CourtListener opinion 10770632

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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
 in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

 2024 IL App (3d) 240222-U

 Order filed December 24, 2024
 ____________________________________________________________________________

 IN THE

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

 THIRD DISTRICT

 2024

 In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
 ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
 TIMOTHY P. HOSTER, ) Will County, Illinois,
 )
 Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-24-0222
 ) Circuit No. 21 D 124
 and )
 ) Honorable
 TIFFANY Y. HOSTER, ) David Garcia,
 ) Judge, Presiding.
 Respondent-Appellant. )
 ____________________________________________________________________________

 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
 Justices Anderson 1 and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
 ____________________________________________________________________________

 ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear the issues raised on appeal.

¶2 Following a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the respondent, Tiffany Hoster, appealed

 the judgment of dissolution. While the appeal was pending, Timothy Hoster filed a motion

 seeking to stay the enforcement of a maintenance award until the judgment was enacted and the

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 Justice Anderson was substituted on the panel. Justice Anderson did not participate in oral
 argument but has fully reviewed the briefs and record on appeal.
 parties' property was divided. Tiffany's appeal was dismissed. However, the parties' property

 was not divided, and the stay remained in effect. Tiffany moved to lift the stay, and her motion

 was denied. Tiffany appealed.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Timothy filed a petition seeking dissolution on January 19, 2021. A default dissolution

 was entered on April 7, 2021. On April 19, 2021, the default was vacated, and the case was

 continued to allow Tiffany time to obtain counsel. On September 30, 2021, Tiffany obtained

 counsel, but on July 18, 2022, Tiffany moved orally to discharge her attorney. She filed her pro

 se appearance on September 16, 2022.

¶5 On December 8, 2022, the case proceeded to hearing on Timothy's petition for

 dissolution. Tiffany represented herself at the hearing. On that date, the marriage between the

 petitioner and the respondent was dissolved. The judgment of dissolution provided, inter alia, (1)

 the parties' marital residence was to be listed for sale within thirty days, and the proceeds from

 the sale of the residence split equally between the parties, and (2) Timothy was ordered to pay

 $807.00 per month in maintenance. Tiffany filed several motions attacking the judgment, the last

 of which was filed on July 5, 2023. Tiffany appealed to this court on that date. However, Tiffany

 failed to file a brief, and the appeal was dismissed pursuant to our authority under Rule 375(a),

 which allows for dismissal when a party "wilfully fail[s] to comply with the appeal rules ***."

 Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); In re Marriage of Hoster, No. 3-23-0312 (2023)

 (unpublished dispositional order).

¶6 While the appeal was still pending, Timothy moved to stay the maintenance award,

 arguing (1) the former marital residence had not been sold, (2) he was paying the mortgage, and

 (3) Tiffany's appeal had caused a delay in selling the former marital residence. The court granted

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 Timothy's motion on August 24, 2023, and stayed Timothy's maintenance payments. After

 Tiffany's appeal was dismissed, she filed a Petition for Rule to Show Cause alleging Timothy

 had failed to pay maintenance as ordered. Tiffany then sought to remove the stay of

 maintenance. Both parties also filed motions seeking to appoint realtors to effectuate the sale of

 the former marital residence.

¶7 On January 17, 2024, the court entered an order appointing a realtor and requiring the

 parties to cooperate in the sale of the former marital residence. On February 14, 2024, the court

 denied Tiffany's Petition for Rule to Show Cause and clarified that the stay would be lifted only

 once Tiffany vacated the former marital residence and established residence outside it. In

 discussing its ruling, counsel for Timothy observed the former marital residence was not "in

 showable condition" due to Tiffany's property remaining in the residence. The court told Tiffany

 she needed to "remove all the junk you have in the house," and, addressing Timothy's attorney,

 stated, "[i]f she doesn't remove it by the [end of the month], just throw it outside."

¶8 An order was entered on that date, which reflected the denial of Tiffany's Petition for

 Rule to Show Cause. The order further stated that Tiffany "shall remove all of her belongings

 and personal property items from the parties' former marital residence by 3/31/2024" and "the

 stay on [Timothy]'s maintenance payments shall recommence the 1st pay period *** after

 [Tiffany] has fully vacated and established her residence outside the former marital residence."

 The court did not enter a finding under Rule 304(a).

¶9 On March 12, 2024, Tiffany filed a Motion for Entry of a Qualified Domestic Relations

 Order (QDRO) and a Motion to Modify Order of February 14, 2024. On March 13, 2024,

 Tiffany filed a second motion seeking to modify and vacate the same order. On March 28, 2024,

 the circuit court denied her motions, and Tiffany appealed.

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 ¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, Tiffany claims the court misapplied the law when it (1) ordered the sale of the

 former marital residence, (2) divided the parties' marital property, (3) imposed a stay on

 Timothy's maintenance obligation, and (4) ordered her personal property to be thrown outside.

 Additionally, Tiffany requests we review whether the attorney she retained prior to trial "or any

 other attorneys" committed fraud in this case.

¶ 12 In response, Timothy has filed a motion to dismiss Tiffany's appeal, asserting this court

 no longer has jurisdiction to hear issues related to the original judgment, and any other issues

 raised by Tiffany are either not subject to appeal or not properly before this court.

¶ 13 We have an independent duty to consider our jurisdiction and to dismiss an appeal if

 jurisdiction is lacking. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539 (1984).

 The Illinois Constitution grants this court jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments of the

 circuit courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art VI, § 6. Absent an exception provided by the Illinois Supreme

 Court's rules, we are without jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that are not

 final. In re Marriage of Arjman, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 19. "An order is final and appealable if it

 terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties,

 either on the entire controversy or a separate part thereof." R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G

 Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (1998). Claims previously raised and dismissed are also

 barred on subsequent appeals. Fernandez v. Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2024 IL App (1st) 220884,

 ¶ 38.

¶ 14 "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of

 competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on

 the same cause of action." In re B.G., 407 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686 (2011). For res judicata to apply,

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 three requirements must be satisfied: "(1) the rendition of a final judgment on the merits by a

 court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the existence of an identity of cause of action; and (3) the

 parties or their privies are identical in both actions." Id. at 687. Further, "[r]es judicata bars not

 only what was actually decided in the first action but also whatever could have been decided."

 Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008).

¶ 15 Tiffany's first appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with the rules of appellate

 procedure, i.e., her failure to file a brief. "The failure to comply with the rules is not an

 inconsequential matter and may justify *** dismissing the appeal." In re Marriage of Reicher,

 2021 IL App (2d) 200454, ¶ 30. The subject of Tiffany's first appeal was the judgment of

 dissolution entered on December 8, 2022, and any claims seeking to challenge that judgment are

 now barred by res judicata. See In re Marriage of Lehr, 317 Ill. App. 3d 853, 860 (2000) ("[r]es

 judicata bars the relitigation of an issue between the same parties after a final judgment on the

 merits has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.")

¶ 16 Even if Tiffany had not appealed the original judgment of dissolution, her appeal of those

 issues is no longer timely. An appeal must be taken within thirty days of the judgment or within

 thirty days of any timely posttrial motion directed against the judgment. Il. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff.

 July 1, 2017). Tiffany has not filed any motions or petitions attacking the original judgment of

 dissolution since July 5, 2023. Thus, Tiffany's first two claims, which deal with the original

 judgment of dissolution, are both untimely and barred by res judicata, and must be dismissed.

¶ 17 Tiffany's next two claims concern postdissolution matters: the modification of

 maintenance, and the disposition of her personal property. Following the entry of a judgment of

 dissolution, postdissolution matters constitute separate claims for purposes of appellate

 jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Crecos, 2021 IL 126192, ¶ 45. Such claims, once final, are

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 appealable only once the court enters a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a)

 (eff. March 8, 2016). Rule 304(a) allows a party to appeal a final judgment "only if the trial court

 has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement

 or appeal or both." Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a).

¶ 18 In general, maintenance is modifiable following a petition seeking modification and a

 showing of a substantial change in circumstances. 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2022); In re

 Marriage of Gray, 314 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253 (2000). The court must then consider the factors set

 forth in sections 510(a-5) and 504(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act

 (Act). 760 ILCS 5/504(a), 510(a-5) (West 2022); In re Marriage of Osseck, 2021 IL App (2d)

 200268, ¶ 65. Maintenance is modifiable on a temporary basis prior to the entry of a judgment

 for dissolution, and such temporary modifications are not considered final and appealable. See In

 re Marriage of Zymali, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1145, 1147 (1981). By contrast, postdissolution

 maintenance modifications are generally considered final and appealable orders. Osseck, 2021 IL

 App (2d) 200268, ¶ 45.

¶ 19 At the outset, we decline to consider the court's statements regarding the disposition of

 Tiffany's property. Such statements, while potentially inadvisable, were never incorporated into

 an order, much less a final and appealable order, and thus are beyond our jurisdiction to consider.

 See Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 19 (our jurisdiction extends only to final and appealable

 orders). The court's written order merely indicated that Tiffany was to "remove all of her

 belongings and personal property items from the parties' former marital residence by

 3/31/2024." The court's written orders also stayed Timothy's maintenance payments, first during

 the pendency of the appeal and, later, pending Tiffany's compliance with the court-ordered sale

 of the former marital residence. However, our review of the record suggests the court did not

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 intend these orders to stand as a final modification of maintenance. The court made no findings

 as to whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Nor did the court consider the

 factors contained in sections 510(a-5) and 504(a), which must be considered in all proceedings

 involving the modification of maintenance. Id. ¶ 65; 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2022). Finally,

 the court made no provisions for whether the unpaid maintenance would be held in escrow,

 repaid at a later date, or whether the overall length of maintenance would be modified because of

 the court-ordered stay. In short, the court's order did not \dispose of the rights of the parties."