CourtListener opinion 11102146

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

NOTICE
 Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite
 such a decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

 JOSEPH VANN RIGGS III, )
 ) Supreme Court No. S-18658
 Appellant, )
 ) Superior Court No. 3AN-19-09136 CI
 v. )
 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
 AMBER DAWN MASON-RIGGS, ) AND JUDGMENT*
 )
 Appellee. ) No. 2066 – January 2, 2025
 )

 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
 Judicial District, Anchorage, Jack R. McKenna, Judge.

 Appearances: Joseph Vann Riggs III, pro se, Anchorage,
 Appellant. No appearance by Appellee.

 Before: Maassen, Chief Justice, and Carney, Borghesan, and
 Pate, Justices. [Henderson, Justice, not participating.]

 INTRODUCTION
 A husband appeals various aspects of the superior court's property
division as well as the court's determination that he violated a domestic relations
standing order. We vacate the property division because the marital home was not
valued correctly. However, we affirm the superior court's valuation of the remaining
property at issue. We also affirm the court's finding that the husband violated the
domestic relations standing order.

 *
 Entered under Alaska Appellate Rule 214.
 FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 Joseph Riggs III (Joe) and Amber Mason-Riggs married in July 2004 and
separated in July 2019. 1
 Amber is a chiropractor. She owns and operates her own chiropractic
practice, Back In Motion, LLC. She is the business's sole chiropractor. Although
Amber previously maintained a standalone practice, she now subleases office space
from another chiropractic business.
 Joe has had a number of different careers. He was most recently employed
by Merrill Lynch as a financial advisor, but testified that as of May 2022 he was
unemployed.
 Amber filed for divorce in August 2019. The superior court held a
property trial between April and June of 2022. Amber was represented by counsel.
Although Joe had been represented by three different attorneys during the pretrial phase,
he was not represented at trial.
 The parties disputed the value of the marital home. The court found that
two Comparable Market Analyses (CMA) of the home's fair market value prepared by
Amber's expert were more credible than the appraisal prepared by Joe's expert. The
court then subtracted $136,700 from the earlier of the two CMA figures to account for
the cost of repairs that a contractor (presented by Amber as an expert witness) testified
were necessary to make the home marketable.
 The parties also disputed the value of Amber's business. The court found
Amber's evidence more reliable. The court found that Back In Motion's book of
business was entirely based on Amber's personal goodwill and therefore had no
independent value. The court concluded that Back In Motion had a value of -$5,793.44
because its "credit card balance outweighed the value of any tangible assets at the time

 1
 The parties have two minor children, but custody is not at issue in this
appeal.

 -2- 2066
 of separation" and Amber's limited ability to work due to injuries and childcare needs
further diminished the business's value.
 The court valued Amber's retirement account at $131,452.73. Finding
credible Amber's testimony that she would need to liquidate the account in order to pay
her attorney, the court also awarded her "the debt related to the tax consequences of
cashing out" the account: ‑$44,693.92.
 The court found that Joe violated its initial domestic relations standing
order when he failed to renew health insurance coverage for Amber while the divorce
was pending. Joe argued that he acted on the advice of his attorneys, but the court
nevertheless held him responsible. The court accordingly ordered Joe to reimburse
Amber $7,946 for healthcare expenses she incurred while uninsured.
 The court determined that a 50/50 division of the marital estate was
warranted based on the parties' relative financial conditions. The court awarded Amber
the marital home, Back In Motion, her retirement account, and various personal
property. The court awarded Joe a cash account, a retirement account in his name, and
various items of personal property. The court also ordered Joe to pay Amber an
equalization payment in the sum of $30,139.45.
 Joe, representing himself, appeals. Amber does not participate in the
appeal.
 DISCUSSION
 Joe appeals four aspects of the superior court's divorce order: (1) the
valuation of the marital home, (2) the valuation of Amber's retirement account, (3) the
valuation of Back In Motion, and (4) the determination that Joe's failure to add Amber
to his new health insurance policy violated the domestic relations initial order.
 A. We Reverse The Valuation Of The Marital Home.
 "Division of marital property involves three steps: (1) deciding what
specific property is available for distribution, (2) finding the value of the property, and

 -3- 2066
 (3) dividing the property equitably."2 "The second step, the valuation of property, is a
factual determination that we review for clear error." 3 "[W]hether the trial court applied
the correct legal rule . . . is a question of law that we review de novo using our
independent judgment." 4
 1. It was error to reject the most current evidence of the home's
 value without explanation.
 Joe argues that Amber's expert's testimony contained "obvious, major
flaws" and demonstrated bias, and that the superior court erred in valuing the marital
home based on her CMAs.
 Joe does not convince us that the superior court clearly erred in finding
Amber's expert more credible than his expert. "In evaluating the relative credibility of
witnesses, the court ordinarily has no obligation to accept expert testimony when it finds
other evidence more persuasive; nor is the court bound to favor the testimony of an
ostensibly neutral witness who is unconvincing over that of a witness who testifies
convincingly despite circumstances suggesting potential bias." 5 Moreover, "it is the
function of the trial court, not of this court, to judge witnesses' credibility and to weigh
conflicting evidence."6 Joe argues that Amber's expert witnesses deliberately skewed
their testimony to advance Amber's interests as well as their own. And he contends
that his expert's testimony as to the value of the home was more accurate. The superior

 2
 Aubert v. Wilson, 483 P.3d 179, 186 (Alaska 2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 454 P.3d 981, 988 (Alaska 2019)).
 3
 Id. (quoting Pasley v. Pasley, 442 P.3d 738, 744 (Alaska 2019)).
 4
 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Grove v. Grove, 400 P.3d 109, 112
(Alaska 2017)).
 5
 Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 480 (Alaska 1994) (footnote omitted).
 6
 Fink v. Mun. of Anchorage, 379 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska 2016) (quoting In
re Adoption of S.K.L.H., 204 P.3d 320, 325 (Alaska 2009)).

 -4- 2066
 court found otherwise, and Joe does not persuade us the court was clearly wrong to do
so.7
 However, having accepted Amber's expert's CMAs, the court erred by
accepting the older of the two without explaining why. In valuing marital property, the
superior court should rely on evidence that indicates the property's value as close to the
time of trial as practicable. 8 "[T]here may be special situations in which the date of
separation is more appropriate," but "the court must make specific findings in such
cases as to why the use of this date is proper." 9 Amber's expert valued the home at
$455,280 in November 2020 and $468,000 in June 2022. Amber's written closing
argument urged the court to value the marital home as reflected in the CMA from 2020,
near the time of separation. The court ultimately did so, finding that "the CMAs . . .
more accurately reflect the value of the home" than Joe's expert's appraisal. But the
court did not explain why it chose to adopt the earlier of the two CMAs. Because the
court did not explain its decision, it was error to value the home based on the 2020
CMA instead of the 2022 CMA. Indeed, Amber's expert testified that the housing
market had "increased in Anchorage pretty drastically" between November 2020 and
June 2022, suggesting the later CMA was a more accurate estimate of the home's value
at the time of trial.
 2. It was not clear error to deduct the cost of repairs a contractor
 deemed necessary from the home's fair market value.
 Joe argues that the superior court erred by deducting $136,700, the cost of
repairs a contractor testified were necessary to make the home marketable, from the

 7
 See id.
 8
 Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 917 (Alaska 1994) (citing Ogard v. Ogard, 808
P.2d 815, 819 & n.8 (Alaska 1991)).
 9
 Id.

 -5- 2066
 CMA estimate of Amber's expert, which the court found credible. We cannot say the
court's decision to do so was plain error.
 "In valuing a marital asset, the court should look to the asset's fair market
value."10 "[F]air market value is a single, unitary figure."11 Black's Law Dictionary
defines fair market value as "[t]he price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is
willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction." 12
 In this case Amber's expert prepared a CMA by comparing the house to
other properties in the vicinity. The expert spent "at least an hour" in the home. Based
on her observations during this time, she testified that the property seemed structurally
sound, but needed various repairs to fetch the best possible offer. As noted above, she
valued the home at $455,280 in November 2020 and $468,000 in June 2022.
 The expert's testimony is somewhat ambiguous on whether her estimate
reflected the fair market value of the home in its current condition. On the one hand,
she testified that "[i]f [she] were to list the property right now in its current condition,"
she would list it at $475,000, close to CMA estimates. But when asked whether the
repairs would need to be completed before the buyer would pay that price, she did not
give a clear answer. She stated:
 I think this is a situation where it would depend on how the property
 was marketed. . . . A property where the seller would be willing to
 do repairs, we would have to negotiate — my recommendation at
 that point, that Amber address all of the health and safety —
 additional repairs, which would be, likely, finishing the bathroom,
 the fogged window, the leaking skylight, installing (indiscernible).
 I would say to focus on things like the electrical — anything in the
 heating, the HVAC room, the laundry room.

 10
 Nelson v. Jones, 781 P.2d 964, 970 (Alaska 1989) (citing Richmond v.
Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Alaska 1989)).
 11
 Doyle v. Doyle, 815 P.2d 366, 370 n.6 (Alaska 1991).
 12
 Fair Market Value, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).

 -6- 2066
 The expert also testified that "if it's an as-is sale looking for a cash buyer, [the issues
needing repair] may be able to be left in their current state," but if she were to "ask top
dollar" and market the property for buyers "with more than just cash," she would ask
that the repairs be completed before listing. This testimony could be interpreted to
mean that she would list the property at much more than the CMA estimate if the needed
repairs were performed before listing. But it also can be interpreted to mean that she
would negotiate a substantial discount below asking price for a cash buyer willing to
take the property as-is. Her CMA report lends some support to the latter interpretation
— the comparable properties all were sold with conventional financing rather than cash
offers.
 Given the ambiguity in the testimony, we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that the superior court made a mistake in discounting the CMA estimate
by the value of necessary repairs.
 B. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Deducting From The Retirement
 Account Awarded To Amber The Expected Tax Liability For
 Cashing Out The Account To Pay Her Attorney's Fees.
 The superior court awarded Amber the full value of a retirement account
in her name, valued at $131,452.73. The court then allocated her a debt of $44,693.92,
representing the predicted taxes she would have to pay upon cashing out the account
early. The court did so because it found credible her assertion that she needed to
liquidate the entire contents of the account to pay over $100,000 in outstanding
attorney's fees. We review the superior court's equitable allocation of marital property
for abuse of discretion and "will reverse only if the division [was] clearly unjust." 13
 Joe argues that it was improper for the court to account for the tax
consequences Amber would trigger by cashing out the account early "unless there was

 13
 Thompson v. Thompson, 454 P.3d 981, 989 (Alaska 2019) (alteration in
original) (quoting Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766, 769 (Alaska 2015)).

 -7- 2066
 proof that the Court's division of the property would create the taxable event." He cites
our decision in Oberhansly v. Oberhansly14 to support his position. There we explained
that the trial court "is not required to speculate on or to consider tax consequences in
the absence of proof that a taxable event will occur in connection with the division of
property."15 But we prefaced that statement by declaring that "[w]here the trial court
orders that property be distributed in a way that creates an immediate and specific tax
liability, . . . the court is required to consider that liability." 16
 Although hypothetical tax consequences are not a permissible
consideration when the superior court values and distributes property, it is within the
court's discretion to account for a tax liability that appears inevitable. 17 In Dodson v.
Dodson the superior court awarded one spouse's 401(k) plan to the other spouse in the
course of divorce proceedings, but discounted the value of the plan to account for taxes
the receiving spouse would have to pay to draw funds from the plan. 18 On appeal the
other spouse, citing Oberhansly, argued that the court erred in its valuation by
discounting the plan's value by this "hypothetical" tax consequence. 19 We held that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by recognizing that transferring the plan
shifted a tax liability to the receiving spouse and discounting the plan's value to reflect
that. 20
 Dodson supports the superior court's approach in this case. The facts of
Dodson differ somewhat from the situation here because the tax liability for the

 14
 798 P.2d 883 (Alaska 1990).
 15
 Id. at 887.
 16
 Id.
 17
 See Dodson v. Dodson, 955 P.2d 902, 909 (Alaska 1998).
 18
 Id.
 19
 Id.
 20
 Id. at 909-10.

 -8- 2066
 receiving spouse in Dodson was unavoidable, 21 whereas Amber could avoid an early
withdrawal penalty by waiting until retirement age to access the account. But like the
court in Dodson, which made assumptions regarding the amount of taxes the receiving
spouse would pay on her 401(k) distributions,22 the superior court here made
assumptions regarding the high likelihood that Amber would need to cash out her
retirement account to pay over $100,000 in attorney's fees. These assumptions were
reasonable because Amber credibly testified that she intended to imminently liquidate
the account to pay her attorney, which was necessary because she did not have sufficient
funds to do so otherwise. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by accounting
for the tax liability that would result.
 Joe argues that Amber did not need to liquidate her retirement account and
incur the associated taxes because she sold the marital home in June of 2023 and could
use the proceeds to pay her attorney. Joe's argument is not persuasive. First, Joe fails
to point to any evidence in the record that supports his assertion. But even if evidence
of the home's sale were properly before us, the proceeds Amber would have netted
likely would not have been so substantial as to eliminate the need to liquidate her
retirement account. As discussed above, the fair market value of the home at the time
of trial was around $460,000. When the superior court issued its order, the home was
subject to a mortgage totaling more than $350,000. Upon selling the home, Amber
would have needed to secure new housing for her and the children and likely would
have needed to use the proceeds to pay for it. Therefore, any surplus funds generated
by selling the home would likely not have been enough to cover over $100,000 in
outstanding attorney's fees. We are not convinced by Joe's argument.

 21
 See id. at 909 (noting that receiving spouse "would have to pay deferred
taxes on the 401(k) plan before she could use the plan's funds").
 22
 See id. at 909-10.

 -9- 2066
 Nothing in the record indicates that the superior court was incorrect to
consider Amber's attorney's fees in discounting the value of her retirement account.
The court declined to rule on attorney's fees in its order. It indicated that it would
address the matter once all pending issues in the case were resolved. When the court
issued its property order a custody modification trial was still pending. If, after the
custody trial concluded, the court orders Joe to pay all or most of Amber's fees, that
might undercut the need for Amber to empty her retirement account to fund the divorce
litigation. In that event, Joe could move for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil
Rule 60(b). 23 However, on the record before us, we see no error in the court's order.
We therefore affirm.
 C. The Superior Court Did Not Clearly Err By Using Older, More
 Reliable Evidence To Value Amber's Business.
 Joe argues that the superior court clearly erred in assigning Back In
Motion a negative value. He contends that the court erred by rejecting his expert's
appraisal of the business and relying instead on Amber's more dated and incomplete
evidence of value. Although Joe is correct that, as a general matter, trial courts should
value marital property to reflect the property's value as close to trial as is practicable,
we see no error in the court's valuation of Back In Motion.
 The parties painted very different pictures of the business's value. Amber
provided a balance sheet from July 11, 2019, as the best evidence of Back In Motion's
value. The balance sheet showed that Back In Motion's debts exceeded its equity by
$5,793.44 at that time. Amber also provided a report showing the business's profits
and losses from January through December 2021. Joe's expert conducted an appraisal
of the business in April 2022. Because Joe's expert did not have access to the business's
financial statements for 2021, his appraisal valued Back In Motion as of December 31,
2020. The report valued the business at $129,900, largely based on the value of Back

 23
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b).

 -10- 2066
 In Motion's book of business. Amber countered that conclusion with expert testimony
from another Anchorage chiropractor indicating that her book of business was not a
marketable asset in the local chiropractic industry.
 The superior court valued Back In Motion at -$5,793.44. The court's
valuation was based on several findings. First, the court found that Amber's evidence
as to the business's value was more credible than Joe's. The court found Joe's expert
"credible to the extent that his assumptions were true," but found that his assumptions
"were based solely on how [Joe] viewed the business," which was not entirely accurate.
Second, the court determined that Back In Motion's book of business was not a
marketable asset. The court found that the book of business was "based solely on
[Amber's] personal goodwill" and therefore had no fair market value. 24 Third, the court
determined that Back In Motion's "credit card balance outweighed the value of any
tangible assets at the time of separation," and therefore the business itself had a negative
value. Fourth, the court found that limitations in Amber's ability "to work due to
injuries and childcare needs" supported the modest valuation.
 Because the superior court found Joe's expert's appraisal not credible, it
could rely on Amber's evidence, even though it was less current. 25 Moreover, the 2021
profit and loss report Amber provided was evidence of value closer in time to the date
of trial that further supports the court's findings. In sum, the superior court did not err
in valuing Amber's business.

 24
 See Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 347-48 (Alaska 1988) (explaining that
if trial court determines business good will is unmarketable it should not be considered
in dividing marital assets).
 25
 See Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991) (explaining that
property should be valued "as close as practicable to the date of trial"); Beals v. Beals,
303 P.3d 453, 462 (Alaska 2013) (recognizing earlier valuation date may be appropriate
"when a later valuation date [is] less reliable").

 -11- 2066
 D. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Finding That Joe Violated A
 Domestic Relations Standing Order By Not Renewing Amber's
 Health Insurance Coverage.
 Joe argues the superior court erred by requiring him to reimburse Amber
for the cost of a surgery she had after separation. The court did so because it found that
Joe violated a domestic relations standing order by leaving Amber off his insurance
when he obtained a new policy. Joe argues he did not violate the order because he took
this action on the mistaken advice of counsel, but the court did not accept this excuse.
We see no error in the court's ruling.
 The superior court issued a domestic relations standing order in August
2019. The order provided that Joe could not "cancel, change or stop paying for any
insurance policy." Joe's insurance, covering Amber and their sons, expired in late 2019.
Joe testified that he asked his attorneys whether the order required him to add Amber
to any new policy he applied for. According to Joe, his attorneys informed him that
this was not necessary. Relying on this advice, Joe did not add Amber to his new policy.
 Amber underwent knee surgery in October 2020. Because she was not
covered by Joe's new policy, Amber was uninsured at the time. She incurred $7,946 in
out-of-pocket healthcare costs as a result.
 The superior court granted Amber's request that Joe reimburse her for her
out-of-pocket medical costs. The court found Joe's testimony about his reasons for not
adding Amber to his new insurance policy not credible. It found that Joe "willfully
removed [Amber] from the policy when he should have included her during open
enrollment."
 On appeal Joe seems to argue that it was error for the superior court to
find that he violated the domestic relations standing order because his failure to add
Amber to his new insurance policy was merely a product of incorrect legal advice. He
also maintains that when he tried to rectify the issue, Amber unreasonably obstructed
his attempts to do so.

 -12- 2066
 These arguments are not persuasive. The superior court was under no
obligation to find Joe's testimony credible. 26 And even if Joe did act in reliance on bad
advice from his attorneys, he does not point to any law suggesting he cannot be held
responsible for acts taken on advice of counsel. Moreover, even assuming that Amber
was uncooperative when Joe attempted to reinstate her coverage, this does not
undermine the superior court's finding that Joe violated the order when he let her
coverage lapse.
 The standing order clearly provided that Joe could not "cancel, change or
stop paying for any insurance policy." And it made clear, in bold text, that should either
party violate the order, the court could "order sanctions," including fines. The trial
court has discretion to impose appropriate sanctions when a party violates a domestic
relations standing order. 27 We see no error in the court's conclusion that Joe violated
the domestic relations order in this case when he failed to add Amber to his new
insurance policy. Nor do we see any error in the court's exercise of its discretion by
requiring Joe to reimburse Amber for the medical costs she incurred as a result of his
violation of the order.
 CONCLUSION
 We VACATE the superior court's property division and REMAND with
instructions to value the marital home in accordance with this opinion. We AFFIRM
the court's order in all other respects.

 26
 See Fink v. Mun. of Anchorage, 379 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska 2016) ("[I]t is
the function of the trial court . . . to judge witnesses' credibility and to weigh conflicting
evidence." (quoting In re Adoption of S.K.L.H., 204 P.3d 320, 325 (Alaska 2009))).
 27
 See, e.g., Butts v. LeMaster, No. S-18367, 2024 WL 955834, at *7-8
(Alaska Mar. 6, 2024).

 -13- 2066