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Fourth Court of Appeals
 San Antonio, Texas
 MEMORANDUM OPINION

 No. 04-23-00110-CV

 Curtis Tyrone WILLIAMS,
 Appellant

 v.

 Larmetrice NUNNALLY-WILLIAMS,
 Appellee

 From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
 Trial Court No. 2022-CI-09154
 Honorable Elma T. Salinas-Ender, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
 Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
 Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 19, 2025

AFFIRMED

 Appellant Curtis Tyrone Williams ("Curtis") appeals the trial court's post-divorce qualified

domestic relations order ("QDRO") awarding his former spouse, appellee Larmetrice Nunnally-

Williams ("Larmetrice"), one-half of his military retirement that was earned until the date of

divorce. On appeal, Curtis argues the trial court erroneously awarded Larmetrice a portion of the

retirement benefits that were his separate property because it was earned prior to the marriage. On

this record, we affirm.
 04-23-00110-CV

 BACKGROUND

 According to Curtis, he served in the military prior to his marriage to Larmetrice and

continued to serve after they were divorced. Although the record does not contain the final divorce

decree, the record reflects Curtis provided it to the trial court without objection. The trial court's

findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect that the parties were divorced on March 27, 2017. 1

The parties entered into an Agreed Final Decree of Divorce (the "Divorce Decree") that was signed

by the parties and their attorneys. The Divorce Decree was signed by the trial court on June 21,

2017. According to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Divorce Decree

contained the following two paragraphs regarding the division of Curtis's military retirement

benefits:

 W-4. Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams receive a Judgment against and recovers
 from Curtis T. Williams fifty percent (50%) of Curtis T. William[s's] net retired
 pay arising out of Curtis T. Williams'[s] employment with the United States Army,
 together with any cost of living adjustments applicable thereto payable if, as and
 when, received by Curtis T. Williams, and more particularly defined in the
 Domestic Relations Order as of March 27, 2017. IT IS ORDERED that such
 payment begins on the date of Curtis T. Williams to Larmetrice
 Nunnally[-]Williams on the first of the month thereafter until it is paid directly to
 Larmetrice Nunnally Williams of DFAS or other entity.

 W-5. Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams is awarded a portion of Curtis T.
 Williams's sums, whether matured or unmatured, accrued [or] unaccrued, vested
 or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any
 other rights related to any profit-sharing plan, thrift-saving plan, retirement plan
 Keogh plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, 401(k) plan, employee
 saving plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, disability plan, or other benefits exi[s]ting by
 reason of Curtis T. Williams's employment [with the] United States Army. As of
 March 19, 2017 that portion being Eight [T]housand Four Hundred Seventy dollars
 and Fifty-Seven cents ($8,470.57) of the related benefits earned during the
 marriage.

1
 Because the record does not contain the Divorce Decree, we rely on the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions
of law for information in and pertaining to the Divorce Decree.

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 04-23-00110-CV

 Although the Divorce Decree refers to a domestic relations order in paragraph W-4, there

was no domestic relations order signed by the trial court in the divorce proceeding.

 On May 17, 2022, Larmetrice filed an original petition in the underlying suit seeking to

enter a post-divorce QDRO based on the division of Curtis's military retirement in the Divorce

Decree. At trial, Curtis provided the trial court with the docket notes from the judge who presided

over the divorce proceedings and signed the Divorce Decree. 2 The judge's docket notes from the

divorce proceeding contain the following notation: "CP ÷ of retirement + TSP[.]" The docket

notes also state there was an "[a]greement on the record" on March 27, 2017. Curtis argued "CP"

means community property and that the judge's docket notes indicate the judge intended to divide

the portion of his military retirement that was earned or accrued during the marriage. Curtis argued

some of his military retirement—which was earned or accrued before and after the marriage—was

his separate property. Curtis contended the Divorce Decree mistakenly included the separate

property portion of his military retirement in the division with Larmetrice because it conflicted

with the trial judge's notes indicating only the community property portion of his military

retirement would be divided.

 The trial court in the underlying proceeding noted the agreed Divorce Decree stated

Larmetrice was entitled to half of the military retirement accrued or earned until March 27, 2017,

and that included any portion that was allegedly earned or accrued before the marriage. On

November 14, 2022, the trial court signed a QDRO stating Larmetrice was entitled to receive

39.79% 3 of Curtis's military retirement payment. Curtis appeals.

2
 The trial court attached the docket notes to its findings of fact and conclusions of law in this proceeding.
3
 The record does not reflect how the trial court calculated this percentage. In her brief, Larmetrice provides a footnote
stating: "39.79% is calculated by dividing 191 months (the number of months that Appellant had served on active
duty as of the date the divorce was granted) by 240 months (the . . . total number of months that Appellant served on
active duty) and multiplying by 50%." As more fully explained in the analysis, Curtis did not bring forth a sufficient

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 04-23-00110-CV

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 A qualified domestic relations order "is a species of post-divorce enforcement or

clarification order." Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97, 107 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for enforcement or

clarification of a divorce decree under an abuse of discretion standard." Shakouri v. Shakouri,

No. 02-20-00297-CV, 2022 WL 189084, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 20, 2022, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without

reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.

 DISCUSSION

 On appeal, Curtis reasserts the same arguments he presented to the trial court. He argues

the agreed Divorce Decree erroneously awards Larmetrice a portion of his military retirement that

was earned or accrued before they were married. Although Curtis contends in this appeal that the

trial court incorrectly calculated the division of his military retirement in its QDRO, his complaint

is really that the Divorce Decree itself contains a mistake.

 At the outset, we note the record does not contain the Divorce Decree nor does it contain a

transcript of the agreement that was read into the record on March 27, 2017. Further, the record

does not contain specific evidence of when the parties were married and when Curtis began his

military service prior to the marriage. 4

record to show the trial court abused its discretion. Absent such a record, we must presume there was adequate
evidence before the trial court to support its decision. See Marquez v. Marquez, No. 04-03-00538-CV, 2004 WL
1054843, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 12, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.).
4
 Curtis was called by his counsel to testify at trial and sought to present testimony on the dates the parties were
married and the dates that he served in the military; however, Larmetrice objected to the testimony because Curtis did
not provide disclosures before trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.1, 194.2, 194.4. The trial court sustained the objection
and excluded Curtis's testimony. Although Curtis made an offer of proof of his testimony, he has not challenged the
trial court's evidentiary ruling on appeal. Thus, the trial court's evidentiary ruling will not be disturbed on appeal,
and we cannot consider Curtis's testimony as evidence. We note, however, that during argument Curtis's counsel told
the trial court that Curtis served in the military ten years prior to the marriage. Curtis contradicted this statement when

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 04-23-00110-CV

 A party complaining the trial court abused its discretion "has the burden to bring forth a

record showing such abuse." MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, Ltd. v. Gulley-Hurst, L.L.C.,

664 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tex. 2023); see also Marquez v. Marquez, No. 04-03-00538-CV, 2004 WL

1054843, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 12, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). "Absent such a

record, the reviewing court must presume that the evidence before the trial [court] was adequate

to support the decision." MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, Ltd., 664 S.W.3d at 109.

 Here, Curtis failed to bring forth a record showing the trial court abused its discretion when

it rendered the QDRO. Based on the record before us, we are unable to ascertain the parties'

agreement that was read into the record during the divorce proceeding or determine the basis for

the trial court's characterization and division of the military retirement benefits in the Divorce

Decree. Curtis argues the trial court incorrectly characterized separate property as community

property in violation of section 3.001 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 3.001 (providing a spouse's separate property consists of property owned or claimed by the

spouse before marriage). However, there is a presumption that property possessed by either spouse

during or on dissolution of marriage is community property, and it was Curtis's burden at the

divorce proceeding to establish that the property is separate property by clear and convincing

evidence. See id. § 3.003. Further, Curtis does not dispute he and Larmetrice entered into the

Divorce Decree pursuant to an agreement incident to the divorce. Notwithstanding the general

rules regarding property division, spouses may enter into a written agreement concerning the

division of property, and the trial court may set forth this agreement in the final decree if it

he testified in his offer of proof that he served in the military four years prior to the marriage. Neither counsel's
argument nor Curtis's offer of proof constitute evidence in the case.

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 04-23-00110-CV

determines the agreement was just and right. 5 See id. § 7.006(a), (b). Simply stated, the trial court

presiding over the divorce proceeding could have presumed the entitlement to military retirement

was community property until the date of divorce, or the parties could have agreed to characterize

the alleged separate property as community property. Thus, we cannot conclude whether the

agreed Divorce Decree accurately portrays the parties' agreement or contained a mistake in the

division of the military retirement. And, because there was no evidence regarding the date Curtis

began his military service or the date the parties were married, the trial court had no basis to

conclude the Divorce Decree mischaracterized the alleged separate property portion of Curtis's

retirement as community property.

 Moreover, even if the trial court agreed the Divorce Decree contains a mistake in the

division of property, it cannot change the division of property after plenary power expired. "After

a trial court issues a divorce decree, it retains continuing subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the

property division contained with[in] the decree." Schlecht v. Schlecht, No. 04-13-00183-CV,

2014 WL 1319330, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 2, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.002). "After the expiration of its plenary power, however, the court

may not alter, amend, or modify the substantive division of property in the decree." Schlecht,

2014 WL 1319330, at *2 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007). "As with any post-divorce

enforcement or clarification order, a QDRO may not amend, modify, alter, or change the division

of property made or approved in the decree of divorce or annulment." Schlecht, 2014 WL

1319330, at *2 (alteration omitted) (quoting Gainous, 219 S.W.3d at 107).

5
 In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court in this case found: "The Agreed Final Decree of Divorce
is replete with entire paragraphs being struck out and with several changes to language in the decree being penned in
and initialed by the parties." The trial court could have reasonably concluded the markups in the Divorce Decree
indicate the division of the military retirement, like other provisions of the Divorce Decree, was negotiated and agreed
to by the parties.

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 04-23-00110-CV

 The trial court interpreted paragraph W-4 of the Divorce Decree—which was incorporated

in the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law—as awarding Larmetrice "50% of the

value of [Curtis's] disposable military retired pay[,]" with applicable cost of living adjustments,

earned or accrued until the date of divorce: March 27, 2017. In its oral pronouncement, the trial

court expressly stated it interpreted the judge's docket notes from the divorce proceeding—which

contained the note, "CP ÷ of retirement"—as awarding Larmetrice one-half of the military

retirement for Curtis's time served in the military until March 27, 2017. The trial court's

interpretation gives effect to the "CP" 6 notation as excluding military retirement that is based on

Curtis's military service after the date of divorce. Based on this record, we cannot conclude the

trial court's interpretation of paragraph W-4 of the Divorce Decree was arbitrary, unreasonable, or

without reference to any guiding rules or principles. As such, it was not an abuse of discretion to

render a QDRO based on the trial court's reasonable interpretation of the Divorce Decree.

 Accordingly, we overrule Curtis's sole issue.

 CONCLUSION

 We affirm the trial court's Domestic Relations Order.

 Irene Rios, Justice

6
 It appears from the record the trial court agreed with Curtis that "CP" means community property.

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