CourtListener opinion 11102740

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NOTICE
 Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite
 a memorandum decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Appellate Rule 214(d).

 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

DEBORAH M. ISTURIS, )
 ) Supreme Court No. S-14779
 Appellant, )
 ) Superior Court No. 1JU-94-01829 DR
 v. )
 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
RUDOLPH M. ISTURIS, JR., ) AND JUDGMENT*
 )
 Appellee. ) No. 1462 - June 26, 2013
 )

 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First
 Judicial District, Juneau, Philip M. Pallenberg, Judge.
 Appearances: Steven C. Levi and Gloria S. Levi, Anchorage,
 Guardians for Appellant. Gregory W. Lessmeier, Lessmeier
 & Winters LLC, Juneau, for Appellee.
 Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and
 Bolger, Justices.

I. INTRODUCTION
 Rudolph and Deborah Isturis divorced 18 years ago. Their divorce decree
incorporated a property settlement agreement that gave Rudolph fifty percent of
Deborah's pension benefits, which he would receive in monthly payments. In 2011
Deborah, now suffering from serious mental disabilities and residing in an assisted-living
facility, petitioned through her legal guardians to reopen the divorce proceeding under
Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5), which allows for relief from judgment if, as relevant here,

 *
 Entered under Appellate Rule 214.
 "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." She
claims that she is in dire financial need, that Rudolph caused her current condition, and
that it is no longer equitable that he should receive the payments due him under the
property settlement agreement. The superior court denied the petition. We affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 Rudolph M. Isturis, Jr. and Deborah M. Isturis married in 1981 and
divorced in 1995. Both were represented by counsel during their divorce proceedings.
Their divorce decree incorporated a property settlement agreement that addressed
Deborah's account with the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), a marital
asset then worth $15,278. Through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), the
agreement gave Rudolph a fifty-percent ownership of the PERS monthly benefit. The
divorce decree, along with the accompanying property settlement agreement and QDRO,
was issued in March 1995.
 In November 2011 Deborah, through her guardians, filed a pro se petition
to reopen the divorce case under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5). In her petition and
subsequent reply, Deborah claimed that her mental health began to deteriorate in 1997;
that she currently lives in an assisted-living facility; that her income is now insufficient
to meet the expenses of her treatment and care; and that her mental condition likely
resulted from abuse that Rudolph inflicted on her during their marriage. Arguing that
the divorce decree's prospective application was no longer equitable,1 she asked the
superior court to suspend all PERS payments to Rudolph pending a review of newly-
available medical evidence.

 1
 Although Deborah ties this argument to the likelihood that Rudolph caused
her current state, she also argues that she "is oppressed regardless of the cause of her
illness and disability. She cannot meet her basic needs with her current income."

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 Superior Court Judge Philip M. Pallenberg denied the petition and
Deborah's subsequent motion for reconsideration, explaining that Civil Rule 60(b)(5) did
not apply. Deborah appeals through her guardians.
III. DISCUSSION
 A. Standard Of Review
 "We review a superior court's decision to deny relief under Civil Rule
60(b)(5) for abuse of discretion, reversing only if we are ‘left with the definite and firm
conviction on the whole record that the trial court has made a mistake.' "2
 B. The Superior Court's Denial Of The Petition Was Not An Abuse Of
 Discretion.
 In the superior court, Deborah relied primarily on Rule 60(b)(5),
contending that the PERS payments required by the QDRO constitute prospective relief
that "is no longer equitable" in light of her dramatically changed circumstances.3 She
argues on appeal that the superior court erred in failing to consider the fact that Rudolph
had caused her condition. We find no abuse of discretion.

 2
 Cox v. Floreske, 288 P.3d 1289, 1292 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Princiotta
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 785 P.2d 559, 562 (Alaska 1990)).
 3
 Because Deborah filed this action 16 years after the divorce decree was
final, any relief must be pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b). See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 252
P.3d 998, 1005 (Alaska 2011) ("Other than a Civil Rule 77(k) motion for
reconsideration, which must be made within ten days of the court's order, an Alaska
Civil Rule 60(b) motion provides the only available means for seeking relief from a final
judgment of property division." (citing Lowe v. Lowe, 817 P.2d 453, 456 (Alaska
1991))). In her superior court briefing, Deborah explicitly waived claims under
subsections (b)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of the rule. She waived claims under subsection
(b)(6) by failing to raise them.

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 Civil Rule 60(b)(5) allows relief from a judgment when it is "no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."4 Judge Pallenberg
decided correctly that there was no prospective application at issue on Deborah's motion
to reopen the divorce case because "[a] QDRO transfers ownership in a pension at the
time it is entered." We have previously held that "[a] valid court order dividing a
spouse's pension benefits has an immediate legal effect."5 "Using a QDRO simply
transfers the ministerial act of payment . . . from [the former spouse] to the state."6
Because of the QDRO, Rudolph already owns fifty percent of the PERS account;
ownership of the benefits that he is yet to receive in the future was transferred to him in
the divorce. The judgment at issue has no prospective application, and the allegations
of wrongdoing on Rudolph's part do not change that fact. Without prospective
application, the judgment cannot be subject to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5).
V. CONCLUSION
 We AFFIRM the superior court's judgment.

 4
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); see also Ferguson v. State, Dep't of Revenue,
CSED, ex rel. P.G., 977 P.2d 95, 99 (Alaska 1999) (holding that "the prospective
application requirement limits . . . the circumstances in which Rule 60(b)(5) may be
applied" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
 5
 Gallant v. Gallant, 882 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the
ex-wife's pension interest was not in the ex-husband's bankruptcy estate because she
already owned the interest under a previous court order); see also AS 39.35.500(a)(1)
(providing that a QDRO assigns "an employee's right to receive benefits").
 6
 Rice v. Rice, 757 P.2d 60, 62 (Alaska 1988).

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