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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 DISTRICT OF OREGON 

SECURIAN LIFE INSURANCE Case No. 6:24-cv-00161-MTK 
COMPANY, 
 OPINION AND ORDER 
 Plaintiff, 
 v. 
MERCEDES S. MCALISTER; DEBRA A. 
MCALISTER; KEITH MCALISTER; KYLE 
MCALISTER; RACHEL MCALISTER; 
DEREK MCALISTER; R. MCALISTER, a 
minor, by and through her guardian ad litem; 
and TRIBUTE INSURANCE 
ASSIGNMENTS, LLC, 
 Defendants. 

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge: 
 Securian Life Insurance Company ("Securian") filed a Complaint for Interpleader Relief 
to resolve competing claims to a life insurance policy by Defendants Mercedes S. McAlister 
("MM") and Debra A. McAlister ("DM"), along with her minor child, R. McAlister ("RM"). 
Each Defendant has filed cross-claims and motions for summary judgment. Under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56. Mot. For Summ. J. (ECF No. 63) ("MM's Mot."), Counter Mot. For Summ. J. Mot. (ECF 
No. 64) ("DM's Cross-Mot."). For the reasons explained below, DM's Cross-Motion is 
GRANTED, and MM's motion is DENIED. 
 BACKGROUND 
 Kenneth McAlister ("Mr. McAlister") died on June 11, 2023. MM's Mot., Ex. 1 (ECF 
No. 63-1). Prior to his death, Mr. McAlister participated in a group life insurance policy 
sponsored by his employer, Ryder Transportation Co., and administered by Securian (the 
"Securian Plan"). The Securian Plan is subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"), discussed below. Mr. McAlister's coverage under 
the Securian Plan began January 1, 2023. MM's Supp. (ECF No. 68) ("Ex. 9"). At the time of his 

death, the proceeds of the policy amounted to $59,000.00. The Securian Plan listed MM as the 
named beneficiary, and so she submitted a claim to Securian for the proceeds. DM, who was 
formerly married to Mr. McAlister, submitted a separate claim on behalf of their minor daughter, 
RM. DM asserted a right to the proceeds under the terms of a 2019 Stipulated General Judgment 
of Dissolution of Marriage Money Award ("SGJ"), which formalized the McAlisters' divorce. 
MM's Mot., Ex. 2 (ECF No. 63-2.) ("SGJ"). 
 The SGJ ordered Mr. McAlister to make monthly child support payments until each child 
turned eighteen years old, or if the child was still in school, then until she turned twenty-one 
years old. SGJ at 6. Mr. McAlister was required to "obtain and maintain a life insurance policy 
on [his] life with face value coverage of not less than $100,000.00 in full force and effect naming 

the child or children as primary beneficiary or beneficiaries." Id. at 7-8. He was required to 
maintain the life insurance policy "until all child support under this Judgment has been fully 
paid[.]" Id. at 7. The SGJ also stated that "[a] constructive trust is imposed over the proceeds of 
any insurance owned by [Mr. McAlister] at the time of [his] death . . . if said insurance is in 
force, but another beneficiary is designated to receive said funds." Id. at 8. 
 In the face of MM and DM's competing claims, Securian filed a Complaint for 
Interpleader Relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. Pl.'s 
Compl. for Interpleader Relief (ECF No. 1) ("Pl.'s Compl."). Both Defendants filed answers 
with cross-claims. Securian asserts no beneficial interest in the proceeds. The Court granted 
Securian's motion to deposit the amount remaining of the life insurance proceeds plus interest 
($53,307.15) with the Court and discharged Securian from this action. See Order & J. of 

Discharge & Order to Deposit Funds (ECF No. 56). 
 STANDARDS 
 Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file, if any, show "that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Serv., 
Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party determines the 
authenticity of the dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings 
and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. 

 Special rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary judgment motion: (1) all 
reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved 
against the moving party; and (2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Service, Inc., 809 F.2d at 
630. 
 DISCUSSION 
 MM moves for a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to priority of the life insurance 
proceeds because she is the policy's designated beneficiary. DM moves for a declaratory 
judgment that she, as legal guardian of RM, is entitled to a portion of the life insurance proceeds 
to provide child support for RM, as mandated by the SGJ. For the reasons explained below, the 
Court finds that the SGJ is a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO") which triggers the 
exception to the anti-assignment provision of ERISA, elevating Mr. McAlister's child support 
obligations above MM's designated beneficiary status.1 

I. Statutory Background 
 Congress enacted ERISA "to protect participants in private employee benefit plans." In 
re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997). In pursuit of this goal, ERISA prohibits the 
assignment or alienation of these benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Separately, ERISA also 
broadly preempts state law affecting employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The 
interaction of these two concepts—ERISA preemption and its anti-assignment provisions—
presented the question: did ERISA preempt a state court's domestic relations order that 
purported to reassign benefits? Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 
1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

1 DM's attorney stipulates that the SGJ is not a QDRO. DM's Cross-Mot. at 6. DM's attorney 
then misstates the implications of that stipulation, arguing that if the SGJ "is not a [QDRO] . . . 
the anti-alienation provision prohibits elimination of a former spouse's interest, and [the] 
proceeds should be awarded to [DM] and [RM] as requested. DM's Cross-Mot. at 11. However, 
the opposite is true. If the SGJ is a QDRO, then the exception to ERISA's anti-assignment 
provision applies, and DM may be entitled to proceeds from the insurance plan on RM's behalf. 
Whether a domestic relation order is a QDRO is a legal matter. See Stewart v. Thorpe Holding 
Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (courts must determine whether a 
domestic relations order substantially complies with ERISA's statutory requirements). This 
Court is not bound by the parties' stipulation which is based, in part, on a fundamental 
misconception of ERISA. 
 In 1984, Congress made clear that it did not and "resolved any uncertainty" by passing 
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA"), 26 U.S.C. § 417. Id. "The REA amended ERISA by 
creating an exception to its anti-assignment provisions for state ‘domestic relations orders' 
(commonly known as marriage dissolution orders) that meet the requirements of a ‘qualified 

domestic relations order' or QDRO." Id. As amended, ERISA's broad preemption clause does 
not apply to QDROs as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), explained below. 29 U.S.C. § 
1144(b)(7). A QDRO therefore has the effect of "elevat[ing] a plan participant's legal 
obligations, commonly to a former spouse or children of a previous marriage, over the 
participant's express wishes to provide for other individuals as designated beneficiaries." Trs. Of 
the Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 425 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 QDROs are any orders relating "to the provision of child support, alimony, or marital 
property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a plan participant . . . 
made pursuant to a State domestic relations law." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(B)(3)(ii). To qualify, a 

QDRO must specify: 
 (i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the 
 participant and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee 
 covered by the order, 

 (ii) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid 
 by the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which 
 such amount or percentage is to be determined, 

 (iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, 
 and 

 (iv) each plan to which such order applies. 

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C). Furthermore, a QDRO must not "require the plan to provide 
increased benefits (determined on the basis of actuarial value)." Id. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii). 
 The specificity requirements of § 1056 serve a practical purpose: Congress was 
"concerned with reducing the expense to plan providers and protecting them from suits for 
making improper payments." In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d at 817; Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 
1041, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010). While specificity is required, "[t]he pivotal question is whether the 

[order] ‘clearly contains the information specified in the statute that a plan administrator would 
need to make an informed decision.'" Hamilton v. Washington State Plumbing & Pipefitting 
Indus. Pension Plan, 433 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stewart, 207 F.3d at 1154). 
Congress' intention in enacting the QDRO provisions was to "mitigate the impact of divorce 
upon children and former spouses" by requiring that preexisting obligations under domestic 
relations orders be upheld. Tise, 234 F.3d at 425. As such, a domestic relations order ("DRO") 
that "substantially complies" with the requirements of § 1056 qualifies as a QDRO. Id. at 420. 
 Thus, a threshold issue in this case is whether DM's SGJ is a QDRO; if it is, then it takes 
precedence over MM's designated beneficiary status in the Securian Plan. 
II. The SGJ is a QDRO 
 MM contends that DM's SGJ does not satisfy the QDRO requirements. The Court finds 
that DM's SGJ is a QDRO because it substantially complies with the requirements of § 
1056(d)(3)(C). Each statutory requirement at issue is discussed in turn. 

 The first statutory requirement is that the DRO specify the name and the last known 
mailing address of the participant and of the alternate payee(s) covered by the order. 29 U.S.C. § 
1056(d)(3)(C)(i). Here, the SGC specifies the name and last known mailing address of the plan 
participant, Mr. McAlister. Regarding the payee, the SGJ awards physical custody of RM (as a 
minor child) to both parents. The names and addressed of RM's parents, Mr. McAlister and DM, 
are listed throughout the SGJ. See SGJ at 14-16. As RM's parents, these addresses aid in the 
identification of the payee. The SGJ also includes RM's full name and age. Courts "have 
liberally interpreted the address requirement for a valid QDRO in light of its purpose as an aid 
[to] plan administrators in identifying and locating alternate payees under a QDRO." Stewart, 
207 F.3d at 1151 (alteration original). The first statutory requirement is satisfied. 
 The next requirement is that the DRO specify "the amount or percentage of the 

participant's benefits to be paid by the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which 
such amount or percentage is to be determined." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii). The SGJ 
specifies that "[Mr. McAlister] shall immediately obtain and maintain a life insurance policy on 
[his] life with face value coverage of not less than $100,000.00 in full force and effect naming 
the child or children as primary beneficiary or beneficiaries." SGJ at 7-8. This requirement is 
satisfied. 
 Third, the DRO must specify "the number of payments or period to which such order 
applies[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iii). Life insurance is customarily paid in a single lump 
sum, and the SGJ here does not specify otherwise. Accordingly, this requirement is satisfied. 
Stewart, 207 F.3d at 1152 ("because no periodic payments were contemplated, there was no need 

. . . to determine the number of payments affected by the order"). 
 Finally, the DRO must specify "each plan to which such order applies." 29 U.S.C. § 
1056(d)(3)(C). In Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Valois, the legal separation agreement 
("LSA") at issue only mentioned "a policy of life insurance". No. 23-3286, 2024 WL 4678055 
(9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024) (unpublished). However, because "the decedent had but one such 
policy—the one under the Hartford Plan," . . . [t]he LSA clearly require[d] the decedent to name 
E.K. as the sole beneficiary on that policy." Id. Holding, "where it is clear which plan is 
implicated, the LSA substantially complies with ERISA's specificity requirements and is a 
QDRO." Id. Here, the SGJ required Mr. McAlister to obtain and maintain a life insurance policy 
for the benefit of his children. SGJ at 7-8. MM has not presented evidence of another life 
insurance policy which this provision in the SGJ could possibly refer to. A plan administrator 
would therefore have no difficulty determining that the SGJ refers to the Securian Plan and that 
the funds should be distributed to McAlister's minor child RM. 

 The Court finds that the SGJ substantially complies with the requirements of § 
1056(d)(3)(C) and that the remaining requirements of § 1056(d) are met. The SGJ is a QDRO as 
a matter of law. 
III. Requested Relief 
 The Securian Plan has a balance of $53,307.15. DM requests a total of $25,030.08, which 
can be broken down into three parts: First DM requests the child support arrears that Mr. 
McAlister owed at the time of his death, $6,930.08. DM's Cross-Mot. at 12; DM's Cross-Mot. 
Ex. 1 (ECF No. 64-1). Second, DM requests the child support that would accrue and be owed to 
RM through her eighteenth birthday, $13,750.00. Id. Last, because RM will turn eighteen before 
graduating high school, DM requests the child support accruing between RM's eighteenth 
birthday and the termination of her high school education, $4,350.00. Id. 
 MM argues that any child support owed to RM past the date of Mr. McAlister's death is 
unwarranted because child support in Oregon ends at the death of the obligor. Citing Streight v. 

Streight's Est., 226 Or. 386 (1961). 
 Straight's Estate regarded a claim against the estate which would have circumvented the 
testator's intent. Id. at 390. The Oregon Supreme Court held that "on the death of a parent who 
has been ordered to make payments for the support of a child such order terminates 
automatically with respect to payments which would have accrued after such death." Id. The 
Oregon Supreme Court explained that "the long-established right of [the] testator to make an 
unrestricted disposition of his estate" takes priority unless the child support order "in effect 
ordered that the payments shall not be affected by the parent's death." Id. (emphasis added). 
 Straight's Estate is consistent with the circumstances presented here and cuts against 
MM's argument. The SGJ ordered Mr. McAlister to make monthly child support payments until 

the child turned eighteen years old, or if the child was still in school, then until she turned 
twenty-one years old.2 SGJ at 6. The SGJ required Mr. McAlister to maintain a life insurance 
policy "until all child support under this Judgment has been fully paid[.]" Id. at 7. The SGJ states 
that "[a] constructive trust is imposed over the proceeds of any insurance owned by [Mr. 
McAlister] at the time of [his] death . . . if said insurance is in force, but another beneficiary is 
designated to receive said funds." Id. at 8. The life insurance clause of the SGJ only becomes 
relevant in the event of Mr. McAlister's death. It ensures that his eligible children continue to 
receive support, regardless of Mr. McAlister's intended disposition of his estate. In effect, the 
SGJ ordered that Mr. McAlister's payments shall not be affected in the event of his death. 
 Mr. McAlister violated the SGJ by falling behind in his child support payments, by 

waiting until 2023 to obtain a life insurance plan, by maintaining a plan under $100,000 in value, 
and by naming MM as the beneficiary to that plan. MM argues that DM failed to timely seek 

2 The "Money Award for Child Support" section in the SGJ states that from June 2020 and on, 
Mr. McAlister: 
 shall pay to [DM], and [DM] shall have a money award for child 
 support against [Mr. McAlister], in the amount of $641.00 per 
 month as and for the support of the parties' minor children and the 
 first of such payments shall be due on the 1st day of June, 2020, 
 and shall continue on the same day each and every month 
 thereafter until said child shall attain the age of eighteen (18) years, 
 or so long as a child qualifies to receive support pursuant to the 
 provisions of ORS 107.108 and other applicable statutes." 

SGJ at 6. Under Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.108, a child can continue receiving child support after turning 
eighteen if the child is under 21 years of age and is still attending school. 
enforcement of the SGJ. The Court disagrees. Mr. McAlister's failure to comply with the SGJ, 
does not relieve him of the obligations ordered therein. Neither does his untimely death, which in 
effect was contemplated by the SGJ. MM fails to present evidence creating a dispute of fact that 
Mr. McAlister owed $6,930.08 in arrears, that RM would have accrued $13,750.00 in child 

support payments through her eighteenth birthday, or that RM would have accrued $4,350.00 in 
child support payments after turning eighteen while still attending school. On behalf of her minor 
child RM, DM is entitled to the requested relief of $25,030.08 from the Securian Plan. The 
remaining balance shall be distributed to MM, the named primary beneficiary. 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons above, MM's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63) is DENIED. 
DM's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 64) is GRANTED. Within fourteen days 
of this Opinion and Order, DM is Ordered to (1) submit a proposed Judgment and (2) file a 
motion to withdraw funds consistent with LR 67-3. 

 DATED this 21st day of February 2025. 

 s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai 
 MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him) 
 United States District Judge