleading is filed." Westwood One, LLC v. Loc. Radio Networks, LLC, 
No. 1:21-cv-00088-HAB-SLC, 2023 WL 7273553, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2023) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). The Court declines to prevent joinder of Lombardo's claim, as Sun Life's 
arguments on the sufficiency of Lombardo's ERISA benefit claim, "even if merited, remain[s] 
better left for full briefing on a [dispositive motion]." Id. (second alteration in original) 
Accordingly, Sun Life's motion to join Lombardo will be granted.6 
 C. Bifurcation 
 "For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a 
separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party 
claims." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). A district court has discretion in deciding whether to bifurcate claims 

and hold separate trials. See Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1089 (7th Cir. 2013). The moving 
party maintains the burden of showing bifurcation is appropriate. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. S&L 
Builders, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1026 DRL-MGG, 2020 WL 3264114, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 17, 2020). 
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a three-step test to analyze bifurcation. The steps are as follows: 
 First, the trial judge must determine whether separate trials would avoid 
 prejudice to a party or promote judicial economy. Only one of these criteria—
 avoidance of prejudice or judicial economy—need be met before a court can 
 order separation. Next, the court must be satisfied that the decision to 

meet the standards of a "qualified domestic relations order[,]" as discussed in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 
F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 1994). (See ECF 4-5). 

6 Good cause is also met for this amendment to the pleadings under Rule 16(b) for the same reason expressed supra 
in footnote 2. Further, the Court notes that none of the cautionary harms associated with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(a)(2) are applicable here. 
 bifurcate does not unfairly prejudice the non-moving party. Finally, separate 
 trials must not be granted if doing so would violate the Seventh Amendment. 
Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 Here, bifurcation of the two claims is not warranted. First, the Court does not foresee a 
scenario where separation of the two claims avoids prejudice to a party or promotes judicial 
economy.7 See Houseman, 171 F.3d at 1121. "A vast number of federal decisions in this district 
have decided against bifurcating insurance coverage breach of contract claims from bad faith claims 
and the [C]ourt sees no reason to deviate here." Westfield Ins. Co., 2020 WL 3264114, at *1 
("Because bifurcating the issues would not avoid prejudice to either party or promote judicial 
economy, the court denies the bifurcation motion."). Although a bad faith claim is styled differently 
than the alternative nomenclature of a fiduciary duty claim, "[u]nder Indiana law, a claim that the 

duty of good faith and fair dealing has been breached is considered to be the same as a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty . . . ." Domsic v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2:09-CV-208-PRC, 2010 WL 
3326708, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2010) (citing Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 446, 451 
(Ind.Ct.App.2003) (analyzing the elements of a bad faith claim in Indiana, within the context of an 

7 The Court is not persuaded by Sun Life's argument that bifurcation will further judicial economy and avoid 
prejudice. (See ECF 37 at 6). Sun Life appears to argue that since discovery of the fiduciary duty claim might take 
until December 2024, bifurcation is appropriate. (Id.). However, a two-month delay in the potential disposition of 
the fiduciary duty claim is hardly prejudicial to Sun Life and is unlikely to further judicial economy. As one district 
court in this circuit has persuasively noted: 

 The Court is mindful of the fact that this is an individual plaintiff going up against a 
 corporation, which, in all probability, has the resources to absorb expenses and delays more 
 easily than the Plaintiff. Having already determined that there is a strong possibility that a 
 jury will need to hear issues on damages, an order of separate trials and separate discovery 
 periods will only add unnecessary and considerable delay . . . An unreasonable delay in a 
 case's resolution amounts to prejudice to the one opposing separation. It is clearly not in the 
 public interest. 

Real v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 623-24 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Similarly, this case involves an individual plaintiff against three companies, including the movant—a subsidiary of a 
large insurance corporation. (See ECF 7). 
insurance contract). "The insurance coverage and fiduciary duty claims will overlap." Westfield Ins. 
Co., 2020 WL 3264114, at *1; see also McLaughlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 F.3d 861, 
871 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that there was overlap in evidence between a compensatory damage 
claim concerning an insurance agreement and punitive damages claim concerning a duty to exercise 

good faith). Given the first element of the bifurcation test is not met, the Court declines to continue 
to the next step of the analysis. Sun Life's motion for bifurcation of the claims in this case will be 
denied. 
 D. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, Sun Life's motion (ECF 36) is GRANTED as to joinder of Sally Ann 
Lombardo and her competing claim to this case but DENIED as to bifurcation. 
 SO ORDERED. 

 Entered this 2nd day of December 2024. 
 /s/ Susan Collins 
 Susan Collins 
 United States Magistrate Judge