CourtListener opinion 10815766

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
 EASTERN DIVISION 

ROBERT L. WOLFE, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-00092 

v. District Judge Michael H. Watson 
 Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson 

JUDGE GEORGE P. MCCARTHY, 
et al., 

 Defendants. 

 ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
Plaintiff Robert L. Wolfe, an Ohio resident proceeding pro se, brings this action against 
Defendants Judge George P. McCarthy, Judge Patrick Lang, Magistrate John Perrin, and Clerk 
Candy S. Russell. (Doc. 1 at 1). This matter is before the Undersigned on Plaintiff's Motion to 
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5) and for an initial screen of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 
1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 
The Undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. And 
the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Two months ago, Plaintiff filed a nearly identical complaint in this Court. See Wolfe v. 
Athens County Common Pleas, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-4309 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2024) (Doc. 1-
1). The Undersigned briefly summarizes his allegations again. 
Plaintiff is upset about what happened in state court. (See generally Doc. 1-1). On 
February 23, 2023, Plaintiff was served with an ex parte civil stalking protection order. (Id. at 1; 
Doc. 1 at 4). A full hearing on that order was scheduled for February 28, 2023, in the Athens 
County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 1 at 4). Plaintiff appeared for the hearing but asked 
Defendant Judge McCarthy for a continuance. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Defendant Judge McCarthy granted 
his request, but the full hearing never happened. (Id.; Doc. 1 at 4). Instead, Defendant Judge Lang 
decided the matter without a hearing and issued a final civil protection order. (Doc. 1-1 at 1–2, 4). 

Because of that order, Plaintiff's firearms were confiscated. (Doc. 1 at 5). 
Like in his previous complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
violations of his constitutional rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 3). 
As relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering the Athens County Court of Common Pleas to 
vacate the protection order and return his firearms, and Plaintiff wants "punitive damages." (Id. 
at 5). 
II. STANDARD 
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint, 
or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent 
standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004). 
Nonetheless, "basic pleading essentials" are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th 
Cir. 1989). 
These essentials are not burdensome. A complaint must contain "a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and providing "the grounds 
for the court's jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring a complaint to provide enough facts to give the defendant with 
"fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" (internal quotation 
omitted)). At this stage, the Court must construe Plaintiff's Complaint in his favor, accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains "enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Consequently, this means a complaint with only "labels and 
conclusions" cannot survive the pleadings. Id. at 662 (internal quotation and quotation marks 
removed). 
III. DISCUSSION 
As mentioned, Plaintiff's Complaint is largely duplicative of a previously dismissed 
complaint. See Wolfe, Case No. 2:24-cv-4309 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2024) (Doc. 1). The Court 
dismissed that case because of pleading deficiencies, immunity defenses, and jurisdictional 
defects. Wolfe v. Athens Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, No. 2:24-cv-4309, 2025 WL 41899, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-cv-4309, 2025 WL 

278442 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2025). In his new Complaint, Plaintiff tries to fix some of those 
problems. (Doc. 1-1 (providing more details about the underlying events and arguing Defendants 
are not entitled to immunity)). But just like before, the Court cannot give Plaintiff what he wants. 
To start, the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff's request for injunctive 
relief. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts are prohibited "from conducting 
appellate review of final state-court judgments." VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 
F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted) (noting that such jurisdiction lies only 
with the United States Supreme Court). The doctrine is implicated "not only when a party attempts 
to expressly appeal a state court decision to a lower federal court, but also whenever the issues 
raised in the federal action implicate the validity of the state court proceedings." Gentry v. Tenn. 
Bd. of Jud. Conduct, No. 3:17-cv-00020, 2017 WL 6462348, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2017) 
(citing McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2007)). If the source of the injury 
alleged in the federal complaint is a state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman bars the claim. 

VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 402. 
Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to (1) vacate the civil protection order, and (2) direct 
Defendants to return his firearms. (Doc. 1-1 at 5–6; Doc. 1 at 5). Though he says he does not seek 
to "retry" his state court case, the source of his injury is the protection order itself. (Doc. 1-1 at 
2); see also Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012) (saying courts must examine the 
relief requested to determine if Rooker-Feldman applies). To vacate that order, the Court would 
have to examine and reject Defendant Judge Lang's decision. Rooker-Feldman bars precisely that 
type of review. See Johnson v. Ohio Sup. Ct., 156 F. App'x 779, 782–83 (6th Cir. 2005) (saying 
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court judgments or hear lawsuits "that are, 
in substance, appeals from state court judgments"); Johnson v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. of Common 

Pleas Domestic Rels., No. 1:18-cv-2521, 2019 WL 969449, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2019) 
(concluding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented the court from overturning a state court's civil 
protection order); Dunina v. Hein, No. 3:06-cv-383, 2007 WL 496355, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 
2007) (declining to overturn a state court's domestic relations order under Rooker-Feldman). 
More still, Defendants enjoy immunity. Judicial immunity is absolute; it shields judges 
and other public officers not only from monetary damages but from suit entirely. Mireles v. Waco, 
502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (explaining judicial 
immunity exists to protect judges "from undue interference with their duties and from potentially 
disabling threats of liability"); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417–18 (6th Cir. 1988) (saying court 
clerks also "enjoy absolute immunity from suit"). For that reason, "judicial immunity is not 
overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be 
resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (internal 
citation omitted); see also Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tennessee, 63 F.4th 510, 

518 (6th Cir. 2023) ("[A]ll of a judge's actions taken in an official judicial capacity are immune 
from suit."). Instead, it is overcome only if the judge acted outside of her judicial capacity or 
beyond her jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12. 
Clearly, Plaintiff challenges actions Defendants took as judges and state court officers. 
(Doc. 1-1 at 2–4 (discussing Defendants' issuance of protection orders, preparation of court forms, 
and failure to hold a hearing)); see Mackey v. Berryman, No. 17-cv-12359, 2019 WL 197000, at 
*5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2019) (saying the issuance of a protection order is "a classically judicial 
function"). Plaintiff tries to claim that Defendants are not immune because their conduct resulted 
in a "sham process." (Doc. 1 at 4; see also Doc. 1-1 at 1–2 (saying the Defendants' conduct 
showed there was "skullduggery afoot")). At most, these are allegations of bad faith, malice, or 

bias. They do not suggest Defendants acted without jurisdiction, and they are nowhere near 
enough to overcome judicial immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12; Hughes v. Duncan, 636 
F.Supp.3d 879, 889–90 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2022) ("[J]udicial immunity forecloses [a plaintiff's] 
claim based on a judge's alleged failure to hold a hearing." (internal quotations and quotation 
marks omitted)); Huffer v. Bogen, 503 F.App'x 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding a court clerk who 
implemented a domestic violence order as a judge instructed was protected by judicial immunity). 
Therefore, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be 
DISMSSED. The Undersigned also WARNS Plaintiff that if he files duplicative lawsuits in the 
future, the Court may place filing restrictions upon him. See Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 
F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting courts can impose prefiling restrictions "in matters with a 
history of repetitive or vexatious litigation"). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. 

(Doc. 5). And the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that his Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: March 3, 2025 /s/Kimberly A. Jolson 
 KIMBERLY A. JOLSON 
 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 Procedure on Objections 
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 
authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those 
portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is 
made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 
part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may 
recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 
and Recommendation de novo and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).