CourtListener opinion 11093474

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

Filed 7/10/25 Hiramoto v. MacMaster CA6
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 JONI T. HIRAMOTO, H051793
 (Alameda County
 Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. D0404880)

 v.

 DOUGLASS C. MACMASTER

 Defendant and Appellant.

 Respondent Joni T. Hiramoto and appellant Douglass MacMaster were married in
1989 and separated in 2004. During their marriage, Hiramoto was appointed to the
Contra Costa County Superior Court and became a member of the Judicial Retirement
System II (JRS II). (Gov. Code, § 75500 et seq.)1 On December 8, 2005, a status-only
judgment of dissolution was filed that included an order reserving jurisdiction over the
division of the parties' community property interest in the JRS II retirement plan.
 Fourteen years later, on December 12, 2019, Hiramoto filed a request for a
domestic relations order dividing the community property interest in the JRS II retirement
plan. The request included a proposed order that divided the community interest as
follows pursuant to section 75551: (1) 50 percent of the monetary credits attributed to
Hiramoto's service from the date of marriage to the date of separation would be awarded
to MacMaster as the nonmember; (2) the JRS II administrator would pay MacMaster the

 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise
 1

indicated.
 amount of monetary credits allocated to him after receiving an acceptable court order;
(3) MacMaster would have no further interest in the JRS II fund; and (4) the trial court
reserved jurisdiction to modify the order for the purpose of implementation.
 The trial court granted Hiramoto's request and a domestic relations order dividing
the community property interest in the JRS II retirement benefits was filed on November
18, 2020. The judgment on reserved issues, also filed on November 18, 2020, awarded
MacMaster 50 percent of the monetary credits attributed to Hiramoto's service in the JRS
II system during the period from the July 1, 1989 date of marriage to the October 4, 2004
date of separation, in accordance with section 75551, subdivision (a) and Family Code
section 2610.
 On appeal, MacMaster contends that the trial court erred and the judgment should
be reversed because (1) he is not a nonmember subject to JRS II because he did not
petition the court for division of the community property interest in Hiramoto's JRS II
plan; (2) he did not consent to the division of the parties' community property interest
into separate accounts as required by Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a); (3) an
equal division of his community property interest in the JRS II plan under Family Code
section 2610, subdivision (a) requires that he receive the present value of Hiramoto's
"matured pension benefits;" and (4) Hiramoto violated her spousal fiduciary duty with
respect to the division of community property.
 For the reasons stated below, we are not convinced by MacMaster's contentions on
appeal and we will affirm the judgment.2
 I. THE JUDICIAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM
 A. JRS I
 The Judges Retirement Law (JRS I) was enacted in 1978 and became effective on
July 1, 1979. (§ 75005; In re Marriage of Alarcon (1983) 149 Cal. App.3d 544, 551.)

 2
 The California Supreme Court ordered transfer of this appeal from the Court of
Appeal, First Appellate District to this Court.

 2
 The JRS I plan is administered by the Board of Administration of the Public Employees'
Retirement System (CalPERS). (Ibid.)
 JRS I provides for the division of a community property interest in the plan. "[I]f
the court divides the community property pursuant to [former Civil Code section 4800.8,
subdivision (c), now Family Code section 2610],3 it ‘shall order that the accumulated
contributions and service credit attributable to periods of service during the marriage be
divided into two separate and distinct accounts in the name of the member and
nonmember, respectively. (Gov. Code, § 75050, subd. (b).) Upon being awarded a
separate account, the nonmember may choose a refund of accumulated contributions or a
retirement allowance based on service years which the judge accrued during marriage and
in keeping with the community property settlement. (Gov. Code, §§ 75052, 75058.)" (In
re Marriage of Colvin (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1577 (Colvin), fn. omitted.)
 JRS I defines "nonmember" as follows: " ‘Nonmember,' as used in this article,
means the spouse or former spouse of a member, who as a result of petitioning the court
for the division of community property, has been awarded a distinct and separate account
reflecting specific credited service and accumulated contributions." (§ 75051.)
 The section 75051 definition of "nonmember" in JRS I has been construed to
mean that it is "the spouse or former spouse, not the judge or retired judge, who must
petition the court for a separation of accounts. . . . The obvious import of this language
is that it is the spouse's or former spouse's choice whether or not to seek a separation of

 3
 Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a)(3)(D) provides: "Except as provided
in subdivision (b), the court shall make whatever orders are necessary or appropriate to
ensure that each party receives the party's full community property share in any
retirement plan, whether public or private, including all survivor and death benefits,
including, but not limited to, any of the following: [¶] Upon the agreement of the
nonemployee spouse, order the division of accumulated community property
contributions and service credit as provided in the following or similar enactments: [¶]
Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 75050) of Chapter 11 of Title 8 of the Government
Code [JRS I]".

 3
 accounts and the attendant rights flowing therefrom. This makes sense because there are
advantages and disadvantages to proceeding with this method which the nonmember
would have to evaluate." (Colvin, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1579.) Further, "[t]he very
wording of this statute implies that some former spouses will seek their own account and
retirement allowance or lump sum payment under the [JRL I] amendments, while others
will seek another type of division." (Id. at p. 1580.)
 Thus, it has been held that under JRS I, the trial court has the "discretion to tailor
division of a judge's pension plan according to the circumstances of a given case."
(Colvin, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1580.)
 B. JRS II
 The Judges' Retirement System II Law, which applies to Hiramoto's judicial
service, was enacted in 1994 to establish a new system providing retirement benefits to
California judges first elected or appointed to judicial office on or after November 9,
1994. (§ 75500 et seq.; Warner v. Public Employees' Retirement System (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 659, 663 (Warner).) "[U]nder this more recently enacted retirement
system, known as JRS II, judges receive significantly reduced retirement benefits than
were provided under JRS I. [Citation.]" (McGlynn v. State of California (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 548, 553-554.) The legislature enacted JRS II to "[p]rovide a new, lower
tier of benefits for judges' because the prior system was ‘[a]ctuarially unsound from its
inception.' (Conf. Com., Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 65 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 25, 1994,
p. 1.)" (Warner, supra, at p. 667.)
 Similar to the definition of "nonmember" in JRS I, "nonmember" is defined in
JRS II as follows: "In this article, unless the context indicates otherwise: [¶] . . . [¶]
‘Nonmember' means the spouse or former spouse of a member, who as a result of
petitioning the court for the division of community property has been awarded a distinct
and separate account reflecting specific monetary credits, specific credited service, and
accumulated contributions." (§ 75550, subd. (b).)

 4
 However, JRS II substantially revised the provisions governing the division of a
community property interest in the plan's retirement benefits. The JRS II procedures for
dividing a community property interest begins with section 75551, subdivisions (a)(1)
and (a)(2), which provide, as relevant here: "If a member's marriage is dissolved or a
member and his or her spouse are legally separated while the member is an active judge,
the court shall make the following determinations: [¶] The number of years of service
that accrued during the marriage of the member and nonmember, down to the date of
their separation. [¶] The date of the parties' separation."
 Next, section 75551, subdivision (a)(4) provides: "If a member's marriage is
dissolved or a member and his or her spouse are legally separated while the member is an
active judge, the court shall make the following determinations: [¶] If the member had
been a judge for five years or more on the date of separation, the court shall determine the
member's and nonmember's shares of the judge's monetary credits that have accrued
pursuant to Section 75520, based on Section 2610 of the Family Code, and on the law
generally applicable to property earned during marriage. The monetary credits include
the credits computed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 75520 computed to the date
the court finds appropriate."
 Under section 75520, subdivisions (a) and (b), monetary credits are computed as
follows: "A judge shall, monthly, accrue monetary credits equal to 18 percent of the
judge's monthly salary. [¶] To the total monetary credits in each judge's account, an
additional amount shall be credited monthly at a rate, not less than zero, equal to the
annual net earnings rate achieved by the Judges' Retirement System II Fund on its
investments of moneys in the Judges' Retirement System II Fund during the preceding
fiscal year."
 Section 75551, subdivision (b) then provides that the determinations made
regarding the member's and nonmember's shares of a judge's monetary credits "shall be
included in the judgment of dissolution or separation. The system shall deem any portion

 5
 of the judge's contributions or of the judge's monetary credits that were not allocated by
the judgment to the nonmember, to be allocated to the member."
 Section 75551 also specifies that "[p]romptly after receiving a certified copy of a
judgment dissolving the marriage of a member or legally separating a member and
nonmember and allocating shares of the member's contributions pursuant to [section
75551, subdivision (a)(4)], the fund shall pay to the nonmember the amount allocated to
him or her in the judgment. The nonmember shall have no further interest in the fund."
(§ 75551, subd. (d).)
 Finally, JRS II provides for redeposit of the member's share of the monetary
credits after payment of the nonmember's share: "The amount of the payment pursuant
to subdivision (c) or (d) shall be subtracted from the member's monetary credits as
computed pursuant to Section 75520. Until the amount is redeposited pursuant to
Section 75552, the additional credits accorded pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
75520 shall be computed on the amount so reduced. (§ 75551, subd. (e).)
 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 A. Dissolution Proceedings
 Hiramoto and MacMaster were married on July 1, 1989. In 1998 Hiramoto was
appointed to the Contra Costa County Superior Court and became a member of JRS II.
The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement in September 2004 that included,
among other things, an agreement that the community property interests in their existing
retirement accounts would be divided upon the dissolution of their marriage.
 In October 2004 Hiramoto filed a petition for dissolution of marriage that stated
October 4, 2004, was date of separation and property rights were to be determined.
MacMaster filed a response and request for dissolution of marriage that also stated that
property rights, including community property rights, were to be determined.
 In November 2004 MacMaster filed a motion for a status-only dissolution.
Hiramoto opposed the motion unless the parties' pension and employee benefit plans,

 6
 including the JRS II plan, were divided concurrently with the termination of marital
status. In October 2005 Hiramoto consented to MacMaster's motion for joinder of
several retirement accounts and savings plans, including "CalPERS JRS II." In
November 2005 MacMaster filed a request for joinder of JRS II, which filed a notice of
appearance in the parties' dissolution proceeding in December 2005.
 Subsequently, in the December 8, 2005 order permitting bifurcation of marital
status the trial court reserved jurisdiction to order equal division of the parties'
community interest in their retirement plans, including JRS II.4 Also on December 8,
2005, a status-only judgment of dissolution was filed that incorporated the order
permitting bifurcation, including the order reserving jurisdiction over the JRS II plan.
 B. Dispute Regarding the Division of Community Interest in the JRS II Plan
 Fourteen years later, on December 12, 2019, Hiramoto filed a request for a
domestic relations order dividing the community property interest in the JRS II retirement
plan. The request included a proposed order that divided the community interest as
follows pursuant to section 75551: (1) 50 percent of the monetary credits attributed to
Hiramoto's service from the date of marriage to the date of separation would be awarded
to MacMaster as the nonmember; (2) the JRS II administrator would pay MacMaster the
amount of monetary credits allocated to him after receiving an acceptable court order; (3)
MacMaster would have no further interest in the JRS II fund; and (4) the trial court
reserved jurisdiction to modify the order for the purpose of implementation.
 Hiramoto's request was supported by an October 15, 2019 letter from a JRS II
program analyst stating that the proposed order was acceptable to JRS II. A second letter
from a JRS II program analyst, also dated October 15, 2019, stated that MacMaster's
share of the monetary credits and accumulated interest as of the date of separation,

 4
 The December 8, 2004 order included an order dividing the parties' interest in
the Contra Costa County Employees Retirement Association plan.

 7
 October 4, 2004, was approximately $87,682.03, and as of September 30, 2019, the
amount of MacMaster's share was $310,503.95.
 The parties each filed a memorandum of points and authorities regarding
Hiramoto's proposed order to divide the community interest in the JRS II plan. In her
memorandum of points and authorities Hiramoto pointed out that the parties' community
interests in their other retirement plans were divided long ago, leaving only the
community interest in the JRS II plan to be divided. Hiramoto asserted that the proposed
order properly divided the community interest in the JRS II plan pursuant to section
75551 and was pre-approved by JRS II.
 MacMaster opposed Hiramoto's request to divide the community interest in the
JRS II plan on the grounds that a cash-out of his share of the community interest was
improper because (1) he had not petitioned the court for division of the community
interest and therefore he did not qualify as a nonmember former spouse under
section 75550, subdivision (b); (2) since he was not a nonmember and had not consented
to a cash-out, he was entitled to "an annuitized income stream based upon 26% of Judge
Hiramoto's annual salary plus earnings" when she retires; (3) Family Code section 2610,
subdivision (a) requires an equal division of the community property interest in
retirement plans, which includes his future interest in the JRS II plan; (4) Hiramoto failed
to present any evidence to show that the value of the proposed cash-out of his interest in
JRS II is equal to the present value of his interest; (5) the proposed cash-out deprives him
of his share of the community interest in enhanced benefits, including the statutory
guarantee against negative returns; and (6) the court should retain jurisdiction to divide
the community interest in the JRS II plan when Hiramoto's maximum benefits vest at age
65.
 Prior to the hearing on Hiramoto's request for a division of the parties' community
property interest in her JRS II plan, MacMaster submitted a letter from a JRS II program
analyst dated March 20, 2020, responding to MacMaster's request for information. In

 8
 addition to providing MacMaster with documentation of Hiramoto's JRS II account, the
letter stated that JRS II did not divide benefits based on a present value calculation.
Regarding the benefits owed to MacMaster, the letter stated: "If the JRS II is provided
with an acceptable filed Domestic Relations Order and you receive a payment in April
2020 your share of the monetary credits with interest through March 31, 2020, would be
approximately $320,805.28." The letter also stated: "A separate account for your
community property interest will be created for you when JRS II has received an
acceptable filed Domestic Relations Order awarding you an interest in Judge Hiramoto's
JRS II account. Once a separate account is established, you shall be paid a lump sum
payment of the monetary credits pursuant to Government Code Section 75551 (d)."
 C. Trial Court Statement of Decision and Judgment
 After holding a hearing, the trial court issued a tentative statement of decision on
October 13, 2020.5 The court ruled that Hiramoto's proposed order was consistent with
the division of the parties' community property interest in the JRS II plan under section
75551, noting that JRS II had approved the proposed order.
 In so ruling, the trial court rejected MacMaster's contention that he was not a
nonmember as defined in section 75550, subdivision (b) because he had not petitioned
the court for a separate judicial retirement account. The court determined that
MacMaster was a nonmember under section 75550, subdivision (b) because he had
petitioned the court for division of community property when he filed a response to
Hiramoto's petition for dissolution in which he asked for a determination of community
property rights. The trial court also rejected MacMaster's contention that under Family
Code section 2610, subdivision (a)(3) his agreement to the proposed division of the
community property interest in the JRS II plan was required.

 5
 The matter was assigned to the Alameda County Superior Court after the Contra
Costa County Superior Court recused its entire bench upon MacMaster's motion for
disqualification.

 9
 For those reasons, the trial court granted Hiramoto's request for a domestic
relations order dividing the community property interest in the JRS II retirement plan.
No party objected to the tentative statement of decision. A domestic relations order
dividing the community interest in the JRS II retirement benefits as requested by
Hiramoto was filed on November 18, 2020. The judgment on reserved issues, also filed
on November 18, 2020, awards MacMaster 50 percent of the monetary credits attributed
to Hiramoto's service in the JRS II system during the period from the July 1, 1989 date of
marriage to the October 4, 2004 date of separation, in accordance with section 75551,
subdivision (a) and Family Code section 2610.
 III. DISCUSSION
 On appeal, we understand MacMaster to contend that the trial court erred because
(1) he is not a nonmember under JRS II because he did not petition the court for division
of the community property interest in Hiramoto's JRS II plan; (2) he did not consent to
the division of the parties' community property interest into separate accounts as required
by Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a); (3) an equal division of his community
property interest in the JRS II plan under Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a)
requires that he receive the present value of Hiramoto's "matured pension benefits."6
 We will begin our analysis with the applicable standard of review.
 A. Standard of Review
 In general, the standard of review that applies to the trial court's division of
community property is abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Schleich (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 267, 276.) However, where the facts are undisputed and the issues on

 6
 MacMaster's motion for judicial notice of various documents not specific to
Hiramoto's JRS II account, including documents he received from JRS II pursuant to a
documents request, is denied as irrelevant. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock
Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 ["any matter to be judicially noticed must be
relevant to a material issue"].)

 10
 appeal present questions of statutory interpretation, as in the present case, the standard of
review is de novo. (Ibid.)
 B. Nonmember Under JRS II
 1. The Parties' Contentions
 We understand MacMaster to contend that he is not a nonmember as defined by
JRS II, section 75550, subdivision (b), and therefore the provisions of JRS II governing
the division of a community property interest do not apply to him. Instead, MacMaster
claims that under Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a), he is entitled to an award of
his community property interest that would be based on the present value of Hiramoto's
potential maximum JRS II retirement benefit, which he believes would be higher than the
lump sum awarded under the trial court's order.
 Hiramoto responds that MacMaster is a nonmember within the meaning of
section 75550, subdivision (b), because he petitioned the court for division of the
community property interest in her JRS II plan when he sought joinder of JRS II in his
request for an order determining the nonemployee's benefits under the plan. Hiramoto
also argues that JRS II provides only for "an immediate lump-sum payment under the
monetary credits formula when an active judge divorces. There is no room in the JRS II
law for a deferred benefit for an ex-spouse . . . ."
 2. Analysis
 We resolve the issue of whether MacMasters is a nonmember within the meaning
of the JRS II provisions governing the division of a community property interest in a JRS
II plan by applying the rules of statutory interpretation.
 " ‘[C]onstruction of a statute and its applicability to a given situation are matters
of law to be determined by the court.' [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Thornton (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 251, 253-254.) " ‘ "Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to
determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose." [Citation.] "We
first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the most reliable

 11
 indicator of legislation's intended purpose." [Citation.] "We consider the ordinary
meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute,
and the structure of the statutory scheme." [Citation.] If the relevant statutory language
permits more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to appropriate extrinsic sources,
such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.' [Citation.]" (Cox v.
City of Oakland (2025) 17 Cal.5th 362, 373.)
 Further, " ‘ "[i]f possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase,
sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose." [Citation.] "[A]
construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided." [Citation.]' [Citation.]"
(Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 775-776 (Woosley).) Our Supreme
Court has also instructed that " ‘a statute should be interpreted " ‘with reference to the
whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have
effect,' " ' [citation]." (Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1056, 1080 (Naranjo).)
 The statutory language at issue in the present case is the definition of
"nonmember" in JRS II, which states: "In this article, unless the context indicates
otherwise: [¶] . . . [¶] ‘Nonmember' means the spouse or former spouse of a member,
who as a result of petitioning the court for the division of community property has been
awarded a distinct and separate account reflecting specific monetary credits, specific
credited service, and accumulated contributions." (§ 75550, subd. (b).)
 The phrase "unless the context indicates otherwise" guides our construction of the
definition of "nonmember" in JRS II. (§ 75550, subd. (b).) The relevant context includes
the provisions of JRS II that govern the division of a community property interest. These
provisions begin with section 75551, which directs the court to (1) compute the member's
and nonmember's shares of the monetary credits accrued during the marriage (§ 75551,
subd. (a)); and (2) allocate the member's and nonmember's shares of the monetary credits
in the judgment of dissolution or legal separation (§ 75551, subd. (b)). JRS II must make

 12
 prompt payment of the amount allocated to the nonmember by the judgment (§ 75551,
subd. (d)). Section 75551, subdivision (d) also expressly provides that after the
postjudgment payment, "[t]he nonmember shall have no further interest in the fund."
 Significantly, these provisions do not include as a prerequisite to the division of a
community property interest in a JRS II plan that a spouse or former spouse petition the
court for the division of community property in order to become a nonmember. We are
mindful that " ‘a statute should be interpreted " ‘with reference to the whole system of
law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect,' " ' [citation.]"
(Naranjo, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1080.) Here, the provisions of section 75551 governing
the division of a community property interest between a JRS II member and a
nonmember would be of no effect if "nonmember" is defined only as a spouse or former
spouse who has already been awarded "a distinct and separate account reflecting specific
monetary credits, specific credited service, and accumulated contributions." (§ 75550,
subd. (b).)
 Moreover, we must "choose the construction that comports most closely with the
Legislature's apparent intent, endeavoring to promote rather than defeat the statute's
general purpose, and avoiding a construction that would lead to absurd consequences.
[Citation.]" (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.) To construe the section
75550, subdivision (b) definition of "nonmember" to allow the spouse or former spouse
to delay the division of the community property interest in a JRS II plan until years after
the judgment of dissolution, by failing to petition the court for the division of community
property, would be contrary to the Legislature's express intent that the nonmember be
promptly paid the amount allocated to him or her by the judgment and thereafter have no
interest in the JRS II plan. (§ 75551, subd. (d).)
 Additionally, construing the section 75551, subdivision (b) definition of
"nonmember" to allow a postjudgment delay in the division of the community property
interest in a JRS II plan until the spouse or former spouse files a petition for division of

 13
 community property has the potential to defeat the Legislature's purpose in enacting JRS
II. As we have noted, the Legislature enacted JRS II to reduce the amount of retirement
benefits paid to judges, and consequently reduce the community property share paid
spouses and former spouses, because the JRS I plan was "actuarily unsound." (Warner,
supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 667.)
 The present case demonstrates that construing the definition of "nonmember" to
allow a postjudgment delay in the division of the community property interest in a JRS II
plan until such time as the spouse or former spouse decides to petition the court for
division of community property may increase the amount of the community property
share. Under section 75520, subdivisions (a) and (b), the computation of monetary
credits includes the addition of interest in the form of the net earnings rate on the JRS II
fund. The record reflects that JRS II program analysts calculated that MacMaster's
community property share of Hiramoto's JRS II retirement plan increased in value from
$87,682.03 as of the date of separation, October 4, 2004, to $320,805.28 as of March 31,
2020. This result is obviously contrary to the Legislature's intention in enacting JRS II to
reduce the amount of retirement benefits owed by the judicial retirement system.
 We also give great weight to the JRS II program analyst's approval of the
proposed order in this case, which the trial court adopted, as well as the program analyst's
advice that JRS II does not calculate future interest in dividing the community property
interest in JRS II benefits. When an agency construes a controlling statute, " ‘[t]he
appropriate mode of review in such a case is one in which the judiciary, although taking
ultimate responsibility for the construction of the statute, accords great weight and
respect to the administrative construction. [Citation.] [Citations].' " (Yamaha Corp. of
America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12.) Thus, it has been held that
CalPERS acts within its authority in interpreting the provisions of JRS II. (Danser v.
Public Employees' Retirement System (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 885, 891.)

 14
 Following oral argument, we allowed MacMaster to file a supplemental letter brief
regarding the phrase "unless the context indicates otherwise" in the JRS II definition of
"nonmember." (§ 75550, subd. (b).) We also allowed Hiramoto to file a supplemental
letter brief in response. MacMaster argues that the statutory language "unless the context
indicates otherwise" in section 75550 has no significance with respect to the statutory
definition of a JRS II nonmember. We are not persuaded by this argument, since a
statutory construction " ‘ "making some words surplusage is to be avoided." [Citation.]'
[Citation.]" (Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 775-776.)
 Hiramoto responds that the context of the JRS II statutory scheme "nonmember"
means the divorced or separated spouse of a member. Hiramoto asserts that the
provisions of section 75551 governing the division of the community property interest in
a JRS II plan would be rendered inoperative if the section 75550 definition of
"nonmember" as a spouse or former spouse who already has a separate JRS II account
was applied. As we have discussed, we agree.
 For these reasons, we determine that the context of the JRS II statutory scheme
requires that MacMaster, as the former spouse of Hiramoto, be deemed a nonmember
within the meaning of the section 75550, subdivision (b) definition of "nonmember," and
therefore the provisions of JRS II apply to the division of his community property
interest. MacMaster is therefore not entitled to an award of his community property
interest that would be based on the present value of Hiramoto's potential maximum JRS
II retirement benefit. We are not persuaded by MacMaster's reliance on the decision in
Colvin, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 1570 for a contrary conclusion because that decision
concerned only JRS I.
 2. Family Code section 2610
 Alternatively, MacMaster contends that an equal division of his community
property interest in Hiramoto's JRS II plan under Family Code section 2610, subdivision
(a) requires that he receive the present value of Hiramoto's "matured pension benefits."

 15
 MacMaster also argues that he did not consent to division of his community interest as a
cash-out of monetary credits under JRS II, and consent is required by Family Code
section 2610, subdivision (a).
 Hiramoto disagrees, arguing that Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a)(3)(D)
expressly provides that consent of a nonemployee spouse to the division of the
community interest is required only as to JRS I, since JRS II was omitted from the list of
enactments for which consent is required.
 Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a)(3)(D) provides: "Except as provided in
subdivision (b), the court shall make whatever orders are necessary or appropriate to
ensure that each party receives the party's full community property share in any
retirement plan, whether public or private, including all survivor and death benefits,
including, but not limited to, any of the following: [¶] Upon the agreement of the
nonemployee spouse, order the division of accumulated community property
contributions and service credit as provided in the following or similar enactments: [¶]
[¶] Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 75050) of Chapter 11 of Title 8 of the
Government Code [JRS I]."
 "Applicable here is the ‘principle, commonly known under the Latin name of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, . . . that the expression of one thing in a statute
ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things.' [Citation.] ‘ " ‘[I]f a statute enumerates
the persons or things to be affected by its provisions, there is an implied exclusion of
others . . . . It is an elementary rule of construction that the expression of one excludes
the other. And it is equally well settled that the court is without power to supply an
omission." ' [Citation.]" (Kunde v. Seiler (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 (Kunde).)
 Since Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a)(3)(D) does not include JRS II
(§ 75500 et seq.) in the enumeration of enactments that require the consent of the
nonemployee spouse to the division of the community property in a retirement plan as
provided by specific enactments, we determine under the principle of expressio unius est

 16
 exclusio alterius that JRS II is excluded. Therefore, consent of the former spouse is not
required for the division of the community property interest in a JRS II retirement plan as
provided by the provisions of JRS II. (See Kunde, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.)
 We understand MacMaster to argue that since Family Code section 2610 was
enacted in 1992, prior to the enactment of JRS II in 1994, the Legislature unintentionally
failed to amend Family Code section 2610, subdivision (a)(3) to include JRS II in the list
of enactments for which the consent of a nonemployee spouse is required to divide the
community property interest in a retirement plan. However, we may not construe
section 2610 subdivision (a)(3) to include JRS II in the list of enactments since it is
" ‘ "well settled that the court is without power to supply an omission." ' [Citation.]"
(Kunde, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) Accordingly, we reject MacMaster's
challenge to the trial court's order based on the application of Family Code section 2610,
subdivision (a)(3)(D).
 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err and we will affirm
the judgment. Having reached this conclusion, we need not consider MacMaster's
further contention that Hiramoto violated her spousal fiduciary duty with respect to the
division of community property.
 IV. DISPOSITION
 The November 18, 2020 judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
respondent Joni T. Hiramoto.

 17
 _______________________________
 Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________________
 Danner, J.

______________________________________
 Bromberg, J.

H051793 Hiramoto v. MacMaster