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Filed 3/24/25 Marriage of Hosman CA5

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re the Marriage of MELISSA and RYAN
 HOSMAN.

 MELISSA SMITH, F087151

 Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. S-1501-FL-621309)

 v.
 OPINION
 RYAN HOSMAN,

 Respondent.

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gloria J. Cannon,
Judge.
 Bobby Cloud Law and Bobby L. Cloud, Jr., for Appellant.
 Klein, DeNatale, Goldner, Cooper, Rosenlieb & Kimball, LLP, Catherine E.
Bennett and Patricia R. Di Pasquale for Respondent.
 -ooOoo-
 Melissa Smith appeals the family court's August 7, 2023 order denying her request
to set aside a December 2018 order that designated her ex-husband Ryan Hosman's
industrial disability retirement benefits as his separate property. On August 18, 2023,
 Smith filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 7, 2023 order, which the family
court denied on November 1, 2023. She did not file a notice of appeal from the August 7,
2023 order until November 9, 2023, more than 60 days after she was served with notice
of entry of the order.
 We reject Hosman's argument that the appeal is untimely, as we conclude the
motion for reconsideration extended the time in which to file the notice of appeal. Smith,
however, fails to make any legal or factual argument in her opening brief that the family
court erred in finding that she did not establish grounds to set aside the December 2018
order. Instead, she addressed only the underlying issue of the character of the retirement
benefits. As a result, we affirm the family court's August 7, 2023 order.
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 Smith filed a petition for dissolution of her seven-year marriage to Hosman in
April 2012, after the couple's separation in November 2011. In April 2013, then 33-year-
old Hosman, who had been employed by the California Department of Corrections since
January 2003, was awarded industrial disability retirement benefits (disability benefits)
after suffering a massive heart attack at work in February 2012. Hosman was too young
to retire since the minimum retirement age was 50 and he had not been employed long
enough to qualify for service retirement benefits.
 A judgment of dissolution was entered on July 23, 2013 (the 2013 judgment). The
2013 judgment contained a clause which stated that Smith "shall receive her one half
community interest in [Hosman]'s retir[e]ment with the State of California (CALPERS,
Pension, 401k's, medical retir[e]ment, disability retirement etc), with the court retaining
jurisdiction over this matter."
The 2018 Order Confirming Hosman's Disability Benefits as his Separate Property
 In March 2018, Smith gave the California Public Employees' Retirement System
(CalPERS) notice of a community property claim in Hosman's disability benefits and
proposed a stipulation to divide those benefits as community property. In July 2018,

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 CalPERS began withholding 50 percent of Hosman's monthly benefit pending a court
order regarding Smith's potential community property interest.
 In June 2018, Hosman filed a request for order asking the family court to confirm
his disability benefits as his separate property. Hosman argued his disability benefits
were not community property because they were not retirement income as he began
benefits postseparation, he was ineligible to receive a service retirement, and his benefits
were not based on his years of service.
 The parties and their attorneys appeared at a September 2018 hearing. The family
court continued the matter to November 14, 2018, as the parties reached a partial
stipulation. The family court ordered CalPERS to immediately release the withheld
benefits to Hosman and pay the entire benefit to him each month until further court order,
with the court reserving the issue.
 According to the minute order of the November 14, 2018 hearing, the matter was
continued to February 11, 2019, as the parties, who were present at the hearing with their
attorneys, requested time to finalize a stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(QDRO). The minute order states the parties agreed Hosman's disability benefits through
CalPERS are his sole and separate property.
 Hosman's attorney prepared findings and order after hearing, which the family
court signed and filed on December 14, 2018 (the 2018 order). The 2018 order states:
"[Hosman]'s Disability Benefits. The parties agree and the Court orders that all of
[Hosman]'s disability benefits/income is his sole and separate property. More
specifically, to the extent any of [Hosman]'s monthly benefits/income is disability, those
benefits/income are his separate property. Once and if [Hosman]'s disability benefits are
converted by California Public Employees Retirement System to longevity/regular
retirement, [Smith] shall be entitled to her community property share of those benefits
pursuant to the ‘time rule.' [Smith]'s attorney shall provide [Hosman]'s attorney with a

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 proposed Qualified Domestic Relations Order and the attorneys shall attempt to work out
the language of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order consistent with this Order."
Smith's Motion to Set Aside the 2018 Order
 On February 5, 2019, Smith moved to set aside the 2018 order based on
"inadvertence and surprise," and because "justice requires determination of the issues
after a hearing on the merits of the case," citing Code of Civil Procedure1 section 473,
subdivision (b). As to the claim of inadvertence and surprise, Smith stated only that
"[Hosman] and his attorney of record misinterpreted the agreement in court." Smith
asserted that while her proposed QDRO would grant her a community interest in
Hosman's retirement, the 2018 order as written would grant Hosman his entire CalPERS
plan and leave her without her portion. Smith asserted she was unaware of the 2018
order until the family court received it and asked the court to reword and clarify the order
to specify that Smith's portion should be awarded to her.
 In her declaration in support of the motion, Smith stated that per the 2018 order's
language, Hosman "is awarded his entire disability benefits, as to which, the [sic] I am
not contending." Smith, however, stated she was contesting the following sentence in the
2018 order: " ‘More specifically, to the extent that any of [Hosman]'s monthly
benefits/income is disability, those benefits/income are his separate property.' " She
asserted "this would grant [Hosman] his entire CalPers benefit as his sole and separate
property as [Hosman] became medically retired since approximately 2013-2014."
 While Smith acknowledged Hosman's benefits became disability benefits when he
medically retired, she asserted CalPERS reviewed the 2013 judgment awarding her half
of the CalPERS retirement and concluded an error was made, which could be fixed by
calculating her interest under the time rule and having a "Module ‘C' " QDRO prepared.
Smith asserted the 2018 order contradicted the QDRO, which allowed her to obtain her

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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 interest, since it stated that to the extent Hosman's benefits were disability benefits, they
are his separate property.
 A hearing was held on February 11, 2019. According to the minute order of the
hearing, the family court ordered counsel to draft language regarding the disability
retirement, which would remain his.
 Hosman filed a responsive declaration to Smith's motion in March 2019. Hosman
asserted there were several things wrong with the motion: (1) Smith did not cite any
legal authority to set aside the 2018 order; (2) her request was "extremely confusing," as
she admitted she was not contesting the fact that Hosman was awarded all the benefits
and the sentence she had problems with was consistent with that; and (3) California law
is "very clear" that his industrial disability retirement is his separate property. Hosman
asked the court to deny Smith's request to set aside the 2018 order and order Smith and
her attorney to approve the QDRO his attorney provided to them.
 In April 2023, after numerous continuances of the motion to set aside, Smith filed
a supplemental brief.2 Smith argued: (1) contrary to the 2018 order and the QDRO
Hosman prepared, Hosman's benefits are community property under the law; and
(2) denying Smith an interest in those benefits contradicted the 2013 judgment, which
evinced the parties' intent that Smith should have a community property interest in
Hosman's " ‘disability retirement' benefits."
 On May 3, 2023, Hosman, through his attorney, filed a brief opposing Smith's
motion and supplemental brief. Hosman asked the family court to deny Smith's motion
as Smith failed to meet her burden of establishing grounds to set aside the 2018 order.
Hosman argued Smith never explained the circumstances surrounding her inadvertence
and surprise and she was aware of the order before it was filed because Hosman's

2 At a March 2023 status conference, the family court continued the matter to
August 10, 2023, and granted the parties the opportunity to file supplemental briefing
pursuant to a briefing schedule set by the court.

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 attorney sent it to Smith's attorney for review and approval, and only submitted it to the
family court after receiving no response. Moreover, contrary to Smith's assertion, the
matter was decided on the merits. Hosman further argued that his benefits were his sole
and separate property under California law.
 The matter was deemed submitted on May 8, 2023. On August 7, 2023, the family
court issued a minute order with its ruling denying the motion, finding Smith failed to
establish a basis to set aside the order (the August 2023 order). The family court
recounted the proceedings that led to the 2018 order. The family court recalled
conducting an in-chambers conference with counsel at the September 17, 2018 hearing,
and the matter was continued to November 14, 2018, in part so counsel could conduct
further research and prepare for the hearing. The family court further stated the parties'
attorneys advised the court at the November 14 hearing that the parties agreed Hosman's
disability benefits are his sole and separate property.
 The family court found that while Smith's motion to set aside the 2018 order was
timely, she failed to establish surprise or inadvertence. The court explained that Smith
did not allege she was unaware of the character of the disability benefits when the parties
agreed they were Hosman's sole and separate property, and the case law Smith was
relying on concerning the character of the benefits was not recent.3 Therefore, Smith
knew or reasonably should have known the information or law at issue when the order
was entered.
 The family court rejected Smith's argument that the order should be set aside to
allow the parties to litigate the character of Hosman's benefits because the parties were

3 The family court noted that while it was not relitigating the matter, the two cases
Smith relied on, In re Marriage of Stenquist (1978) 21 Cal.3d 779 and In re Marriage of
Justice (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 82, could be distinguished from the instant matter as
Hosman: (1) did not elect to take disability retirement versus service retirement; (2) was
not eligible for service retirement based on his age and years of service; and (3) was
receiving disability based on having suffered a heart attack when he was 33 years old.

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 present and represented by counsel at the hearing and they agreed that the benefits were
Hosman's separate property. The family court further found the 2018 order was
consistent with the clause in the 2013 judgment which stated that Smith "shall receive her
one half community interest in [Hosman]'s retirement with the State of California
(CALPERS pension, 401k's[,] medical retirement, disability retirement) with the court
retaining jurisdiction over this matter." The court explained the clause was a generic one
that encompasses all types of pensions and retirements which may or may not be
applicable, and Smith was aware or should have been aware of the clause when the
parties agreed the benefits were Hosman's sole and separate property and the court made
the 2018 order.
 The superior court clerk mailed a copy of the minute order to the parties' attorneys
on August 7, 2023.
Smith's Motion for Reconsideration
 On August 18, 2023, Smith filed a request for order stating that she was moving
for reconsideration under "FC § 1008(a)" and seeking a stay of the retirement account.
The request, which Smith signed under penalty of perjury, further stated: "[Smith] is
requesting the court reconsider the ruling issued on August 7, 2023 and issue a stay of
[Hosman]'s CalPERS retirement account, until a hearing on the reconsideration, due to a
misrepresentation stated within the court's ruling." (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.)
 The request was accompanied by a notice of motion and motion for
reconsideration prepared by Smith's attorney. Smith's attorney asked the family court to
reconsider the August 2023 order based on the following: "Within the Court's Ruling, it
states, ‘On November 14, parties were both present and represented by counsel. Counsel
advised the Court that parties agreed the disability benefits of [Hosman], through
CalPERS, are his sole and separate property.' This is a misrepresentation, instead, we
agreed this would be the case, IF, [Hosman]'s disability had occurred prior to Judgment.
I apologize, if I was not more clear, but this has been the basis of the argument this entire

 7.
 time." Smith's attorney further asserted that if Hosman's disability occurred prior to the
2013 judgment then that portion would be his separate property, and if the court upheld
its ruling, individuals would be encouraged to elect a disability retirement instead of a
typical one to avoid their fiduciary duty to their spouses and deprive spouses of their
community interests. Smith's attorney asserted the motion was timely because no formal
order had been issued, and claimed the motion was based on new facts, but did not state
what those facts were other than the alleged misrepresentation in the court's ruling.
 A hearing on Smith's motion for reconsideration was held on November 1, 2023,
with the parties and their attorneys present. The minute order states that after the motion
for reconsideration was heard, the family court held that "[t]he ruling will stand," and
denied the request to stay the retirement account.
 On November 9, 2023, Smith filed a notice of appeal from the August 2023 order.
 DISCUSSION
Timeliness of the Appeal
 As a threshold issue, we address the timeliness of the appeal, which Hosman
raised in his respondent's brief. Hosman contends we lack jurisdiction to consider this
appeal because Smith filed an untimely notice of appeal and her motion for
reconsideration did not extend the time in which to file it. After consideration of the
issue, we conclude the appeal was timely.
 The filing of a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional. If a notice of appeal is
filed late, the court must dismiss the appeal. (Bourhis v. Lord (2013) 56 Cal.4th 320,
324–325; Hollister Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 674 [when
a notice of appeal has not been filed within the relevant jurisdictional period, "the
appellate court, absent statutory authorization to extend the jurisdictional period, lacks all
power to consider the appeal on its merits and must dismiss, on its own motion if
necessary, without regard to considerations of estoppel or excuse"].)

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 As applicable here, a notice of appeal must be filed "60 days after the superior
court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of
Entry' of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was
served." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).)4 The superior court clerk served the
August 7, 2023 order on Smith that same day. Smith filed a notice of appeal on
November 9, 2023—94 days after she was served with the August 7 order. Thus, Smith's
notice of appeal was untimely, unless another provision of law extended the time to file
the notice of appeal.
 Rule 8.108 allows an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in certain
circumstances. Among other provisions, the rule allows for additional time when a party
serves a "valid" motion to reconsider an appealable order under section 1008,
subdivision (a). (Rule 8.108(e).) The word "valid" as used in rule 8.108 means " ‘the
motion or notice complies with all procedural requirements[, but] does not mean that the
motion or notice must also be substantively meritorious.' " (Branner v. Regents of
University of California (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1047 (Branner).) A valid motion
for reconsideration is one that is timely, contains a declaration in support of the motion,
and is brought on a ground recognized in the statute authorizing a motion to reconsider.
(Id. at p. 1048.) The question is whether Smith's motion for reconsideration was valid.
 Hosman asserts Smith's motion did not comply with a motion for
reconsideration's procedural requirements because: (1) the motion was untimely as it
was filed 11 days after entry of the family court's ruling; (2) the motion did not introduce
new facts, circumstances, or law; and (3) the motion was not accompanied by an affidavit
of counsel supporting the claim of new facts, circumstances, or law.
 We reject Hosman's argument that rule 8.108 is inapplicable because Smith did
not timely file her motion for reconsideration. A party must file a reconsideration motion

4 Further rules references are to the California Rules of Court.

 9.
 "within 10 days" after the party is served with written notice of entry of the order.
(§ 1008, subd. (a).) The 10-day period begins running from a party's service of notice of
entry of the order and not from the clerk's service of the court's ruling. (Forrest v.
Department of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 183, 203, disapproved on another
ground in Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1172, fn. 3; § 1019.5, subd. (a).)
When a notice of entry of the order is never served, the 10-day requirement for filing the
motion for reconsideration is inapplicable. (Novak v. Fay (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 329,
335‒336.) Here, while the clerk served the August 7, 2023 minute order on the parties,
the record does not show that Hosman served a formal notice of entry of the order on
Smith. Therefore, the 10-day period did not begin running and the motion for
reconsideration was timely.
 Moreover, even if the clerk's service of the minute order triggered the running of
the 10-day period, where, as here, service is by mail, the time to file the reconsideration
motion is extended five days. (§ 1013, subd. (a); see Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide:
Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 9:326.1 [the 10-day deadline is
extended under § 1013 for service by, inter alia, mail because § 1008 does not contain an
express exception to such an extension].) The clerk mailed a copy of the minute order
denying Smith's motion to set aside on August 7, 2023; therefore, the motion for
reconsideration needed to be filed 15 days later. Since Smith filed her motion 11 days
later, on August 18, 2023, her reconsideration motion was timely.
 We also reject Hosman's contention that rule 8.108 is inapplicable because Smith's
motion was not supported by new facts and "was not accompanied by an affidavit of
counsel supporting the claim of new facts, circumstances or law." The statute authorizing
a reconsideration motion requires the moving party to file a supporting affidavit or
declaration stating, inter alia, "what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are
claimed to be shown." (§ 1008, subd. (a).) In Branner, the appellate court concluded the
motion for reconsideration was not valid and did not meet the requirements of

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 rule 8.108(e) because, while the motion was brought on a ground recognized in the
statute authorizing a motion to reconsider, the motion was not accompanied by an
affidavit or declaration. (Branner, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.)
 Here, while there is not a separate affidavit or declaration of counsel supporting
Smith's motion, Smith submitted a request for order, which she signed under penalty of
perjury. The request for order thus qualified as a declaration for purposes of a motion for
reconsideration. The request for order states a ground for the motion—Smith claimed
there was a "misrepresentation stated within the court's ruling." (Capitalization omitted.)
Rule 8.108's extension of the time to appeal applies if the motion complies with all
procedural requirements, even if the trial court ultimately determines the motion was not
based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. (Branner, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1047.) Thus, even if Smith's stated ground ultimately does not constitute a new or
different fact, circumstances or law, that she stated a ground for reconsideration is
sufficient for purposes of establishing that the motion was valid for purposes of
rule 8.108. Because the motion for reconsideration was timely, contained a declaration in
support of the motion, and was brought on a ground recognized in the statute governing
motions for reconsideration, the time to file the notice of appeal was extended under
rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) and the appeal was timely.
Merits of the Appeal
 Section 473, subdivision (b), grants a trial court the discretionary authority to set
aside a prior order if the party moving to set aside that order shows (1) the order was the
product of the party's "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,"5 and (2) the

5 "The term ‘surprise,' as used in [the statute] refers to ‘ "some condition or
situation in which a party … is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or
negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." ' "
(State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 611.) Where a
party seeks relief based on mistake or inadvertence of counsel, the party " ‘must
demonstrate that such mistake, inadvertence, or general neglect was excusable,' " which

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 party's application for relief was filed "within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
months, after the … order [to be set aside] … was" entered. (§ 473, subd. (b); Hopkins &
Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410 [burden of proof lies with moving
party]; Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423.)
 Carrying this threshold burden is a " ‘ "daunting task." ' " (Grappo v. McMills
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006.) Once carried, however, a trial court has broad
discretion whether to exercise its authority to set aside a prior order. (Minick v. City of
Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 24.) Generally, the purpose of section 473,
subdivision (b), "is to promote the determination of actions on their merits" (Even Zohar
Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830,
839), so any doubts in applying the section must be resolved in the moving party's favor
(Rogalski v. Nabers Cadillac (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 816, 819).
 We review a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside an order under section 473
for an abuse of discretion and review any subsidiary factual findings for substantial
evidence. (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 257‒
258; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479.) In the absence of a clear showing
of abuse, the trial court's decision not to exercise its discretion will not be disturbed on
appeal. (Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.)
 Here, while Smith is appealing the family court's August 7, 2023 denial of her
motion to set aside the 2018 order, her appellate argument focuses on the merits of her
claim that the family court erroneously concluded the conversion of Hosman's retirement
account into a disability retirement eliminated her community interest in the account.
Specifically, Smith argues the family court erroneously distinguished the cases she relied
on to show the community retained an interest in Hosman's retirement—In re Marriage

requires the court to inquire " ‘whether "a reasonably prudent person under the same or
similar circumstances" might have made the same error.' " (Zamora v. Clayborn
Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.)

 12.
 of Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779 and In re Marriage of Justice, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d
82—and misapplied In re Marriage of Jones (1975) 13 Cal.3d 457. She further argues
that In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096 parallels the current case and
underscores that the community interest in retirement benefits does not end on their
conversion to disability retirement benefits.
 Smith, however, does not make any legal or factual argument on appeal that the
family court erred in finding that she failed to establish a basis to set aside the 2018 order.
She does not argue that she established surprise or inadvertence, or that she was denied
the opportunity to litigate the character of Hosman's disability benefits before the 2018
order was issued. While Smith briefly asserts the family court erred in finding the 2018
order was consistent with the 2013 judgment, she does not explain how that would justify
setting aside the 2018 order, even if true. As the family court pointed out, Smith should
have been aware of the 2013 judgment when the 2018 order was made; therefore, she
cannot establish surprise or inadvertence.
 Instead of focusing on whether she established grounds to set aside the 2018 order,
Smith's argument focuses on an issue the family court stated it was not relitigating,
namely, the character of Hosman's disability retirement. Smith apparently
misapprehends that the family court's comments distinguishing the cases she relied on
were dicta, as the character of the benefits is irrelevant as to whether Smith showed
grounds to set aside the 2018 order.
 An appellant must provide reasoned argument and citations to pertinent legal
authority to support contentions made on appeal. (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799.) We may treat as abandoned issues not properly
addressed in the briefs. (Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 517, 538 [party's
failure to brief an issue "constitutes a waiver or abandonment of the issue on appeal"];
accord, Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1336, fn. 2;
Mecchi v. Picchi (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 470, 475 [failure to provide points and

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 authorities attacking the judgment deems appeal from that judgment waived and
abandoned.)
 Having made no showing the family court erred in finding that she failed to
establish grounds to set aside the 2018 order, Smith is not entitled to the reversal of the
family court's August 2023 order. Put another way, even if the family court erred in
distinguishing the cases Smith claimed showed the community retained an interest in
Hosman's disability retirement, we would not reverse as Smith abandoned the issue of
whether she established grounds to set aside the 2018 order. We recognize that we are
reviewing the order of a family court, which is a court of equity. (In re Marriage of
Schaffer (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 801, 811.) But having abandoned the issue of whether
the family court erred in denying her motion to set aside the 2018 order, we must affirm
the August 2023 order.
 DISPOSITION
 The August 7, 2023 order denying Smith's motion to set aside the December 14,
2018 order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Hosman. (Rule 8.278(a)(1).)

 DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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