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NOTICE
 Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite
 such a decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

 PABLO DIAZ-FONTAO, )
 ) Supreme Court No. S-18388
 Appellant, )
 ) Superior Court No. 3AN-20-07233 CI
 v. )
 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
 MARTHA ANDRADE, ) AND JUDGMENT*
 )
 Appellee. ) No. 1990 – August 30, 2023
 )

 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
 Judicial District, Anchorage, Gregory Miller, Judge.

 Appearances: Joe P. Josephson, Josephson Law Offices,
 LLC, Anchorage, for Appellant. Taylor R. Thompson,
 Thompson Law Group, Anchorage, for Appellee.

 Before: Maassen, Chief Justice, Carney, Borghesan, and
 Henderson, Justices. [Pate, Justice, not participating.]

 INTRODUCTION
 A husband failed to respond to his wife's divorce complaint and summons
for more than five months. The court entered default against the husband, dissolved the
marriage, and divided the couple's property. The then-ex-husband retained an attorney
and moved to overturn the property division, asserting that he had limited English
proficiency and had not understood the divorce paperwork. He also claimed that the

 *
 Entered under Alaska Appellate Rule 214.
 property division was inequitable. After four days of evidentiary hearings, the court
denied the ex-husband's motion to overturn the property division.
 The ex-husband appeals, contending that his neglect in failing to respond
to the divorce complaint and summons was excusable and that the superior court
therefore erred in declining to set aside the default judgment. For the reasons below,
we affirm the superior court's denial of the motion to set aside the property division.
 FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 A. Facts
 Pablo Diaz-Fontao and Martha Andrade married in 2003 in Anchorage.
Long prior to that, in the early 1990s, Pablo had fled his home country of Cuba for
Florida. About a year after he arrived in Florida, Pablo married Maria Perez. Pablo
claims that he did not know this marriage happened. His understanding was that he
only submitted an "application to get married, but . . . never completed it" and "never
receive[d] any documents showing [him] that [he] was indeed married." Nevertheless,
a Florida marriage certificate signed by a deputy clerk indicates that Pablo married
Maria Perez on January 7, 1993.
 Pablo spent nearly ten years in Florida. In 2002 he moved to Alaska to
work in crab fisheries. In 2003 he came to Anchorage, where he met and married
Martha Andrade that year.
 Pablo claims he only found out about his Florida marriage to Maria Perez
in 2006, when Martha discovered some IRS documents and informed Pablo of what she
had learned. Martha helped Pablo retain an Anchorage attorney and obtain a divorce,
which was finalized in April 2006. Martha obtained legal advice that her marriage with
Pablo was valid and thus she did not need to re-marry Pablo or take other actions to
validate their marriage.
 Martha and Pablo remained together until separating in March 2020.
Martha then advised Pablo that she was seeking a divorce, that she had retained an
attorney, that Pablo had to fill out paperwork, and that he should retain a lawyer.

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 B. Proceedings
 Martha filed a complaint for divorce on July 27, 2020. She and Pablo had
discussed her plan to dissolve the marriage in June, and she served Pablo personally
with the divorce complaint, summons, and related paperwork through a process server
on August 11. When she met with Pablo in September 2020, he confirmed that he had
received the complaint and was going to get a lawyer. Martha urged him to respond to
the complaint multiple times. But Pablo never answered the complaint.
 On October 8 Martha applied for default. Pablo was properly served with
Martha's default application that day, but he still failed to respond. The clerk entered
default on October 20. The court held a default hearing on November 17, 2020, and
Pablo did not attend or appear. After the hearing, on November 30, 2020, Martha's
attorney sent Pablo both the proposed Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs)
dividing the couple's retirement accounts and the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dividing Martha and Pablo's property. Pablo still did not respond
or attend the default divorce hearing. The court issued a divorce decree dissolving
Pablo and Martha's marriage on December 2, 2020. It also incorporated the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and QDROs dividing Martha and Pablo's property and
debts. The court divided each of the parties' retirement accounts equally and held the
parties responsible for debts in their own names. The court did not value or divide the
condominium that Martha maintained was her separate property.
 After receiving the default paperwork Pablo retained an attorney and on
December 30 moved to set aside the default property division under Alaska Civil Rule
60(b)(1), based on mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Pablo attributed his
failure to respond to not being "fully functional" in English and not understanding what
was transpiring in the case.
 Martha opposed, noting Pablo's failure to appear or respond since the case
was initiated on July 27, over five months prior. She contended that there was "no
reason to re-open the case to litigate the issues between the parties, as [Pablo] ha[d] not

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 shown good cause as to his prior failure to litigate" after he "simply refused to engage
in the process." She also argued that he had failed to set forth a meritorious defense
demonstrating that the case's outcome might differ if the case was reopened. The court
denied Pablo's motion without prejudice on January 25, 2021, indicating that Pablo
could file "another motion that shows a ‘meritorious defense,' supported by admissible
evidence."
 Pablo filed another motion four months later, arguing first that he had
difficulties understanding English and did not understand the legal process and property
rights at issue; second, that the parties' marriage was void and that all orders on marital
property thus should be void; and third, that the court needed to reconsider the property
division because, among other things, Pablo believed Martha's condominium had at
least partially transmuted into marital property that needed to be accounted for. He also
submitted emails from four coworkers and friends attesting that his English was not
strong and that they often translated documents for him.
 Martha once again opposed Pablo's motion. She argued that Pablo "failed
to appear despite notice, opportunity, request, and urging." In response to Pablo's
arguments, she contended that the couple's marriage satisfied Alaska's putative
marriage requirements and thus was valid, and that no property had transmuted during
the marriage. She also attached three letters from friends indicating that Pablo spoke
and understood English well.
 The court held a series of evidentiary hearings centered on the "issue [of]
whether the December 2020 default should be set aside." At the final hearing, the court
made findings on the record. It noted three Rule 60(b) subsections, trial permit a
judgment to be set aside for the following reasons: (1) "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect"; (4) a void judgment; and (6) "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment." It noted that the moving party has to "prove a
meritorious defense." Then it denied Pablo's Rule 60(b) motion because it found that
he had not met his burden of proof "as to any of these parts or the meritorious defense."

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 The court first acknowledged that Pablo came to the United States from
Cuba 30 years ago and to Alaska 20 years ago, after having worked in the United States
since 1992. It also noted that he "speaks some English, but reads and writes little
English."
 Turning to the Rule 60(b) subsections, the court first found Pablo and
Martha's marriage satisfied the requirements of Alaska's putative marriage law 1 and
that Pablo therefore had not established a void judgment and entitlement to relief under
Rule 60(b)(4).
 Regarding Rule 60(b)(1), the court found that "there was no mistake, there
was no inadvertence, there was no surprise. Nobody's really alleging that." The court
found that "the facts clearly establish . . . neglect by" Pablo, but determined that Pablo's
neglect was not excusable. It noted that Pablo "was personally served by a process
server with the complaint" and cited evidence that Pablo received the complaint and
other documents "in one form or another three times with the default packet." It also
credited Martha's account that she told Pablo that she was filing for a divorce, that she
had an attorney, and that he should speak with an attorney as well. The court observed
that Pablo decided not to go to an attorney, that he instead took the documents to "a
friend or a couple of friends over time," and that, on his friends' advice, "he did
nothing." The court also noted that Pablo had already obtained a divorce once in Alaska
and had retained an Alaska attorney to help him with that prior divorce. It

 1
 AS 25.05.051 ("If, during the lifetime of a husband or wife with whom a
marriage is still in force, a person remarries and the parties to the subsequent marriage
live together as husband and wife, and one of the parties to the subsequent
marriage . . . is without knowledge of the former marriage, then after the death or
divorce of the other party to the former marriage, if they continue to live together as
husband and wife in good faith on the part of one of them, they are legally married from
the time of removal of the impediment."). Here, both parties claimed to lack knowledge
of Pablo's first marriage, and they continued to live together as husband and wife after
they discovered the first marriage and Pablo obtained a divorce.

 -5- 1990
 acknowledged Pablo's argument that he did not think he could afford an attorney, but
reasoned that many litigants in civil matters represent themselves and the inability to
retain counsel did not justify simply ignoring this divorce action. The court
characterized Pablo's failure to participate as the result of a series of poor decisions and
reiterated that those poor decisions did not establish excusable neglect.
 The court then considered whether Rule 60(b)(6) applied, particularly
whether Pablo's proficiency, or lack thereof, with English constituted "any other reason
justifying relief" from the judgment at issue. The court found that Pablo had "at least a
fundamental working knowledge" of spoken English and noted that Pablo conversed
with all trial witnesses using English, had previously completed important transactions
with documents in English, and used English at work. The court acknowledged that
Pablo could not read and write English as well as he could speak it, but concluded that
this did not justify ignoring his divorce paperwork, particularly since Pablo already had
been divorced in Alaska.
 Finally, the court determined that Pablo had not proven a meritorious
defense that would justify reopening the divorce and property division litigation.
 Pablo appeals, contending that the court erred in determining that his
neglect of the divorce action was not excusable and denying him relief under Rule
60(b).2
 STANDARD OF REVIEW
 We review legal determinations made within a trial court's division of
property de novo.3 We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion,

 2
 On appeal Pablo does not challenge the superior court's decision that his
marriage to Martha was valid and that he was not entitled to relief due to a void
judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).
 3
 Hicks v. Pleasants, 158 P.3d 817, 820 (Alaska 2007) (citing Leis v.
Hustad, 22 P.3d 885, 887 (Alaska 2001)).

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 the entry of a default judgment, and the refusal to set aside a default judgment.4 We
find an abuse of discretion if the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, manifestly
unreasonable, or . . . stems from an improper motive."5
 DISCUSSION
 Pablo argues that the superior court should have granted him relief under
Rule 60(b)(1) because his status as an immigrant with limited English ability renders
his failure to litigate his divorce excusable neglect. We disagree. Under these
circumstances, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
Pablo's neglect of the divorce action was not excusable.6
 Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.7 Alaska Civil Rule

 4
 Melendrez v. Bode, 941 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Alaska 1997) (citing Murat v.
F/V Shelikof Strait, 793 P.2d 69, 73 (Alaska 1990); Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v.
Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375, 378-79 (Alaska 1982)); see Schindler v. Schindler, 474 P.3d
648, 649 n.2 (Alaska 2020).
 5
 Del Rosario v. Clare, 378 P.3d 380, 383 (Alaska 2016) (quoting Gunn v.
Gunn, 367 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Alaska 2016)).
 6
 Thus concluding, we do not reach the question of whether Pablo presented
a meritorious defense. Pablo asserts other arguments that we do not reach here. Pablo
asserts that he should have been granted an additional evidentiary hearing. But he
waived that argument by failing to substantively brief it. Casciola v. F.S. Air Serv.,
Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Alaska 2005) ("We do not consider arguments that are
inadequately briefed."). Regardless, Pablo has not shown how an additional evidentiary
hearing – beyond the four days of hearings he had – would make any difference. And
Pablo asserts in his reply brief that the property division was grossly inequitable. But
we have a "well-established rule that issues not argued in opening appellate briefs are
waived." Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874, 887 (Alaska 2010). This is because "the
failure to raise an argument in an opening brief leaves the other party with no notice or
opportunity to respond to the argument." Id. at 887-88.
 7
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

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 55(e) provides that the court may set aside a default entry for good cause, and likewise
may set aside a default judgment in accordance with Rule 60(b).8
 Particularly when a self-represented litigant is involved, we have held that
setting aside a default judgment may be warranted when the default stems from "lack
of familiarity with the rules" or where the self-represented litigant is unversed in the
applicable processes.9 But we have cautioned repeatedly that "gross neglect or lack of
good faith" are not proper grounds for setting aside a default judgment, even for a self-
represented litigant.10
 Pablo suggests that if we affirm the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, other
immigrants with limited English proficiency "will . . . be placed at a serious
disadvantage." At first blush, he seems to raise issues similar to those that we addressed
in Crafts v. Morgan, where we vacated a property division given one spouse's lack of
understanding of the terms of the parties' dissolution.11
 Despite some parallels, though, Crafts is not dispositive here. The issue
in Crafts was whether an active participant in a divorce fully understood "the nature
and consequences" of signing a dissolution under AS 25.24.230(b)(1).12 There, both
spouses helped fill out the dissolution agreement papers (six pages of court forms) and
signed them voluntarily, and they both participated in the drafting of a property division

 8
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(e).
 9
 Cook v. Rowland, 49 P.3d 262, 265 (Alaska 2002) (quoting Wright v.
Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1998)).
 10
 Wright, 964 P.2d at 444 (setting aside default because self-represented
litigant's failure to answer not due to "bad faith or gross neglect"); see also Kennedy v.
First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks, 637 P.2d 297, 297-98 (Alaska 1981) (same); Sanuita v.
Hedberg, 404 P.2d 647, 651 (Alaska 1965) (same).
 11
 Crafts v. Morgan, 776 P.2d 1049, 1053-54 (Alaska 1989).
 12
 AS 25.24.230(b)(1) (permitting court to grant final dissolution pursuant to
spouses' written agreement if "the spouses understand fully the nature and
consequences of their action").

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 agreement.13 But the wife relied on her husband's representations to understand what
was being agreed to, which the husband used to his advantage.14 Indeed, the husband
advised the wife not to seek an attorney and urged her to sign the property division
agreement, despite the fact that she did not fully understand her property rights.15
 These circumstances are not comparable to Pablo's. Unlike the husband
in Crafts, Martha advised Pablo that she was seeking an attorney and encouraged him
to seek one as well. Nothing in the record suggests Martha ever deceived Pablo about
the nature of the divorce action she filed or discouraged him from litigating his position.
And unlike the wife in Crafts, Pablo considered whether to participate in the
proceedings overall and decided not to participate.16
 In fact, efforts were made and offered in Spanish to help Pablo understand
his legal situation. And by at least September 2020, Pablo understood his legal
circumstances sufficiently to confirm that that he had received the divorce complaint
and express his intention to get a lawyer. Given the court's extensive factual findings,
which are supported by the record, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion
for the court to reject Pablo's argument that his neglect of the divorce case was
excusable.17

 13
 Crafts, 776 P.2d at 1050-51.
 14
 Id. at 1050-54.
 15
 Id. at 1054.
 16
 Id. at 1050-52.
 17
 Pablo also cites Rule 60(b)(6), by which a court may grant relief from
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
But "[a] party can invoke subsection (b)(6) only if none of the other five clauses apply
and ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist." Powell v. Powell, 194 P.3d 364, 371 (Alaska
2008) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Juelfs v. Gough, 41 P.3d 593, 597
(Alaska 2002)). Here, Pablo asserts grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)'s provision
on "excusable neglect." A failed Rule 60(b)(1) argument does not create an

 -9- 1990
 Pablo also contends that because his decision not to respond to Martha's
divorce complaint was based on the poor advice of a recently divorced friend, the
superior court should have granted him relief under Rule 60(b)(1). We disagree. The
court was within its discretion to rule that Pablo's choice not to participate based on a
friend's poor advice was not excusable, particularly given that this is Pablo's second
divorce in Alaska.
 Pablo cites Gregor v. Hodges for the proposition that a default judgment
may be reversed in certain circumstances in which a litigant failed to participate.18
Gregor involved a default judgment entered against a defendant accused of fraudulently
obtaining and then refusing to return a piece of land.19 In Gregor the default judgment
was set aside for excusable neglect because, at the time of service, the defendant was
bedridden with a broken ankle and pneumonia and under the influence of prescribed
pain medication.20 Due to her condition she did not expect a lawsuit or initially realize
the importance of the summons and complaint.21 Once she realized the importance of
the papers, she immediately took action to address both the lawsuit and the subsequent
default.22

extraordinary circumstance for relief under Rule 60(b)(6); we have consistently held
that "[a]lthough clause six is a ‘catch-all' provision, relief under clause six is not
available unless the other clauses are inapplicable." Williams v. Crawford, 982 P.2d
250, 255 n.16 (Alaska 1999); see also Chena Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Bridges
ex rel. S.B., 502 P.3d 951, 963-64 (Alaska 2022) (declining to apply Rule 60(b)(6) to
failed Rule 60(b)(1) "excusable neglect" claim); Vill. of Chefornak v. Hooper Bay
Constr. Co., 758 P.2d 1266, 1270-71 (Alaska 1988) (same).
 18
 612 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1980) (per curiam).
 19
 Id. at 1009.
 20
 Id. at 1010.
 21
 Id.
 22
 Id.

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 Pablo argues that, like Gregor, he did not understand the importance of
the divorce documents he received. And like Gregor, he also began taking further steps
to pursue his case only after receiving his default paperwork. But the similarity between
Pablo's case and Gregor ends there. Unlike Gregor, who was incapacitated and
contacted three attorneys upon realizing the importance of the papers she had
received,23 Pablo understood that he had been served with a divorce complaint and
nevertheless accepted his friend's assessment that he need not do anything because
there was "no disputing any properties or any children" and the parties did not "have
anything commonwealth." Soliciting legal advice from a non-lawyer is not analogous
to being medically incapacitated. And as Martha notes and the record reflects, Pablo
had been warned that Martha intended to file for divorce; received multiple forms of
notice regarding the divorce, what Martha sought, and how he could respond; was not
ill; and simply chose not to participate based on his friend's advice.
 Pablo also relies upon our decision in Wright v. Shorten, where we
reversed the trial court's refusal to find excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) in the
case of a self-represented litigant who filed a non-compliant response to a complaint.24
But in Wright, unlike here, the self-represented litigant made an effort to respond to the
documents he was served, timely filing a letter that substantively responded to the
complaint's allegations.25 Here, although Pablo may have been "unversed in the rules
of civil procedure,"26 he made no attempt to respond to Martha's complaint or default
motion until months later, after the court had rendered its decision. This was in spite
of the fact that Martha informed Pablo in multiple ways that she was filing for divorce,
that she was working with an attorney, and that he should also speak with an attorney.

 23
 Id.
 24
 Wright v. Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1998).
 25
 Id.
 26
 See id.

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 Given these facts, Pablo's failure to respond is more analogous to "gross neglect" than
to mere "lack of familiarity with the rules." Neither Gregor nor Wright convinces us
that the court abused its discretion.
 CONCLUSION
 For the reasons above, we AFFIRM the superior court's denial of the
motion to overturn the default judgment.

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