CourtListener opinion 10754408

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

 No. 24-0100
 Filed December 4, 2024

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JEFFERY ALAN MAU
AND ANN MARIE MAU

Upon the Petition of
JEFFERY ALAN MAU,
 Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
ANN MARIE MAU,
 Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Patrick A. McElyea,

Judge.

 A former spouse appeals the denial of his petition to modify legal custody

and physical care concerning a minor child and other claims following a stipulated

dissolution of marriage. AFFIRMED.

 Paul L. Macek of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Davenport, for appellant.

 Ryan M. Beckenbaugh of Beckenbaugh Law, P.C., Davenport, for appellee.

 Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
 2

BULLER, Judge.

 Jeffery (Jeff) Mau appeals a district court ruling addressing his and ex-wife

Ann Marie Mau's dueling petitions for modification. On appeal, Jeff raises four

issues—concerning legal custody and physical care of a minor child, the

admissibility of certain evidence (including pre-decree conduct), division of assets

after sale of the home, and division of Jeff's retirement accounts. Ann Marie resists

each of Jeff's arguments and requests appellate attorney fees. On our review, we

affirm and order Jeff to pay Ann Marie $15,647.50 in fees.

 I. Background Facts and Proceedings

 Jeff and Ann Marie divorced by stipulation in February 2020. They agreed

to joint legal custody and Anne Marie having physical care of their then-six-year-old

child. The stipulation also provided Jeff parenting time every other weekend and

every other Wednesday during the school year.

 Things rapidly deteriorated between the parties after the divorce. They

fought over essentially everything—prescriptions and appointments for the child's

somewhat complicated medical needs, drop-offs and pick-ups, parent-teacher

conferences, summer visitation, and everything in-between. In court, Jeff applied

for a rule to show cause relating to sale of the marital home and a dispute over

costs, the lawyering grew contentious, and the court found Ann Marie in contempt.

Ann Marie then filed a motion for court involvement relating to the qualified

domestic relations order (QDRO) that was the subject of a previous appeal and

petitioned to modify the decree such that she had sole legal custody of the minor

child. Jeff counterclaimed seeking sole legal custody and physical care for himself.

As the district court put it, "[b]oth parents [took] an all-or-nothing approach."
 3

 Discovery disputes followed, and the court denied a motion to compel filed

by Jeff, finding Ann Marie had complied with her obligations and ordering Jeff to

pay $500 of Ann Marie's attorney fees. The court next quashed a subpoena filed

by Jeff, granted a protective order limiting depositions, and ordered Jeff to pay

another $600 in Ann Marie's attorney fees. Then the court granted another

protective order limiting depositions to stop Jeff from deposing witnesses about

irrelevant and pre-decree conduct.

 Ann Marie sought to exclude evidence of pre-decree conduct from trial,

including but not limited to the conduct that was the subject of the earlier protective

order. She also sought a third protective order regarding certain surreptitious video

recordings she alleged were obtained in violation of Illinois law. In oral rulings, the

court informed the parties it would generally not admit any pre-decree evidence

because the court had no interest in re-litigating the stipulated decree.

 It would serve little purpose for us to recount the full blow-by-blow of the

parties' trial testimony, in which each essentially sought to paint the other as a

villain in nearly every interaction between them since the divorce. One particularly

troublesome incident warrants some focus. In 2021, the child was referred to

pediatrician Dr. Barbara Harre for an evaluation due to mental-health and

behavioral issues. The child continued to see Dr. Harre without incident until a

May 2022 follow-up appointment. During this appointment, in Dr. Harre's words

Jeff "launched into an angry—I would say hostile—tirade about how no one was

keeping him informed," even though he was welcome at every appointment.

During this "tirade," the child "curled up and snuggled into" Ann Marie. Jeff grew

so loud that Dr. Harre's staff came back to check on her and the child. Jeff
 4

threatened to sue Dr. Harre, claiming she was violating the divorce decree by not

sharing the child's medical information with his mother (the child's grandmother).

Dr. Harre testified that the whole exchange—some forty minutes driven by Jeff's

"hostile" outbursts—was unhealthy "bullying" that was likely contributing to the

child's mental-health problems. And she expressed skepticism that Jeff could look

out for the child's best interests, particularly when it came to the child's medical

needs. In his testimony, Jeff did not dispute that Dr. Harre warned him that she

was considering discontinuing care for the child because of Jeff's behavior, but he

otherwise disagreed with Dr. Harre and Ann Marie's descriptions of the event or

claimed he couldn't recall the specifics.

 Beyond the particulars of the parties' disagreements, we think the district

court summarized the relationship between them well: "contentious would be a

gross understatement. There is virtually no trust between Jeff[ ] and Ann Marie,

which, essentially, negates their ability to effectively coparent." As just one

example of this, the court highlighted that, even when the parties were seeking

emergency medical care for the child, they were unable to effectively

communicate, choosing to email each other rather than pick up the phone. And

the court was particularly struck by how, when Jeff learned the child was headed

to the emergency room, Jeff immediately called his divorce attorney to protect his

interest in litigation—rather than focusing on the child's welfare. After the child

was released from the hospital, both parties argued for more than an hour over

where to drop the child off, and Ann Marie later called the police to conduct a

welfare-check. From this, the court concluded that "both parties have placed their

animosity towards one another and their desire ‘to win' above the needs of their
 5

child." And the court concluded both parents have put the child "in the middle" and

remained unable to effectively communicate.

 In its modification ruling, the district court observed that "[a]ll of these facts

make this a very difficult decision for the court," and it ultimately declined to grant

Jeff's petition to modify. The court emphasized that Jeff was capable of being a

good father but had not met his heavy burden to show he was a superior caregiver

compared to Ann Marie. The court expressly found that Jeff "does not demonstrate

the same commitment to his son that Ann Marie does" and noted that his "request

for primary physical care and sole legal custody appears to be motivated by a

desire to win rather than a genuine desire to be the primary caretaker."

 As for Ann Marie's request for sole legal custody, the court found evidence

on both sides of the question but ultimately determined sole legal custody was

warranted based on the parties' inability to communicate appropriately; their

tendency to manipulate or attempt to manipulate each other, the court, and their

child; their inability to support each other as parents; and their win-at-all costs

mentalities. In so ruling, the court repeatedly emphasized its familiarity and

first-hand observations of the dynamics between the parties, observing: "It is

evident to this Court, having presided over much of their post-decree litigation, that

this is not about fairness and equity, it is about winning and righting whatever

perceived wrongs happened during their relationship." The court ultimately found

that the child needed to have a primary caregiving decisionmaker and, between

the two options, "Ann Marie has demonstrated the ability to better administer to his

medical, emotional, and educational needs." In the end, the court modified the
 6

decree to place sole legal custody with Ann Marie and preserved the stipulated

physical-care and visitation arrangement.

 The court also resolved a factual and financial dispute between the parties

over who would be responsible for certain costs associated with selling the marital

home. In ruling on this issue, the court found credible testimony that Ann Marie

caused certain water damage, and the court found Jeff's claim about other costs

and billing for yardwork incredible and unsupported by the law. The court found

the plumbing costs were divisible and payable by Ann Marie—and everything else

claimed by Jeff was not. And it ordered release of Ann Marie's portion of the

proceeds, minus her share of these expenses.

 Last, the court addressed a lingering dispute concerning a QDRO related

to Jeff's retirement accounts. The parties submitted evidence regarding the date

the accounts were opened, and the court ultimately ordered that Ann Marie receive

62.53% of the retirement assets after an agreed-upon distribution and Jeff 37.47%.

In entering this order, the court addressed a prior decision of our court, which we

will discuss in more detail later in this opinion.

 Jeff appeals, challenging denial of his petition for modification of custody

and the court's decision to grant Ann Marie sole legal custody, the court's ruling

on the admissibility of evidence, the determination of costs associated with selling

the marital home, and the court's handling of the QDRO.

 II. Standards of Review

 Our review in dissolution modification cases is de novo. In re Marriage of

Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015). We give weight to the district court's

factual findings, particularly regarding the credibility of witnesses, but we are not
 7

bound by them. Id. On custody questions, "[t]he child[ ]'s best interest is the

‘controlling consideration.'" Id. (citation omitted). On issues related to marital

property, "we will disturb the trial court's order only when there has been a failure

to do equity." In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015) (cleaned

up). Within this same rubric, we also review issues related to QDROs de novo.

See In re Marriage of Veit, 797 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 2011).

 We review the district court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 239 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2000).

 III. Discussion

 The issues on appeal concern Jeff's claims about legal custody and

physical care, various evidentiary issues, costs related to sale of the home, and a

QDRO. Ann Marie defends the district court's order and requests appellate

attorney fees. We analyze each of these claims separately.

 A. Legal Custody and Physical Care

 We consider the custody and care of the parties' minor child first, as this

issue consumed the majority of the district court record. We begin by recognizing

our review is not the same as it might be if we were reviewing a contested decree

and an initial assessment of custody and care. Instead, our review is more limited

at this later stage:

 A party seeking modification of a dissolution decree must
 prove by a preponderance of the evidence a substantial change in
 circumstances occurred after the decree was entered. The party
 seeking modification of a decree's custody provisions must also
 prove a superior ability to minister to the needs of the children.
 8

In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted).

Under our case law, the changed circumstances "must be more or less permanent"

and "relate to the welfare of the children." Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32 (citation

omitted).

 The district court's finding that a material and substantial change took place

is uncontested by these parties. So we move to the next step of the analysis,

which requires that, to warrant modification, the parent seeking to modify the status

quo bears a "heavy burden" justified by only "the most cogent reasons" which

demonstrate a superior ability to care for the child. In re Marriage of Frederici, 338

N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983); see also Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32.

 "The criteria for determining child custody are applied in modification

proceedings," including the factors found in Iowa Code section 598.41 (2022) and

other modification cases. In re Marriage of Courtade, 560 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1996). As the district court observed, and the supreme court recently held,

legal custody is all-or-nothing—there is no parsing out of certain legal rights from

others. In re Marriage of Frazier, 1 N.W.3d 775, 786 (Iowa 2024). Perhaps the

most compelling justification supporting sole legal custody for Ann Marie is that the

parties are no longer able to coparent in any meaningful sense. See In re Marriage

of Rolek, 555 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 1996) ("When, following a dissolution decree

providing joint custody, the actions of the parties indicate that they are no longer

able to cooperate, a modification of the custody status is appropriate.").

 Many of the district court's findings on this basis are wrapped up in

credibility determinations that we are loathe to disturb, but we also find the record

independently and abundantly establishes the still-growing discord and inability of
 9

these parties to coparent. We agree with the district court that it was appropriate

to select a sole legal decision maker. And between the two parties, Ann Marie was

better able to minister to the child's needs, as her involvement in the child's medical

and schooling issues was significantly greater than Jeff's. We also find it striking

in our review of these two imperfect parents that Ann Marie repeatedly expressed

regret for times she behaved inappropriately or could have made better choices;

Jeff, in contrast, had no apologies to offer for his behavior toward Ann Marie or

anyone else (including Dr. Harre) and no recognition of how his behavior affected

the child. We affirm, as it was "unreasonable" to continue joint legal custody and

sole legal custody with Ann Marie was in the child's best interests. See Iowa

Code § 598.41(2)(b).

 As for the physical-care determination, our foremost consideration is again

the best interests of the child. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n); In re Marriage of

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 700 (Iowa 2007). Given our decision on legal custody,

it follows that physical care of the child remains with Ann Marie. See, e.g., In re

Marriage of Anderson, No. 23-1224, 2024 WL 4615622, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.

Oct. 30, 2024) ("[A] parent without legal custody of a child cannot be awarded

physical care."); cf. Iowa Code § 598.41(5) (limiting joint physical care to cases

with joint legal custody).

 We affirm the district court's ruling granting sole legal custody and

maintaining physical care with Ann Marie.

 B. Evidentiary Issues

 Jeff next challenges the admission of several exhibits, a deposition

transcript, and evidence about the number of persons he had dated since the
 10

divorce. Other than the deposition transcript and question about his dating life, we

understand Jeff's argument and the district court's ruling to revolve around

pre-decree conduct, and the district court excluding them on that basis. On our

review, we cannot say the district court abused its broad discretion in so ruling.

See Thielges, 623 N.W.2d at 239. Assuming without deciding the evidence was

otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence (which Ann Marie does not

concede), we look to our case law regarding when pre-decree conduct is relevant

in a modification hearing: "A parent seeking modification must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances have so materially and

substantially changed since the decree was entered that the requested

modification is in the children's best interests." Frazier, 1 N.W.3d at 781 (emphasis

added). In other words, pre-decree conduct is generally not relevant and not

admissible. See id.; In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 1999)

(noting any changed circumstances "must not have been within the contemplation

of the district court" at the time of the decree). But see In re Ziegler, No. 05-0911,

2006 WL 623685, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2006) (affirming admission of

father's pre-decree domestic abuse as evidence he was not a suitable caretaker

for the child).

 We see no reason why the evidence proffered by Jeff here would justify

deviation from the normal rule. And we broadly share the district court's concern

that opening the floodgates to pre-decree evidence is undesirable from the

perspective of courtroom management and efficient use of judicial resources. In

the same vein, we believe statements made by Ann Marie's counsel below that,

had the door been opened to pre-decree evidence, she had video and
 11

documentary evidence prepared to rebut it, which would have furthered the

devolution into a collateral mini-trial. This is exactly the kind of distraction from the

main issue that the rules of evidence guard against, and we discern no abuse of

discretion in the court preventing Jeff from relitigating the divorce.

 The next portion of Jeff's evidentiary claim concerns a transcript of the

deposition of a man Ann Marie dated, with the initials J.C.P. We do not address

the admissibility of this exhibit on the merits because we conclude the issue was

not preserved for our review by offer of proof or other adequate means. Jeff's trial

counsel made some assertions that this witness was unavailable and out of state;

Ann Marie's counsel disagreed, indicating the witness was available and had never

been contacted by Jeff's attorney via subpoena or otherwise. Neither party offered

evidence on this point, and the deposition was not admitted into evidence as an

offer of proof.1 Because the issue was not preserved, we do not analyze it further.

See 7 Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence § 5.103:11 (Oct. 2023)

(collecting cases on the necessity of a specific offer of proof to preserve error,

including a record regarding the relevance of the proffered exhibit); State v. Lange,

531 N.W.2d 108, 114 (Iowa 1995) ("This court considers offers of proof so

important that we require them to preserve error."); cf. Papiboune v. Deibarra,

No. 22-1628, 2024 WL 960965, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2024) (finding error

not preserved where there was "nothing before us memorializing any formal or

1 We recognize the district court did not allow Jeff to make an offer of proof on the

pre-decree evidence, but the district court made no such prohibition regarding the
deposition of J.C.P. And even if the district court had directed Jeff not to make an
offer of proof, that would not resolve the lack of record on whether the witness was
in fact unavailable or out of state.
 12

informal offers of proof—or even a rough summary of the testimony at issue"). But

we also observe that, from what we can deduce of the context for the deposition

and J.C.P.'s relationship with Ann Marie, we seriously doubt the deposition would

have affected the outcome.

 Jeff also complains that the district court excluded evidence regarding the

number of sexual or romantic partners he had since the child was born. Although

not a model of clarity, Jeff apparently wished to offer this to contrast his own dating

life (presumably sparse) with Ann Marie's (which he denigrated as excessive or

inappropriate). But Jeff's appellate brief misunderstands or misconstrues the

district court: the court did not exclude all evidence on this issue but instead

instructed Jeff's counsel that he could "ask the question as of" the date of the

decree. That Jeff's counsel declined to follow the district court's direction is no

basis for relief. And the merits of this ruling do not reflect an abuse of discretion

for the reasons we have already discussed.

 Last, we recognize some legal tension alluded to in Jeff's brief, where he

claims that, because our review is de novo and the case sounds in equity, the

district court should not have been able to exclude the pre-decree evidence and

constrain his presentation of evidence below. See In re Marriage of Erickson,

228 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1975) ("[U]nder our rules in equity cases evidence is

ordinarily allowed to come in subject to objection without rulings by the court so

that the entire record is before the reviewing court for de novo appeal."). While

often evidence is received subject to objection in equity, this does not mean every

equity trial must be an evidentiary free-for-all. The district judge remains master

of the courtroom and is afforded considerable latitude in "matters relating to the
 13

course and conduct of a trial." In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1998). And Jeff has not shown any abuse of that considerable latitude and

discretion.

 C. Costs Related to Home Sale

 At trial, the parties and their realtor testified as to expenses incurred

regarding the marital home before it was sold. Jeff calculated his expenses at just

under $10,000, and he requested that Ann Marie pay half that—which would

exceed the roughly $4000 she received in proceeds from sale of the home. We

decline to repeat at length the various itemized charges the parties bickered over

below. As pertinent to the issues raised on appeal, we agree with the district court

that it was appropriate for Ann Marie to pay the costs associated with water

damage she caused. And we both credit and agree with the district court's

credibility findings rejecting Jeff's claims he should be reimbursed for yard work

and decluttering the home, which we find border on frivolous. Consistent with the

deference we show to district court valuations of marital property, we find the

district court's determination of costs related to sale of the home "within the range

of permissible evidence," and we affirm because we see no failure to do equity.

Cf. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Iowa 2013).

 We understand that at least part of Jeff's argument on appeal contends the

district court should have blindly accepted the realtor's summary of expenses. The

parties negotiated that the realtor would settle disagreements, but only as to

"repair[s]" of the home. To the extent the fight on appeal concerns review of this

language and not principles of equity, our review would be for correction of errors

at law. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. But we are confident we would come to the
 14

same conclusion under either standard of review, as we agree with the district

court that the yardwork, decluttering, and other miscellaneous attempts by Jeff to

bill were not "repair[s]" within the meaning of the stipulated decree. See Repair,

Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ("The process of restoring something that

has been subjected to decay, waste, injury, or partial destruction, dilapidation, etc.;

an instance or a result of this process.").

 Last, to the extent Jeff now claims he should also be entitled to some

calculation of expenses (seemingly based on the carrying costs of the mortgage)

due to "delay" attributable to Ann Marie, error was not preserved.

 It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues
 must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before
 we will decide them on appeal. . . . When a district court fails to rule
 on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue
 must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for
 appeal.

Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (internal citations omitted).

We are skeptical this claim was adequately raised below, and it certainly was not

decided by the district court. We do not address it further. See id.

 D. QDRO Calculations

 Jeff also appeals how the district court handled a tricky issue concerning

the QDRO. The procedural posture is unusual. In an earlier appeal, Jeff sought

to enforce the language of the stipulated decree and a proposed order to

essentially undo the district court's equitable modification of his proposed QDRO.

See In re Marriage of Mau, No. 20-1422, 2021 WL 1663608, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Apr. 28, 2021). We reversed and remanded with directions to approve Jeff's

proposed QDRO, which purported to rely on the Benson formula. Id. at *1 n.1, *3
 15

(citing In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996)).2 On remand

to the district court, it became apparent that both Jeff's proposed QDRO and our

opinion were not based on a true and accurate accounting of Jeff's retirement

accounts or their ages. As a result, the specific QDRO that we ordered be

approved did not implement the Benson formula; the inputs were wrong, so the

outputs were too.

 Under Benson, the numerator is the [number of years of marriage while also

participating in the pension plan] while Jeff's proposed QDRO has the numerator

as solely [the number of years of marriage]. See 545 N.W.2d at 255. The

denominator is the number of years the account existed in total. Id. Jeff's

proposed QDRO used a single age—the oldest account—in its calculations, even

though the funds at issue consist of multiple accounts with differing ages. Long

story short, Jeff's proposed QDRO does not employ the Benson formula, despite

what he claimed to us in the first appeal. This renders our remand order to approve

the proposed QDRO in conflict with the legal foundations of our opinion.

 The district court correctly recognized that we did not intend this result and

chose to "follow the spirit" of our earlier decision, which was, after deducting offsets

negotiated by the parties, to divide the accounts subject to Benson per the parties'

agreement. The court did so and, in converting the dollar amounts into

2 It's a little strange that the parties agreed to use the Benson formula for these

defined-contribution retirement accounts. "[O]ur courts generally have not applied
the Benson formula to defined-contribution plans (like a [thrift savings plan]),
typically reserving the formula only for defined-benefit plans (like [federal and state
government] pensions)." In re Marriage of Bolger, No. 22-1201, 2023
WL 7378490, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2023) (citing Benson, 545 N.W.2d at
256 n.1 ("[I]t may be more appropriate to divide and distribute defined contribution
plans under the present-value method.")).
 16

percentages at the request of the custodian, ruled that, including the offsets, Ann

Marie would receive 62.53% of the total retirement assets and Jeff 37.47%. Jeff

asserts on appeal that the Ameriprise fund should be divided such that he receives

58% and Ann Marie 42%—based on a third set of calculations. But his proposed

distribution does not rectify the factual errors and omissions we have mentioned

and the district court addressed in its ruling.

 Jeff largely debates the evidence regarding what he calls the "start date" for

determining the age of the accounts. Assuming without deciding that Jeff is right

there is a conflict in the evidence, the district court resolved the conflict, and we

have little reason to second-guess its resolution of the facts on our review of the

cold record. This is particularly so because Jeff's appellate claim seems to rely at

least in part on Jeff's live testimony, which the district court heard firsthand and

discounted in other areas. And contrary to Jeff's assertions on appeal, the district

court's implementation this time around conformed with the stipulated agreement

rather than imposing its own judgment of the equities. We discern no error in the

district court's enforcement of the stipulation or its application of Benson.

 In resolving this claim, we have considered Ann Marie's alternative

argument that, if we give Jeff what he wants by strictly applying the math and

incorrect formula he originally proposed in the QDRO, she would receive 92% of

the retirements accounts. We choose not to wade into this argument as it was

made in the alternative, and we believe the district court's resolution of the issue

enforces both the original bargain and the spirit of our decision in the previous

appeal. But we recognize that, had the district court not resolved the issue as it

did (with the benefit of Ann Marie's somewhat-favorable-to-Jeff calculations), this
 17

would likely be the alternative facing this court—unpalatable though it may be. As

we recognized in the earlier appeal, it is not our place to inject our own sense of

equity into parties' bargained-for agreements, and Jeff may well be reaping the

benefit of the district court's generosity by us affirming the ruling below rather than

accepting Ann Marie's alternative disposition.

 E. Appellate Attorney Fees

 Ann Marie seeks appellate attorney fees. "An award of attorney fees on

appeal is not a matter of right, but rests within the court's discretion and the parties'

financial position." In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the needs of the requesting

party for an award of fees, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the

requesting party had to defend the trial court's decision on appeal. McDermott,

827 N.W.2d at 687.

 Ann Marie's total request for attorney fees is $15,647.50. She prevailed in

all aspects of this appeal, she was required to defend the district court's ruling, and

she has significant need for the award given her comparatively limited income and

the drain this litigation has had on her finances. See id. We appreciate that Ann

Marie's counsel timely filed a fee affidavit, though we wish it had been better

itemized to enable us to review her request in more detail. That said, Jeff

addresses Ann Marie's fee claim with a single sentence in his reply brief: "Ann

Marie should not prevail and as such no attorney fees should be awarded."

Because Ann Marie prevailed, and because Jeff has not contested the

reasonableness of her requested fees (only whether she is entitled to them), we

order Jeff to pay Ann Marie's appellate attorney fees in the amount of $15,647.50.
 18

 IV. Disposition

 We affirm the district court ruling and order Jeff to pay Ann Marie's appellate

attorney fees in the amount of $15,647.50.

 AFFIRMED.