CourtListener opinion 11102504

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NOTICE
 Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite
 such a decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

DOUGLAS GREENE, )
 ) Supreme Court No. S-16473
 Appellant, )
 ) Superior Court No. 3AN-14-10699 CI
 v. )
 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
MICHELLE GREENE, n/k/a MICHELLE ) AND JUDGMENT*
ZARKOVICH, )
 ) No. 1701 – October 24, 2018
 Appellee. )
 )

 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
 Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael Spaan, Judge pro tem,
 and Andrew Guidi, Judge.

 Appearances: Douglas Walter Greene, pro se, Las Vegas,
 Nevada, Appellant. Maryann E. Foley, Law Office of
 Maryann E. Foley, Anchorage, for Appellee.

 Before: Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, and Carney, Justices.
 [Stowers, Chief Justice, not participating.]

I. INTRODUCTION
 The superior court divided the property of a couple during divorce
proceedings. It also awarded the ex-wife $1,000 in attorney's fees on the basis that some
of the ex-husband's litigation conduct was vexatious. After the property division order
was issued, the ex-husband moved to recuse the superior court judge on the basis of

 *
 Entered under Alaska Appellate Rule 214.
 alleged bias and also challenged the process through which the case had been assigned
to that judge. The ex-husband — now self-represented — appeals the denial of the
recusal motion, contests the superior court's personal jurisdiction to make a property
division, and challenges several specific determinations in the property division order,
as well as the attorney's fee award. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the
motion to recuse because the ex-husband failed to show bias resulting from an
extrajudicial source. We also conclude that the superior court had personal jurisdiction
over the ex-wife because she availed herself of the court by filing the divorce complaint.
We find no error in the superior court's property division order. The remainder of the
ex-husband's arguments are waived for failure to raise them in the superior court or for
failure to adequately brief them in this appeal.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 A. Facts
 Michelle Zarkovich and Douglas Greene married in 2002. Prior to the
marriage, the couple resided in Alaska, where Michelle is originally from. During most
of the marriage, Michelle and Douglas resided in Kentucky. Douglas worked as a pilot
for UPS with an Anchorage-based crew; Michelle worked on and off for various retail
and real estate businesses.
 The couple purchased a house in Anchorage in 2006 because Douglas was
frequently there for work. They listed the Anchorage house as their residence on tax
forms. Douglas occasionally stayed at the Anchorage house as his flight schedule
demanded; he also permitted other crew members and his college-age son to stay there
and collected some rent from them. Michelle helped furnish the Anchorage house and
stayed there when she was visiting family in Anchorage, but she never resided there.
Also her name does not appear on the deed.

 -2- 1701
 Michelle and Douglas moved from Kentucky to Florida in late 2011 or
2012. They apparently left Kentucky to avoid a pending tax enforcement action in which
the state was attempting to impose income taxes on Douglas's UPS earnings even though
he claimed he was not a Kentucky resident for tax purposes. Douglas was terminated
from his job with UPS in November 2013 and thereafter commenced a wrongful
termination suit against UPS and his union.1 He briefly worked for another airline in
2014 but alleges that UPS undermined his employment from that job before he
completed his training. He was subsequently unable to find a job with another airline
and was unemployed at the time of the 2016 divorce trial.
 In early 2014 Douglas and Michelle decided to open a franchise location
of Apricot Lane, a women's clothing store chain, in Florida. They signed a ten-year
lease, and the store opened in June with Michelle as its manager.
 B. Proceedings
 1. Florida petition for divorce
 Michelle filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Florida state court
in October 2014. In November Douglas moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss claimed that the Florida court lacked
jurisdiction over Douglas because he was a resident of Alaska and had not maintained
a marital domicile in Florida "for at least the last 8 years." It therefore asserted that the
Florida court lacked jurisdiction to divide marital property or award alimony or
attorney's fees. Attached to the motion was a November 4 affidavit by Douglas that
offered various indicia of his Alaska residency: voter registration; federal income tax
forms and returns; unemployment insurance records; licenses for driving, piloting,

 1
 Douglas testified that, at the time of the trial, he had four separate lawsuits
pending involving his UPS termination.

 -3- 1701
 hunting, and fishing; vehicle title, registration, and insurance; Permanent Fund Dividend
records; home ownership records; and property tax payments.
 2. Alaska complaint for divorce, service of process issues, and
 motion to dismiss
 In December 2014 while the Florida petition for divorce and Douglas's
motion to dismiss were still pending, Michelle filed an additional complaint for divorce
in Alaska superior court. The Alaska complaint alleged that Douglas was an Alaska
resident and asked that the court equitably divide the marital property and award
Michelle attorney's fees. That same day the superior court issued its routine orders: a
summons to Douglas directing him to file a written answer and informing him that the
case had been assigned to Superior Court Judge Olson, and a domestic relations initial
order and order to file financial documents.
 Michelle apparently had difficulty serving the complaint on Douglas and
accordingly moved for alternative service of the complaint in January. The motion
requested that Michelle be permitted to instead serve Douglas's Florida attorney. The
superior court granted the motion for alternative service and ordered that service be made
upon the Florida attorney by certified mail, process server, fax, or email. After
effectuating service, Michelle filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice in
the Florida state court, thereby ending the Florida divorce action.
 Upon receiving the complaint, Douglas's counsel filed a limited entry of
appearance in Alaska superior court for the purpose of seeking dismissal on the basis of
lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Douglas then moved to dismiss the
Alaska divorce complaint on this basis. The motion asserted that because Michelle was
a Florida resident and had not resided in Alaska for over a decade, the superior court
lacked personal jurisdiction over her and therefore lacked the subject matter jurisdiction
to grant a divorce or divide property. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss

 -4- 1701
 without comment. Douglas's attorney then entered an unlimited entry of appearance in
the matter and answered the complaint.
 3. Sale of Anchorage house
 While the case was pending, in June 2015 Douglas transferred title of the
Anchorage house to his adult son. This transfer was apparently done without Michelle's
or the superior court's consent, in violation of the court's initial domestic relations order
issued at the commencement of the action. After Michelle brought the transfer to the
court's attention, the court issued an order nullifying the transfer and instructing that the
Anchorage house be sold and all proceeds kept in a trust account pending trial.2
 4. Property division trial and order
 Judge Olson's noncriminal caseload was administratively reassigned to
Superior Court Judge Dani Crosby in November 2015.3 But apparently Judge Crosby
did not commence her judicial service until approximately April 2016. Accordingly, at
a trial call in February 2016, Superior Court Judge Michael R. Spaan presided and
indicated that he would preside at the trial.
 The case proceeded to a two-day trial in March 2016 before Judge Spaan
on the issue of property division; Michelle appeared in person and Douglas appeared
telephonically. At the conclusion of the trial, on March 18, Judge Spaan entered oral
findings regarding property division on the record.

 2
 The house sold before trial.
 3
 See Administrative Order 3AN-AO-15-16 (Alaska Super., Nov. 30, 2015)
("Effective November 30, 2015, open non-criminal cases currently assigned to Judge
Paul Olson will be reassigned to Judge Dani Crosby. The list of cases to be retained by
Judge Olson can be found at http://courts.alaska.gov/jord/retained-olson.pdf or from the
Anchorage Clerk of Court."). The present case was not in the list of retained cases.

 -5- 1701
 At a May 2016 status conference following the trial, Judge Crosby presided
and asked if the parties consented to Judge Spaan retaining assignment of the case until
the written findings of fact and conclusions of law were issued. Both parties consented.
Judge Spaan presided over a July hearing at which the parties addressed remaining
disputed issues concerning the division of property. Judge Spaan issued a written
version of his decision in August, along with a decree of divorce.
 The superior court first found that Douglas was an Alaska resident. The
court then determined it equitable to divide the marital estate equally, although it did not
explicitly reference the statutory factors.4 The court then considered several disputed
property issues. It found the Anchorage house to be marital property because it was
acquired during the marriage, Michelle had helped decorate it, and Michelle had stayed
there on occasion. Moreover Douglas had not offered any evidence in support of his
assertion that it was purchased with non-marital funds. The court declined to grant
Douglas credit for post-separation payments he had made on the Anchorage house
mortgage on the basis that Douglas had stayed in the house during that time and had also
collected some rent from other tenants and retained those funds for himself.
 The court next considered the Apricot Lane business. It accepted Douglas's
expert's valuation of the business and awarded the business to Michelle because the
evidence showed she operated it. It assigned the obligations for the business loan, lease,
and expenses to Michelle and required Michelle to remove Douglas's name from the
lease and loan within 30 months.

 4
 See AS 25.24.160(a)(4) (listing factors court must consider in equitably
dividing marital estate, including length of marriage, age and health of parties, earning
capacity of parties, financial condition of parties, conduct of parties, and circumstances
and necessities of parties).

 -6- 1701
 The court then turned to the litigation expenses stemming from Douglas's
UPS lawsuits. It reasoned that because Michelle had testified that she disclaimed any
interest in the lawsuits, she should also not be required to pay for the expenses stemming
from the suits. The court assigned to Douglas "sole[] responsib[ility]" for all expenses
associated with his UPS lawsuits, and if he recovered any money as a result of them, he
would retain all of the recovered sums.
 Regarding Douglas's UPS retirement accounts, the court stated that the
marital portion would be divided equally by qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).
Finally the superior court considered Michelle's request for attorney's fees. It reasoned
that Douglas's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was "unnecessary and
vexatious." It found that his transfer of title to the Anchorage house, in violation of the
court's order, was also vexatious. Because this conduct "clearly increased [Michelle's]
attorney fees," the court ordered that $1,000 be taken out of Douglas's share of the
Anchorage house proceeds and paid to Michelle.
 5. Motion to recuse
 In June 2016 after the superior court entered its oral decision on the record,
Douglas sent a letter to the presiding judge of the third judicial district that enumerated
several complaints about Judge Spaan's statements during the trial and about the court's
ultimate decision.5 Douglas alleged that Judge Spaan was biased against him and had
engaged in ex parte communication with Michelle and her family. Douglas argued that
assignment of the case to Judge Spaan had been improper and requested that Judge
Crosby preside over all matters pertaining to the case thereafter. Judge Spaan treated the
letter as a motion to recuse, rejected all of the allegations, and denied the motion. That

 5
 Even though Douglas was still represented by counsel at this point, he
appears to have sent this letter himself.

 -7- 1701
 same day, the chief justice issued an order assigning review of Judge Spaan's denial to
Superior Court Judge Andrew Guidi.6 Judge Guidi affirmed Judge Spaan's denial of
Douglas's motion to recuse.
 Douglas timely appeals the superior court's property division order and the
denial of his motion to recuse Judge Spaan.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 "The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a property division in a
divorce action."7 "There are three basic steps in the equitable division of marital assets:
(1) deciding what specific property is available for distribution, (2) finding the value of
the property, and (3) dividing the property equitably."8 The first step "may involve both
legal and factual questions."9 We review legal conclusions de novo, adopting "the rule
of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy."10 "Underlying
factual findings as to the parties' intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate
are factual questions," which we review for clear error.11 The superior court clearly erred
only if "we are left with a definite and firm conviction based on the entire record that a

 6
 See AS 22.20.020(c) (requiring judge's denial of motion to recuse be
reviewed by a judge assigned "by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts").
 7
 Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska 1994).
 8
 Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 458 (Alaska 2013).
 9
 Id. at 459 (quoting Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 330 (Alaska 2006)).
 10
 Odom, 141 P.3d at 330 (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6
(Alaska 1979)).
 11
 Beals, 303 P.3d at 459.

 -8- 1701
 mistake has been made."12 We similarly review the second step — valuation — for clear
error.13 Finally we review the superior court's equitable division for abuse of discretion
and reverse only if the division is "clearly unjust."14 We also review for abuse of
discretion the decision to grant credit for post-separation mortgage payments.15
 We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion.16 We
will not find an abuse of discretion "unless it is plain that a fair-minded person could not
rationally [deny the motion] on the basis of the known facts."17
IV. DISCUSSION
 A. The Superior Court Had Personal Jurisdiction Over Michelle, And
 Douglas Has Waived His Remaining Personal Jurisdiction Arguments.
 Douglas challenges the superior court's personal jurisdiction on two bases.
First he argues that the court lacked personal jurisdiction by virtue of improper service
of process. He claims that he never received Michelle's Alaska divorce complaint and
only learned of it from his Florida attorney. "Service of process is a preliminary
requirement to a court obtaining personal jurisdiction over a party."18 However a party

 12
 Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080, 1088 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Urban
v. Urban, 314 P.3d 513, 515 (Alaska 2013)).
 13
 Beals, 303 P.3d at 459.
 14
 Bellanich v. Bellanich, 936 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1997).
 15
 Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1016 (Alaska 2009).
 16
 Timothy W. v. Julia M., 403 P.3d 1095, 1100 (Alaska 2017).
 17
 Id. (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 36 P.3d 1181, 1183 (Alaska 2001)).
 18
 Beam v. Adams, 749 P.2d 366, 367 (Alaska 1988); see also
AS 09.05.015(a) (requiring that defendant be properly served for superior court to have
personal jurisdiction).
 -9- 1701
 waives any claim of insufficiency of process by failing to include the argument in either
an Alaska Civil Rule 12(b) motion or responsive pleading.19 Neither Douglas's motion
to dismiss nor his answer contains a claim of insufficient process. Indeed Douglas did
not contest the sufficiency of service at any point during the superior court proceedings.
Accordingly he has waived this argument and cannot now raise it on appeal.
 Douglas additionally challenges the superior court's personal jurisdiction
on the basis that neither he nor Michelle was an Alaska resident at the time the suit was
commenced. But even assuming Michelle was a Florida resident at the time she filed the
complaint, this fact does not deprive the superior court of personal jurisdiction. "A
spouse may submit to the personal jurisdiction of the court by instituting a suit for
divorce . . . ."20 Thus the superior court obtained personal jurisdiction over Michelle
when she filed a complaint for divorce in Alaska court, thereby purposefully availing
herself of the court's jurisdiction.21
 Turning to the issue of Douglas's residency, we conclude Douglas has
waived his argument that the superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over him by
failing to raise it in his motion to dismiss. "[W]hen a party appears and defends an
action" without first raising the defense of personal jurisdiction, "the party cannot later

 19
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) ("A defense of . . . insufficiency of process . . .
is waived . . . if it is neither made by motion under [Rule 12(b)] nor included in a
responsive pleading . . . .").
 20
 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 151, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2018).
 21
 See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
703 (1982) ("[A]n individual may submit to the jurisdiction of the court by
appearance."); Fletcher v. State, 258 P.3d 874, 877 (Alaska App. 2011) ("[P]ersonal
jurisdiction may be acquired by waiver or consent . . . .").

 -10- 1701
 argue lack of personal jurisdiction."22 Douglas's motion to dismiss on the basis of
personal jurisdiction focused exclusively on Michelle's lack of Alaska residency. It did
not mention, let alone contest, the superior court's personal jurisdiction over Douglas.23
Indeed Douglas's attorney's limited entry of appearance stated that the attorney was
appearing only for the purpose "of seeking a dismissal . . . on grounds that the Alaska
court has no personal jurisdiction over one of the parties," thereby implicitly conceding
that the court had personal jurisdiction over Douglas. (Emphasis added.) After the
superior court denied the motion to dismiss, Douglas fully participated in the
proceedings and did not again challenge personal jurisdiction on any basis.24 Douglas
therefore waived this argument, and we will not consider it.
 B. Douglas Fails To Show Any Error In Reassignment To Judge Spaan.
 Douglas alleges several reasons reassignment of the case to Judge Spaan

 22
 Vanvelzor v. Vanvelzor, 219 P.3d 184, 190 (Alaska 2009); see Alaska R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(1) ("A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . is waived . . . if
it is neither made by motion under [Rule 12(b)] nor included in a responsive
pleading . . . ."); see also Heppinstall v. Darnall Kemna & Co., 851 P.2d 78, 79 n.2
(Alaska 1993).
 23
 Douglas's motion quoted and applied AS 09.05.015(a)(12), which sets forth
circumstances in which a court has personal jurisdiction "over a person served in [a
divorce] action." Despite relying on this provision, Douglas did not argue that the
superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over the party served in the action (i.e.,
Douglas). Rather, he argued that under this provision the court lacked jurisdiction over
"the party initiating [the] divorce action" (i.e., Michelle).
 24
 Douglas's trial brief did mention in a footnote that Douglas had "not
resided in Alaska for a long time," but this was not in the context of contesting
jurisdiction but rather in the context of explaining why he transferred title of the
Anchorage home to his son without the court's permission. Moreover the brief was filed
in March 2016, so this statement was not inconsistent with Douglas nevertheless being
an Alaska resident when the action was commenced in December 2014.
 -11- 1701
 was improper. First he argues that the court failed to provide him written notice of the
reassignment. But even assuming the lack of written notice was error, Douglas must
show that this error affected his "substantial rights."25 He cannot satisfy this showing
because, notwithstanding the lack of written notice, Douglas received notice of the
reassignment during a trial call he attended in February 2016. During the trial call,
Judge Spaan indicated that he would preside over the divorce trial scheduled to occur the
next month. Neither party objected. Therefore the lack of written notice of the
reassignment did not affect Douglas's substantial rights because he nevertheless received
adequate notice and consented to the reassignment.
 Second Douglas claims that he was deprived of his right to peremptorily
challenge Judge Spaan's assignment. Alaska Statute 22.20.022(a) grants each party in
a superior court proceeding the ability to change judge once as a matter of right. A party
wishing to exercise this right must file a notice of change of judge within five days of
receiving notice of judge assignment.26 The peremptory right is waived if the party
knowingly participates before that judge in a trial, pretrial conference, or "[a]ny judicial
proceeding which concerns the merits of the action and involves the consideration of
evidence or of affidavits."27 Douglas had notice of the fact that Judge Spaan would be
presiding over the trial no later than the February 2016 trial call, yet he failed to timely

 25
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 61 ("[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court . . . is ground for . . . vacating, modifying or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.").
 26
 AS 22.20.022(c); Alaska R. Civ. P. 42(c)(3).
 27
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 42(c)(4).

 -12- 1701
 file a change of judge request. Although Douglas points to his June 2016 complaint
letter to the presiding judge, this far exceeded the five-day deadline. And by
participating in the trial before Judge Spaan, Douglas waived any right to file such a
change of judge request and cannot now complain that he was deprived of such a right.28
 Douglas next argues that the reassignment violated the Alaska Constitution
because Judge Spaan exceeded the age of 70 at the time of the assignment. The Alaska
Constitution does require all state judges to retire from active service by age 70.29
However it also allows these judges to continue to serve by "special assignment[] as
provided by court rule."30 Accordingly Alaska Administrative Rule 23 permits the chief
justice or designee to appoint by special assignment any retired judge to sit as a senior
judge for a period of up to two years "where such assignment is deemed necessary for
the efficient administration of justice."31 The rule specifically allows for the special
appointment of former judges who exceed the mandatory retirement age.32 Pursuant to
this power, the chief justice appointed Judge Spaan to serve as a superior court judge pro
tempore in January 2016 and renewed this appointment in June 2016.33 Judge Spaan's
appointment was thus legally sound.

 28
 Id.; see also Juelfs v. Gough, 41 P.3d 593, 598 (Alaska 2002) ("Failure to
file a timely notice precludes change of judge as a matter of right." (quoting Alaska R.
Civ. P. 42(c)(3))).
 29
 Alaska Const. art. IV, § 11.
 30
 Id.
 31
 Alaska Admin. R. 23(a).
 32
 Alaska Admin. R. 23(b).
 33
 Special Order of the Chief Justice No. 6731 (Alaska June 14, 2016); Special
Order of the Chief Justice No. 6674 (Alaska Jan. 5, 2016).

 -13- 1701
 Finally Douglas claims that Judge Spaan was not chosen at random but
rather was "hand picked" to preside over this case. There is no support for Douglas's
suggestion that he was singled out for assignment to Judge Spaan, and Douglas fails to
offer any evidence of this claim.
 C. It Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion To Deny The Motion To Recuse.
 Douglas argues that the superior court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to recuse Judge Spaan. The bases for recusal of a judge are set out in
AS 22.20.020(a). As relevant here, those bases include that the judge "feels that, for any
reason, a fair and impartial decision cannot be given" or the judge "is related to a party
or a party's attorney by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree."34 In addition
Canon 3(E) of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification if "the judge
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer."35 To necessitate
recusal this personal bias must result from a nonjudicial source, not simply what the
judge learned during the course of the litigation.36 And bias cannot be inferred merely
from adverse rulings.37 This is because "[d]isqualification ‘was never intended to enable
a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings.' "38
 Douglas alleged in his recusal motion that Judge Spaan is somehow
associated with Michelle's family or her sister's family and had ex parte communications

 34
 AS 22.20.020(a)(2), (9).
 35
 Hanson v. Hanson, 36 P.3d 1181, 1184 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Alaska
Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(a)).
 36
 Williams v. Williams, 252 P.3d 998, 1010 (Alaska 2011).
 37
 Kinnan v. Sitka Counseling, 349 P.3d 153, 160 (Alaska 2015).
 38
 DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956, 967 (Alaska 2007) (alteration in
original) (quoting Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1171 (Alaska 2002)).

 -14- 1701
 with one or both of these families. He noted that some of Michelle's family members
were present at the trial. But Douglas offered no evidence of any affiliation between
Judge Spaan and Michelle's family, let alone any evidence of ex parte communications.
And the presence of Michelle's family at the trial does not raise an inference of
impropriety; indeed Michelle's sister was present at the trial because she was a testifying
witness. Without any evidence to substantiate Douglas's claim of association and
ex parte contact between Michelle's family and Judge Spaan, it was not an abuse of
discretion to deny the motion to recuse on this basis.39
 Douglas argues that Judge Spaan's comments during the divorce trial
evince bias. Specifically, he points to three statements by Judge Spaan regarding
Douglas's lawsuits. First during Douglas's testimony describing his various lawsuits,
Judge Spaan stated: "[I]t's giving me the chills thinking of that much litigation. I
understand what your wife . . . ." Judge Spaan then cut himself off and instructed
Douglas to continue in his testimony. Second Judge Spaan stated that Douglas had "a
lot of lawyers." This comment was made in the context of questions regarding when and
how many times Douglas, who was living abroad, traveled to the United States to
procure legal counsel. Finally during the oral decision on the record, Judge Spaan told
Douglas:
 I think you are obsessed by these lawsuits. I think
 your thinking is clouded. You're a litigious person. We're
 talking four separate lawsuits, and we have some pending. . . .
 . . . I think your unemployment today in the field you
 love is more based on your . . . overall fixation with these

 39
 See Wright v. Anding, 390 P.3d 1162, 1170-71 (Alaska 2017) (affirming
denial of motion to recuse on basis that movant "fail[ed] to point to any specific evidence
beyond his unsubstantiated allegations that [the judge was] biased against him").
 -15- 1701
 [lawsuits] than any plot by UPS. Those are my feelings. I
 hope I'm wrong. I hope this is a great asset for you.
Judge Spaan made these comments in the context of discussing how the litigation
expenses would be equitably divided and explaining why the court would assign all of
those expenses to Douglas. Judge Spaan explained that the outcome of the suits was
uncertain — Douglas "may hit the jackpot," but in the meantime he would not "saddle
[Michelle] with any ongoing obligations to fund those lawsuits, nor . . . give her any
piece of them."
 Judge Spaan's statements regarding Douglas's litigation fall short of the
standard required to show bias because they do not result from an extrajudicial source,
but rather are based only on evidence presented during the trial.40 Douglas testified
extensively at the trial about his ongoing lawsuits stemming from his UPS termination
and his belief that UPS and his union had conspired to terminate him. And Judge Spaan
was required to assess Douglas's litigation in order to render a decision on how the
expenses for the litigation should be distributed in the property division order. "[A]
judge is not disqualified if the judge's ‘knowledge and the opinion it produced were
properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed
sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge's task.' "41
 Judge Spaan's assessment of Douglas's litigation efforts and the merits of
his various suits properly derived from the testimony. Moreover although Judge Spaan's

 40
 The United States Supreme Court in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540
(1994), articulated an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine, which we adopted
in Hanson: An opinion that "is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair
judgment" can evince judicial bias, even when it arises from knowledge gained during
the proceeding. 36 P.3d at 1184 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551). Judge Spaan's
comments also fall short of this very high standard.
 41
 Hanson, 36 P.3d at 1184 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551).

 -16- 1701
 comments arguably express a negative opinion of Douglas, the court's comment during
the decision on the record also recognizes the chance that Douglas may succeed in his
lawsuits and obtain a large damages award. It is therefore not as derogatory as other
judicial comments we have deemed insufficient to show personal bias.42 In sum Judge
Spaan's comments regarding Douglas's litigation activity do not evince personal bias
from an extrajudicial source, and thus recusal on this basis was not warranted.43
 As his final argument regarding recusal, Douglas contends that Judge
Guidi's review of the denial was improper. He argues that the recusal statute requires
the denial of a motion to recuse to be reviewed by a judge of a higher court, not another
superior court judge. He also appears to suggest that Judge Guidi was biased by virtue
of sitting in the same judicial district as Judge Spaan and being Judge Spaan's "personal
friend."

 42
 Cf. id. at 1186 (judge's comment that litigant "really hate[s] women" did
not establish bias where no "extrajudicial source" of bias was shown (alteration in
original)).
 43
 As further evidence of bias, Douglas points to Judge Spaan laughing during
the proceedings and referring to Douglas as "the mayor." We have reviewed the
transcript and concluded that nothing in the judge's demeanor or tone indicates bias.
Kinnan v. Sitka Counseling, 349 P.3d 153, 161 (Alaska 2015). The remainder of the
allegations in Douglas's recusal motion all amount to complaints about Judge Spaan's
adverse decisions. We have repeatedly held that such complaints "are insufficient to
show that [a judge's] decision not to recuse was an abuse of discretion." Hymes v.
DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874, 888 (Alaska 2010); see also Lacher v. Lacher, 993 P.2d 413,
420-21 (Alaska 1999) (dismissing an argument for recusal as "little more than an
expression of [appellant's] dissatisfaction with the superior court's ruling"). In addition
for the first time on review, Douglas suggests that Judge Spaan may have some
connection with UPS or with one of the federal judges presiding over one of Douglas's
UPS-related suits. Because this allegation is entirely unsubstantiated and raised for the
first time on appeal, we do not consider it.
 -17- 1701
 There was nothing improper about Judge Guidi's review. The recusal
statute, AS 22.20.020(c), requires that if a judge denies a recusal motion, the motion
"shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the
presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the
supreme court." Nothing in the recusal statute requires that a judge from a higher court
review denial of recusal, only that review be assigned by such a judge. In accordance
with this directive, the chief justice issued an order assigning review of the denial to
Judge Guidi. Douglas offers nothing more than his bare assertions in support of his
claim that Judge Guidi was biased by his association with Judge Spaan. His challenge
to Judge Guidi's review is therefore unavailing.
 D. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Its Property Distribution Order.
 1. Michelle's alleged misconduct
 Douglas devotes much of his briefing to faulting the superior court for
failing to consider Michelle's alleged crimes and misconduct in its equitable-division
decision. The crux of this argument is Douglas's contention that, around the time of their
separation, Michelle withheld from Douglas a recording device that contained evidence
incriminating UPS. Douglas appears to contend that, by withholding this evidence,
Michelle undermined Douglas's case against UPS and thereby imposed significant
financial consequences on the marital estate.
 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider
Michelle's alleged misconduct in its equitable division of the marital estate. Douglas did
not offer any evidence of this misconduct and did not attempt to quantify its financial
impact. The only support in the record for Douglas's claims are the bare assertions in
his own testimony. Given this record, it was not clearly unjust for the superior court to

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 fail to consider Michelle's alleged misconduct in equitably dividing the marital
property.44
 2. Anchorage house proceeds
 Douglas challenges the superior court's finding that the Anchorage home
was marital property subject to equitable division.45 He claims that the house was his
separate property and that Michelle never lived there. At trial he argued that he
purchased the home and paid the mortgage using non-marital funds. He also notes a
homestead waiver that Michelle signed when the house was purchased, which he argues
waived any property interest Michelle may have had in the house.
 "Marital property includes all property acquired during the marriage
‘excepting only inherited property and property acquired with separate property which
is kept as separate property.' "46 The Anchorage home was presumptively marital
property because it was purchased in 2006 — during the marriage.47 Douglas failed to
offer any evidence in support of his claim that the down payment on the home came from
non-marital funds. Douglas therefore did not meet his burden to show that the home was

 44
 See Brandal v. Shangin, 36 P.3d 1188, 1194 (Alaska 2001) ("[T]he party
seeking deviation from [equal division of the marital estate] bears the burden of showing
that the property division is clearly unjust.").
 45
 Douglas characterizes the property division order as awarding Michelle
82% of the proceeds from the sale of the Anchorage house, but this is misleading. The
marital estate was split equally between the parties. In order to effect this equal division,
Douglas was required to make an equalization payment to Michelle comprising roughly
80% of the sale proceeds.
 46
 Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1125 (Alaska 2004) (quoting Lewis v.
Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 558 (Alaska 1990)).
 47
 See Pestrikoff v. Hoff, 278 P.3d 281, 284-85 (Alaska 2012) ("For equitable
distribution purposes, all property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be marital
property.").
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 not marital despite the fact that it was purchased during the marriage. The superior court
did not clearly err in characterizing the home as marital property.
 Douglas also challenges the superior court's denial of his request for credit
for post-separation payments he made on the Anchorage house mortgage. He argues that
he is owed $26,343 in mortgage payments that he made between the date of separation
and the date of the house sale. A court is required to consider and make findings on
whether credit for post-separation mortgage payments is appropriate, but it is not
required to grant such a credit.48 The court must also consider whether this credit
"should be offset by the value of the benefit of [the spouse's] post-separation occupancy
of the house."49
 The superior court declined to grant Douglas any credit for post-separation
mortgage payments on the basis that, after separation, Douglas had continued to use the
house and to collect rent from tenants. This was not an abuse of discretion; indeed the
superior court was required to consider Douglas's occupancy of the home in deciding
whether to grant him credit.
 Douglas protests that he did not use the house after November 2014 and did
not collect rent for many months during separation. However he acknowledges he
allowed his son to live there during this time. There is "no fixed rule requiring credit [for

 48
 See Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93, 96 (Alaska 1999).
 49
 Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 464 (Alaska 2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess, 158 P.3d 827, 833 (Alaska 2007)).

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 post-separation payments made to maintain marital property] in all cases,"50 and on this
record we do not find an abuse of discretion.51
 3. Apricot Lane
 Douglas also argues that Michelle misidentified some of her personal
expenses as Apricot Lane business expenses in order to make the business appear less
profitable than it actually was. However this argument is inapposite given that the
superior court rejected Michelle's valuation of the business in favor of Douglas's
expert's valuation and the valuation Douglas requested in his property spreadsheet.
 Douglas next faults the superior court for failing to require Michelle to
share in the cost of his expert valuation of the Apricot Lane business. "The superior
court has broad discretion to award costs and fees in a divorce action."52 It is vested with
this discretion in order "to ensure that ‘both spouses have the proper means to litigate the
divorce action on a fairly equal plane.' "53 In exercising this discretion, "the court ‘must
focus on the parties' relative economic situations and earning capacities.' "54 The
superior court denied Douglas's request to require that Michelle pay a share of his expert
valuation costs, reasoning that Michelle presented her own determination of the
business's value and that each party should pay for his or her respective valuation. This

 50
 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992).
 51
 See, e.g., Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080, 1091 (Alaska 2017) (no
abuse of discretion in denying credit to husband when he lived in house after separation);
Hansen v. Hansen, 119 P.3d 1005, 1011-12 (Alaska 2005) (no abuse of discretion when
the superior court gave "clear reasons for its decision" to deny credit).
 52
 Horning v. Horning, 389 P.3d 61, 65 (Alaska 2017).
 53
 Id. (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 265 P.3d 279, 290 (Alaska 2011)).
 54
 Id. (quoting Stevens, 265 P.3d at 290).

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 denial was reasonable in light of the superior court's finding that Douglas and Michelle
had equal earning capacities, a finding that Douglas does not show was clearly
erroneous. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Douglas to pay
the entire cost of his own valuation expert.
 4. Equalization payment
 As his final challenge to the property division order,55 Douglas claims that
the superior court's requirement that he pay an equalization payment to Michelle
subjected him to "double jeopardy" and awarded Michelle "a windfall." However the
equalization payment is merely a necessary component of the court's property division
findings and its determination that the marital estate should be divided equally. Because
we affirm the property division order, we also affirm the equalization payment.
Douglas's "double jeopardy" argument is too cursory to comprehend and therefore need
not be addressed.56
 E. Douglas Has Forfeited His Attorney's Fees Argument, And Regardless
 The Award Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion.
 Douglas finally appears to contend that the superior court abused its
discretion in awarding Michelle attorney's fees. The superior court granted Michelle's
request for attorney's fees and awarded her $1,000, to be subtracted from Douglas's
share of the Anchorage house proceeds. The court reasoned that this award was justified

 55
 Douglas also appears to challenge the superior court's QDRO awarding half
of the marital portion of his UPS retirement accounts to Michelle. However Douglas's
argument on this issue relies on a prior version of the QDRO that was subsequently
revised due to technical errors. The error that Douglas complains of in the initial QDRO
has therefore already been corrected and need not be addressed on appeal.
 56
 See Adamson v. Univ. of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 n.3 (Alaska 1991)
("[W]here a point is given only a cursory statement in the argument portion of a brief,
the point will not be considered on appeal."); see also Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874,
887 (Alaska 2010) (applying this rule equally to pro se litigants).

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 because it found some of Douglas's conduct throughout the course of the case to be
"unnecessary and vexatious," and this conduct had "clearly increased [Michelle's]
attorney fees." The court specifically cited Douglas's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and his transfer of title to the Anchorage home in violation of the court's
order.
 Douglas's challenge to this fee award is cursory and difficult to understand.
He again alleges that this fee award amounted to "double jeopardy" and returns to his
allegations regarding Michelle's alleged misconduct. He has therefore forfeited any
challenge to the attorney's fee award for failure to adequately brief it.57 In any event,
Douglas's transfer of the Anchorage house in violation of the court's domestic relations
initial order is adequate to justify this award.
V. CONCLUSION
 The superior court's judgment is AFFIRMED.

 57
 We have made an effort to identify and discuss each of the arguments raised
by Douglas on appeal. However much of Douglas's briefing is difficult to follow, so
some arguments may have been overlooked. To the extent that Douglas requests relief
from the judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), we do not consider this argument on
appeal because (1) Douglas did not move for Rule 60(b) relief in the superior court and
(2) this argument was raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief. Douglas also
appears to request restitution damages based on Michelle's conduct that allegedly
resulted in his termination from UPS. However he did not raise this claim in the superior
court, and this property division case is not the proper vehicle for a tort damages claim.
Finally Douglas makes vague reference to the United States and Alaska Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses, but his opening brief merely notes that he is guaranteed such
rights and that they were violated. We need not address this cursory argument.

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