CourtListener opinion 11112240

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If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to
 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

 STATE OF MICHIGAN

 COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL URIEL WELLS, UNPUBLISHED
 July 31, 2025
 Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 10:32 AM

v No. 368917
 Lenawee Circuit Court
ANNE PATRICIA MCCARTHY-WELLS, LC No. 2020-047358-DO

 Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and BORRELLO and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

 Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee (plaintiff), Michael Uriel Wells, appeals as of right from
a November 15, 2023 judgment of divorce, which divided the marital estate. The judgment also
awarded spousal support to defendant-appellee/cross-appellant (defendant), Anne Patricia
McCarthy-Wells, and reflected the parties were responsible for paying their own attorney fees.
Defendant cross-appeals from the judgment of divorce. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand for further proceedings.

 I. BACKGROUND

 This appeal stems from the parties' acrimonious divorce, which resulted in a lengthy trial
court proceeding. In December 1990, the parties married. In 2002, defendant was declared
disabled by the Social Security Administration. She received Social Security disability benefits,
which were retroactive to January 2, 2000. Plaintiff, who had worked in law enforcement and as
a firefighter, retired in 2012. In 2015, the parties purchased 25 acres of property, which neighbored
their marital home. They invested a significant amount of money into creating a winery business
on the land; and the winery's property was encumbered by a mortgage in their names.

 On February 14, 2020, plaintiff filed for divorce, requesting the trial court equitably divide
the marital estate. Defendant requested the same relief, along with spousal support. Discovery,
and extensive motion practice, ensued. The parties obtained personal protection orders (PPOs)
against each other in relation to an event that occurred in the marital home in June 2020. The trial
court granted defendant exclusive use of the marital home. The trial court also ordered: "The

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 parties shall maintain the financial status quo. Each bill shall be paid by the person who paid it
prior to February 14, 2020, from the same account it was paid prior to February 14, 2020."

 After several delays, trial commenced on May 11, 2021. Defendant was proceeding in
propria persona, alleging she lacked the funds to retain counsel because plaintiff controlled the
parties' finances and prevented her from obtaining a loan. At that time, plaintiff was not paying
spousal support. After trial was held over several days, and plaintiff's testimony was complete,
the trial court granted a lengthy adjournment because defendant obtained counsel. The trial court
reopened discovery, and motion practice again ensued. An order requiring plaintiff to pay
temporary spousal support was entered, and it was challenged by plaintiff.

 Trial resumed in February 2023. The parties testified about the marital debts, which were
substantial, and their respective income streams, which were limited. Despite only paying $9,600
in spousal support and being in arrears, plaintiff testified he paid the marital bills throughout the
lengthy proceedings. He also testified defendant failed to comply with court orders and improperly
removed funds from the winery's bank account. The parties agreed plaintiff should pay spousal
support to defendant in the future, but they disputed the amount. The parties also agreed the marital
property should be sold. On November 15, 2023, the trial court entered the judgment of divorce,
which (1) appointed a receiver; (2) ordered the parties' property to be sold to pay marital debts,
and any proceeds be divided equally between the parties; (3) divided plaintiff's pensions equally
between the parties; and (4) required plaintiff to pay $425 in monthly spousal support to defendant,
until plaintiff reached 67 years of age.1 These appeals followed.

 II. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ON DIRECT APPEAL

 Plaintiff raises various challenges to the trial court's division of the marital estate. We
address them in turn.

 A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

 In a divorce action,

 this Court must first review the trial court's findings of fact regarding the
 valuations of particular marital assets under the clearly erroneous standard. A
 finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, the reviewing
 court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
 This Court gives special deference to a trial court's findings when they are based
 on the credibility of the witnesses. If the trial court's findings of fact are upheld,
 this Court must decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light
 of those facts. The dispositional ruling is discretionary and should be affirmed
 unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable.
 [Welling v Welling, 233 Mich App 708, 709; 592 NW2d 822 (1999) (quotation
 marks and citations omitted).]

1
 At the time of trial, plaintiff was 63 years old, and defendant was 62 years old.

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 Likewise, when reviewing spousal-support awards, this Court's first task is to determine
whether the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App
21, 26; 826 NW2d 152 (2012). "If the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous, we must
determine whether the dispositional ruling was fair and equitable under the circumstances of the
case." Id. Again, the fact-finder is best suited to consider a witness's credibility and demeanor,
and "an appellate court should not conduct an independent review of credibility determinations[.]"
Smith v Anonymous Joint Enterprise, 487 Mich 102, 113, 130; 793 NW2d 533 (2010).

 B. ANALYSIS

 The purpose of a divorce judgment is to fix the property rights and interests of the parties.
Westgate v Westgate, 291 Mich 18, 28; 288 NW 860 (1939). "The goal in distributing marital
assets in a divorce proceeding is to reach an equitable distribution of property in light of all the
circumstances." Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 423; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). "A division of
property in a divorce action need not be equal, but it must be equitable." Jansen v Jansen, 205
Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275 (1994).

 When dividing property,

 the following factors are to be considered wherever they are relevant to the
 circumstances of the particular case: (1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions
 of the parties to the marital estate, (3) age of the parties, (4) health of the parties,
 (5) life status of the parties, (6) necessities and circumstances of the parties,
 (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8) past relations and conduct of the parties, and
 (9) general principles of equity. There may even be additional factors that are
 relevant to a particular case. For example, the court may choose to consider the
 interruption of the personal career or education of either party. The determination
 of relevant factors will vary depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
 [Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159-160; 485 NW2d 893 (1992) (citation
 omitted).]

 "The trial court must consider all relevant factors but not assign disproportionate weight to
any one circumstance." Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 717; 747 NW2d 336 (2008)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). "While each spouse need not receive a mathematically
equal share, any significant departures from congruence must be explained clearly by the court."
Welling, 233 Mich App at 710. "[T]here is no Michigan statute or caselaw that precludes outright
a substantial deviation from numerical equality in a property distribution award." Washington v
Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 673; 770 NW2d 908 (2009).

 In reaching an equitable division, the trial court must first determine what property is
considered marital property and what property is considered separate property. Cunningham v
Cunningham, 289 Mich App 195, 200; 795 NW2d 826 (2010).

 Generally, marital property is that which is acquired or earned during the
 marriage, whereas separate property is that which is obtained or earned before the
 marriage. Once a court has determined what property is marital, the whole of which
 constitutes the marital estate, only then may it apportion the marital estate between

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 the parties in a manner that is equitable in light of all the circumstances. As a
 general principle, when the marital estate is divided each party takes away from the
 marriage that party's own separate estate with no invasion by the other party. [Id.
 at 201 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

 Yet, a spouse's separate estate can be invaded for redistribution when the statutory
exceptions under either MCL 552.23(1) or MCL 552.401 have been met. Reeves v Reeves, 226
Mich App 490, 494; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). MCL 552.23(1) authorizes a court to invade separate
assets if, after the division of marital assets, one party demonstrates additional need. Id. at 494.
MCL 552.401 authorizes a trial court to invade one spouse's separate property when the other
spouse "contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of the property." See id. at
494-495 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

 Plaintiff first challenges the trial court's decision relating to his pensions. There is no
dispute that plaintiff received a pension from working in a police department from 1978 to 1982
as well as a pension for working as a Ypsilanti firefighter from 1987 to 2012. Nor is there any
dispute that "pension benefits are assets to be considered part of the marital estate subject to
distribution in the discretion of the circuit court." Boonstra v Boonstra, 209 Mich App 558, 563;
531 NW2d 777 (1995).

 Concerning plaintiff's retirement assets, the judgment of divorce stated:

 Plaintiff and defendant shall equally divide Plaintiff's City of Ypsilanti
 Retirement benefits and Plaintiff's police pension. Plaintiff is currently in "pay
 status" and has been since prior to the filing of the Complaint for Divorce. . . . The
 marital portion shall be determined to be the date of the marriage (12/08/1990)
 through the date of the filing of the Complaint for Divorce (02/14/2020). The
 effective date of division shall be December 15, 2021 meaning Defendant shall be
 entitled to her portion of the retirement benefit paid to Plaintiff from December 15,
 2021 going forward. . . . Plaintiff shall pay Defendant directly the past due amount
 of $69,024 through August 15, 2023 and then directly each month the amount of
 $2,157 per month until the division date. . . .

 Therefore, the trial court held plaintiff's police pension and firefighter pension would be
divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff argues this holding was erroneous because (1) his
entire police pension was earned before the marriage; (2) a portion of the firefighter pension was
earned before the marriage; and (3) to the extent that trial court intended to invade plaintiff's
separate assets under either MCL 552.23(1), or MCL 552.401, the trial court failed to explain why
it was appropriate to do so.

 Plaintiff is correct, and it appears the trial court acknowledged at least a portion of the
pensions were plaintiff's separate property. Indeed, in a March 23, 2023 opinion and order, the
trial court held: "The marital portion of the parties' pension and retirement accounts shall be
divided equally using the date of marriage through the date of filing of the Complaint as the
division date." (Emphasis added.) A July 20, 2023 order contains identical language. Yet, in the
November 2023 judgment of divorce, the trial court held defendant is entitled to premarital
portions of the pensions.

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 It appears this unequivocal language was mistakenly included in the judgment of divorce,
however. Indeed, in a different portion of the judgment of divorce, the trial court essentially
acknowledged at least a portion of the pensions were plaintiff's separate property. Specifically,
the trial court ordered: "The marital portion shall be determined to be the date of the marriage
(12/08/1990) through the date of the filing of the Complaint for Divorce (02/14/2020)." (Emphasis
added.) The trial court's calculations concerning the monthly payments are consistent with the
monthly amount distributed from the marital portion of plaintiff's firefighter pension. Based on
this, defendant argues the individuals in charge of preparing the Qualified Domestic Relations
Order (QDRO) will rely on the trial court's directive and only include the marital portion of the
firefighter pension for purposes of division. As a result, defendant argues the trial court need not
revisit this issue on remand. Although defendant's argument appears to be supported by the QDRO
entered by the trial court, a portion of the judgment of divorce holds that defendant is entitled to
50% of the entire police pension and firefighter pension. This is erroneous and the trial court's
holdings are inconsistent. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the judgment of divorce relating
to plaintiff's pensions and remand for further consideration addressing the issue.

 Next, concerning the trial court's retroactive award to defendant relating to plaintiff's
firefighter pension, plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
defendant was essentially already awarded a portion of the firefighter pension because, under the
August 25, 2020 status quo order, plaintiff was ordered to pay the household bills during the
pendency of the divorce proceedings. According to plaintiff, the property award and the status
quo order, taken together, constitute an impermissible "double dip" that results in an inequitable
outcome. In so arguing, plaintiff notes he paid a $9,100 lump sum spousal support payment.

 "Double dipping—or tapping the same dollars twice—refers to situations where a business
or professional practice is valued by capitalizing its income, some or all of which is also treated as
income for spousal support purposes." Loutts, 298 Mich App at 26-27 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). In Loutts, this Court addressed a double-dipping argument in the context of a
spousal support award. Id. at 25-31. This Court noted it "previously addressed double-dipping in
the context of pensions," and explained such issues were resolved on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
28-29. The Loutts Court went on to explain the trial court improperly "determined that the value
of a business may be used for the purpose of either property distribution or spousal support, but
not both." Id. at 31. Such a determination was erroneous because it resulted in "applying a bright-
line test and failing to consider the specific facts and circumstances of th[e] case." Id. This Court
remanded the case and directed the trial court to "redetermine spousal support . . . , including
whether the equities . . . warrant utilizing the value of [the business] for purposes of both property
division and spousal support." Id. Based on the holding in Loutts, there is no bright-line rule for
whether the value of a pension, or retirement account, can be used in determining property
distribution and awarding spousal support. See id. at 25-31. Instead, trial courts must consider
what is equitable, i.e., what is just and reasonable under the circumstances. See id.

 We conclude the trial court did not engage in an inequitable "double-dip" by entering the
status quo order, and later ordering plaintiff's firefighter pension be divided between the parties.
The status quo order stated, in relevant part: "The parties shall maintain the financial status quo.
Each bill shall be paid by the person who paid it prior to February 14, 2020, from the same account
it was paid prior to February 14, 2020." The status quo order did not require plaintiff to pay
defendant a portion of the firefighter pension. Rather, because plaintiff handled the finances and

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 bills during the parties' marriage, plaintiff was responsible for paying the marital bills during the
proceedings. Notably, defendant complained that plaintiff refused to give her information about
the parties' finances and wielded financial control over her during the marriage and divorce
proceedings.

 As noted by the trial court, it is unclear what source of income, or from which funds,
plaintiff paid the marital bills. Moreover, plaintiff did not present evidence at trial to support he
used funds from the firefighter pension to pay them. Plaintiff had at least one other source of
income: the parties' winery. Although plaintiff testified the winery consistently operated at a loss,
plaintiff was able to employ three people, who earned $15 per hour. In 2020, plaintiff admitted he
claimed more than $16,000 in income from the winery. The trial court found: "It appears that the
winery business produced some actual income despite showing losses on its tax returns which
included a significant noncash expense related to depreciation." Given these facts, plaintiff's
reliance on Loutts is misplaced. Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks, i.e., reversal and
remand with instructions "to offset the retroactive pension award and spousal support arrearages
to reflect the funds [plaintiff] paid under the status quo order."

 Next, plaintiff argues the trial court failed to consider defendant's conduct during the
proceedings when dividing the marital estate. Although Michigan's no-fault divorce law does not
require a showing of fault to obtain a divorce, fault is a relevant consideration when dividing the
marital estate. McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 88-91; 545 NW2d 357 (1996). Although
misconduct related to assets does not require automatic forfeiture of those assets, attempts to
conceal assets, or uncooperative behavior during discovery, can be considered when dividing
assets and can support a deviation from an equal split. Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415,
430; 566 NW2d 642 (1997).

 To support the claim that defendant's conduct should have resulted in defendant receiving
less property, plaintiff relies on the holding in Sands v Sands, 192 Mich App 698, 699-705; 482
NW2d 203 (1992), aff'd 442 Mich 30; 497 NW2d 493 (1993). In that case, the trial court split the
marital estate equally between the parties despite the husband hiding assets and the trial court
holding him in contempt four times during the proceedings. Id. at 699-702. This Court stated:
"[W]e find it an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to have taken some sort of punitive action
in light of [the husband's] persistent attempts to conceal assets." Id. at 704. Citing the maxim
"one who seeks the aid of equity must come in with clean hands," this Court remanded with
instructions for the trial court to determine which assets the husband attempted to conceal and to
award those assets to the wife before splitting the remainder of the property equally. Id. at 704-
705. Our Supreme Court affirmed this holding, but made it clear this rule of forfeiture is not
automatic. Sands, 442 Mich at 36. Rather, it is simply one way to achieve an overall "equitable
division on the basis of the facts proven in each individual case." Id.

 Unlike the husband in Sands, defendant did not attempt to conceal assets. Rather, the
record supports defendant (1) failed to comply with the trial court's orders at times; (2) delayed
trial because of illness and lack of trial counsel in 2021; and (3) damaged marital property. In fact,
contempt proceedings were initiated against defendant because of her failure to comply with the
trial court's orders. Nonetheless, this is not a case where defendant engaged in an "attempt to
conceal marital assets both during and after the parties' separation." Cf. Cassidy v Cassidy, 318
Mich App 463, 478; 899 NW2d 65 (2017). While defendant admittedly removed funds from the

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 winery's bank account, defendant stated she did so to pay for necessities of daily living, such as
food. Notably, as already discussed, defendant accused plaintiff of concealing, and lying about,
the parties' assets.

 Importantly, in denying defendant's request for attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2), the
trial court concluded: "[A]n award of attorney's fees is inappropriate as both parties' litigious
nature contributed to the fees accrued in this matter." The trial court also commented at an
October 17, 2022 hearing: "I don't think particularly that either party has very clean hands in this
case. . . . I think that both sides have done things to complicate this case and make it drag on farther
than [necessary] . . . ." While these findings were not made in relation to an argument raised by
plaintiff concerning attorney fees, or sanctions, these findings are relevant to his argument. Indeed,
as stated in Sands, 192 Mich App at 704-705, "one who seeks the aid of equity must come in with
clean hands." Plaintiff in this case did not do so. Defendant repeatedly alleged plaintiff largely
controlled the parties' finances. Plaintiff admittedly removed funds from the winery's bank
account and placed them in a separate account, to which only he had access. Plaintiff did so despite
acknowledging defendant had a right to those funds. Additionally, defendant alleged plaintiff
abused her throughout the marriage and the divorce proceedings. The trial court awarded both
parties personal protection orders in relation to an incident where plaintiff entered the marital home
after they separated. And, aside from one lump-sum payment of $9,600, plaintiff did not pay
spousal support during the proceedings. As a result, contempt proceedings against plaintiff were
initiated. Plaintiff also unilaterally put the marital home mortgage in forbearance during the
proceedings, resulting in defendant being unable to obtain a home-equity loan to obtain counsel in
2021. After this was discovered, and plaintiff was questioned about how he spent the mortgage
funds, plaintiff testified he used the funds to pay off a joint credit card.

 While plaintiff argues the proceedings "spanned 40 months almost entirely because of
[defendant's] wrongful conduct and attempts to delay the proceedings," this is unsupported. The
case was filed shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic, which plaintiff's third attorney
acknowledged contributed to the delays. Additionally, the parties engaged in mediation, and both
parties changed legal counsel during the proceedings. Plaintiff's 2022 surgery resulted in the
December 8, 2022 trial being adjourned. It cannot be said the delays are entirely attributable to
defendant or that plaintiff's behavior was impeccable.

 In sum, although defendant's conduct was far from perfect during the proceedings, "fault
is an element in the search for an equitable division—it is not a punitive basis for an inequitable
division." McDougal, 451 Mich at 90. "Marital misconduct is only one factor among many and
should not be dispositive. Instead, fault should be considered in conjunction with all the other
relevant factors." Cassidy, 318 Mich App at 478 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Again,
"the judge's role is to achieve equity, not to ‘punish' one of the parties." Sands, 442 Mich at 36.

 In this case, the trial court was clearly aware of defendant's misconduct and nonetheless
decided to give that evidence minimal weight. The trial court considered a number of other factors,
including the parties' disparate earning abilities, ability to work, life statuses, necessities, and
circumstances. See Sparks, 440 Mich at 159-160 (outlining factors to consider when dividing
property). It is clear the trial court took great pains to equitably distribute the marital estate. Aside
from the trial court awarding defendant premarital portions of the pensions, which appears to have

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 been a mistake,2 the division of the marital estate was fair and equitable on the facts of this case.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award defendant less property on the basis
of her conduct during the divorce proceedings.3

 III. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL

 Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award her permanent
spousal support. We disagree.

 A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

 We review a trial court's award of spousal support for an abuse of discretion. Loutts, 298
Mich App at 25.

 The object in awarding spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs
 of the parties so that neither will be impoverished; spousal support is to be based
 on what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case. We review for
 clear error the trial court's factual findings regarding spousal support. A finding is
 clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite
 and firm conviction that a mistake was made. If the trial court's findings are not
 clearly erroneous, we must determine whether the dispositional ruling was fair and
 equitable under the circumstances of the case. We must affirm the trial court's
 dispositional ruling unless we are convinced that it was inequitable. [Id. at 25-26
 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

 B. ANALYSIS

 "A trial court has discretion to award spousal support under MCL 552.23," Myland v
Myland, 290 Mich App 691, 695; 804 NW2d 124 (2010); and MCL 552.28 authorizes the
modification of periodic spousal support awards, Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 565; 616

2
 Plaintiff states the trial court's error concerning the pensions "adds up to $2,847.24 per year."
3
 To the extent plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to use its inherent
authority to sanction defendant for her conduct during the proceedings, including by awarding
plaintiff attorney fees, this argument is unpreserved. See Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach
Servs & Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 289-294; 14 NW3d 472 (2023). And, even if we
disregarded this preservation requirement, plaintiff would not be entitled to relief because the trial
court determined that neither party had "clean hands in this case" and that both had engaged in
actions to "complicate" and "drag" the proceedings on further than necessary[.]" See and compare
Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 389; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (quotation marks and
citations omitted) (recognizing that a trial court's inherent authority "is a creature of the clean
hands doctrine" and "rooted in a court's fundamental interest in protecting its own integrity and
that of the judicial process").

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 NW2d 219 (2000).4 "Spousal support does not follow a strict formula. Indeed, . . . there is no
room for the application of any rigid and arbitrary formulas when determining the appropriate
amount of spousal support. . . ." Loutts, 298 Mich App at 30 (quotation marks and citation omitted;
second alteration in original).

 Among the factors that a court should consider are (1) the past relations and
 conduct of the parties; (2) the length of the marriage; (3) the abilities of the parties
 to work; (4) the source and the amount of property awarded to the parties; (5) the
 parties' ages; (6) the abilities of the parties to pay support; (7) the present situation
 of the parties; (8) the needs of the parties; (9) the parties' health; (10) the parties'
 prior standard of living and whether either is responsible for the support of others;
 (11) the contributions of the parties to the joint estate; (12) a party's fault in causing
 the divorce; (13) the effect of cohabitation on a party's financial status; and
 (14) general principles of equity. [Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352,
 356; 792 NW2d 63 (2010).]

 "The trial court should make specific factual findings regarding the factors that are relevant
to the particular case." Loutts, 298 Mich App at 32 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The
objective of spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a way that will
not impoverish either party, and support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under the
circumstances of the case." Woodington, 288 Mich App at 356. Although property awards may
be taken into account when determining spousal support, one party should not be required to
dissipate a property award to support himself or herself. Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App
278, 296; 527 NW2d 792 (1995). "The voluntary reduction of income may be considered in
determining the proper amount of alimony. If a court finds that a party has voluntarily reduced
the party's income, the court may impute additional income in order to arrive at an appropriate
alimony award." Cassidy, 318 Mich App at 475 (alteration, quotation marks, and citations
omitted).

4
 Although MCL 552.28 "unambiguously provides that parties to a divorce may petition the trial
court for modification of alimony, our decisions also recognize that divorcing spouses can, in some
circumstances, structure an alimony agreement that will not be subject to future modification."
Staple, 241 Mich App at 565. "If the alimony is either a lump sum or a definite sum to be paid in
installments, the alimony provision is classified as alimony in gross. . . . [A]limony in gross is
considered nonmodifiable and exempt from modification under MCL 552.28[], though the
recipient spouse dies or remarries before all the payments are made." Id. at 566. "However, if the
installment payments are subject to any contingency, such as death or remarriage of a
spouse, . . . the payments are more in the nature of maintenance payments, and therefore periodic
alimony subject to modification." Id. An award of periodic spousal support "may be modified
upon petition of the receiving party showing new facts or changed circumstances." Richards v
Richards, 310 Mich App 683, 692; 874 NW2d 704 (2015). Absent the parties' express intent to
make spousal support nonmodifiable, they maintain their right under MCL 552.28 "to seek
modification of alimony." Staple, 241 Mich App at 568.

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 In February 2020, plaintiff filed his complaint for divorce. Initially, plaintiff was not
ordered to pay temporary spousal support. Instead, the trial court entered an order requiring the
parties to maintain the status quo during the divorce proceedings. This order resulted in plaintiff,
who had control of the parties' finances, being required to pay a majority of the parties' bills. On
November 8, 2021, the Friend of the Court (FOC) issued a recommended order, which required
plaintiff to pay $1,595 in temporary, monthly spousal support. The trial court entered the proposed
order; and, on December 15, 2021, plaintiff objected. The parties agreed the amount calculated
by FOC was erroneous, and it was agreed the trial court would address the issue at trial. At the
time of the February 2023 trial, plaintiff had only paid $9,600 toward spousal support.

 On March 23, 2023, the trial court entered an opinion and order, which outlined its findings
of fact and conclusions of law after the bench trial. The trial court considered the spousal-support
factors and made detailed findings of fact and observations, including: (1) the parties had a "long-
term marriage"; (2) defendant was unable to work because of her long-term disabilities;
(3) defendant received monthly Social Security disability benefits; and (4) plaintiff had the ability
to work in the future, likely earning minimum wage. The trial court also acknowledged it had
already awarded defendant a portion of plaintiff's firefighter pension. The trial court further
recognized that the parties were "close to a traditional retirement age," and would likely face
financial difficulties in the future "due to the financial damage related to the end of the marriage
and loss of the winery." The trial court then held:

 Based on the length of the marriage, the discrepancy in incomes,
 [defendant's] long-standing disability, and the impact of the divorce on both parties,
 the Court finds that an award of long-term spousal support paid to defendant is
 appropriate. Her needs moving forward will be significantly greater than those of
 [plaintiff] due to her disability and she has a lesser ability to meet those needs given
 her limited and fixed income. Further, [plaintiff] providing for the financial support
 of [defendant] is not new, as it was the state of affairs throughout most of the
 parties' marriage. However, after division of [plaintiff's] pension, the parties will
 be far closer in income, and indeed it appears that [defendant] would have greater
 income than [plaintiff] if he does not obtain further employment. Since it does
 appear that [plaintiff] is employable at least in a minimum wage job, it is
 appropriate to include this earning capacity for purposes of determining spousal
 support. Given the circumstances, the award of spousal support should generally
 strive to somewhat equalize the parties' incomes. Consequently, Ms. Wells [sic]
 shall pay spousal support to [defendant] in the amount of $425.00 per month.
 Spousal support shall terminate in the month that [plaintiff] reaches full retirement
 age for purposes of social security.

 On April 21, 2023, the trial court entered an order holding spousal support would be
effective "December 15, 2021, the date [plaintiff] first objected to the spousal support award," and
spousal support would be modifiable based on a change in income. On November 15, 2023, the
judgment of divorce and a final uniform spousal support order were entered. They required
plaintiff to pay defendant $425 in monthly spousal support, effective December 15, 2021. Plaintiff
was to pay spousal support until he reached "his full retirement age of 67 unless further modified
by the Court. . . ."

 -10-
 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court should have awarded her permanent spousal
support. We disagree.

 When reviewing spousal support awards, this Court's first task is to determine if the trial
court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. See Loutts, 298 Mich App at 26. "If the trial
court's findings are not clearly erroneous, we must determine whether the dispositional ruling was
fair and equitable under the circumstances of the case." Id. The fact-finder is best suited to
consider a witness's credibility and demeanor, and "[a]n appellate court should not conduct an
independent review of credibility determinations." Smith, 487 Mich at 130 n 64. See also Berger,
277 Mich App at 705 (holding "[t]his Court will defer to the trial court's credibility
determinations").

 As noted by the trial court, defendant has health issues and is unable to work. In 2002,
defendant was deemed disabled by the Social Security Administration. She began to receive Social
Security disability benefits, which were retroactive to January 2, 2000. At the time of trial,
defendant received $1,535 per month in Social Security disability benefits. Defendant's testimony
supports she required spousal support to pay her expenses. After dividing plaintiff's firefighter
pension, the trial court imputed income to plaintiff. The trial court did so in an effort to balance
the parties' incomes. However, the trial court held spousal support would terminate after plaintiff
turned 67 years of age. In so ordering, the trial court took into consideration plaintiff's age, health,
and physical limitations. It then determined that plaintiff was capable of working a minimum wage
job. The trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. Indeed, plaintiff had surgery in
November 2022, and he would likely require another surgery in the future. Plaintiff also had other
health issues. Plaintiff testified that his prior employment, including work at the winery, was
"[m]ore physically labor intensive." He would not be able to do physically intensive work in his
current medical condition; and he did not know if his overall ability to work would be hampered
by his medical conditions or their associated medications. Plaintiff was hopeful he would be able
to work in a nonlabor intensive job in the future.

 Nonetheless, defendant essentially argues the trial court did not give adequate weight to
the length of the parties' marriage, her health, and the parties' previous standard of living. But, it
is clear the trial court considered these factors and also took into consideration plaintiff's ability
to pay given his age and circumstances. In doing so, the trial court balanced defendant's needs
and the amount of property already awarded to her. The trial court further considered the tenth
factor, i.e., "the parties' prior standard of living," see Woodington, 288 Mich App at 356, and
found the parties lived comfortably for a majority of the lengthy marriage. Yet, the trial court also
recognized the parties would both be unable to return to the standard of living they enjoyed for
much of the marriage because of their financial issues. Given the parties' debts, and their limited
assets, the trial court's ruling was largely based on need. This was a proper focus because
"[s]pousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of the
case." See Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 289; 662 NW2d 111 (2003).

 The trial court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and its award of spousal support
was just and reasonable under the circumstances. While defendant complains it is likely the
parties' incomes will not be equalized after plaintiff is no longer required to pay spousal support
because his Social Security retirement benefits will exceed her benefits, it is clear the trial court

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 balanced the parties' incomes and needs so that neither would be impoverished. See Loutts, 298
Mich App at 26. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.5

 IV. CONCLUSION

 We vacate the portion of the judgment of divorce relating to plaintiff's pensions and
remand for further consideration of this issue. We affirm the remainder of the trial court's holdings
concerning division of the marital estate and spousal support. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
 /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
 /s/ Anica Letica

5
 We note that defendant's argument concerning spousal support is largely based on future events,
i.e., plaintiff's income after retirement. If the events transpire, defendant is not without recourse
because she can move the trial court to extend spousal support payments. See Richards, 310 Mich
App at 692.

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