CourtListener opinion 10776130

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THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

 SUPREME COURT

 In Case No. 2021-0282, In the Matter of Mary Braun and
Terry Braun, the court on August 11, 2022, issued the following
order:

 The respondent's motion to expand the record is denied for the reasons
stated in the petitioner's objection, and because the evidence he seeks to admit
was not presented to the trial court. See Sup. Ct. R. 13; Lake v. Sullivan, 145
N.H. 713, 717 (2001) ("On appeal, we consider only evidence and documents
presented to the trial court.").

 Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The
respondent, Terry Braun, appeals an order of the Circuit Court (LeFrancois, J.),
following a hearing, denying his petition to modify the property distribution and
alimony award set forth in the parties' 2015 mediated final divorce decree. He
argues primarily that the trial court erred by denying his petition because the
petitioner filed a fraudulent financial affidavit undervaluing her retirement
accounts, and failed to correct that information. We affirm.

 We review the trial court's order on the petition to modify the final property
distribution and alimony award for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. See
In the Matter of Arvenitis & Arvenitis, 152 N.H. 653, 654 (2005); In the Matter of
Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 57 (2006). We will affirm the findings
and rulings of the trial court unless they are unsupported by the evidence or are
legally erroneous. See Shafmaster v. Shafmaster, 138 N.H. 460, 464 (1994).
"Property distributions or stipulations decreed by a court are not retained under
the continuing jurisdiction of the court and will not be modified unless the
complaining party shows that the distribution is invalid due to fraud, undue
influence, deceit, misrepresentation, or mutual mistake." Id. "To obtain an order
modifying a support obligation, a party must show that a substantial change in
circumstances has arisen since the initial award, making the current support
amount either improper or unfair." Laflamme v. Laflamme, 144 N.H. 524, 527
(1999) (quotation omitted). "Changes to a party's condition that are both
anticipated and foreseeable at the time of the decree cannot rise to the level of a
substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of an
alimony award." Id. at 528-29.

 In this case, the parties signed a mediated final divorce decree on May 1,
2015. On the same day, the petitioner submitted a financial affidavit, in which
she represented that one of her assets was a 401(k) retirement account valued at
 $157,000 — the same value as that set forth in her prior financial affidavit,
submitted on January 28, 2015. As part of the distribution of marital property
set forth in the final decree, the respondent was awarded $55,000 of the
petitioner's retirement account. He was also awarded alimony in the amount of
$700 per month for a period of approximately four years.

 In March 2020, the respondent petitioned the trial court to modify the
property distribution and alimony award. In May 2021, following a hearing, the
trial court denied the respondent's petition. In its order, the trial court agreed
with the respondent that, as of May 1, 2015, when the petitioner signed her
financial affidavit, the credible evidence established that the petitioner actually
had two retirement accounts — a 401(a) and a 403(b); not a 401(k) — and that
the value of those accounts totaled approximately $180,000, not $157,000.
Nonetheless, the trial court found that the respondent had failed to demonstrate
that the petitioner had intentionally deceived him — a necessary showing for the
trial court to modify the property distribution on the basis of fraud, see
Shafmaster, 138 N.H. at 464 ("Having alleged fraud, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant made a fraudulent representation for the purpose or with the
intention of causing the plaintiff to act upon it." (quotation omitted)). The trial
court explained that, rather than being fraudulent, the petitioner's May 1, 2015
financial affidavit was inaccurate as a result of her confusion as to the type of
account(s) she held, and her "fail[ure] to update the amount when she signed the
. . . affidavit, which was based on a previously filed financial affidavit [that] had
used the September 2014 retirement account value." The court noted that the
record contained an account statement for the period ending September 2014,
which listed the value as $157,308.43.

 Additionally, the trial court found that there was evidence of substantial
communication between counsel for the parties, as well as the attorney who was
retained to prepare the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), regarding the
type and value of the petitioner's retirement accounts. Accordingly, the trial
court concluded:

 The evidence does not establish that [the petitioner] deceived [the
 respondent] about the value of her retirement account or that [the
 respondent] solely relied on the value listed on the May 1, 2015
 financial affidavit as the basis for agreeing to the property
 settlement. As early as January 2015, [the petitioner] provided a
 value of the retirement account of $182,459.89.[1] The evidence
 established that the confusion about the retirement account was
 clarified before the execution of the [QDRO]. Both parties and their

1 Here, the trial court is referring to a document provided by the petitioner as part of her initial

disclosures under Family Division Rule 1.25-A. The respondent argues that the document was
simply a transaction history, and does not support a finding that the value of the retirement
account(s) was $182,459.89. We will address this argument later in the order.

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 respective counsel reviewed and signed the proposed [QDRO] which
 was approved by the court in February 2016.

 Looking at the totality of the evidence, [the respondent] failed
 to prove fraud and his petition to reopen the property distribution of
 the final decree is denied.

Having found that the petitioner did not commit fraud, and finding no other
unanticipated or unforeseeable substantial change in circumstances, the trial
court also denied the respondent's request to modify the alimony award. See
Laflamme, 144 N.H. at 527-29.

 We first consider the respondent's arguments that the trial court's findings
are contrary to RSA 458:15-b, I (2018) — which he contends required him to
trust and rely on the value stated in the petitioner's financial affidavit — and
Shafmaster — which he contends required the trial court to find that the
petitioner intentionally deceived him by allowing him to rely on financial
information which she knew was outdated and false. We are not persuaded.

 Contrary to the respondent's argument, Paragraph I of RSA 458:15-b does
not require him to trust and rely on the petitioner's financial affidavit. Rather,
that provision — which provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he financial affidavits
shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts reflected therein unless
challenged by a party" — clearly contemplates, by its plain language, that a party
may challenge the accuracy of the other party's financial affidavit. See RSA
458:15-b, I. In any event, the evidence demonstrates that the respondent did
not, in fact, trust the value stated in the petitioner's affidavit because he himself
submitted two financial affidavits, in January 2015 and May 2015, asserting that
her retirement account was worth $170,000 to $180,000, not $157,000 as she
had disclosed.

 With respect to Shafmaster, the respondent is correct that, in that case, we
held that the defendant, the husband, had fraudulently induced the plaintiff, his
wife, to sign a permanent stipulation for property distribution, because he had
"failed to provide the plaintiff with updated financial statements in violation of his
duty to do so," thereby allowing her to rely on information "which he knew was
dated and false" when she signed the agreement. Shafmaster, 138 N.H. at 467.
However, key to our decision in that case was the considerable evidence of the
defendant's intentional deception, and his "eleventh hour change of negotiating
posture from cooperation to combat." Id. at 463, 465-67, 468 (noting the
defendant's intentional withholding of his newest financial statement — showing
a significant increase in the value of his assets — and his "eleventh hour refusal
to warrant the reliability of his financial information").

 Unlike in Shafmaster, here, as the trial court found, the evidence in the
record does not establish that the petitioner intentionally misled the respondent

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 about the value of her retirement accounts. Cf. Walker v. Percy, 142 N.H. 345,
351-52 (1997) (deferring to trial court's factual finding that evidence failed to
establish an intent to deceive). Rather, the evidence demonstrates that, in
August 2015, once the petitioner and her counsel became aware of the mistake
— after being alerted to it by the attorney who had been retained to prepare the
QDRO — petitioner's counsel quickly notified respondent's counsel, clarifying
that the petitioner actually had two retirement accounts, a 401(a) and a 403(b),
but not a 401(k) as had previously been disclosed. The petitioner's counsel
"apologize[d] for [the] oversight," and stated that the petitioner would obtain
statements for both accounts so that they could "straighten this out as soon as
possible." In September 2015, prior to the execution of the QDRO, petitioner's
counsel emailed respondent's counsel, attaching two letters from T. Rowe Price
setting forth the value of both accounts as of September 1, 2014, and June 1,
2015, and stating: "Please see attached communications from T. Rowe Price
regarding the balances in [the petitioner's] retirement accounts. We used the
account balances from September 2014 for settlement purposes at mediation."

 Next, the respondent argues that petitioner's counsel did not, in fact,
attach both letters from T. Rowe Price to her email. Rather, he contends,
emphasizing the petitioner's failure to respond to his first requests for admission
on this point, that petitioner's counsel provided only the letter regarding the
401(a) account, but intentionally withheld the letter regarding the 403(b)
account. Therefore, he argues, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to
conclude, contrary to its finding, that the confusion about the type and value of
the retirement accounts had not been clarified prior to the execution of the
QDRO.

 As an initial matter, the respondent misstates our standard of review,
which is not whether there was evidence sufficient to find in his favor, but
"whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial
court based upon the same evidence." In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein,
173 N.H. 38, 47 (2020) (quotation omitted); see also Shafmaster, 138 N.H. at 464.
Here, as explained above, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support
the trial court's finding that "the confusion about the retirement account was
clarified before the execution of the [QDRO]." The petitioner's initial failure to
respond to the respondent's first requests for admission is not to the contrary, as
the trial court subsequently granted the petitioner's motion to allow late entry of
her responses. In any event, the trial court, as the trier of fact, "is in the best
position to assess and weigh the evidence before it," Abrams v. Abrams, 131 N.H.
522, 525 (1989), and may "accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever
evidence was presented," In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 332
(2007) (quotation omitted).

 Nonetheless, even assuming, without deciding, that the T. Rowe Price letter
regarding the 403(b) account was not attached to the email, that fact does not
establish fraudulent intent. Given that petitioner's counsel had previously

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 disclosed that the petitioner had two different retirement accounts, the pluralized
references in counsel's email to the "attached communications from T. Rowe
Price" regarding the "balances" in the "retirement accounts" clearly suggest that,
even if one of the letters was omitted, such an omission was not intentional, and,
therefore, not fraudulent. Moreover, given that the respondent was on notice
that the petitioner had two retirement accounts, it was incumbent upon him to
raise the purported failure to disclose the second letter at that time — before
signing the QDRO. Such mistakes do not amount to fraud.

 Similarly, the respondent also argues that the petitioner failed to comply
with Family Division Rule 1.25-A when, as part of her initial disclosures in
January 2015, she provided him with a document that was simply a transaction
history for an unspecified account, and which did not contain account balance
information. Accordingly, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that
the petitioner had informed him, by January 2015, that the value of the
retirement account(s) was $182,459.89.

 Even assuming, without deciding, that the document is not compliant with
Rule 1.25-A, and that the trial court erred by finding that the document had
informed the respondent of the value of the petitioner's account(s), the trial court
nonetheless correctly determined that this evidence did not establish fraudulent
intent. Indeed, using this document to mislead the respondent about the value
of the account(s) would have been illogical, as it would have suggested a higher
value than that shown on the petitioner's financial affidavit. Accordingly, rather
than serving to mislead the respondent, this document would have put him on
notice that the petitioner's financial affidavit may have been incorrect. In any
event, this document was produced in the early stages of the parties' divorce
proceeding, and any concerns about its accuracy or its compliance with Rule
1.25-A should have been raised at that time. See Birmingham, 154 N.H. at 57
(observing, in case involving a petition to modify a final distribution of marital
property, that purported legal errors "should have been raised on appeal, and . . .
did not meet the respondent's burden of showing fraud, undue influence, deceit,
misrepresentation, or mutual mistake").

 Here, the question before us is not whether the parties perfectly complied
with their obligations, but whether the trial court erred by denying the
respondent's petition to modify the final divorce decree because he had failed to
prove fraud. See id.; Shafmaster, 138 N.H. at 464. Based upon our review of the
record, we conclude that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the
petitioner did not intentionally deceive the respondent, and, therefore, the trial
court did not err by denying the respondent's petition to modify the decree on the
basis of fraud. Cf. Sheris v. Thompson, 111 N.H. 328, 331-32 (1971) (observing
that "fraud will never be presumed," that it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence, and that it "will not be implied from doubtful
circumstances").

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 Lastly, the respondent argues that we should reverse the trial court's
decision because Judge LeFrancois was biased. However, the respondent's
allegations of bias are based solely upon Judge LeFrancois' allegedly erroneous
rulings against him, and it is well-established that adverse rulings alone do not
render a judge biased. See, e.g., State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002); In the
Matter of Tapply & Zukatis, 162 N.H. 285, 297 (2011). Furthermore, based upon
our review of the record, we cannot conclude either that a reasonable person
would have questioned Judge LeFrancois' impartiality, or that any factors that
would have per se disqualified him were present. See Bader, 148 N.H. at 268-71.

 Affirmed.

 MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

 Timothy A. Gudas,
 Clerk

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