CourtListener opinion 11102308

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NOTICE
 Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite
 such a decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

MARIE ALICE CECCHINI )
STERNQUIST, ) Supreme Court No. S-17594
 )
 Appellant, ) Superior Court No. 3AN-17-09650 CI
 )
 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
 ) AND JUDGMENT*
GREG LEVERN STERNQUIST, )
 ) No. 1901 – June 15, 2022
 Appellee. )
 )

 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
 Judicial District, Anchorage, Herman G. Walker, Jr., Judge.

 Appearances: Marie Alice Cecchini Sternquist, pro se,
 Anchorage, Appellant. David W. Baranow, Law Offices of
 David Baranow, Anchorage, for Appellee.

 Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Carney,
 and Borghesan, Justices.

I. INTRODUCTION
 A divorcing couple reached a mediated settlement of their property disputes
but were unable to reduce their agreement to writing. The husband drafted findings of
fact and conclusions of law and a proposed settlement agreement that the court adopted
over the wife's objections.

 *
 Entered under Alaska Appellate Rule 214.
 The wife contends that the documents adopted by the court fail to reflect
the parties' actual agreement on three issues: division of retirement accounts, allocation
of personal property, and the date of separation. She also contends that she is entitled
to attorney's fees for the husband's discovery violations; that the superior court
erroneously failed to enforce an order requiring joint filing of one year's tax returns; and
that the court abused its discretion by requiring her to share the cost of an accountant to
review those returns. We agree with her in part. We agree that the adopted settlement
agreement does not properly reflect the parties' agreement with regard to retirement
accounts and the allocation of personal property, and we therefore remand for further
consideration of those two issues. On the remaining issues we find no error or abuse of
discretion and therefore affirm the court's decisions.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 Marie and Greg Sternquist were married in 2008. Greg filed for divorce
in 2013, dismissed the action, and filed for divorce again in October 2017.
 The marital estate was complex. Each party entered the marriage with
considerable assets; Greg had four retirement accounts and Marie had two. Marie owned
rental properties in other states, and they jointly owned two homes in Anchorage. Greg
owned a chiropractic clinic where Marie had worked for several years during the
marriage.
 After over a year of contentious proceedings, Greg and Marie settled their
property disputes at a February 2019 mediation. The settlement was memorialized in a
handwritten list of issues on which they had reached agreement, apparently drafted by
the mediator and signed by both Greg and Marie. The mediator also made a recording
in which he described the agreement, provision by provision, and elicited the parties'
oral consent to it. In sum, the parties agreed to the allocation of the residences, rental
properties, chiropractic business, and other major assets. They agreed to "QDRO marital

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 portions of retirement [accounts plus] gains [and] losses."1 They divided their personal
property as shown on a separate spreadsheet, and Greg agreed to make an equalization
payment to Marie.
 When the parties next appeared in court they informed the judge that they
disagreed about the settlement's terms, particularly the QDRO requirement. Marie
wanted a QDRO for at least four of the parties' six retirement accounts, but Greg
interpreted their agreement as requiring a QDRO only for those accounts that were first
determined to contain marital funds. The court decided it could not enforce the
settlement when it did not "even know if there's a meeting of the minds," and it advised
the parties to work together to determine which accounts contained marital funds. The
parties returned to court several months later, still without agreement on the division of
the accounts. Greg's counsel advised the court that he was drafting a set of findings and
conclusions, reflecting the parties' settlement as he understood it, which the court could
adopt by order even if Marie continued to disagree.
 A week later Greg submitted a set of "non-stipulated pleadings" consisting
of findings of fact and conclusions of law, his version of the settlement agreement, a
spreadsheet showing the property allocation, and a divorce decree. Marie filed
objections. As relevant to this appeal, she complained that Greg's proposal ignored their
agreement at mediation to use QDROs on all the retirement accounts, that Greg's
property spreadsheet differed from the one used at mediation, that the decree had the
wrong date of separation, and that Greg continued to withhold discovery related to his
assets.

 1
 A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) is "any judgment, decree,
or order" "made pursuant to a State domestic relations law" "which creates or recognizes
the existence of an alternate payee's right to . . . receive all or a portion of the benefits
payable with respect to" a retirement plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B).

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 The court signed the divorce decree and Greg's proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, incorporating Greg's version of the settlement agreement. A day
later it signed an order requiring the parties to hire an accountant to review their tax
filings, splitting the cost equally. Marie moved for reconsideration of this order, arguing
that the court had earlier ordered Greg to bear the cost; the court denied the motion.
Marie appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
 Marie's arguments on appeal raise essentially six issues. She contends that
the settlement agreement and the findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted by the
superior court do not reflect the parties' actual agreement at mediation with respect to
three issues: the QDRO requirement, the division of personal property, and the date of
separation. She also challenges rulings on attorney's fees, discovery, and tax filings. We
address each issue in turn.
 A. The Settlement Agreement As Adopted By The Superior Court Does
 Not Reflect The Parties' Actual Agreement At Mediation.
 "We review a superior court's decision to enforce a settlement agreement
for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if a review of the entire record leaves us
with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court has erred."2 But "[w]e review
a settlement agreement using contract principles, and the proper meaning of a contract
is a legal question, which we review de novo."3 "When interpreting any contract, the
goal is to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties."4

 2
 Colton v. Colton, 244 P.3d 1121, 1126 (Alaska 2010) (footnote omitted).
 3
 Easley v. Easley, 394 P.3d 517, 521 (Alaska 2017).
 4
 Mahan v. Mahan, 347 P.3d 91, 94 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Villars v. Villars,
277 P.3d 763, 768 (Alaska 2012)).

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 1. QDRO requirement
 Marie argues that the settlement agreement as adopted by the court fails to
reflect the parties' mutual agreement that QDROs would be issued for all four of Greg's
retirement accounts. The mediator's handwritten list of settled issues, signed by the
parties, reads: "QDRO marital portions of retirement + gains losses." The mediator
explained this provision orally:
 QDRO marital portion of retirement plus gains and losses.
 The parties have retirement accounts. The parties have
 agreed [on] the date of marriage, no dispute as to that. The
 parties have agreed that the date of separation is October
 2017. So any contributions that the parties have made to
 their retirement accounts [during the marriage are] considered
 marital. That contribution plus any gains or losses is the
 marital portion of it and it will be divided 50/50.
Following his explanation of the agreement's provisions, the mediator asked Greg's
counsel whether there was anything he "wish[ed] to add, clarify, or comment [on]"; the
lawyer voiced no concerns about the QDRO provision. Greg then confirmed that he
believed the agreement to be "a fair agreement."
 Greg's later written version of the parties' agreement expanded on the
QDRO provision by allowing alternate methods of dividing the funds:
 The parties shall divide the marital portions of each part[y's]
 retirement-related accounts equally, by way of [QDRO](s),
 or such other division documentation as shall be deemed
 acceptable by the custodian/administrator of each such fund
 or account. Such divisions shall be applied to the marital
 portion of each such account . . . if any, and division shall
 include investment gain or loss from the date of separation to
 the date of allocation. [Emphasis added.]

 -5- 1901
 Marie objected to the added language, arguing that "[i]t was not part of the agreement
to use any other division documentation" than QDROs. But the court adopted Greg's
version of the agreement as written.
 We agree with Marie that the adopted version does not reflect the parties'
mutual intent as objectively expressed. Neither the handwritten list of settled issues nor
the recorded conversation about it uses any language suggesting that the accounts could
be divided by means other than a QDRO. Indeed, when Greg first raised the possibility
of using alternate forms of documentation in a later hearing, he explained that the idea
came from fund administrators following settlement. And throughout the later
proceedings, Marie was adamant in her refusal to accept anything other than QDROs,
insisting that less formal methods of accounting would allow Greg to hide marital funds.
 We understand Greg's position that there are less burdensome and time-
consuming ways to deal with the retirement accounts. But it is clear to us, as it was
initially clear to the superior court, that there is no meeting of the minds on dividing the
marital funds in Greg's retirement accounts by any means other than QDROs. And while
the handwritten list of settled issues requires the parties to "QDRO marital portions," it
does not say how the parties are to determine which accounts contain marital funds
subject to QDRO. We note that Marie's position on this has varied. At a July 2019
hearing she appeared to concede that two of Greg's accounts were entirely premarital
and QDROs were necessary for only the other two; she does not make this distinction
on appeal, arguing that all four "have a marital component."
 On remand, therefore, the superior court should determine — to the extent
possible from the available documentation, if it cannot do so by agreement — which of
the parties' retirement accounts contain marital funds. To best effectuate the parties'

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 mutual intent, the court should issue QDROs for any accounts that cannot be excluded
as entirely premarital.5
 2. Personal property spreadsheets
 Marie's second complaint about the settlement agreement as adopted by the
superior court is that it incorporates a different personal property spreadsheet than the
one the parties agreed to at mediation. The handwritten list of settled issues states:
"Each keeps personal items per amended exhibit A." The mediator explained in his oral
commentary that "exhibit A" was "the one I'm talking about with the yellow highlights."
 The draft settlement agreement Greg submitted to the court states that it
"shall include and does incorporate an amended property spreadsheet attached hereto as
Exhibit A, which shall signify the agreed allocation of the various marital and non-
marital assets and debts. Each spouse shall retain the personalty identified as being
allocated to them in the referenced spreadsheet." The attached Exhibit A does not
contain yellow highlights.
 Marie's objections to Greg's proposed findings and conclusions attached
what she claimed was the Exhibit A used at the mediation. There are some differences
between hers and Greg's. Marie's version grants her the painting equipment, belt sander,
and "Outcast Fish Cat Customizations," while Greg's version allocates that property to
him. Greg does not explain these discrepancies or point to a different document as the
one the mediator identified.
 The parties' reasonable expectations, as expressed at the mediation, were
that their settlement agreement incorporated a specific spreadsheet marked as Exhibit A
"with the yellow highlights." The court on remand should identify that specific

 5
 See, e.g., Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 329 (Alaska 2006) ("Because
[husband's] interests were inherited before the marriage, or created using entirely
premarital assets, they were presumptively unavailable for distribution in the divorce.").
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 spreadsheet and ensure that Exhibit A reflects the parties' intended distribution of
personal property.
 3. The date of separation
 The superior court accepted Greg's proposed finding that the parties
"separated permanently on or about October 1, 2017 as mutually agreed." Marie
challenges this date, contending that it should be "either October 27, 2017, Marie's last
day of employment" at the chiropractic clinic, or a week earlier when she was served
with the divorce complaint. The date of the parties' separation is important because it
"may determine whether acquired property is marital or separate."6 The mediator's
handwritten list of settled issues does not include a separation date, but in describing the
agreement's terms the mediator said, "The parties have agreed that the date of separation
is October 2017"; neither party objected. "[W]e have expressly rejected defining the
date of separation as a matter of law, and have instead granted the superior court the
discretion to identify the date of separation according to the facts before it."7 The court's
task is to find "the point at which ‘the marriage has terminated as a joint enterprise' or
when a couple is no longer ‘functioning economically as a single unit.' "8 Relevant
considerations include "whether the parties have objectively separated" — that is, are
living apart — and "whether at least one party subjectively intended to separate."9 "A

 6
 Dundas v. Dundas, 362 P.3d 468, 472 (Alaska 2015).
 7
 Faris v. Taylor, 444 P.3d 180, 184 (Alaska 2019).
 8
 Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 2018)).
 9
 Id. at 184-85.

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 superior court abuses its discretion if its separation date determination lacks sufficient
evidentiary support."10
 We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
narrowed the parties' agreed date — October 2017 — to the specific date of October 1,
and that this is consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations as objectively
expressed. At an early evidentiary hearing for interim relief, Marie testified that the date
of separation was October 7, when Greg moved out of the marital home. She further
testified that Greg asked her to leave the business on September 27 (though she said she
was "a little hazy on exactly what day"), testifying further that she nonetheless stayed
through October "because [she] was making sure [she] left [the business] in good hands."
 In short, Marie's own testimony supports findings that Greg intended the
parties to separate by late September and that they physically separated in early October.
Given the parties' agreement on an October separation date, the superior court did not
abuse its discretion by using October 1 as the date that both reflected reality and was
consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations in mediation.
 B. Remaining Issues
 Marie raises several other issues regarding the superior court's handling of
the divorce proceedings: its alleged failure to award her attorney's fees for Greg's
discovery violations, its failure to order that the parties file a joint tax return, and its order
that the parties share the costs of a tax accountant. We conclude that these arguments
lack merit.

 10
 Id. at 185.
 -9- 1901
 1. Any claim for attorney's fees preceding the mediation was
 subsumed in the settlement.
 In August 2018 Marie moved to compel Greg's responses to a set of
discovery requests pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 37(a)(2)(B). The court granted the
motion in part in September, ordering that if Greg did not provide the discovery by
October 4 he would "pay full fees."
 Marie contends that these fees remain unpaid and that she is still entitled
to them because Greg's discovery violations hampered her claims for interim spousal
support and weakened her position at mediation.11 Greg does not dispute that he missed
the pertinent deadline; he argues instead that any prior right to attorney's fees was
subsumed in the parties' agreement at mediation that they would each bear their own
attorney's fees and costs. We agree.
 The mediator's handwritten list of agreed issues does not address attorney's
fees. But when the mediator went over the agreement orally and asked whether either
party had clarifications or comments, Greg's attorney said, "It's also my understanding,
for some reason it dropped off on one of these, but each party's going to bear their own
expenses and costs and attorney fees . . . . That's the only clarifications I had." The
mediator responded, "Okay," and turned to Marie and her counsel for further comment.
They sought clarification of the parties' tax-filing obligations but made no objection to
Greg's counsel's "understanding" and "clarification" of the attorney's fees issue.

 11
 Notwithstanding the alleged discovery violations, Marie acknowledges that
she "decided to move forward with settlement despite not having complete
documentation" and insists that the settlement reached at mediation should be "upheld
as a contractual agreement" with certain corrections. We therefore do not read her
discovery arguments as contending that the settlement should be voided on the ground
that she lacked information essential to an informed decision, only that she should be
awarded attorney's fees.

 -10- 1901
 In Greg's subsequent draft of the settlement agreement, adopted by the
court, a provision read: "Each party shall bear their own attorney['s] fees, other
professional fees, costs and expenses incurred in this litigation and settlement
proceedings." We agree that this reflects the parties' mutual understanding at mediation
as objectively expressed. "In determining whether circumstances for avoiding [a
property settlement] exist, a party's active negotiation of settlement terms, affirmative
participation in clarifying terms on the record, and failure to object despite the
opportunity to do so are relevant considerations."12 And we agree that the broad
language of the attorney's fees provision encompasses any fees and costs to which Marie
now claims she is entitled. Regardless of whether Marie should have received attorney's
fees for discovery violations preceding the mediation, the settlement mooted any such
claim.13
 2. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting its
 own statements regarding tax returns.
 Marie's final challenge is to the superior court's handling of the parties'
2017 tax returns. She contends that the court ordered the parties to file jointly and then
failed to enforce its order. She also argues that the court's requirement that the parties
share the cost of an accountant conflicted with an earlier order placing that burden on
Greg.14

 12
 Colton v. Colton, 244 P.3d 1121, 1129 (Alaska 2010).
 13
 Marie also asks us to award her the money she spent on business valuation
and "any additional sanctions and fees [d]eemed appropriate." We reject these
arguments for the same reason.
 14
 Neither party argues that the issue of whether to file a joint 2017 return was
mooted by the settlement.

 -11- 1901
 The tax issue was first raised at an August 2018 hearing. Recognizing that
the divorce trial was being continued past the tax filing deadline, Marie suggested to the
court and Greg's attorney that it would be financially advantageous for the couple to file
a joint 2017 return. The court observed that "it [made] sense for the parties to file
jointly." Greg's attorney said that he would "get [his] client's permission and . . . advise
him to do joint filing," then suggested that the parties could "sequester the refund and use
it on the property spreadsheet." The court responded: "No, no distribution of the tax
refund unless someone files a motion. I'll make a ruling on it. It'll stay in whosever
[sic] trust fund until the decision is made on it. But definitely . . . it makes sense to file
jointly and it sounds like I'm not hearing any objection from [Greg's attorney]."
 In October Marie brought a motion contending that the court had ordered
joint filing and Greg had violated the order. The court addressed the motion at a January
2019 hearing. The judge explained that he had listened to the audio of his earlier
remarks and concluded that "[i]t was not an order": "What I said was hearing no
objection, you guys should probably work this out. It was not an emphatic order." But
because the court still believed both parties might benefit from filing jointly, it followed
up with a clear order directing Greg to research the issue:
 I am giving an emphatic order today so there's no
 misunderstanding. [Greg's attorney] will look into this and
 make a determination as to whether it would be beneficial to
 both parties to amend the tax returns so that both parties can
 benefit. If there is a big enough issue regarding the
 refunds[,] . . . then get them amended and then put it into
 your trust account to be held until I make a decision
 regarding distribution.
Marie raised concerns about claimed deductions, and the court told the parties to get "a
CPA to look at it." But the court did not address how the accountant would be paid for.

 -12- 1901
 Marie brought up the issue of the 2017 tax returns again at the final hearing
in July 2019. Greg informed the court that he had not yet done the required research; the
court told him that it would "like to see a comparison within 30 days." Shortly thereafter
Greg submitted a draft order appointing an accountant to review the tax returns and
requiring the parties to cooperate with her and share the cost. The court signed the order
in August a day after it issued the divorce decree and the findings of fact and conclusions
of law incorporating the settlement agreement.
 First, we reject Marie's argument that the court misinterpreted its own
statements when it concluded that it had not ordered joint filing. "Interpreting an order
requires discerning the intent of the issuing court"; the court "in the best position" to do
that is "the court that entered the original order."15 "[W]e review the superior court's
interpretation of its own order for abuse of discretion."16 Here, the superior court
listened to the audio recording of its earlier remarks and concluded that, although it had
agreed with the sense of Marie's suggestion that the parties file jointly, it did not make
it an order. The court's interpretation of its own words is reasonable and therefore not
an abuse of discretion.
 Marie also argues that the court abused its discretion in its August order
when it required the parties to share the cost of the accountant. She argues that this
aspect of the August order conflicts with the January order assigning to Greg the
responsibility to determine "whether it would be beneficial to both parties to amend the
tax returns so that both parties can benefit." But although the court clearly directed Greg
to involve an accountant in the process of reviewing the 2017 tax filings, it did not
discuss the related costs. The mediation took place a few weeks later and, as discussed

 15
 del Rosario v. Clare, 378 P.3d 380, 383-84 (Alaska 2016).
 16
 Id.

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 above, the parties agreed to bear their own fees and costs. The court's later order that
they split the costs of the accountant — retained for the benefit of both of them — was
consistent with the parties' agreement that each pay their own way going forward. The
court's cost-sharing order was therefore not an abuse of discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
 We REMAND the case to the superior court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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