CourtListener opinion 11099190

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In re the Marriage of: No. 87370-9-I

 LINGJUN STEVE HOU, DIVISION ONE

 Respondent,
 and UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 JIE YAO HOU,

 Appellant.

 SMITH, J. — An arbitrator directed Jie Hou to prepare a qualified domestic

relations order (QDRO) splitting her Public Employees' Retirement System

Plan 2 (PERS 2) account with her ex-spouse, Steve Hou. In this appeal, Jie1

challenges the trial court's orders confirming the arbitrator's award, denying Jie's

motion to vacate the award, entering a QDRO pursuant to the award, and

awarding attorney fees to Steve. She also challenges the trial court's denial of

her motion to revise a commissioner's order that denied reconsideration of fees

awarded to Steve in a contempt proceeding. We affirm.

 FACTS

 In December 2022, the trial court entered a final dissolution decree

dissolving the parties' marriage. The decree incorporated a separation contract

that the parties executed under Civil Rule (CR) 2A in September 2022 (CR 2A

 1The parties share a last name, so for clarity, we refer to them by the
names they used in their declarations and correspondence below.
 No. 87370-9-I/2

agreement). The CR 2A agreement provided, with regard to the parties'

respective pensions,
 4. Pensions: The community interest in Husband's City of Seattle
 Pension shall be awarded 50% to husband and 50% to wife.
 Husband shall pay the cost of preparing a QDRO to effectuate
 this award.
 5. The community interest in Wife's PERS II Pension shall be
 awarded 50% to wife and 50% to husband. Wife shall pay the
 cost of preparing a QDRO to effectuate this award.

The CR 2A Agreement also provided, "Each party agrees and stipulates that all

disputes in reducing this agreement to orders suitable for entry with the court,

including resolution of any issues inadvertently omitted from the agreement but

necessary to final disposition of this matter, shall be subject to binding arbitration"

under the uniform arbitration act (UAA), RCW chapter 7.04A.2

 The dissolution court also entered a child support order stating, among

other things, that "[b]eginning 10/1/2022, [Steve] agrees to provide [the parties'

daughter] with $700.00 per month for living expenses and share [certain]

expenses so long as she is enrolled in her undergraduate program."

 In June 2023, Steve moved to compel arbitration, alleging that although he

had complied with his obligation to prepare a QDRO to effectuate the CR 2A

agreement as it applied to his pension, Jie was refusing to prepare a QDRO for

her PERS 2 pension. On August 2, 2023, an arbitrator issued an award directing

Jie "to prepare an approved [QDRO] for her Washington State PERS II pension,

 2 The CR 2A agreement refers to RCW chapter 7.04, which was repealed
when Washington adopted the revised UAA. See LAWS OF 2005, ch. 433, § 50.
It is undisputed that RCW chapter 7.04A applies, and both parties rely on it in
their briefs.

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 No. 87370-9-I/3

present it to [Steve] for signature and submit it to the pension administrator for

review no later than August 31, 2023."

 In December 2023, Steve again moved to compel arbitration. He argued

that because Jie was vested in her PERS 2 pension, she was required to prepare

a QDRO that split her PERS 2 account into two separate accounts under

WAC 415-02-520 (split-type QDRO), rather than one that merely gave Steve an

interest in her account under WAC 415-02-510 (interest-type QDRO). Steve

pointed out that under an interest-type QDRO, he would not receive any

payments from Jie's pension until Jie terminated her employment or retired, and

if Jie terminated her employment, he would not receive any payments until Jie

withdrew her accumulated contributions. See WAC 415-02-510(2)(b)(i)-(ii).

Therefore, Steve asserted, he would "receive nothing until [Jie] decides to retire

and until she decides to take a distribution of the proceeds of her pension," and

because Jie was four years younger than Steve, he would "be forced to wait until

at least he is 69 before receiving any benefit." He also asserted that under WAC

415-02-510(2)(c)(iii), he would stop receiving payments if Jie died before he did.

By contrast, under a split-type QDRO, Steve could begin receiving payments

once he reached retirement age, see WAC 415-02-520(3)(i), and "[w]hen [Jie] or

[Steve] dies, there will be no impact to the other person's retirement account

because the accounts are independent from one another." WAC 415-02-

520(3)(h). Steve represented that Jie was insisting on an interest-type QDRO,

and he requested that the matter be submitted to binding arbitration.

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 The trial court determined that "this is a dispute that clearly falls within the

broad language of the binding arbitration clause of the CR2A Agreement" and

granted Steve's motion to compel arbitration. On April 22, 2024, the arbitrator

issued their award. They explained that "[e]xcept for the requirement that

QDRO's be prepared, the manner in which [the community interest in each

pension] will be distributed is not stated in the [CR 2A agreement] and is the

subject of this arbitration." After discussing the parties' arguments about an

interest-type versus a split-type QDRO, the arbitrator concluded,
 If [Jie]'s ‘interest' QDRO were entered, she would continue to have
 authority to determine when or if [Steve] would receive his now
 separate interest in her PERS II pension. He would be left with the
 specter of continued litigation to secure his property right if his fears
 are realized and Ms. Hou elects not to collect her pension during
 his lifetime. The law prefers finality and the way to achieve that in
 this situation is to enter an order under WAC's 415-02-500 and
 415-02-520 splitting Ms. Hou's PERS II pension into two accounts.

The arbitrator directed Jie to prepare a split-type QDRO for Steve's review "no

later than May 10, 2024." They also ordered that if Jie failed to timely prepare a

split-type QDRO, Steve "may prepare the order and [Jie] shall be obligated to

pay any attorney fees that [Steve] incurs for drafting, preparation and entry of the

order."

 On May 17, 2024, Steve moved to confirm the arbitration award and for

attorney fees. He asserted that Jie had refused to obey the arbitrator's order,

and he requested that the trial court direct her to comply. Jie, for her part, moved

to vacate the arbitration award. She argued among other things that by stating

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 No. 87370-9-I/5

that "the community interest"3 in her PERS 2 pension would be awarded 50

percent to Steve, the CR 2A agreement contemplated that Steve would receive

only an interest in her PERS 2 pension and was not entitled to a split-type QDRO

giving him a separate account.

 On August 12, 2024, the trial court granted Steve's motion to confirm the

arbitration award, denied Jie's motion to vacate it, and awarded Steve $2,500 in

attorney fees. The court ordered Jie to comply with the award within seven days,

and "[i]f [Jie] fails to comply with this order within 7 days, [Steve] may draft a

QDRO that is compliant with the arbitration award and submit it to the court for

signature along with an additional request for attorney fees for the costs of

drafting and presenting the QDRO."

 On August 29, 2024, Steve moved for an award of attorney fees. He

represented that after the trial court confirmed the arbitration award, Jie "took no

action whatsoever," so on August 22, Steve, through counsel, prepared a QDRO

and sent it to the Washington Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) for

preliminary review. Steve submitted copies of correspondence showing that Jie

objected to DRS's approval of Steve's proposed QDRO, telling DRS that Steve

"[d]oes [n]ot have the authority to create a Proposed Order dividing my retirement

account using the ‘split account' option."4 DRS approved Steve's proposed

QDRO,5 which Steve then submitted to the trial court for signature and filing.

 3 Emphasis added.
 4 Bold face omitted.
 5 According to an e-mail from the DRS retirement specialist who reviewed

the proposed QDRO, "DRS does not make a determination on whether a court

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 Jie opposed Steve's motion for an award of fees. She asserted that

Steve's proposed split-type QDRO was "void," again arguing that the reference to

"interest" in the pension provisions of the CR 2A agreement meant that she was

required to prepare an interest-type QDRO and not a split-type QDRO. She also

argued that because the CR 2A agreement stated that "[n]either party shall pay

any attorney fees or costs to or for the benefit of the party," she could not be

ordered to pay Steve's attorney fees.

 On September 23, 2024, the trial court entered an order awarding Steve

$1,338.50 in attorney fees incurred in connection with preparing the QDRO. It

also entered Steve's proposed QDRO. Jie timely appealed from these orders as

well as the trial court's earlier order confirming the arbitration award and denying

Jie's motion to vacate it.

 Meanwhile, in July 2024, Jie moved for an order holding Steve in

contempt for failing to pay postsecondary educational support for the parties'

daughter. A commissioner denied the motion, reasoning that "per RCW

26.19.090(4) the child is required to make her academic records available to

[Steve]," and "[h]er refusal to do so is a basis for [Steve] to suspend payment."

The commissioner also ordered Jie to pay $787.50 in attorney fees, reasoning

that "[t]he CR 2A agreement did not prospectively bar [Steve] from seeking fees

for matters beyond the scope of the [agreement]."

order should or should not be applied to a DRS retirement account" but would
review it "for compliance with the rules and regulations regarding the division of a
state retirement account."

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 Jie moved for reconsideration of the commissioner's fee award, arguing

that because "[t]he Attorney Fees and Costs clause in [the CR 2A agreement]

states: ‘Neither party shall pay any attorney fees or costs to or for the benefit of

the other party,' " Steve was responsible for paying his own attorney fees and

costs. The commissioner denied reconsideration, explaining,
 The CR 2A Agreement signed by the parties in 2022 was binding
 as to the issues addressed in the agreement including post-
 secondary education (which was incorporated into a court order).
 The CR2A & final orders provide that each party will pay their own
 attorney fees. Nothing in the CR2A or the final orders supports
 [Jie]'s position that the court is somehow barred from awarding fees
 incurred by a party post-decree associated with litigation that was
 not part of the CR2A. Post-secondary support was part of the
 CR2A & final orders. The issue of contempt and/or enforcement is,
 however, distinct and, in this case, the fees awarded were
 authorized by statute.

 Jie moved to revise the commissioner's order denying reconsideration,

and a superior court judge denied revision. Jie then filed another notice of

appeal designating the order denying revision.

 DISCUSSION

 Confirmation of Arbitration Award

 Jie claims that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award and

denying her motion to vacate it. We disagree.

 We review de novo a trial court's decision to confirm or vacate an

arbitration award. Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1311

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Salewski v. Pilchuck Veterinary Hosp., Inc., P.S., 189

Wn. App. 898, 903, 359 P.3d 884 (2015) (on review, appellate court applies "the

same standard applicable in the court which confirmed, vacated, modified or

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 No. 87370-9-I/8

corrected th[e arbitration] award"). Washington law strongly favors the finality of

arbitration awards, and "judicial review of an arbitration award in the context of a

proceeding . . . to confirm an arbitrator's award is exceedingly limited." Davidson

v. Hensen, 135 Wn.2d 112, 118-19, 954 P.2d 1327 (1998). Judicial review of an

arbitration award "does not include a review of the merits of the case," and the

evidence before the arbitrator ordinarily will not be considered by the court.

Davidson, at 119. Instead, review " ‘is confined to the question of whether any of

the statutory grounds for vacation exist.' " Salewski, 189 Wn. App. at 903-04

(quoting Cummings v. Budget Tank Removal & Env't Servs., LLC, 163 Wn. App.

379, 388, 260 P.3d 220 (2011)). As relevant here, the court "shall" confirm the

arbitrator's award unless (1) the arbitrator "exceeded the arbitrator's powers" or

(2) the arbitrator "refused to consider evidence material to the controversy . . . so

as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding."

RCW 7.04A.220; RCW 7.04A.230(1), (4). As the party seeking to vacate the

award, Jie bears the burden to show that such grounds exist. Salewski, 189 Wn.

App. at 904.

 Jie does not meet this burden. She first contends that the arbitrator

exceeded their powers. "To vacate an award on this ground, the error must

appear ‘on the face of the award,' " such as, for example, where an arbitrator

identifies a portion of the award as punitive damages in a jurisdiction that does

not allow punitive damages. Salewski, 189 Wn. App. at 904 (quoting Federated

Servs. Ins. Co. v. Pers. Representative of Estate of Norberg, 101 Wn. App. 119,

123, 4 P.3d 844 (2000)).

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 No. 87370-9-I/9

 Jie makes a number of arguments to support her contention that the

arbitrator exceeded their powers. She contends that the arbitrator decided an

issue that was not before them, failed to render a final and definite award, and

committed significant legal errors. But at bottom, all of her arguments are

premised on her claim that by referring to the "community interest"6 in the parties'

respective pensions, the CR 2A agreement—and the final dissolution decree that

incorporated it—mandated that the parties enter into interest-type QDROs to

effectuate the pension-related clauses of the agreement.7 The arbitrator rejected

this argument, explaining that "[t]he word ‘interest' in these clauses refers to the

property being divided and not to the manner in which it is to be divided." Jie

obviously disagrees with the arbitrator's interpretation of the CR 2A agreement,

and her arguments on appeal essentially ask this court to reexamine the

agreement and reach a different conclusion than the arbitrator did. But because

our review does not encompass the merits of the arbitrator's decision, we decline

to do so.

 Jie next contends that the arbitrator refused to consider evidence material

to the controversy and that when she raised this alleged refusal in her motion to

 6 Emphasis added.
 7 For example, Jie asserts that "[b]oth the husband and the wife have
agreed, without dispute, that each party should enter an ‘interest' type QDRO as
mandated by the decree of dissolution"; the only issue that should have been
considered by the arbitrator was "whether WAC 415-02-520 should be
used . . . for the wife's PERS 2 ‘interest' type QDRO"; "[t]he decree of dissolution
includes mirrored pension division terms that specifically require the husband
and wife each to prepare and enter the same ‘interest' type QDRO"; and she is at
risk of being held in contempt based on the conflict between the arbitration award
and the dissolution decree, which the arbitrator was without authority to overrule.

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 No. 87370-9-I/10

vacate the arbitrator's award, the trial court failed to consider it, thus depriving Jie

of due process. Jie does not specify what evidence the arbitrator failed to

consider; but she described it below as "the parties' CR2A agreement, the

pension division law WAC 415-02-500 and her original interest type PERS 2

QDRO," which Jie asserted "prove[d] that [she] . . . did follow the direction of

WAC 415-02-500 and the CR2A agreement by using [an interest-type QDRO] to

divide her pension."

 But this evidence was not "material" to the controversy because the issue

before the arbitrator was the manner in which the parties' community interest in

Jie's pension should be divided (i.e., using an interest-type QDRO or a split-type

QDRO), not whether Jie's proposed interest-type QDRO complied with the

WACs. Furthermore, Jie does not point to anything in the record to show that the

trial court did not consider her argument that the arbitrator refused to consider

material evidence. To the contrary, the trial court expressly acknowledged in its

order confirming the arbitration award that Jie alleged the arbitrator "failed to

consider evidence." Jie's contentions fail, and she does not establish that the

trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award.

 Entry of QDRO

 Jie next asserts that the QDRO was procured by fraud and that it is void,

and she points out that a court may vacate a judgment obtained by fraud, as well

as a void judgment, at any time under CR 60(b)(4) and (5). But Jie did not file a

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 No. 87370-9-I/11

CR 60(b) motion below, and in any case, she does not establish a basis to

vacate the QDRO.8

 According to Jie, the arbitration award states, " ‘[The husband] may

prepare the [‘split' type QDRO] and . . . [The wife] shall . . . sign [the] order . . . so

it can be submitted to the court.' "9 Therefore, Jie asserts, Steve was required to

obtain her signature on the QDRO before he could submit it to the court, and

because the trial court did not require him to do so and instead entered the

QDRO without her signature, the QDRO is void.

 Jie at best misunderstands—and at worst, misrepresents—the language

in the arbitration award. In full, it states,
 [Jie] shall prepare a qualifying "split" [QDRO] pursuant to WAC 415-
 02-520 for [Steve]'s review no later than May 10, 2024. If she fails
 to timely provide an order, [Steve] may prepare the order and [Jie]
 shall be obligated to pay any attorney fees that [Steve] incurs for
 drafting, preparation and entry of the order. [Jie] shall have no
 more than ten business days to sign an order once it is approved
 by [Steve] so it can be submitted to the court.[10]

In other words, Jie's signature was not a condition to submission of the QDRO

but rather an obligation she was required to fulfill. The trial court did not err by

authorizing Steve to present a QDRO without Jie's signature, or entering that

QDRO without Jie's signature, after Jie did not timely fulfill that obligation.

 8 We exercise our discretion to reach Jie's arguments in favor of vacating
the QDRO even though she raises them for the first time on appeal. Cf. RAP
2.5(a) ("The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was
not raised in the trial court.").
 9 Bold face omitted.

 10 Emphasis added.

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 No. 87370-9-I/12

 Jie also asserts that the QDRO was procured by fraud because Steve's

counsel submitted it to the court without an accompanying motion; "intentionally

made a false statement that ‘This Order is entered pursuant to the decree of

dissolution' [when i]n reality, it directly contradicted the ‘interest' type QDRO

explicitly mandated by the decree of dissolution"; and "improperly submitted the

void ‘split' type QDRO to [DRS]." But the trial court's order confirming the

arbitration award expressly authorized Steve to submit an split-type QDRO to the

court for signature if Jie failed to do so within seven days; Jie's claim that the CR

2A agreement and resulting dissolution decree mandated an interest-type QDRO

is, as discussed, not within the scope of our review; and Jie cites no authority for

the proposition that Steve acted "improperly" by submitting his proposed QDRO

to DRS for approval.

 Finally, Jie maintains that the superior court deprived her of due process

by allowing Steve to submit the split-type QDRO without a motion and, thus, the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter it, and it is void. This

argument is without merit. Jie had notice and an opportunity to be heard when

Steve moved to confirm the arbitration award that directed Jie to prepare an split-

type QDRO, and the record reflects that Steve provided her a copy of his

proposed QDRO when he submitted it to DRS for review. Jie fails to show that

additional process was required under the circumstances. Cf. In re Detention of

Lough, 27 Wn. App. 2d 717, 533 P.3d 1184 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1013

(2024) (in determining procedural due process protections, courts balance

" ‘(1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that

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 No. 87370-9-I/13

interest through existing procedures and the probable value, if any, of additional

procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest, including costs and

administrative burdens of additional procedures.' " (quoting In re Detention of

Stout, 159 Wn.2d 357, 370, 150 P.3d 86 (2007))).

 QDRO-Related Fee Awards

 Jie next asserts that we must vacate the fee awards entered in connection

with confirming the arbitration award and entry of the QDRO. We disagree.

 "Washington follows the American rule that attorney fees are recoverable

in a suit only when authorized by statute, contract, or equity." Mehlenbacher v.

DeMont, 103 Wn. App. 240, 244, 11 P.3d 871 (2000). When reviewing an award

of attorney fees, we generally ask first whether the prevailing party was entitled

to fees, and second, whether the award of fees was reasonable. Pub. Util. Dist.

No. 1 of Klickitat County v. Int'l Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 789, 814, 881 P.2d 1020

(1994). Here, Jie challenges only Steve's entitlement to fees. To that end, the

UAA provides that "[o]n application of a prevailing party to a contested judicial

proceeding [to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award], the court

may add to a judgment . . . attorneys' fees and other reasonable expenses of

litigation incurred in a judicial proceeding after the award is made." RCW

7.04A.250(3).

 "[W]e review a discretionary decision to award or deny attorney fees . . .

for an abuse of discretion." Gander v. Yeager, 167 Wn. App. 638, 647, 282 P.3d

1100 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is " ‘manifestly

unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.' " In

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 No. 87370-9-I/14

re Receivership of Applied Restoration, Inc., 28 Wn. App. 2d 881, 891, 539 P.3d

837 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MONY Life Ins. Co. v.

Cissne Fam., LLC, 135 Wn. App. 948, 952-53, 148 P.3d 1065 (2006)), review

denied, 3 Wn.3d 1012 (2024). A trial court also abuses its discretion when its

decision is based on an error of law. King v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 104 Wn. App.

338, 355, 16 P.3d 45 (2000).

 Jie contends that Steve was not entitled to fees because "[b]oth parties

expressly agreed and stipulated in the CR 2A agreement that ‘Neither party shall

pay any attorney fees or costs to or for the benefit of the other party.' " She

asserts that "[b]y signing this agreement, the parties waived their rights to seek

attorney fees and costs." Absent disputed material facts, whether a party

contractually waived a statutory right is a question of law that we review de novo.

In re Estate of Petelle, 195 Wn.2d 661, 665, 462 P.3d 848 (2020).

 Jie relies on Hitter v. Bellevue School District No. 405, 66 Wn. App. 391,

832 P.2d 130 (1992), to claim that Steve waived any right to request fees under

the UAA. But Hitter is distinguishable. There, we held that a person who

prevails at arbitration in a wage dispute is entitled to attorney fees under RCW

49.48.030. Hitter, 66 Wn. App. at 396. But we also held that the party seeking

fees had waived that entitlement under an agreement that specifically stated that

"[t]he fees and expenses of the arbitrator shall be shared equally by [the parties,

and a]ll other expenses shall be borne by the party incurring them." Id. at 397.

 Here, unlike in Hitter, the attorney fees provision in the CR 2A agreement

does not mention arbitration—much less does it address fees incurred in future

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 No. 87370-9-I/15

judicial proceedings to confirm or vacate an arbitration award. Instead, the only

reasonable interpretation of the provision is that each party was to bear their own

fees incurred in connection with entering into the agreement itself. Jie's reliance

on Hitter is misplaced.

 Jie next contends that the trial court "overlooked" that Steve's attorney

fees "were incurred . . . for obtaining fraudulent orders from the Court through his

counsel's three instances of fraud upon the court," and "[i]t is axiomatic that fraud

vitiates everything." But for reasons already discussed, Jie's claim that the trial

court's challenged orders were obtained through fraud lack merit.

 In sum, Jie does not establish that the trial court erred by concluding that

Steve, who prevailed below, was entitled to fees under the UAA for the fees he

incurred in connection with confirming the arbitrator's award and then carrying it

out after Jie herself did not timely do so.

 Contempt Hearing Fee Award

 Jie also maintains that we must vacate the commissioner's order awarding

Steve fees for defending against Jie's contempt motion. We disagree.

 Jie asserts that under RCW 26.09.160(7), a court is authorized to order

the party moving for contempt to pay the nonmoving party's fees only if "the court

finds the motion was brought without reasonable basis." And here, the

commissioner did not make that finding in their order denying Jie's contempt

motion and awarding Steve his attorney fees. But Jie did not appeal from that

order. Instead, she appealed from the superior court's order denying her motion

to revise the commissioner's order denying reconsideration of that order. We

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 No. 87370-9-I/16

review the superior court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Applied

Restoration, 28 Wn. App. 2d at 890; see also In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn.

App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 753 (2010) ("When an appeal is taken from an order

denying revision of a court commissioner's decision, we review the superior

court's decision, not the commissioner's.").

 In her motion for reconsideration, Jie argued only that an award of fees

was precluded by the language in the CR 2A agreement stating, "Neither party

shall pay any attorney fees or costs to or for the benefit of the other party." For

reasons already discussed, that argument is without merit. It was not until Jie

moved to revise the commissioner's order denying reconsideration that she

raised the issue of whether the commissioner erred under RCW 26.09.160(7).

 Jie does not address this procedural history much less show that the trial

court abused its discretion by declining to revise based on an issue that was not

before the commissioner. Cf. In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93,

976 P.2d 1240 (1999) ("Generally, a superior court judge's review of a court

commissioner's ruling, pursuant to a motion for revision, is limited to the evidence

and issues presented to the commissioner."). Accordingly, she does not

establish a basis for reversing the trial court's denial of her motion to revise the

commissioner's order denying reconsideration.

 Fees on Appeal

 Steve requests an award of fees on appeal under (1) the UAA, (2) RCW

26.09.140, the discretionary attorney fee statute for dissolution proceedings, and

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 No. 87370-9-I/17

(3) RAP 18.9(a) as a sanction for a frivolous appeal. We may award attorney

fees on appeal if authorized by applicable law. RAP 18.1(a).

 As noted, the UAA provides that "[o]n application of a prevailing party to a

contested judicial proceeding [to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration

award], the court may add to a judgment . . . attorneys' fees and other

reasonable expenses of litigation incurred." RCW 7.04A.250(3). Because Steve

is the prevailing party with regard to Jie's appeal from the orders entered to

confirm and effectuate the arbitration award, we grant his request for fees

incurred in connection with Jie's appeal from those orders, subject to his

compliance with RAP 18.1(d).11 Cf. Saleemi v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 166 Wn.

App. 81, 98, 269 P.3d 350 (2012) (awarding fees to substantially prevailing party

in appeal from confirmation of arbitration award).

 However, we deny Steve's request for fees on appeal to the extent

incurred in connection with Jie's appeal from the order denying revision of the

commissioner's contempt hearing fee award. That aspect of Jie's appeal is not

governed by the UAA. Furthermore, Jie's arguments in that part of her appeal

were not frivolous, and Steve did not timely file a financial affidavit as required by

RAP 18.1(c) when "applicable law mandates consideration of the financial

resources of one or more parties regarding an award of attorney fees and

expenses." Cf. Advocates for Responsible Development v. W. Wash. Growth

 11 Because we grant Steve's request under the UAA, we need not decide
whether RCW 26.09.140 or RAP 18.1 support an award of fees incurred in
connection with Jie's appeal from the orders entered to confirm and effectuate
the arbitration award.

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 No. 87370-9-I/18

Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 170 Wn.2d 577, 580, 245 P.3d 764 (2010) ("An appeal is

frivolous if, considering the entire record, the court is convinced that the appeal

presents no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ, and that

the appeal is so devoid of merit that there is no possibility of reversal."); In re

Marriage of French, 32 Wn. App. 2d 308, 319, 557 P.3d 1165 (2024) (in

exercising discretion under RCW 26.09.140, " ‘we consider the issues' arguable

merit on appeal and the parties' financial resources, balancing the financial need

of the requesting party against the other party's ability to pay' " (quoting In re

Marriage of Kim, 179 Wn. App. 232, 256, 317 P.3d 555 (2014))).

 We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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