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24CA0459 Marriage of Hook 01-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0459
City and County of Denver District Court No. 05DR2245
Honorable Marie Avery Moses, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Charles R. Hook,

Appellee,

and

Paula S. Rhoads Hook,

Appellant.

 ORDER AFFIRMED

 Division III
 Opinion by JUDGE TOW
 Martinez* and Bernard*, JJ., concur

 NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
 Announced January 23, 2025

No Appearance for Appellee

Paula S. Rhoads Hook, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
 ¶1 This appeal concerns the efforts of Respondent, Paula S.

 Rhoads Hook, to secure access to benefits from the pension of

 Petitioner, Charles R. Hook, which benefits were allotted to her in

 the permanent orders upon the entry of a decree of legal separation

 in 2006. While Rhoads Hook has raised the issue at various times

 over the years, for reasons we will explain, we have jurisdiction in

 this appeal over only one order: a February 3, 2024, order denying

 Rhoads Hook's motion to reconsider a previous denial of a motion to

 enforce the judgment. We affirm.

 I. Background

¶2 While, as noted, we have appellate jurisdiction over only one

 order, we believe it would nevertheless be of benefit to the parties —

 and particularly to Rhoads Hook, who is pro se — to provide a fairly

 extensive history of the background of this dispute.

¶3 In March 2006, after nearly ten years of marriage, the district

 court entered a decree of legal separation. The district court made

 findings and announced permanent orders in open court, then

 instructed the parties to obtain a transcript of the ruling to serve as

 the written permanent orders. The court explained to the parties

 that Rhoads Hook would likely qualify as indigent and, if so, the

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 court would authorize her portion of the cost of the transcript to be

 paid by the state. To that end, the court provided Rhoads Hook

 with a copy of a document known as a Form JDF 208. Rhoads

 Hook completed and submitted that form and the district court

 signed it, finding her indigent for purposes of obtaining a state-paid

 transcript.

¶4 Throughout the marriage — as well as after the decree was

 entered — Hook worked for the City of Denver and participated in

 the Denver Employees Retirement Plan (DERP). Relevant to this

 appeal, as part of the property division, the district court ordered

 that the pension be divided pursuant to the deferred distribution

 method authorized in In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 531-32

 (Colo. 1995). In other words, the marital portion of Hook's eventual

 benefit would be calculated by dividing the number of months of the

 marriage by the total number of months Hook was a plan

 participant and multiplying that fraction by the amount of the

 2
 benefit. That marital portion was then to be divided equally

 between Hook and Rhoads Hook.1

¶5 Unfortunately, when announcing its order, the district court

 simply said, "[W]hen the petitioner reaches retirement age, the

 administrator of that plan will be instructed to divide that benefit

 50/50." The court neglected to inform the pro se parties about the

 necessity of submitting to the pension plan administrator a

 document known as a "Domestic Relations Order" (DRO). A DRO is

 a court order that must be submitted to the plan administrator to

 effectuate the court-ordered distribution. Denver Rev. Mun. Code

 § 18-418(b). A DRO must be entered by the court "either upon the

 entry of the decree and permanent orders, or within one hundred

 eighty (180) days thereafter." Id. at § 18-418(b)(2). The court file

 1 To better illustrate the calculation, if, hypothetically, Hook had

 thirty years of service in the pension plan, ten of which were during
 the marriage, one-third of his total benefit would be marital and
 thus subject to division. So if, again hypothetically, his monthly
 benefit at retirement would be $4,500, the marital portion subject
 to division would be $1,500, and Rhoads Hook would be entitled to
 half of that — or $750.

 3
 does not reflect that a DRO was ever submitted to or signed by the

 district court.2

¶6 In November 2023, Rhoads Hook filed a motion to enforce the

 judgment, asking the court to "enforce the 50/50 pension awarded

 [in the 2006 permanent orders] and require DERP to install me as

 beneficiary." A magistrate denied the motion, noting (without

 citation to specific authority) the requirement that a DRO must be

 approved and entered by the court within 180 days after the decree,

 and submitted to the pension plan within ninety days thereafter.

 The magistrate's order informed the parties that, pursuant to

 C.R.M. 7(a), any request for review of the order would need to be

 filed within twenty-one days from the date the order was mailed to

 her (which, according to the court file electronic record, was

 January 4, 2024).

¶7 Rhoads Hook did not file a petition for review with the district

 court by January 25. Thus, by operation of law, the magistrate's

 2 We note that, in responding to Rhoads Hook's motion to enforce

 the judgment, Hook asserts that he provided Rhoads Hook with "the
 appropriate documents" multiple times but she refused to complete
 and return them. We express no opinion on the veracity of this
 assertion.

 4
 order became the order of the district court at the end of that day,

 and any appellate review by this court of that order is forever

 barred. C.R.M. 7(a)(12).

¶8 The next day, Rhoads Hook filed a motion she titled "Motion

 for Reconsideration." This lengthy motion — signed, dated, and

 filed on January 26 — contained myriad contentions, including that

 the court improperly denied her motion to enforce the judgment

 "based on a hearsay comment that DERP had a 180-day deadline";

 that she was only recently informed of that deadline; that she was

 denied a fair hearing, which she characterized as "possibly a Rule

 59(d)(1) irregularity"; that she was continually denied an attorney,

 which she asserted was appointed for her back in 2006 and to

 which she contended she was entitled as an accommodation under

 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); that she had been

 5
 subjected to a pattern of disability discrimination; and that as a

 result of her disability no limitations period can be applied to her.3

¶9 The district court denied the motion for reconsideration. The

 court explained that the DRO was required to be timely submitted,

 and that in the absence of that timely submission, the court lacked

 authority to order DERP to reallocate any portion of Hook's pension.

¶ 10 Rhoads Hook filed a timely appeal. We affirm.

 II. Threshold Issues

¶ 11 Although not addressed in the district court's order, we believe

 it is necessary to address a few threshold issues Rhoads Hook

 raises on appeal related to (1) whether Rhoads Hook's disability

 impacts the timeliness of her motions and appeals, (2) our

 jurisdiction over this appeal, and (3) whether Rhoads Hook was —

 or should have been — appointed counsel.

 3 Rhoads Hook's motion contains extensive assertions related to

 convincing us that she has a disability. For purposes of this
 appeal, we take these assertions as true. She also dedicates a great
 deal of her motion to discussion of various injustices she believes
 she has historically suffered at the hands of Hook, her daughter,
 and the workers' compensation system. Because those issues are
 not relevant to our resolution of this appeal, we do not address
 them further.

 6
 A. Timeliness

¶ 12 Because it impacts our analysis of our jurisdiction in this

 matter, we turn first to Rhoads Hook's assertion, in reliance on

 section 13-81-103, C.R.S. 2024, that her disability exempts her

 from the application of statutes of limitation and other deadlines.

 Rhoads Hook misunderstands this provision. As it pertains to the

 statute of limitation provisions, the term "person under disability"

 does not mean a person who has a medical disability but, rather, a

 person with a legal one. § 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2024. And a legal

 disability "denotes an inability to bring a lawsuit, based on some

 recognized policy of the law." T.D. v. Wiseman, 2017 COA 111,

 ¶ 47.

¶ 13 T.D. involved an individual who invoked section 13-81-103 in

 an attempt to avoid the expiration of the statute of limitation on

 certain civil claims against her former stepfather. The plaintiff

 alleged that she had suffered from drug and alcohol addiction,

 serious mental disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder,

 depression, and other psychological disorders. Id. at ¶ 22.

 Notwithstanding these allegations, a division of this court held that

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 none of these facts indicated that the plaintiff lacked the power to

 timely bring her suit based on some legal rule or policy. Id. at ¶ 48.

¶ 14 Similar to T.D., Rhoads Hook sets forth significant allegations

 establishing her medical disability. But that is simply not relevant

 to this issue. Notwithstanding Rhoads Hook's medical condition,

 nothing in the record suggests that she has ever been under a legal

 disability — i.e., that she lacked the power to timely assert her

 claims based on some legal rule or policy. Thus, Rhoads Hook was,

 and is, bound to comply with all filing deadlines.

 B. Jurisdiction

¶ 15 As noted, Rhoads Hook did not comply with the deadline in

 her attempt to obtain review of the magistrate's denial of her motion

 to enforce the judgment. She did not seek timely district court

 review of that order, filing it one day late without setting forth any

 facts that would constitute excusable neglect for her tardy filing.

 Cf. C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 635 (Colo. 2004)

 (observing that neither section 19-1-108(5) — applicable to reviews

 of juvenile magistrate orders — nor C.R.M. 7(a) provide any

 exceptions for tardy petitions for review but holding that a district

 8
 court can entertain a late-filed petition for review under section 19-

 1-108(5) when the delay is the result of excusable neglect).

¶ 16 Nor does it appear that the district court accepted it as a late

 C.R.M. 7(a) petition for review, because the court did not "adopt,

 reject, or modify" the magistrate's order, which are the only

 permissible resolutions of a C.R.M. 7(a) petition. C.R.M. 7(a)(10).

 Instead, the court "denied" the motion for reconsideration. Because

 Rhoads Hook did not seek timely review of the magistrate's order by

 the district court, we have no jurisdiction to review that order.

 C.R.M. 7(a)(12); In re Marriage of Stockman, 251 P.3d 541, 542

 (Colo. App. 2010). Similarly, Rhoads Hook did not file a timely

 motion under C.R.C.P. 59 to assert what she alleges was a "Rule

 59(d)(1) irregularity" in the fairness of the proceedings. See

 C.R.C.P. 59(a) (requiring any request under that rule be filed within

 fourteen days of the entry of judgment).4

 4 Notably, while the motion at one point is directly addressed to the

 magistrate by name — asserting that "you, Judge Hubler, denied
 me that attorney" — magistrates lack the authority to consider
 motions to reconsider their orders. C.R.M. 5(a). Accordingly, it was
 proper, indeed necessary, that the district court judge, rather than
 the magistrate, address the motion.

 9
 ¶ 17 Indeed, given that Rhoads Hook's motion was untimely to the

 extent it sought relief under C.R.M. 7(a) or C.R.C.P. 59, it is not

 clear on what basis the district court acted. The only proper basis

 we can surmise would be if the district court, liberally construing

 Rhoads Hook's pro se pleading, treated the motion as seeking relief

 from the judgment under C.R.C.P. 60. At least some of Rhoads

 Hook's contentions, construed liberally, could be viewed through a

 Rule 60 lens, such as her claims that (1) she was never informed of

 the need for a DRO (mistake, inadvertence, or surprise); (2) she

 could not comply with the DRO deadline because she "was very

 mentally compromised and unable to understand much in the

 situation of being overwhelmed by two litigation matters" (excusable

 neglect); and (3) the deadline had been concealed from her (fraud or

 other misconduct of an adverse party). We assume that was the

 district court's intent and, thus, review the court's order

 accordingly.

 C. Appointment of Counsel

¶ 18 Before turning to the merits, though, we address one last

 threshold matter: Rhoads Hook's claim that she was entitled to —

 and received — appointed counsel. We first reject her assertion

 10
 that she is entitled to court-appointed and state-paid counsel as an

 ADA accommodation. Rhoads Hook cites no authority for this

 claim, and we are aware of no such requirement.

¶ 19 Nor do we agree that the judge that presided over the

 permanent orders hearing actually appointed her counsel. First

 and foremost, civil parties are simply not entitled to appointed

 counsel. Padilla v. Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. App. 1982).

 Further, the only statutory provision for appointment of counsel in

 a dissolution of marriage action is section 14-10-116, C.R.S. 2024,

 which allows for appointment of an attorney to serve as the legal

 representative of a child. There is no such provision for

 court-appointed counsel to represent a parent or spouse in such

 proceedings.

¶ 20 As the district court explained to Rhoads Hook earlier in the

 litigation, the document Rhoads Hook points to as reflecting an

 appointment of counsel is not what she thinks it is. The Form JDF

 208 that the district court signed in March 2006 was not for the

 appointment of counsel but, rather, for a determination of Rhoads

 Hook's indigency so the court could authorize the state to pay her

 share of obtaining the transcript of the court's ruling. We recognize

 11
 that the document is entitled "Application for Public Defender,

 Court-Appointed Counsel, or Guardian ad Litem." Notwithstanding

 this title, however, this form is used for any situation in which a

 party seeks to be declared indigent for purposes of being entitled to

 some aspect of litigation being paid for by the state. See Chief

 Justice Directive 04-05, Appendix A (providing that persons

 requesting court-appointed assistance — whether appointment of

 counsel, a guardian ad litem, or a child and family investigator —

 on the basis of indigency must file a Form JDF 208).

¶ 21 We turn, then, to the merits of Rhoads Hook's appeal of the

 order denying what we deem to have been a C.R.C.P. 60 motion.

 III. Rhoads Hook Is Not Entitled to Relief

¶ 22 We review the district court's decision whether to grant relief

 under C.R.C.P. 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of

 Anderson, 252 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo. App. 2010). A court abuses its

 discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

 or unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. In re

 Marriage of Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16. We review de novo the

 court's application of the law. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA

 107, ¶ 55.

 12
 ¶ 23 The district court correctly noted that the Uniform Dissolution

 of Marriage Act requires that any agreement to divide a public

 employee retirement benefit must be filed with the plan

 administrator within ninety days after entry of the decree and the

 entry of permanent orders. § 14-10-113(6)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2024. And

 absent compliance with this provision, the district court has no

 jurisdiction to enter an order allocating such a benefit.

 § 14-10-113(6)(f). The district court further correctly noted that,

 under the Denver Municipal Code, any such division of the pension

 benefit required a DRO to be filed within that same 180-day period.

 Denver Rev. Mun. Code § 18-418(b)(2).

¶ 24 Because no DRO was provided to DERP within 180 days of the

 entry of the decree, the district court lacks jurisdiction to enter any

 order requiring DERP to divide the benefit at this late date.

¶ 25 While the district court did not address any other claim that

 may fall within the C.R.C.P. 60(b) rubric, we discern no basis for

 reversal.

¶ 26 To the extent Rhoads Hook seeks relief from the original

 judgment due to the lack of notice regarding the DRO provision,

 such claims are brought far too late. Any claims under C.R.C.P.

 13
 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time and, in particular,

 claims under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) or (2) must be brought within 182

 days after the judgment. As noted, the decree was entered nearly

 nineteen years ago. Moreover, based on the appellate record, it

 appears that Rhoads Hook was aware that there was an issue with

 the pension at least as early as 2011, as she noted as much in a

 motion filed in October of that year. Yet the November 2023 motion

 to enforce the judgment was the first time she took formal action to

 address that issue.

¶ 27 To the extent she seeks relief from the most recent order (the

 magistrate's order which became the order of the district court

 upon the expiration of the time for filing a petition for review), we

 reiterate that we cannot exercise any direct appellate review of that

 order. A litigant cannot file a C.R.C.P. 60 motion as a substitute for

 an appeal. Harriman v. Cabela's, Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 1.

¶ 28 Further, the purpose of C.R.C.P. 60 is to allow a court that

 has rendered judgment the opportunity to change the judgment

 when a new matter of fact or law arises that was extrinsic to the

 judgment because it had not previously been presented to the

 court. Id. at ¶ 26. But the allegations that might support a

 14
 C.R.C.P. 60 claim in Rhoads Hook's motion for reconsideration have

 been presented to the court before. Indeed, the allegations are

 directed at events that predate the most recent order — the alleged

 fraudulent acts of Hook and the court, any excusable neglect

 flowing from Rhoads Hook's disability-caused inability to follow

 through with the DRO process, and the lack of notice of the need

 for a DRO. There is no allegation of any mistake, fraud, or

 excusable neglect extrinsic to the magistrate's order that would

 support a collateral attack on that ruling.

 IV. Disposition

¶ 29 The order denying Rhoads Hook's motion for reconsideration is

 affirmed.

 JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

 15