CourtListener opinion 11060571

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Filed 5/28/25 Marriage of Williams CA1/4
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

 DIVISION FOUR

 In re the Marriage of Yolanda
 and Damon Williams.

 YOLANDA WILLIAMS,
 Respondent A170306
 v.
 (Contra Costa County
 DAMON WILLIAMS, JR.,
 Super. Ct. No. D05-06013)
 Appellant,
 SAN FRANCISCO
 EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
 SYSTEM,
 Respondent.

 MEMORANDUM OPINION1
 In January 2007, a judgment was filed terminating the
marriage of Damon Williams, Jr. and Yolanda Williams.2 In July

 1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant

to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
(See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
 2 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid

confusion. No disrespect is intended. (See Askew v. Askew (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 942, 947, fn. 6.)
 2008, a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) was entered
 in these proceedings providing for the division of Yolanda's
community property interest in Damon's retirement benefits with
 the San Francisco Employees' Retirement System (SFERS).
 Under the QDRO, Yolanda's benefits are to be determined by
 various future employment events and related elections.
 Yolanda died in August 2008, without having made any
elections regarding her community property interest in Damon's
retirement benefits. Under the terms of the 2008 order, "if Non-
member has not yet made any election, and Non-member
predeceases Member, Non-member's Community Property
Interest in Member's monthly retirement allowance shall be paid
to Non-member's estate for as long as a monthly retirement
allowance is payable to Member."
 In April 2021, Damon retired, at which time SFERS began
withholding 13.08 percent of his monthly disbursement to
account for Yolanda's community property interest. SFERS
informed Damon that the amount being withheld would be paid
to Yolanda's estate.
 On June 2, 2023, Damon obtained an order from the trial
court finding that he had "satisfied his community property
obligation to the estate of Ms. Yolanda Williams" and terminating
his obligations under the QDRO (hereafter "Termination Order").
Shortly thereafter, Damon wrote to SFERS requesting that it
immediately stop withholding any amounts from his monthly
benefits and issue a refund of any overpayment of benefits to

 2
 Yolanda's estate. A copy of the Termination Order was attached
to his letter.
 On June 30, SFERS filed a motion to set aside the
Termination Order on the ground that Yolanda's estate was still
entitled to a share of Damon's retirement benefits under the
QDRO.
 On March 4, 2024, after SFERS was joined in the
proceeding, the trial court set aside the Termination Order. The
court found that Damon had failed to provide a legal basis to
terminate the QDRO and that SFERS should continue to
withhold and distribute the retirement allowance to Yolanda's
estate under the terms of that order.
 Damon, appearing in propria persona, timely filed a notice
of appeal challenging the order setting aside the Termination
Order.3
 DISCUSSION
 Damon contends the trial court erred in setting aside its
2023 order because the evidence proves that his community
property obligations have been paid in full. Damon argues that,
because Yolanda's community property interest was valued at
$26,389.61 at the time of separation and a total of $32,796.66 had
been withheld from his benefit payments as of the time of the
2023 order, Yolanda's estate had been fully paid and he was owed

 3 Damon's opening brief raises several arguments regarding

matters not presently before this court, including several
arguments challenging the underlying validity of the QDRO,
rather than its satisfaction. Those arguments will not be
considered.

 3
 a refund. Yolanda's community property interest in Damon's
retirement benefits, however, was not merely a lump sum
amount determined at the time of separation. While the 2008
order includes various conditions under which Yolanda might
have been entitled, had she not passed away, to elect for the
return of her "contributions to the Retirement Fund," as set forth
above, the order plainly entitled her to receive lifetime benefits
following Damon's retirement. Damon's arguments to the
contrary are not persuasive.
 Damon's argument that Yolanda's right to benefits
terminated on her death is contrary to the terms of the QDRO.
The QDRO provision to which he cites, section 6, subdivision (a),
applies only "[i]n the event Non-member elects to receive a
Lifetime Benefit."4 As noted above, Yolanda did not make an
election prior to her death. Accordingly, Yolanda's benefits are
governed by subdivision (c) of that section, which, as set forth
above, applies "if Non-member has not yet made any election, and
Non-member predeceases Member."
 Similarly, the 2008 order does not, as Damon suggests,
provide that all of his retirement benefits are his sole property
because of his industrial disability. Section 5 of the QDRO
governs "Disability Retirement." Because Damon retired for
disability after reaching age 50 and after having been credited
with at least 5 years of service, his disability retirement is

 4 Under the terms of the order, Yolanda could have elected

to receive her community property interest in Damon's monthly
retirement allowance paid out over "Member's lifetime" or as a
"Lifetime Benefit" based on her own lifespan.

 4
 governed by subdivision (b) of that section, which provides that
"beginning on the latter of Member's effective date of retirement
or the date Non-member elects to begin receiving benefits, the
Plan shall pay Non-member her Community Property Interest in:
(1) the monthly retirement allowance that Member would have
received on the latter of these two dates had Member not retired
for disability, and (2) any cost of living adjustments that Member
may be granted. . . . After paying Non-member her Community
Property interest, the Plan shall pay Member the balance of the
monthly retirement allowance and the balance of any cost of
living adjustments."
 Damon's remaining cognizable arguments, all presented
without citation to relevant legal authority, do not require
extended discussion. The order setting aside the Termination
Order does not reflect that the trial judge was biased.5 And
contrary to Damon's argument, SFERS properly moved to set
aside the Termination Order under Family Code sections 2073
and 2074.

 5 In support of his claim, Damon quotes from two

paragraphs in the court's order. The first explains that Damon
requested the Termination Order because he "wished to
discontinue the portion of the retirement allowance from his
pension that had been allocated to his late spouse, Petitioner
Yolanda Williams in order to increase his own retirement pension
benefit" and that he "believed that her retirement benefit under
the QDRO expired upon her death." The second reads,
"Respondent is mistaken. . . . His position demonstrates an
imperfect understanding of how the QDRO works via-a-vis the
community property interest in the SFERS retirement benefit."

 5
 DISPOSITION
 The order setting aside the Termination Order is affirmed.
 GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.

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