CourtListener opinion 10833355

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304 Ga. 199
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 S18Y0717. IN THE MATTER OF SHANNON BRILEY-HOLMES.

 PER CURIAM.

 This Court rejected the first petition for voluntary discipline of Shannon

Briley-Holmes (State Bar No. 447679), which sought a one-year suspension

with conditions on reinstatement for her admitted violations of the disciplinary

rules in representing seven clients. See In the Matter of Briley-Holmes, 300 Ga.

648 (797 SE2d 123) (2017). The State Bar then issued a formal complaint, and

she filed a second petition for voluntary discipline, which she later amended.

In her amended second petition, she admitted violating the disciplinary rules in

representing 11 clients in unrelated matters over a period of almost three years.

She requested a suspension ranging from two to five years with conditions on

reinstatement but said that she would accept a more severe sanction. Special

Master Margaret Gettle Washburn held a lengthy hearing, at which it was made

clear that Briley-Holmes would accept disbarment as a sanction for her

misconduct.
 In a 68-page report and recommendation, the special master recommends

that we accept the amended second petition and impose a five-year suspension

with conditions on reinstatement, and neither the State Bar nor Briley-Holmes

filed exceptions to the special master's report. However, as explained below,

the appropriate sanction for Briley-Holmes's misconduct is disbarment.

Because the record indicates that she is willing to accept disbarment, and

because "[a] voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment," Bar

Rule 4-110 (f), we construe her amended second petition as a petition for

voluntary surrender of license, which we accept.

 As recounted by the special master, Briley-Holmes has admitted the

following facts. In approximately June 2013, Briley-Holmes agreed to represent

the first client pro bono in a civil service appeal challenging his dismissal from

the Atlanta Police Department. After losing that appeal, Briley-Holmes agreed

to pursue the next step by filing a petition for certiorari in the Superior Court.

However, she miscalendared the filing deadline, the petition was filed late, and

the Superior Court dismissed the petition with prejudice. The client then paid

Briley-Holmes $2,000 to pursue an appeal to this Court. She filed a notice of

appeal and began work on the matter, but the representation ended before

 2
 anything else was filed. Meanwhile, the client's POST certification was

revoked. Briley-Holmes agreed to represent him in an attempt to restore the

certification for $750 plus filing fees. The client paid her approximately $600,

and she filed the paperwork necessary to obtain a hearing, including a $150

filing fee. She declined the client's request to accept payment of the balance

owed on the certification case from the $2,000 that the client had paid her to

handle the appeal in the civil service case. Briley-Holmes missed a hearing in

the certification case, resulting in the dismissal of that case. The special master

concluded that Briley-Holmes violated Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct

1.3 by failing to timely file the petition for certiorari in the civil service case,

which resulted in the dismissal of the petition, and by missing the scheduled

hearing in the certification case, which resulted in the dismissal of that case.1

 In March 2014, the second client hired Briley-Holmes to represent him in

a child custody case. She initially communicated with the client, but after the

client hired an investigator at her request, she failed to respond to the client's

 1
 The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are set out in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Rule 1.3
says, "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
Reasonable diligence as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the
detriment of the client in effect wilfully abandon or wilfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the
lawyer. . . ." The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.3 is disbarment.

 3
 communications about this development. For a period of two months, Briley-

Holmes failed to respond to more than one e-mail, text, or telephone call from

the client about the case. She eventually e-mailed the client to let him know that

the complaint was overnighted to a process service company in Florida, but she

did not follow through with the case, and it was later dismissed. The special

master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated Rule 1.3 by failing to follow

through with the case, which caused it to be dismissed, and violated Rule 1.4 by

failing to respond in a timely manner to the client's communications about the

case.2

 In July 2014, Briley-Holmes represented the third client in divorce

proceedings. Under the final judgment and decree of divorce, Briley-Holmes

was to complete a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) for the ex-

husband's 401 (k) account to be awarded to the client within 60 days. Briley-

Holmes did not know how to prepare a QDRO and got assistance from opposing

counsel. Briley-Holmes drafted a QDRO but did not timely forward it to her

client or to opposing counsel. She then failed to respond to her client's e-mails

 2
 Rule 1.4 says, "A lawyer shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of
the matter [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for information . . . ." The maximum
sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.4 is a public reprimand.

 4
 for two years because she does not check the e-mail address that the client was

using. The special master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated Rule 1.3 by

not submitting the completed QDRO to opposing counsel and violated Rule 1.4

by failing to respond in a timely manner to the client's e-mails about the case.

 In June 2015, the family of the fourth client hired Briley-Holmes and her

law partner, Jennifer Wright, to represent the client in a criminal case.3 Briley-

Holmes promptly visited the client in prison in South Carolina for several hours

and then filed an entry of appearance and preliminary motions. She never

visited the client again and had great difficulty communicating with his family

because they did not speak English. Briley-Holmes appeared at the first

calendar call of the case. Wright was supposed to attend the second calendar

call but failed to do so and did not inform Briley-Holmes or the court in

advance. Briley-Holmes immediately notified the judge that she was sick on

that day and unaware that Wright was not going to attend the calendar call.

Neither Briley-Holmes nor Wright appeared at the next two calendar calls.

During that time, Wright allegedly had begun acting in an irrational and

 3
 This Court disbarred Wright in 2016. See In the Matter of Wright, 299 Ga. 139 (786 SE2d
686) (2016).

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 destructive manner, doing such things as cutting off Briley-Holmes's cell phone

on the law firm's business plan and terminating Briley-Holmes's access to the

firm's online case management database. Neither Briley-Holmes nor Wright

attended the fifth court date in the case, and the client's family terminated the

representation. The special master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated Rule

1.3 by failing to attend scheduled court appearances and by failing to ensure that

all necessary actions in the case were taken.

 Also in June 2015, the fifth client hired Briley-Holmes to represent him

in a criminal case in certain pre-warrant matters and to appear at a pre-warrant

hearing, although Briley-Holmes later discovered that there was no such hearing

because an assigned detective had taken over the case. Briley-Holmes advised

the client of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and asked him not to

make any statements to law enforcement without her being present. She tried

to contact the assigned detective to set up an interview but did not reach him,

and she understands that the detective tried to reach her as well, although she

has no recollection of that fact. Briley-Holmes did not follow through and

arrange an interview, which eventually resulted in the client's arrest. When

Briley-Holmes learned of the arrest, she immediately filed an entry of

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 appearance, a motion for bond, and all preliminary motions associated with

representation in a criminal case even though this work was outside the original

scope of the representation. At the bond hearing, she learned that the client had

hired new counsel. The special master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated

Rule 1.3 by failing to arrange an interview with the detective, which resulted in

her client's arrest and a period of incarceration.

 In September 2015, Briley-Holmes received a $1,500 retainer to represent

the sixth client in obtaining a temporary protective order (TPO) and a divorce.

Briley-Holmes obtained the TPO, and a hearing was set on whether to convert

the TPO to a 12-month order. However, the TPO was never served on the

opposing party, and opposing counsel was going to move to dismiss the TPO on

this ground. Shortly before the hearing date, Briley-Holmes and opposing

counsel reached an oral agreement whereby opposing counsel's client would

consent to a 12-month order. Although the agreement was not reduced to

writing and executed, Briley-Holmes told her client on the day before the

hearing that an agreement had been reached and that it was not necessary for the

client to attend the hearing. Briley-Holmes did not notify the court that an

agreement had been reached, as opposing counsel had agreed to obtain his

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 client's signature and submit the agreement to the court. Briley-Holmes sent a

follow-up e-mail to opposing counsel and called the State Bar ethics hotline to

make sure that the agreement was proper and that she had behaved reasonably.

The opposing party refused to consummate the agreement, asserting a material

change in circumstances involving the behavior of the parties' son, so opposing

counsel never submitted the agreement to the court. Neither Briley-Holmes nor

her client appeared at the hearing, and the court dismissed the TPO. The client

was upset despite being told that it was her son's behavior that prevented

consummation of the agreement, and the client terminated the representation.

The special master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated Rule 1.3 when,

without having a written agreement, she told her client not to appear at the

hearing, did not appear herself, did not notify the court of the oral settlement,

and did not confirm with opposing counsel the consummation of the agreement.

 In November 2015, the seventh client contacted Briley-Holmes about

possible representation to contest disciplinary action proposed to be taken

against her son by his high school. No representation agreement was signed at

that time. The client contacted Briley-Holmes again, said that the school was

imposing a ten-day suspension, and said that she wanted to appeal. The

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 following month, the client paid Briley-Holmes a flat fee of $3,000, which

Briley-Holmes said would make her "available at every single step . . . ,

including all meetings, warrant issuance hearings, suspension appeals, etc."

Briley-Holmes contacted the school twice in unsuccessful efforts to obtain

information about the case and arrange a meeting. On the second occasion,

Briley-Holmes was told that the school's legal counsel would contact her. The

client raised specific concerns about her son's circumstances more than once,

but Briley-Holmes said that there was little she could do until she received the

information that she requested from the school. The school's legal counsel

contacted Briley-Holmes more than a month after the client retained her and

explained that the school could not release the information requested without an

executed release of information form under the federal Family Educational

Rights and Privacy Act. Briley-Holmes sent the required form to the client, the

client executed and returned it, and Briley-Holmes promptly forwarded the

executed form to the school's legal counsel. A week later, the client terminated

the representation. Although Briley-Holmes had not performed all the work that

she had said that the flat rate would cover, she did not refund any of the fee that

the client paid her. The special master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated

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 Rule 1.16 by failing to promptly refund the unearned portion of the fee upon

termination of the representation.4

 In December 2015, the eighth client hired Briley-Holmes to represent him

in a civil case, paying her a $3,000 retainer to be billed against at $200 per hour

until exhausted. When the retainer ran out, Briley-Holmes asked for an

additional $1,800 to continue work on the case. The client said that he thought

that the case could be settled for $4,000 total, including the $3,000 retainer that

he had paid to Briley-Holmes, but he paid Briley-Holmes an additional $1,000

anyway. Briley-Holmes missed a court date because she was on jury duty but

failed to present documents confirming that fact to her client or to the court.

Two months later, she missed a second court date, which the client also missed

because Briley-Holmes failed to tell him about it, and the court issued an

incarceration order for the client. Throughout the representation, Briley-Holmes

failed to answer several texts and telephone calls from the client. When the

client obtained new counsel, Briley-Holmes failed to forward the client's file.

 4
 Rule 1.16 says in part, "Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as . . . surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned." The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.16 is a public reprimand.

 10
 The special master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated Rule 1.3 by missing

two court dates, violated Rule 1.4 by failing to respond in a timely manner to the

client's text messages and telephone calls about the case and by failing to notify

him of the second court date, and violated Rule 1.16 by failing to forward the

client's file to his new attorney.

 In January 2016, the ninth client retained Briley-Holmes to represent her

in seeking a child custody modification order and paid her a flat fee of $4,200.

Briley-Holmes planned to attend a scheduled hearing but got into an automobile

accident on the way to court. Briley-Holmes had her assistant notify the court

of the reason for her absence, and court personnel said that the hearing had

already been continued by opposing counsel. Briley-Holmes told the client that

she was sending her a verification form and a financial affidavit that evening,

but the client said in follow-up e-mails that she did not receive them. Briley-

Holmes sent the client a draft modification petition two days later, but the client

sent an e-mail and a text terminating the representation. Briley-Holmes did not

refund any of the fee that the client paid her. The special master concluded that

Briley-Holmes violated Rule 1.16 by failing to promptly refund the unearned

portion of the fee upon termination of the representation.

 11
 In April 2016, the tenth client retained Briley-Holmes to seek emergency

temporary custody of her son and paid her a flat fee of $2,500. Briley-Holmes

communicated extensively with the client by telephone and e-mail and drafted

a petition for modification and emergency petition that the client signed and had

notarized. The client accompanied Briley-Holmes to the courthouse to file the

documents, but no judge was available to hear the emergency petition. Over the

weekend, the client decided not to proceed with the case and sent Briley-Holmes

a text message to that effect on Monday morning. Briley-Holmes did not refund

any of the fee that the client paid her. The special master concluded that Briley-

Holmes violated Rule 1.16 by failing to promptly refund the unearned portion

of the fee upon termination of the representation.

 In late April 2016, the eleventh client paid Briley-Holmes a $5,000

retainer by credit card to represent her in a contempt and custody modification

matter. Late the next month, the client terminated the representation and

initiated a challenge to the retainer payment with the credit card company,

resulting in the reversal of the payment into Briley-Holmes's account. Briley-

Holmes believed that the reversal was unjustified, and a month later she filed a

pro se civil action against the client without confirming the status of the credit

 12
 card payment. By the time Briley-Holmes filed her lawsuit, the credit card

company had already reinstated the full $5,000 payment to her account. The

special master concluded that Briley-Holmes violated Rule 3.1 when,

representing herself pro se, she filed a civil action against the client without first

ensuring that the factual basis for the action was valid.5

 The special master correctly noted that this Court relies on the American

Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for general

guidance in determining the appropriate level of discipline. See In the Matter

of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52) (1995). See, e.g., In the Matter of

Lank, 300 Ga. 479, 482 (796 SE2d 252) (2017). The special master recognized

that ABA Standard 4.4, which applies to violations of Rule 1.3, says that absent

mitigating circumstances, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer

"knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or

potentially serious injury to a client" or "engages in a pattern of neglect with

 5
 Rule 3.1 says, "In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . file a suit, assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another . . . ." Rule 3.1 applies to a lawyer's self-representation. See In the Matter of Morales, 282
Ga. 471 (651 SE2d 84) (2007). The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rule 3.1 is a public
reprimand.

 13
 respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a

client." ABA Standard 4.41 (b), (c). The special master found that Briley-

Holmes knowingly violated Rule 1.3 in her representation of seven clients and

engaged in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and that her

misconduct had caused at least three clients serious injury, as two had their cases

dismissed and a third suffered arrest and a period of incarceration. The special

master thus concluded that under the ABA Standards, disbarment was the

presumptive appropriate sanction for the Rule 1.3 violations, adding that this

Court frequently disbars lawyers who repeatedly abandon their clients, and

citing as examples In the Matter of Ellison, 282 Ga. 647 (651 SE2d 746) (2007),

In the Matter of Ballard, 280 Ga. 504 (629 SE2d 809) (2006), and In the Matter

of Peebles, 280 Ga. 229 (626 SE2d 488) (2006).

 The special master recognized that ABA Standard 4.4 also applies to

violations of Rule 1.4 and says that absent aggravating or mitigating

circumstances, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer "knowingly

fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a

client" or "engages in a pattern of neglect [and] causes injury or potential injury

to a client." ABA Standard 4.42. The special master found that Briley-Holmes

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 violated Rule 1.4 in her representation of three clients and caused them injury

or potential injury. The special master thus concluded that under the ABA

Standards, the presumptive appropriate sanction for the Rule 1.4 violations

would be at least a suspension. The special master noted, however, that under

the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the maximum sanction for a single

violation of Rule 1.4 is a public reprimand.6

 The special master recognized that ABA Standard 7.0 applies to violations

of Rule 1.16 and says that absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances,

suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer "knowingly engages in

conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or

potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system." ABA Standard 7.2.

The special master found that Briley-Holmes violated Rule 1.16 in her

representation of four clients, in one case by failing to promptly surrender the

client's file and in the other three cases by failing to promptly refund unearned

 6
 Although not noted by the special master, the ABA Standards say:
 The standards do not account for multiple charges of misconduct. The ultimate
 sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious
 instance of misconduct among a number of violations; it might well be and generally
 should be greater than the sanction for the most serious misconduct. Either a pattern
 of misconduct or multiple instances of misconduct should be considered as
 aggravating factors (see Standard 9.22).
ABA Standards, II. Theoretical Framework.

 15
 fees. The special master further found that in each of the latter three cases, this

misconduct was not an oversight; instead, Briley-Holmes made a decision not

to refund the unearned fee, meaning that she knowingly engaged in the

misconduct. The special master concluded that under the ABA Standards, the

presumptive appropriate sanction would be at least a suspension. The special

master noted, however, that under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct,

the maximum sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.16 is a public reprimand.

 The special master said that ABA Standard 7.0 also applies to violations

of Rule 3.1.7 The special master found that Briley-Holmes violated Rule 3.1 in

her representation of one client, quoted ABA Standards 7.1 and 7.2, and said,

"Again, however, the maximum penalty under the Georgia Rules of Professional

Conduct for violating Rule 3.1 is a Public Reprimand."

 In aggravation of discipline, the special master found that Briley-Holmes

has a prior disciplinary offense, having received a letter of formal admonition

in 2014, see ABA Standard 9.22 (a);8 that she engaged in a pattern of

 7
 This statement is incorrect. ABA Standard 6.2, which addresses abuse of the legal process,
applies to Rule 3.1 violations.
 8
 The State Bar has not disclosed the basis for the letter of formal admonition. See Bar Rule
4-208.

 16
 misconduct in these 11 cases, committing multiple violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4,

and 1.16, see ABA Standard 9.22 (c); that her misconduct encompassed multiple

offenses, see ABA Standard 9.22 (d); and that most of the victims of Briley-

Holmes's misconduct were in a vulnerable position, as they were not affluent

and had difficulty with English or were involved in domestic relations or

criminal cases, see ABA Standard 9.22 (h). The special master also found that

Briley-Holmes has displayed indifference to making restitution, noting that she

had effectively blocked the fee arbitration process in several cases by failing to

provide necessary information and had failed to make any payment toward any

of the seven existing arbitration awards against her, most of which had been

referred to outside counsel to pursue collection actions. See ABA Standard 9.22

(j). In connection with this last aggravating circumstance, the special master

noted that this Court "nearly always responds harshly to failure to make full

restitution before the imposition of disciplinary sanctions," citing In the Matter

of Henderson, 289 Ga. 837 (716 SE2d 223) (2011), In the Matter of Henderson,

289 Ga. 135 (710 SE2d 124) (2011), and In the Matter of Winningham, 285 Ga.

175 (674 SE2d 877) (2009).

 17
 In mitigation of discipline, the special master found that Briley-Holmes

lacked a selfish or dishonest motive in several cases, see ABA Standard 9.32

(b); that she was suffering from personal or emotional problems in all of the

cases, including trouble in her marriage that led to divorce and, in one case, her

law partner's drug and alcohol problems as a practical matter impaired her

ability to practice, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c); that she made a timely good faith

effort to make restitution and to rectify the consequences of her misconduct in

one case, see ABA Standard 9.32 (d); that she made a full and free disclosure to

the State Bar and was cooperative in the disciplinary proceedings in six cases,

see ABA Standard 9.32 (e); that as to at least some of her misconduct, she was

relatively inexperienced in the practice of law, having been admitted to practice

in 2010, see ABA Standard 9.32 (f); and that she feels remorse, see ABA

Standard 9.32 (l). The special master further found that Briley-Holmes

voluntarily stopped practicing law around mid-September 2016.

 As noted above, the special master recommends that this Court accept

Briley-Holmes's amended second petition and impose a five-year suspension

with conditions on reinstatement. However, after careful consideration of the

 18
 record, the Court finds that the discipline recommended by the special master,

which is not opposed by the State Bar, is unacceptable.

 First, with one exception, it does not appear that this Court has ever

imposed a five-year suspension as a disciplinary sanction outside the reciprocal

discipline context. See, e.g., In the Matter of Sanders, 303 Ga. 293 (811 SE2d

344) (2018) (five-year suspension in reciprocal discipline case); In the Matter

of Erickson, 290 Ga. 369 (720 SE2d 632) (2012) (same). See also In the Matter

of Sicay-Perrow, 301 Ga. 666 (802 SE2d 252) (2017) (suspension for five years

or until reinstatement in Tennessee, whichever is earlier). The exception is In

the Matter of Crudup, 264 Ga. 202 (442 SE2d 736) (1994), where this Court

conditionally imposed a five-year suspension for an attorney's abandonment of

five matters so that the attorney, who was suffering from a terminal illness,

could "die while a lawyer." Id. at 202.9 In any event, Crudup was decided a

year before this Court first said that it would look to the ABA Standards for

general guidance in determining the appropriate level of discipline. See Morse,

 9
 In another case, In the Matter of Rand, 279 Ga. 555 (616 SE2d 452) (2005), this Court
invoked Bar Rule 4-104 (a) to "remov[e] the attorney from the practice of law" for five years due
to mental incapacity. Removal from practice for mental incapacity, however, is not the same thing
as a disciplinary sanction imposed for misconduct.

 19
 265 Ga. at 354. ABA Standard 2.3 says, "Generally, suspension should be for

a period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the

time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years."

 Second, the special master's own analysis shows that Briley-Holmes's

misconduct warrants a more severe sanction than a suspension with conditions

on reinstatement. As the special master recognized, disbarment is the maximum

sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.3; this Court frequently disbars

attorneys for Rule 1.3 violations; Briley-Holmes violated Rule 1.3 in her

representation of seven clients in unrelated matters; and under the ABA

Standards, the presumptive appropriate discipline, before consideration of

mitigating circumstances, would be disbarment, because Briley-Holmes's

violations of Rule 1.3 were knowing, she engaged in a pattern of neglect with

respect to client matters, and her Rule 1.3 violations caused three of her clients

serious injury. The special master also found, and the record shows, that while

Briley-Holmes pointed to a number of cognizable mitigating factors, upon close

examination, their weight in many instances is undermined, attenuated, or even

eliminated. Moreover, as the special master said, the mitigating factors are

"offset by five serious aggravating factors."

 20
 Finally, as the special master aptly put it:

 Together, these cases reveal a disturbingly extensive pattern
 of similar misconduct extending over a period of several years,
 including seven cases of abandonment (Rule 1.3), [three] cases
 involving failure to communicate with clients (Rule 1.4), and four
 cases of violating obligations to clients upon termination of
 representation (Rule 1.16).

Thus, disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter.

 We construe Briley-Holmes's amended second petition as a petition for

voluntary surrender of license, and we accept the voluntary surrender of her

license. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Shannon Briley-

Holmes be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the

State of Georgia. We remind her of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

 Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

 21
 Decided June 4, 2018 — Reconsideration denied July 12, 2018.

 Voluntary surrender of license.

 Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman,

William J. Cobb, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

 22