CourtListener opinion 10755277

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NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

 IN THE
 ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
 DIVISION ONE

 In re the Matter of:

 LAURA LEE STALLINGS, Petitioner/Appellee,

 v.

 TED ELWOOD STALLINGS, Respondent/Appellant.

 No. 1 CA-CV 24-0237 FC

 FILED 12-05-2024

 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
 No. FC2021-093831
 The Honorable Charlene D. Jackson, Judge

 AFFIRMED

 COUNSEL

Modern Law PLLC, Mesa
By Heather N. Pelaez
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

The Arizona Firm, Mesa
By Jessica Ann McCann
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
 STALLINGS v. STALLINGS
 Decision of the Court

 MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Ted Stallings ("Husband") appeals the allocation of one-half
of his Post-Employment Health Plan ("PEHP") and a $10,000 judgment to
Laura Stallings ("Wife") in the parties' dissolution decree. For reasons that
follow, we affirm.

 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties married in 1994, and Wife petitioned for legal
separation in August 2021. Husband moved to convert the separation
petition to a dissolution proceeding in December 2022.

¶3 During the marriage, Husband worked for the City of Tempe.
As part of his compensation, Husband received a retirement benefit called
a PEHP, a tax-free trust account that pays for qualified health care expenses
incurred by the employee, spouse, and qualified dependents after
retirement. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(9) (recognizing voluntary
employees' beneficiary associations as tax exempt organizations).

¶4 The parties agreed that the PEHP could not be liquidated or
divided by a domestic relations order. According to Wife's expert, the
community portion of the PEHP was $94,931.60. Husband argued that the
PEHP was not a community asset because community funds were not paid
into it and that the court could not allocate it. The court found the PEHP
was community property and the community's interest was $94,931.50.
The court ordered Husband to pay half that amount to Wife.

¶5 In 2005, the parties sold their marital home. According to
Wife, they then moved into and planned to purchase a home Husband's
parents owned. Husband told Wife he used $20,000 in sale proceeds from
their marital home as a down payment to his parents, and they then made
payments intending to buy the home under a rent-to-own arrangement. At
trial, however, Husband claimed he was mistaken about the rent-to-own
plan and that he hoped to eventually inherit the home instead. The superior

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 STALLINGS v. STALLINGS
 Decision of the Court

court credited Wife's testimony and awarded her $10,000 for her share of
the amount paid ostensibly as a down payment to Husband's parents.

¶6 In 2016, Husband withdrew around $173,000 from his
retirement account without Wife's knowledge. Wife claimed Husband
spent a large portion of this money without her knowledge or consent. The
superior court awarded Wife $13,840.98 as her share of the retirement funds
for which Husband could not account.

¶7 After the superior court signed qualified domestic relations
orders, Husband timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-
2101(A)(1).

 DISCUSSION

¶8 We review the superior court's allocation of property for an
abuse of discretion; however, the classification of property as separate or
community is a question of law we review de novo. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-
Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4 (App. 2007).

I. Community's Interest in the PEHP.

¶9 Husband now concedes that the PEHP is community
property, but he argues that the superior court erred by failing to calculate
the present cash value of the PEHP. He contends a present cash valuation
was required, citing Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 183 (1986), which held
that "[a]nytime a benefit is matured and payable, . . . the method of division
must be based on a determination of present value." But neither party
presented evidence of the present cash value of the PEHP benefits. Wife's
expert testified that the community's interest in the PEHP account was
$94,931.60 but did not calculate a present cash value. Husband did not
provide an alternative valuation, nor did he argue that the court was
required to determine the present value of the PEHP.

¶10 By not raising this argument at trial and by not providing an
alternative valuation, Husband waived his objection to the lack of a present
cash value calculation. Paloma Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Jenkins, 194 Ariz. 133, 137,
¶ 17 (App. 1998) (appellate court will not consider new arguments raised
for first time on appeal that were not presented to the superior court).
Moreover, courts are not limited to a present cash value method when
dividing a community retirement asset and "should be ‘as creative and
flexible as possible' to ensure that the non-employee spouse will get her
share of the benefits and avoid making the employee-spouse retire against
his wishes." Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254 Ariz. 130, 138, ¶ 16 (App. 2022) (quoting

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 STALLINGS v. STALLINGS
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Koelsch, 148 Ariz. at 185). Accordingly, based on the evidence provided, the
court did not abuse its discretion by accepting Wife's valuation without
calculating the present cash value of the PEHP. See Miller v. Miller, 140 Ariz.
520, 523 (App. 1984) (holding court did not abuse its discretion by using an
alternative method of evaluation because the parties failed to present
evidence of the present cash value of a retirement plan).

II. Reimbursement for $20,000 "Down Payment."

¶11 As noted above, the parties offered conflicting testimony
regarding whether they intended to purchase a home from Husband's
parents. The superior court found it more likely that the parties initially
made a down payment and paid rent to Husband's parents with an intent
to buy the home, and that Husband later decided it was in his best interests
to inherit the home rather than owning it jointly with Wife. The court
concluded that given the lack of documentation showing the community
had any ownership interest in the home, the home was not a community
asset, so Wife was entitled to be reimbursed $10,000 for her share of the
"improper" down payment to Husband's parents. See A.R.S. § 25-318(C).

¶12 Husband argues that Wife offered no evidence to corroborate
her testimony about the source of $20,000 down payment. Husband
contrasts the court's award of an equalization award for the down payment
with the equalization payment awarded based on his unexplained
expenditures of community retirement funds. Husband argues that the
superior court "double-counted" these expenditures by awarding a
judgment to Wife for both. But there were two separate claims for waste
under § 25-318(C). The first involved the $20,000 down payment, and the
second involved Husband's withdrawal of $173,000 of retirement funds
without Wife's knowledge or consent. As to the latter, Husband showed
that he spent all but $27,681.96 of the retirement funds on community
expenses, so the court ordered a $13,840.98 equalization payment to Wife
to account for community waste.

¶13 Husband argues that the only evidence relating to the down
payment was Wife's uncorroborated testimony, whereas Wife proved his
withdrawal and expenditure of retirement funds with bank records.
Husband contends, without citing any authority, that the court "double-
counted" when it relied on Wife's testimony as to the down payment, while
relying on bank records for the retirement funds. But Husband did not
present evidence that the $20,000 down payment came from the
unaccounted-for retirement funds, and the evidence showed that the
$20,000 came from the sale of the parties' marital home in 2005, whereas the

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 STALLINGS v. STALLINGS
 Decision of the Court

unexplained expenses occurred in 2016 and early 2017 after Husband
withdrew funds from his retirement account. Accordingly, Husband has
not established double counting.

 CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

¶15 Wife seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal
under A.R.S. §§ 25-324, 12-349, and 12-341. In the exercise of our discretion
under § 25-324, after considering the parties' financial disparity and
Husband's unsupported arguments on appeal, we grant Wife an award of
attorney's fees on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21. Wife is also
entitled to her costs on appeal under § 12-342(A).

 AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
 FILED: AGFV

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