CourtListener opinion 11096166

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

 NO. 2022-CA-00755-COA

FRED CHARLES OSING APPELLANT/
 CROSS-APPELLEE

v.

ALISON HOLLISTER OSING APPELLEE/
 CROSS-APPELLANT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/28/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. D. NEIL HARRIS SR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: HENRY BERNARD ZUBER III
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MARK V. KNIGHTEN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED IN
 PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
 PART. ON CROSS-APPEAL: REVERSED
 AND REMANDED - 08/13/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

 BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.

 SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Jackson County Chancery Court entered a judgment granting Fred and Alison

Osing an irreconcilable-differences divorce. Both parties filed separate motions to amend

or alter the judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59. In his final judgment

addressing the parties' Rule 59 motions, the chancellor reaffirmed his prior ruling regarding

the division of Fred's retirement account and denied all other requested relief.

¶2. On appeal, Fred argues the chancellor erred (1) by denying his motion to withdraw

his consent to an irreconcilable-differences divorce; (2) in dividing the marital estate; and (3)
 by awarding Alison permanent alimony. On cross-appeal, Alison asserts that the chancellor

erred by failing to require Fred to pay for all expenses associated with college and health

insurance for the parties' minor son.

¶3. With regard to Fred's claims, we affirm the chancellor's denial of Fred's motion to

withdraw consent to the irreconcilable-differences divorce. We find, however, that in

dividing the marital estate, the chancellor failed to make sufficient factual findings as to

certain assets and debts. As a result, we reverse that part of the chancellor's judgment and

remand the issue of equitable division of the marital estate for further findings of fact and

conclusions of law consistent with this opinion. In so doing, we recognize that the

chancellor's reconsideration of the division of the marital estate may impact his award of

alimony to Alison. We therefore also reverse that part of the chancellor's judgment for

further consideration upon remand. The same reasoning applies to Alison's cross-appeal

regarding the minor son's college expenses and health-insurance coverage. Because such

financial awards may also be impacted by the chancellor's reconsideration of the parties'

property division, we likewise reverse the chancellor's decision as to those issues so that the

chancellor may revisit them upon remand along with the equitable distribution of the marital

estate and Alison's award of alimony.

 FACTS

¶4. Fred and Alison married in September 1996, and they separated in June 2020. During

their marriage, the parties had a daughter and a son. Alison initially worked as a nurse but

became a stay-at-home mother once the parties' daughter was born. Fred worked as a banker

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 throughout the marriage.

¶5. On June 22, 2020, Alison filed a complaint for an irreconcilable-differences divorce.

She then filed an amended complaint on August 10, 2020, seeking a divorce on the ground

of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, alternatively, irreconcilable differences. Fred

answered the amended divorce complaint and denied all of Alison's allegations.

¶6. Following a hearing, the chancellor entered a temporary order on October 16, 2020,

that granted the parties joint legal custody, granted Alison temporary physical custody of the

parties' minor son, ordered the parties to equally divide any proceeds from the sale of the

marital home, and ordered Fred to pay Alison $1,400 a month in child support. The

temporary order also directed Fred to pay for expenses associated with the following:

automobiles, insurance, cell phones, and college for the parties' daughter.

¶7. On January 22, 2021, the parties consented to an irreconcilable-differences divorce

and agreed to submit for the chancellor's determination the remaining issues of "[a]limony,

child support, visitation, division of assets and debts to include retirement/pension[,

a]ttorney[']s fees[,] and back child support to the date . . . the complaint was filed." The

parties' filing acknowledged their understanding that their consent to the irreconcilable-

differences divorce could "not be withdrawn . . . without leave of the Court after the Court

ha[d] commenced any proceeding, including the hearing of any motion or other matter

pertaining thereto."

¶8. Following a hearing on January 22, 2021, the chancellor entered a temporary order

that same day that maintained the parties' joint legal custody and Alison's temporary physical

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 custody of the minor son. The temporary order also awarded visitation to Fred, reduced his

monthly child-support obligation to $1,100, and eliminated his duty to pay Alison's

automobile loan. The temporary order reserved for trial the issues of attorney's fees and back

child-support payments.

¶9. An amended temporary order was entered on February 5, 2021, nunc pro tunc to

January 22, 2021, directing Fred to also pay Alison $2,000 a month in alimony. On April 13,

2021, the chancellor entered an order resetting the trial on the matter. The April 13, 2021

order stated that "[a]ll prior orders are to remain in full force and effect."

¶10. On April 29, 2021, Fred filed a motion seeking leave to withdraw his consent to the

irreconcilable-differences divorce. Fred asserted that it had become necessary for him to

withdraw his consent because no fault grounds existed for the parties' divorce. In May 2021,

the parties' matter was transferred to the active docket of a different chancellor. Following

a hearing on June 15, 2021, the chancellor entered an order requiring the parties to provide

updated Rule 8.05 financial statements1 and lists of the witnesses and evidence they planned

to introduce at trial.

¶11. On May 26, 2022, the chancellor entered a final judgment of divorce. The chancellor

denied Fred's motion seeking leave to withdraw his consent to the divorce and granted the

parties an irreconcilable-differences divorce. The chancellor awarded Alison physical

custody and awarded the parties joint legal custody of their minor son. The chancellor also

awarded visitation to Fred and ordered him to pay Alison $1,167 a month in child support.

 1
 See UCCR 8.05.

 4
 With regard to the parties' daughter, the chancellor noted that she was over the age of

twenty-one and had become legally emancipated.

¶12. In addressing the equitable distribution of the marital estate, the chancellor discussed

the Ferguson factors2 but ultimately did not conclude which party, if any, each factor

favored. Likewise, when addressing the issue of alimony, the chancellor discussed the

Armstrong factors3 but did not state which party, if any, each factor favored. Nevertheless,

the chancellor directed Fred to pay Alison $1,500 each month in alimony and ordered Fred's

monthly alimony obligation to increase to $2,500 in two years once the parties' minor son

reached age twenty-one or became otherwise emancipated.

¶13. The chancellor concluded that the money Alison had inherited from her parents was

her separate property. The chancellor's analysis did not address, however, a retirement

account to which Alison had contributed during the early years of the parties' marriage when

she worked as a nurse. By contrast, the chancellor addressed Fred's retirement account and

ordered that those funds be equally divided between the parties as of the date of their divorce.

¶14. Both parties filed Rule 59 motions to alter or amend the final judgment. Fred also

filed an amended Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the final judgment. On June 28, 2022,

the chancellor entered another final judgment that addressed the parties' various Rule 59

motions. The chancellor's June 28, 2022 final judgment incorporated a paragraph from his

earlier judgment that had directed Fred to present a qualified domestic relations order to

 2
 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
 3
 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).

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 allow Alison to receive one-half of the amount in his retirement account. Unless Fred could

"produce evidence that a different amount exists as of [the date of the parties' divorce on]

May 26, 2022[,]" the chancellor ordered that Alison was to receive one-half of the

$831,670.16 reflected on the statement previously submitted to the court. The chancellor

denied all other relief requested in the parties' Rule 59 motions. Aggrieved, Fred appeals,

and Alison cross-appeals.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15. If substantial evidence supports a chancellor's findings of fact, this Court will affirm

the chancellor's determinations unless he "abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong [or]

clearly erroneous[,] or [applied] an erroneous legal standard . . . ." Fox v. Fox, 381 So. 3d

391, 394 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Page v. Graves, 283 So. 3d 269, 274 (¶18)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). We review issues of law de novo. Id.

 DISCUSSION

 I. Withdrawal of Consent

¶16. Fred asserts that the chancellor erred by denying his request to withdraw his consent

to the parties' irreconcilable-differences divorce. Relevant to Fred's argument, Mississippi

Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3) (Rev. 2021) provides the following:

 If the parties are unable to agree upon adequate and sufficient provisions for
 the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or any property
 rights between them, they may consent to a divorce on the ground of
 irreconcilable differences and permit the court to decide the issues upon which
 they cannot agree. Such consent must be in writing, signed by both parties
 personally, must state that the parties voluntarily consent to permit the court
 to decide such issues, which shall be specifically set forth in such consent, and
 that the parties understand that the decision of the court shall be a binding and

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 lawful judgment. Such consent may not be withdrawn by a party without leave
 of the court after the court has commenced any proceeding, including the
 hearing of any motion or other matter pertaining thereto.

¶17. Here, the parties' consent agreement for an irreconcilable-differences divorce

complied with section 93-5-2(3). On January 22, 2021, the chancellor considered and, after

questioning both parties, ultimately accepted their consent agreement. The chancellor then

proceeded to hold a hearing during which the parties provided testimony. Following the

hearing, the chancellor entered a temporary order pertaining to issues such as custody of and

support for the minor child. Between the date of the January 22, 2021 hearing and three

months later when Fred filed his motion to withdraw consent on April 29, 2021, the

chancellor entered an amended temporary order that required Fred to pay Alison alimony.

Also during that time, the chancellor entered an order that reset the date of the parties' trial.

¶18. Thus, based on the record before us, section 93-5-2(3) required Fred to seek the

court's leave to withdraw his consent to the irreconcilable-differences divorce. Fred

complied with the statute, but the chancellor denied his motion. Upon review, we can find

no abuse of discretion or clear error in the chancellor's decision. We therefore affirm the

chancellor's denial of Fred's motion to withdraw his consent.

 II. Equitable Distribution of the Marital Estate

¶19. Fred raises multiple issues related to the chancellor's distribution of the marital estate.

Specifically, Fred contends that the chancellor failed to properly evaluate if Alison's

inherited funds became commingled with marital assets, determine if the accumulated

interest on Alison's inherited funds constituted marital property, consider and value Alison's

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 retirement account, address the parties' marital debt, and properly apply the Ferguson factors

in splitting Fred's retirement account.

¶20. "In dividing marital property, chancellors must (1) classify the parties' assets and

liabilities as marital or separate . . . , (2) determine the value of the property, and then (3)

divide the marital property equitably, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines in light

of each [party's] separate property." Thompson v. Thompson, 380 So. 3d 945, 953 (¶31)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). "The law presumes

that all property acquired or accumulated during marriage is marital property." Cannon v.

Cannon, 375 So. 3d 697, 710 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Castle v. Castle, 266 So.

3d 1042, 1049 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)). Nonmarital property, "such as inheritances, may

be converted into marital assets if they are commingled with marital property or utilized for

domestic purposes, absent an agreement to the contrary. Separate property that has been

commingled with the joint marital estate also becomes marital property subject to equitable

distribution." Id. at 712 (¶49) (citations omitted) (quoting Stewart v. Stewart, 864 So. 2d

934, 937 (¶12) (Miss. 2003)).

¶21. "When determining whether certain property is marital, a chancery court must inquire

whether any income or appreciation resulted from either spouse's active efforts during the

marriage. If so, that income or appreciation becomes part of the marital estate." Id. at 711

(¶46) (citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). "The party claiming that

the asset is separate, nonmarital property has the burden of proof and must overcome the

presumption that the asset is marital property." Id. at 710 (¶43) (quoting Castle, 266 So. 3d

 8
 at 1049 (¶28)). "To determine the date when assets cease to be marital, i.e., the point of

demarcation, the chancery court can use either the date of separation or the date of the

divorce." Brown v. Brown, 350 So. 3d 1169, 1178 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). A

chancellor's failure to properly classify and value the parties' assets can result in reversal.

Id. at 1179-80 (¶¶31, 34).

¶22. The parties' testimony reflected that in 2015, Alison inherited about $500,000 from

her parents. Fred testified that with the exception of one account, he paid the taxes on the

funds that Alison claimed as her separate property. Alison provided no testimony or

evidence to dispute Fred's assertion that he paid the taxes for all but one of the accounts

containing her inherited money. Thus, the only evidence in the record regarding this issue

supports Fred's claim on appeal that his active efforts during the parties' marriage allowed

a portion of Alison's inherited money to appreciate. To the extent that the chancellor did not

consider this appreciation of Alison's inherited money as marital property, we find the

chancellor erred.

¶23. As to the almost $500,000 that Alison inherited, the parties adamantly disagree on

whether the money remained Alison's separate property or became commingled with marital

assets through family use that converted the money to marital property. According to

Alison's testimony, she informed Fred when she received the money that she wanted to keep

the funds separate from their marital assets. Alison claimed that Fred agreed to keep her

inheritance separate. Alison testified that she opened accounts solely in her name and placed

the inherited money directly into those separate accounts. Alison further testified that she

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 withdrew money from the separate accounts to pay for plastic surgery and reconstructive

surgery, four trips with her children where she specifically excluded Fred, the renewal of her

nursing license, and a boat for the parties' minor son. Two years after purchasing the boat,

Alison sold it because she stated that the parties' minor son never really used the boat.

Alison testified that she deposited the proceeds from the sale of the boat into a separate

savings account specifically designated for the parties' son. Alison also testified that she

never used her inheritance to pay marital bills and that she never used the money for Fred's

benefit.

¶24. For his part, Fred maintains that although Alison did not use any of her inherited

money specifically for his personal benefit, he was still a member of their family, and she

used the money for the benefit of other family members and the family in general. He

therefore argues that the chancellor erred by not classifying Alison's inherited money as

marital property. Despite Fred's assertions, we conclude that substantial credible evidence

supported the chancellor's determination that Alison's inherited money remained her separate

property and therefore was not subject to equitable distribution. As a result, we affirm the

chancellor's finding with regard to this matter.

¶25. Fred also argues that the chancellor failed to classify Alison's retirement account as

separate or marital property and failed to determine the value of the retirement account. A

review of the chancellor's May 26, 2022 final judgment reveals no discussion of any such

retirement account in the analysis regarding the equitable distribution of the marital estate.

The parties both testified, however, that Alison worked as a nurse for several years before

 10
 the births of their children. Alison specifically stated that she worked for four years. She

testified that she worked for two years before the parties' marriage and for two years after

their marriage. Alison further testified that she thought the current value of her retirement

account was around $19,000. When questioned on cross-examination, Alison agreed that

Fred would be entitled to half of her retirement account. Thus, to the extent that the

chancellor's final judgment did not consider the classification and valuation of Alison's

retirement account in his distribution of the marital estate, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings on this issue consistent with this opinion.

¶26. The chancellor also omitted from his analysis any discussion of the parties' marital

or separate debts. Fred testified that the parties had marital debt that included loan payments

on four vehicles, credit card balances, a line of credit, and student loans for their daughter.

Alison, however, disputed Fred's claim that the above-mentioned items constituted marital

debt. Alison asserted that the only debt she had incurred during the parties' marriage was the

loan payment on her own automobile. As to the other items to which Fred had testified,

Alison stated that she had not signed the loans along with Fred. She therefore asserted that

the chancellor should assign full responsibility for those debts to Fred alone.

¶27. Because the chancellor did not address the parties' debts, we must reverse and remand

the issue of their property division to allow the chancellor to make appropriate findings of

fact and conclusions of law as to the proper classification, valuation, and equitable division

of all the parties' assets and liabilities. See Thompson, 380 So. 3d at 953 (¶31). In so doing,

we acknowledge Fred's remaining arguments that the chancellor erred by equally dividing

 11
 his retirement account, by making incorrect findings as to several Ferguson factors, and by

failing to apply one valuation date to all the parties' assets.

¶28. The chancellor's judgment reflects that although he discussed the Ferguson factors,

he did not explicitly state which party, if any, each factor favored. Our caselaw requires

chancellors to "support their decisions applying Ferguson in dividing marital property with

findings of fact and conclusions of law." Thompson, 380 So. 3d at 954 (¶33) (quoting Vassar

v. Vassar, 228 So. 3d 367, 378 (¶40) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). In addition, the chancellor

valued Fred's retirement account, which he equally divided between the parties, as of the

date of divorce on May 26, 2022, but he valued Alison's inherited money as of December 31,

2020. Established precedent provides that "[t]o determine the date when assets cease to be

marital, i.e., the point of demarcation, the chancery court can use either the date of separation

or the date of the divorce." Brown, 350 So. 3d at 1178 (¶30). The chancellor should remain

mindful of this guidance as he seeks to properly classify, value, and equitably divide the

parties' marital estate upon remand. Because the chancellor must necessarily revisit these

remaining issues upon remand of the equitable division of the marital estate, we decline to

further address them on appeal.

 III. Alimony, College Expenses, and Health Insurance

¶29. Fred next contends on appeal that the chancellor erred in awarding permanent alimony

to Alison. In her cross-appeal, Alison asserts that the chancellor erred by failing to fully

assign Fred the responsibility for the minor son's college tuition and health insurance.

¶30. First, we note that relevant to Alison's cross-appeal, Mississippi Code Annotated

 12
 section 43-19-101(7) (Rev. 2021) provides that "[a]ll orders involving support of minor

children, as a matter of law, shall include reasonable medical support. . . . In any case in

which the support of any child is involved, the court shall make . . . findings either on the

record or in the judgment" as to "[t]he availability to all parties of health insurance coverage

for the child(ren)" and "[t]he cost of health insurance coverage to all parties." "The

requirements of section 43-19-101[(7)] are mandatory and apply in all cases involving child

support." Savell v. Manning, 325 So. 3d 1208, 1224 (¶57) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). Here, the

final judgment included no discussion about "reasonable medical support" for the parties'

minor son. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(7). Thus, as a matter of law, we must reverse this

part of the chancellor's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

¶31. As to the parties' remaining arguments, we conclude that because reversal of the

equitable division of the marital estate is necessary, we likewise must reverse the chancellor's

determinations as to all other financial awards such as Alison's alimony and the minor son's

college expenses. See Thompson, 380 So. 3d at 958 (¶49). We acknowledge that the

chancellor's reconsideration of the parties' property division may necessarily impact his

decision regarding these other financial matters. We therefore also reverse the chancellor's

award of alimony and denial of the minor son's college expenses so that he may readdress

these matters on remand in conjunction with the issues of property division and health-

insurance coverage for the minor son.

 CONCLUSION

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 ¶32. Upon review, we affirm the chancellor's denial of Fred's motion to withdraw his

consent to the irreconcilable-differences divorce and the chancellor's determination that

Alison's inherited money remained her separate property. In considering Fred's remaining

claims regarding property division, however, we conclude that the chancellor erred in the

proper classification, valuation, and equitable division of the parties' assets and debts. We

therefore reverse and remand the issue of property division to allow the chancellor to make

sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion. Because the

chancellor's reconsideration of the division of the marital estate may impact other financial

awards, such as alimony for Alison and college expenses and health insurance for the minor

son, we likewise reverse and remand these matters for reconsideration along with the parties'

property division.

¶33. ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART. ON CROSS-APPEAL: REVERSED AND REMANDED.

 BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, McCARTY
AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN
THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. LAWRENCE, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.

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