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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

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In re: Case No. 24-11171 (PB) 

ADRIANA CORBEN, Chapter 13 

 Debtor. 
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APPEARANCES: 

For the Debtor: Cushner & Associates, P.C. 
 By: TODD S. CUSHNER, ESQ. 
 399 Knollwood Road, Suite 205 
 White Plains, NY 10603 
 (914) 600-5502 
For the Trustee: Office of the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee 
 By: THOMAS C. FROST, ESQ. 
 399 Knollwood Road, Suite 102 
 White Plains, NY 10603 
 (914) 328-6333 
For Bradley Corben: Lieber & Lieber, Esq. 
 By: BARBIE DAWN LIEBER, ESQ. 
 1 Great Neck Road, Suite 
 Great Neck, NY 11021 
 (917) 414-1190 

 MODIFIED BENCH RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

Hon. Philip Bentley 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 

 Before the Court are three motions to dismiss this chapter 13 bankruptcy: motions to 
dismiss filed by the chapter 13 trustee and by the Debtor's ex-husband, Bradley Corben, and the 
Debtor's motion for an order approving the voluntary dismissal of her bankruptcy. Mr. Corben's 
motion asks that the dismissal be with prejudice—that is, with a bar to future bankruptcy filings 
by the Debtor—on the ground that the Debtor filed and prosecuted her bankruptcy in bad faith. 
 Because the Debtor herself has asked to dismiss the bankruptcy, there is no dispute that 
dismissal is warranted. However, her ex-husband's request that dismissal be with prejudice raises 
both factual and legal issues. Factually, the parties dispute whether the Debtor acted in bad faith. 
For the reasons I will explain below, I find that the Debtor did act in bad faith, both in filing this 
bankruptcy and in failing to comply with basic chapter 13 requirements. 

 As a legal matter, the request for a dismissal with prejudice raises several significant issues. 
When a chapter 13 debtor alleged to have filed in bad faith seeks to dismiss her bankruptcy 
voluntarily, does the court have the power to impose conditions on the dismissal—or more 
precisely, to include provisions in the dismissal order restricting either the debtor's ability to file 
future bankruptcy cases or the application of the automatic stay in future cases? If the court does 
have that power, what restrictions are most appropriate? In this circuit, answering these questions 
requires consideration of two Second Circuit decisions, In re Casse, 198 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 1999), 
and In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616 (2d Cir. 1999), that bear on, but do not fully resolve, these issues. 
 The Court concludes that it has broad discretion to include appropriate restrictions in the 

dismissal order, notwithstanding the Debtor's voluntary dismissal. Moreover, in this case, the most 
appropriate restriction is not a bar on future bankruptcy filings, but instead a more tailored remedy: 
a limitation on the automatic stay in any future bankruptcies the Debtor may file over the next two 
years. Specifically, in any such bankruptcy, the automatic stay will not apply to any action to 
enforce the Debtor's obligations to her ex-husband unless and until the Debtor shows cause to 
reimpose the stay. 
 In the Court's view, this remedy is superior—in this case and perhaps many others—to the 
more common approach of barring future bankruptcy filings by the debtor. Lacking a crystal ball, 
it is impossible to know whether developments over the next year or two might give rise to a 
genuine need for bankruptcy relief by the Debtor, even though no such need appears to exist now. 
The limited remedy we impose preserves the Debtor's right to seek such relief if it turns out to be 
needed. At the same time, this remedy strips the Debtor of the ability to employ the automatic stay 
for abusive purposes a second time, since the stay will not take effect absent a judicial finding of 
cause. 

 Factual Background1 
 This bankruptcy arises out of the Debtor's repeated violations of her obligations to her ex-
husband under a March 2021 divorce judgment. That judgment required Mr. and Mrs. Corben to 
separate their retirement assets pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order. Because Ms. 
Corben's retirement assets were greater than Mr. Corben's, the judgment required her to transfer 
approximately $155,000 of her retirement assets to him. At the time, the balance of her retirement 
account was more than three times that sum. 
 Ms. Corben chose to violate the divorce judgment's plain terms. She transferred none of 
her retirement assets to her ex-husband, but instead withdrew the great bulk of those assets and 

used them to pay personal obligations of her own. As a result, by the time a hearing to address her 
actions was held in April 2024 before Justice Ariel Chesler of New York State Supreme Court, 
New York County, only $59,000 remained in her retirement account. At that hearing, the Debtor 
admitted she had made these unauthorized withdrawals and offered no justification for having 
done so. At the conclusion of the April 2024 hearing, Justice Chesler entered an order directing 

1 A hearing on the three motions before the Court was held on November 14, 2024. At the outset of the hearing, the 
Court asked the parties if they wished to put on testimony or instead to rest on their papers. All three parties waived 
any right to put on testimony or other evidence. The Court's factual findings therefore are based on the parties' motion 
papers, including the annexed exhibits. Most of the relevant facts, including all those concerning pre-bankruptcy 
events, are undisputed. 

The Court issued its bench ruling on November 15. On December 6, the Court entered an order dismissing the 
bankruptcy and limiting the automatic stay in any future bankruptcy the Debtor might file within the next two years. 
This decision formalizes and expands upon the Court's November 15, 2024 bench ruling. 
Ms. Corben to take immediate steps to rectify her violations of the divorce judgment. Specifically, 
the order directed Ms. Corben first to transfer the $59,000 that remained in her retirement account 
to Mr. Corben and then, within 60 days, to raise the balance of the $155,000 she owed and transfer 
that sum to him. 
 Ms. Corben failed to comply with either of these directives. As a result, Justice Chesler 

ordered Ms. Corben to appear at a July 1, 2024 hearing to show cause why she should not be held 
in contempt. At the conclusion of that hearing, Justice Chesler entered an order holding Ms. Corben 
in civil contempt and sentencing her to weekend incarceration at Rikers Island for six months or 
until she complied with the April order. 
 Ms. Corben's response was to file this chapter 13 case two days later, on July 3, and then 
to file a TRO application requesting an order that the automatic stay barred implementation of the 
contempt order. Ms. Corben contended that incarceration would be "life-threatening" for her, 
because she was undergoing chemotherapy treatment for cancer and, in addition, suffered from 
acute high blood pressure. The Court granted the Debtor's application, holding that the automatic 

stay bars the enforcement of civil contempt orders. As a result, the Debtor's incarceration was 
stayed for the remainder of this bankruptcy case. 
 On October 21, 2024, Mr. Corben filed a motion seeking dismissal of the bankruptcy with 
prejudice. He contended that she had acted in bad faith in multiple ways: by filing for bankruptcy 
to avoid the consequences of her deliberate violations of the state court judgment and order; by 
choosing to file under chapter 13 despite knowing she did not qualify to be a debtor under that 
chapter; and by deliberately falsifying the information she provided in her bankruptcy schedules. 
 With respect to the Debtor's eligibility for chapter 13, Mr. Corben alleged that Ms. Corben 
knew that her total liquidated non-contingent debts exceeded the debt limit imposed by Bankruptcy 
Code § 109(e). He pointed out that, while Ms. Corben's schedules listed about $460,000 in 
unsecured claims (just below section 109(e)'s $465,275 debt limit for such claims), the claims 
register showed a substantially larger total amount of filed claims (approximately $577,000). 
Moreover, a number of discrepancies concerning the scheduled claim amounts suggested that the 
Debtor may have fraudulently understated her debts so as to stay under the chapter 13 debt limit. 

At the November 14 hearing, the Debtor's counsel candidly admitted that "there [was] no question" 
that his client's debts exceeded chapter 13's eligibility requirements, and he made little attempt to 
dispute the allegation that she had intentionally understated her debts. 
 Mr. Corben alleged that the Debtor misrepresented her finances in other respects as well. 
For example, he claimed she understated her income and overstated her expenses in an attempt to 
minimize the amount she would have to pay under a chapter 13 plan. The Debtor made no attempt 
to rebut most of these allegations, which Mr. Corben supported with significant documentary 
evidence. 
 The trustee filed his motion to dismiss on October 28, 2024, seeking dismissal for cause 

under Code § 1307(c) on the ground that the Debtor had failed to comply with many of her 
obligations as a chapter 13 debtor. For example, the Debtor had failed to provide copies of bank 
account statements or federal income tax returns, to file a domestic support obligation certification 
or a credit counseling certificate, or to appear at her meeting of creditors under Code § 341. In 
addition, during the more than four months of her bankruptcy, she had made no payments to the 
trustee, despite having filed a plan that provided for $8,000 per month in required payments. The 
Debtor did not dispute these allegations. 
 Ms. Corben filed no response to either of these motions. Instead, she filed a one-sentence 
motion on November 8, stating that she sought leave to dismiss her chapter 13 case voluntarily. 
 Discussion 
The Debtor's Bad Faith 
 The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Debtor filed her bankruptcy in bad faith. 
 Even if the Debtor had fully complied with chapter 13's eligibility and other requirements, 
the circumstances of her bankruptcy filing would probably be sufficient in themselves to warrant 

a finding of bad faith. Such a finding may be warranted when a debtor seeks, through her 
bankruptcy filing, to continue her prepetition misconduct or to shield it from redress. Indeed, in 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365 (2007), the Supreme Court affirmed a 
bad faith finding that rested mainly on the debtor's prepetition misconduct. See id., 549 U.S. at 
367–368, 373. Here, the Debtor engaged in prepetition conduct so egregious that the state court 
entered an order of incarceration, which she has not appealed. By filing for bankruptcy, the Debtor 
sought to avoid that penalty and to continue to violate her undisputed obligations under the divorce 
judgment. 
 Moreover, the Debtor's actions in the bankruptcy showed a continued disregard for her 

legal obligations. She chose to file under chapter 13 even though, as her counsel later admitted, 
there was "no question" her debts exceeded the chapter's statutory debt limit. She then failed to 
comply with chapter 13's reporting requirements, while making not a single plan payment during 
the four months of her bankruptcy. Collectively, these facts suggest that the Debtor lacked a good 
faith intent to reorganize. Together with the circumstances of her filing, they clearly warrant a 
finding of bad faith. 
Fashioning a Proper Remedy 
 Dismissal of a bankruptcy does not, by itself, bar the debtor from filing again or limit the 
debtor's rights in a future bankruptcy. Because some repeat filings by individual debtors are 
entirely legitimate while others are not, Congress has wrestled for decades with the challenge of 
designing appropriate remedies to prevent abusive serial filings while permitting legitimate ones. 
In its 1984 and 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress added a variety of provisions 
designed to curb bad faith repeat filings by individual debtors, including provisions limiting the 
debtor's eligibility to file future bankruptcies or limiting the future application of the automatic 

stay or the discharge of debts in specific circumstances. See, e.g., Code § 109(g) (180-day bar on 
future bankruptcy filings by individual debtors in two specific circumstances); § 362(b)(21)(A) & 
(B) (no automatic stay if debtor files in violation of § 109(g) or of order dismissing prior 
bankruptcy with prejudice); § 362(c)(3) (automatic stay lasts only 30 days, absent good faith 
showing, if debtor's prior bankruptcy was dismissed within past year); § 362(c)(4) (no automatic 
stay, absent good faith showing, if two prior bankruptcies were dismissed within past year); see 
generally Charles J. Tabb, Law of Bankruptcy §§ 2.18, 3.16 (5th ed. 2020). 
 These provisions have proved far from satisfactory. In addition to being needlessly 
complex, the hodgepodge nature of the provisions has left ample opportunity for abusive repeat 

filings by bad-faith debtors, while also imposing unfortunate costs on good-faith debtors. As stated 
in the report of the ABI's Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, 
 the result [of the 1984 and 2005 repeat-filer amendments] has been a jumble of 
 provisions that do not work well together. The bankruptcy system and creditors do 
 not always receive the protection they should from abusive repeat filings. Debtors 
 acting in good faith have to incur costs to deal with overly broad provisions. 

Final Report of ABI Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, Am. Bankr. Inst. 69 (2019) ("ABI 
Report"); see also id. at 69–70 (recommending amendments to Bankruptcy Code's repeat-filer 
provisions, including amending section 109(g) to expressly authorize bankruptcy courts to dismiss 
bad faith filings with prejudice). 
 Few would deny that the Bankruptcy Code's repeat-filer provisions could benefit from 
Congressional amendment. At the same time, the Code as currently written gives bankruptcy 
judges ample power to police abusive future filings when, as here, the court finds the debtor has 
filed in bad faith. The Second Circuit, joined by a number of courts in other circuits, has held that 
bankruptcy courts have the power to dismiss a bad faith bankruptcy with prejudice, i.e., with a bar 
on future filings. Moreover, while few courts appear to have considered the less drastic remedy 

awarded here—allowing the debtor to file again but limiting the automatic stay in future cases—
this remedy is even more clearly authorized by the Bankruptcy Code. And because of its flexibility, 
this remedy may be warranted in a broader range of cases than the more common remedy of barring 
future bankruptcy filings. Finally, a debtor's request to voluntarily dismiss her bankruptcy does 
not strip the court of the power to grant relief of this sort. 
 1. As the Second Circuit has held, the Bankruptcy Code permits bankruptcy courts 
 to dismiss bad faith bankruptcies with prejudice to future filings 
 In In re Casse, 198 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit held that the Bankruptcy 
Code authorizes bankruptcy courts to dismiss bankruptcies filed in bad faith "with prejudice," that 
is, with a bar on future filings beyond the 180-day period contemplated by Code § 109(g). In so 
holding, the Court of Appeals rejected the Tenth Circuit's contrary decision in Frieouf v. United 
States (In re Frieouf), 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991), which had construed Code § 349(a) to bar 
bankruptcy courts from imposing limits on the debtor's future filings beyond the specific limits 
set by Code § 109(g). 
 The challenge faced by the two courts of appeal was how to construe the less-than-clear 
text of section 349(a), which addresses the effects of an order dismissing a bankruptcy: 
 (a) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case 
 under this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts 
 that were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under 
 this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a subsequent petition under 
 this title, except as provided in section 109(g) of this title. 
11 U.S.C. § 349(a) (emphasis added). Specifically, does subsection (a)'s initial phrase, italicized 
above, qualify only the first clause of section 349(a)—that is, the provisions addressing a 
dismissal's effect on the debtor's later discharge? Or does it also qualify the clause that follows 
the semicolon, concerning restrictions on the debtor's future bankruptcy filings? And if the initial 
phrase qualifies only the first clause, must the (unqualified) second clause be read to bar 
bankruptcy courts from imposing restrictions on the debtor's future filings beyond those already 
imposed by section 109(g)? 
 The Tenth Circuit, in Frieouf, held that the meaning of section 349(a) was plain: The 
section's "two clauses were separated by a semicolon and addressed two distinct concerns," and 

therefore the only defensible grammatical reading of the section was that its initial phrase qualified 
only the clause before the semicolon, not the subsequent clause. 938 F.2d at 1103. Consequently, 
section 349(a) prohibited courts from barring future bankruptcy filings except in the specific 
circumstances, and for the specific time period, provided by section 109(g). Quoting the Supreme 
Court's then-recent Ron Pair decision, the panel concluded that section 349(a)'s punctuation was 
dispositive: "The Supreme Court has instructed that a statute must be read as ‘mandated by [its] 
grammatical structure.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 
241 (1989)).2 
 In rejecting this reading of section 349(a), the Second Circuit noted that no other circuit 

court had followed Frieouf, nor had any lower courts outside the Tenth Circuit. Casse, 198 F.3d at 

2 The panel also found, as a further ground for its decision, that a dismissal order barring the debtor from all access to 
bankruptcy relief for a period greater than 180 days was a "harsh" and "extraordinary" remedy, which "encroache[d] 
on the fifth amendment's due process and equal protection guarantees." 938 F.2d at 1103-04. In the panel's view, 
these "serious constitutional concerns" were a further reason to construe § 349(a) to bar such relief. Id. The Second 
Circuit, in Casse, did not respond to this point. 
336–37. Rather than engaging in a debate over the punctuation or wording of section 349(a), the 
court focused instead on the disconnect between the Tenth Circuit's interpretation and the broader 
purposes served by the relevant 1984 Bankruptcy Code amendments, which both added section 
109(g) and amended section 349(a) to add the second clause: 
 When one considers that Congress intended § 109(g) to give bankruptcy courts an 
 additional weapon for use against serial filers, it is perverse to construe the section 
 as striking from the courts' hands other sections of the Code [e.g., § 105(a)] which 
 may remedy the same problem. 

Id. at 340. Principally on this ground, the Second Circuit concluded that section 349(a) does not 
limit the broad discretionary power that Code § 105(a) gives bankruptcy courts "‘to enjoin future 
filings to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process.'" Id. at 336 (quoting In re Earl, 140 B.R. 728, 
741 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992)). 
 The Second Circuit has not revisited Casse, and it remains the law of this circuit. Moreover, 
outside of the Tenth Circuit, a number of courts have joined Casse in recognizing the bankruptcy 
courts' power to dismiss bad faith bankruptcy cases with prejudice. See, e.g., Landis v. Ortega (In 
re Ortega), 2011 WL 10723285, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2011) ("Bad faith is cause for dismissal 
with prejudice under section 349(a)"); In re Rusher, 283 B.R. 544, 548 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002) 
("Sections 105(a) and 349(a) can be used conjunctively to enjoin a serial filer from filing yet 
another bankruptcy petition for a period of time in excess of 180 days."); see also ABI Report at 
68 ("it has become somewhat common for courts to enter orders of dismissal ‘with prejudice,' 
prohibiting the filing of a new bankruptcy case for longer than the 180-day period specified in 
section 109(g)."). 
 For the many courts outside the Second and Tenth Circuits that have not yet ruled on the 
Casse/Frieouf issue, it bears note that two independent legal developments that have occurred in 
the quarter-century since Casse appear to provide further support for the Second Circuit's ruling. 
 First, the Supreme Court's statutory construction jurisprudence has evolved. As noted, the 
Tenth Circuit's construction of section 349(a) rested heavily on the Supreme Court's then-recent 
Ron Pair decision, which held that courts should give controlling effect to the "grammatical 
structure" of statutory text. Frieouf, 938 F.2d at 1103 (quoting Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241). More 
recent Supreme Court decisions, such as King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015), have adopted a 

more flexible approach to statutory construction, giving less weight to the precise text and 
punctuation of isolated provisions and more weight to the purposes evident in the statute as a 
whole. While the Second Circuit's approach in Casse may be in tension with Ron Pair, it is 
strikingly in accord with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell.3 
 Second, it appears that, by its 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code—specifically, the 
addition of Code § 362(b)(21)(B)—Congress may have ratified Casse and rejected Frieouf.4 As 
noted above, the 2005 amendments added a number of Code provisions designed to curb bad faith 
serial filings, principally by limiting the automatic stay for repeat filers. One of these new 
provisions, Code § 362(b)(21), provides that the automatic stay does not apply to any action to 

3 In King, the Court construed a key provision of the Affordable Care Act in a manner that furthered the statute's 
overall purposes but arguably contravened the provision's plain meaning. While acknowledging that the construction 
it adopted was contrary to "the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase" when "viewed in isolation," 576 
U.S. at 497, the Court found the provision to be ambiguous when viewed in the context of the statute as a whole: 

 [O]ftentimes the "meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident 
 when placed in context." So when deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words 
 "in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." 

Id. at 486 (citations omitted); see also id. at 498 (\A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the