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NOTICE
 Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite
 a memorandum decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Appellate Rule 214(d).

 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

DANIEL P. BROWN, )
 ) Supreme Court No. S-14870
 Appellant, )
 ) Superior Court No. 3AN-92-08561 CI
 v. )
 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
CORRIENE A. DEMIENTIEFF, ) AND JUDGMENT*
 )
 Appellee. ) No. 1465 - August 7, 2013
 )

 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
 Judicial District, Anchorage, John Suddock, Judge.

 Appearances: Gayle J. Brown, Anchorage, for Appellant.
 No appearance by Appellee.

 Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and
 Bolger, Justices.

I. INTRODUCTION
 Daniel Brown and Corriene Demientieff divorced in 1996. At the time
Daniel owed a substantial child support arrearage and other obligations to Corriene, and
the court offset these debts by awarding Corriene a significant portion of Daniel's
pension in an otherwise 50/50 property division. A qualified domestic relations order
(QDRO) directed 88% of Daniel's pension to Corriene and 12% to Daniel. In a
subsequent 1999 order the court stated that the QDRO could be adjusted if the child

 * Entered under Alaska Appellate Rule 214.
 support arrearage were satisfied before Daniel's retirement. In 2011, eight years after
satisfying the child support arrearage, Daniel sought to modify the QDRO as
contemplated by the 1999 order. But Daniel also sought to further modify the QDRO
percentages based on claims that: (1) Corriene's pension had not been divided or taken
into account by the trial court when coming to its 50/50 property division; and (2) the
trial court had mistakenly overstated other amounts he owed Corriene in the property
division and therefore mistakenly overstated Corriene's QDRO percentage. The superior
court granted Daniel partial relief, adjusting the QDRO percentages to eliminate the child
support arrearage component, but denied Daniel's other modification requests. Daniel
moved to reconsider, but after considering the merits of Daniel's arguments, the superior
court denied reconsideration. Daniel appeals, arguing that the superior court erred in
denying his motion for reconsideration. Because the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration, we affirm.1
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 Daniel and Corriene married in April 1977 and separated in June 1992.
Following trial the superior court entered a divorce decree in August 1996. The court
divided the marital estate equally.
 The superior court concluded that Daniel's child support arrearage and
other obligations to Corriene for payment of marital debt were at least $75,000 and that
the one easily divisible marital asset was Daniel's pension, valued at about $185,000.
Due to Daniel's past non-compliance with child support orders and the unlikelihood of

 1
 We generally review trial court denials of motions for reconsideration for
abuse of discretion. Brotherton v. Warner, 240 P.3d 1225, 1228 (Alaska 2010); Neal
& Co. v. Ass'n of Vill. Council Presidents Reg'l Hous. Auth., 895 P.2d 497, 506 (Alaska
1995). We also generally review decisions on Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) motions for abuse
of discretion. Ray v. Ray, 115 P.3d 573, 576 (Alaska 2005).

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 his satisfying the debt obligations, the court awarded Corriene 88% of Daniel's pension.
The award was put into effect by a QDRO.
 The State of Alaska's Child Support Services Division (CSSD) later began
garnishing Daniel's wages to satisfy his child support arrearage. In 1999 the superior
court entered the following order:
 To the extent that child support arrears that existed prior to
 August 12, 1996 are actually collected, the percentage
 available in [Daniel's] pension above the 50 percent already
 allocated to [Corriene] as part of the property settlement may
 need to be adjusted, at or near the time of [Daniel's]
 retirement.
 Daniel satisfied the child support arrearage in August 2003. Nearing
retirement, in August 2011 Daniel moved under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5) to modify
the QDRO.2 Daniel requested a 50/50 pension re-division to reflect his satisfaction of
the child support arrearage. At an initial hearing, Daniel articulated an additional
argument: that the original trial court had mistakenly overstated the amount of other
marital debt and that the 38% of Daniel's pension awarded to Corriene above her
otherwise 50% should be reduced. The superior court directed Daniel's attorney to
calculate the child support adjustment for the QDRO and stated that all issues would be
decided by motion practice.
 In October 2011 Daniel moved, without citing any authority, to modify the
1996 findings of fact and conclusions of law underlying the divorce property division.
Daniel argued that the original property award was predicated on a 50/50 division, and
that the unequal division of his pension was designed to accommodate the court's

 2
 Daniel relied on the Rule 60(b)(5) provision allowing a party to seek relief
from a final judgment on the ground that "it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application." A Rule 60(b)(5) motion must be brought "within
a reasonable time" after the final judgment being challenged.

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 prediction that Daniel would not satisfy existing child support and other financial
obligations to Corriene. He then claimed that the trial court had included financial
obligations to Corriene that did not exist. He also argued that Corriene's own pension
had not been considered in the original property division, "albeit totaling just a few
thousand dollars[,]" and that it should be considered in connection with the QDRO
modification. Daniel requested that the original divorce property division be modified
to reflect a 50/50 division of his pension.
 In February 2012 Corriene filed a non-opposition to Daniel's QDRO
modification request, but only to the extent of the child support adjustment. She asserted
that Daniel had owed her nearly $35,000 in other financial obligations included in the
QDRO percentages, and that if he were to pay her a lump sum for that amount she would
agree to a 50/50 division of Daniel's pension.
 In April 2012 Daniel supplemented his motion to modify the 1996 findings
of fact and conclusions of law underlying the divorce property division. Daniel
reiterated his position that a part of the financial obligations making up the pension
percentage awarded Corriene were non-existent and claimed that because he raised the
issue of Corriene's pension in 1999, it should be equitably divided.
 During a May 2012 evidentiary hearing Daniel raised a new argument to
support his requested QDRO modification. He explained that prior to the marital
property allocation in the original proceedings, an $18,000 deficiency judgment was
entered against him after a truck and boat were repossessed, and argued that Corriene
should have been allocated half of the debt.
 The superior court granted relief based on Daniel's satisfaction of the child
support arrearage, modifying the QDRO to reduce Corriene's percentage of Daniel's
pension. Daniel's requests for further modification were denied. The court found
insufficient grounds to credit Daniel for the $18,000 deficiency judgment, reasoning that

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 had Daniel sold the assets as the original trial court ordered, instead of allowing them to
be repossessed, a credit would have resulted to his share of the marital estate. The court
also noted that as to the other marital debts Daniel had complained about, the parties
agreed at the hearing that Corriene had paid them and had been entitled to
reimbursement. Finally, the court found that although the failure to value and divide
Corriene's pension at the 1996 divorce trial was a mistake, Daniel's request for relief was
untimely under Rule 60(b)(1).3
 Daniel filed a motion to reconsider, contending that the superior court had
failed to properly consider his requests for additional credits on his pension percentage
with respect to half of the $18,000 deficiency judgment and half of the marital share of
Corriene's pension. As to the deficiency judgment, he argued that the original trial court
had given him conflicting orders — that he stop making payments on the truck and boat
and that he sell them — which precluded salvaging any equity. As to Corriene's
pension, Daniel argued that his request for adjustment of his pension percentage to
account for his share of the marital interest in Corriene's pension was made under Rule
60(b)(5), not Rule 60(b)(1), and that the one-year limit was inapplicable. Daniel also
argued that he had raised the issue of Corriene's pension in the 1998-1999 proceedings,
within two years of the original divorce proceeding, and therefore it was within the
"reasonable time" requirement for Rule 60(b)(5).
 The superior court considered the merits of Daniel's reconsideration motion
and issued a subsequent order in August 2012. As to the deficiency judgment, the court
found that: (1) Daniel had been ordered in the original divorce proceedings to sell the

 3
 Rule 60(b)(1) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment on the
grounds of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." Rule 60(b) further
provides that a (b)(1) motion must be filed not more than one year after the distribution
of the final judgment being challenged.

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 boat and hold the proceeds in trust; and (2) Daniel had disobeyed this order and allowed
it to be repossessed, resulting in the deficiency judgment. The court noted Daniel could
have raised this issue at the original divorce trial and could have appealed any failure to
properly address the deficiency judgment, but he had not done so. As to Corriene's
pension, the court stated that Daniel had failed to explain why he waited 14 to 16 years
to raise this issue. Analogizing Daniel's claim to that made in Morgan v. Morgan,4
where we held that a party's Rule 60(b)(6)5 motion was not filed within a reasonable
time when it was made three years after discovering an undivided pension (and 29 years
after the divorce),6 the court determined that Daniel's delay was similarly unreasonable.
The court therefore denied Daniel's reconsideration motion.
 Daniel appeals, arguing that the superior court erred in denying his motion
for reconsideration. Corriene, who appeared pro se before the superior court, has not
participated in this appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
 Daniel raises two reasons why the superior court abused its discretion in
denying his reconsideration motion. First, Daniel argues that there was no final division
of the marital estate until the superior court's 2012 order modifying the QDRO; therefore
the entire QDRO, not just the portion relating to child support arrears, remained open to
prospective modification. Second, Daniel argues that a prospective application of the
superior court's 1996 property distribution was no longer equitable and that he was

 4
 143 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2006).
 5
 Rule 60(b)(6) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment on grounds
not covered by (b)(1)-(5) but which would "justify[] relief from the operation of the
judgment." Rule 60(b) provides that a (b)(6) motion must be brought "within a
reasonable time" after distribution of the final judgment being challenged.
 6
 143 P.3d at 977.

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 entitled to relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(5). We reject both arguments.
 A. Final Judgment
 We first note that Daniel did not raise in the superior court his argument
that the 1996 property division was not a final judgment. This argument is therefore
waived.7 We next note that Daniel's 1998 and 2011 superior court filings requesting
Rule 60(b)(5) relief from a final judgment are inconsistent with this argument. We
finally note that the argument has no merit.
 "A property division incorporated within a divorce decree is a final
judgment and is modifiable to the same extent as any equitable decree of the court."8
And "[a] QDRO simply enforces a court order calling for division of retirement
benefits."9 "A valid court order dividing a spouse's pension benefits has an immediate
legal effect. The subsequent issuance of a QDRO . . . is a formality."10 The fact that
Corriene would receive future payments did not make the award of an interest in
Daniel's pension prospective or open-ended — as a result of the 1996 divorce property
division Corriene owned that portion of the pension generating the future payments.
 Daniel obtained Rule 60(b) relief from the 1996 final judgment with the
1999 order providing potential future relief for one specific matter — if Daniel cured his
1996 child support arrearage he could seek an appropriate adjustment of the QDRO
percentages. The 1999 order allowing future alteration of the QDRO did not affect other

 7
 See Brandon v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 280 (Alaska 2001) ("A
party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal." (citing Preblich v. Zorea, 996
P.2d 730, 736 n. 17 (Alaska 2000))).
 8
 O'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225, 228 (Alaska 1981).
 9
 Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Alaska 1998). See also Gallant v.
Gallant, 882 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Alaska 1994).
 10
 Gallant, 882 P.2d at 1256.

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 aspects of the property division. The order was specific and unambiguous — if Daniel
paid his child support the QDRO could be adjusted for those specific payments — and
Daniel provides no argument or evidence showing that the court intended to alter any
other aspect of the property division.
 B. Rule 60(b)(5) Relief11
 Rule 60(b)(5) gives a court discretion to relieve a party from a final
judgment when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application." "Because of the interest in finality, Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for a party
failing to file a timely appeal; nor does it allow relitigation of issues that have been
resolved by the judgment."12 We have stated that "Rule 60(b)(5) requires some change

 11
 We assume for purposes of this appeal that Rule 60(b)(5) was an
appropriate basis for Daniel to seek relief from the 1996 divorce property division. That
provision was the underpinning of his motion for reconsideration in the superior court,
and the superior court ruled on the reconsideration motion on that basis. We note,
however, that the fundamental basis of Daniel's argument has always been that the
original trial court made a mistake in failing to address Corriene's pension and in
assigning him full responsibility for the deficiency judgment, although both were
discussed at trial. Were the issue before us, we might conclude that the superior court's
initial Rule 60(b)(1) analysis was correct, although previous cases with similar issues
implicated Rule 60(b)(6). Cf. Schaub v. Schaub, ___ P.3d ___, ___ Op. No. 6803, 2013
WL 3958208 (Alaska, Aug. 2, 2013) (affirming decision under AS 25.24.160 to modify
divorce decree and divide marital property, even though waiting 20 years after original
decree was too long to modify under Rule 60(b)(6), where original decree did not divide
or address marital property); Morgan v. Morgan, 143 P.3d 975, 976-77 (Alaska 2006)
(reversing grant of wife's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to modify 29-year-old divorce decree
and property distribution when wife did not know about husband's pension for 26 years,
but then waited 3 years before filing her motion); Lacher v. Lacher, 993 P.2d 413, 419­
20 (Alaska 1999) (affirming grant of husband's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to modify a
dissolution decree's property distribution when original distribution omitted substantial
items of marital property and parties never actually implemented property distribution).
 12
 Cook v. Cook, 249 P.3d 1070, 1083 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Morris v.
 (continued...)

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 in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable."13 Finally, a Rule 60(b)(5)
motion for relief from judgment must be made within a reasonable time.14
 1. Change in conditions
 Although Daniel does not explicitly argue that a change in conditions made
enforcement of the original property distribution inequitable, his position must assume
that the cure of his child support arrearage was a change in conditions supporting
Rule 60(b)(5) relief. And indeed, leaving the QRDO in place in light of that change of
conditions would have resulted in an inequitable double counting. But Daniel points to
no change in conditions after the 1996 property division that would render the rest of the
property division inequitable. Daniel argues only that the original trial court mistakenly
failed to address Corriene's pension and mistakenly addressed the circumstances
underlying the deficiency judgment. This is a challenge to the merits of the original
property distribution, not an assertion that a subsequent change in conditions made the
original distribution inequitable.
 The superior court implicitly ruled that there had been no change of
conditions warranting Rule 60(b)(5) relief as to the deficiency judgment when it stated
that Daniel could have raised the issue at the divorce trial and could have appealed the
issue after the final judgment. We agree, and note that the superior court could have
made this same determination with respect to Corriene's pension.

 12
 (...continued)
Morris, 908 P.2d 425, 429 (Alaska 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 13
 Dixon v. Pouncy, 979 P.2d 520, 526 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Dewey v.
Dewey, 866 P.2d 623, 627 (Alaska 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 14
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b).

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 2. Motion within a reasonable time
 Daniel argues that he brought Corriene's pension to the court's attention
after he discovered it in 1998, but that due to possible future modification of the QDRO
it was reasonable to wait until the prospective QDRO modification to challenge the
original property division. Daniel argues that it was similarly reasonable to delay his
challenge of the original trial court's decision regarding the deficiency judgment until
the 2012 QDRO modification hearing.
 Daniel knew about both Corriene's pension and the deficiency judgment
at the time of the 1996 divorce trial. Yet he did not raise the pension issue for resolution
until 2011, and did not raise the deficiency judgment issue for resolution until 2012.
Daniel argues that the possibility of the QDRO modification to reflect his satisfaction of
the child support arrearage left the property division "open-ended" and made his decision
to refrain from appealing or litigating his property interests reasonable. As discussed
above, the property division was not left open-ended in 1996 or 1999. Moreover, Daniel
had no reason to know before 1999 that the QDRO might be subject to future limited
modification, and not until 2003 did he satisfy the contingency allowing modification.
Daniel provides no acceptable reason for not challenging the property division between
1996 and 1999, and the superior court's 1999 decision to revisit the child support aspect
of the QDRO should have had no effect on Daniel's decision to delay his property
division challenge for almost 13 more years.
 We agree with the superior court that Daniel unreasonably delayed seeking
Rule 60(b)(5) relief with respect to Corriene's pension, and note that the superior court
could have made this same determination with respect to the deficiency judgment issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
 We AFFIRM the superior court's decision.

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