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MEMORANDUM DECISION
 Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
 binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
 or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

 FILED
 Aug 07 2024, 9:44 am

 CLERK
 Indiana Supreme Court
 Court of Appeals
 and Tax Court

 IN THE

 Court of Appeals of Indiana
 Dalton E. Griffith,
 Appellant

 v.

 Dawn M. Griffith,
 Appellee

 August 7, 2024
 Court of Appeals Case No.
 24A-DN-580
 Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court
 The Honorable Christopher D. Kehler, Special Judge
 Trial Court Cause No.
 43D01-1907-DN-219

 Memorandum Decision by Judge Brown
 Judges May and Pyle concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 1 of 15
 Brown, Judge.

[1] Dalton E. Griffith ("Husband") appeals from the trial court's decree of

 dissolution and claims the court erred in denying his request to repudiate his

 settlement agreement regarding the division of his pension. We affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[2] Husband and Dawn M. Griffith ("Wife") were married in 1998. In 2019, Wife

 filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. The parties participated in mediation

 in April 2022 which resulted in an agreement resolving all matters except for

 the division of Husband's military pension. On August 21, 2023, the court held

 a hearing on the division of Husband's military pension. Wife testified that

 Husband was in the United States Army, he left the military in 2009, she

 believed that he was in the military for twenty-three and one-half years, and he

 received retirement and disability payments. The court admitted a valuation of

 Husband's military pension. 1 Husband's counsel requested a break.

[3] Following a recess, 2 Husband's counsel stated, "Your Honor, we have reached

 an agreement to resolve all pending matters before the Court" and asked to read

 the agreement into the record. Transcript Volume II at 64. The court replied

 affirmatively and stated it would then ask Wife's counsel if there were any

 1
 The valuation stated it was based on the assumption that Husband's monthly retirement payment was
 $2,761, and Wife testified that his disability payment was "around like 13 to1400 a month." Transcript
 Volume II at 27.
 2
 The transcript states: "Recess at 2:40 p.m. until 3:29 p.m." Transcript Volume II at 64.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 2 of 15
 additions or corrections and "ask both parties who have already been sworn in

if this is, in fact, your agreement." Id. at 64. The court asked, "what about the

entry of the final decree," and after conferring with Wife's counsel, Husband's

counsel stated, "[t]he entry of the final decree is today, Your Honor," and the

court replied, "Okay. All right. Yes." Id. at 64-65. Husband's counsel stated:

 [T]he parties have agreed that [Husband] owes back pay of $36,500,
 which will come out of Husband's proceeds for the sale of the
 marital residence. Then the parties agreed that from April of 2023
 to the present, [Husband] owes [Wife] $5,600 in pension back pay.
 He's going to repay that all to her in 12 months, and moving
 forward from today, which is the date of the decree, the pension
 will be divided 50/50, evenly, between the two of them. And
 [Wife's counsel] will prepare the QDRO for DFAS and submit it,
 and we would just like a minute entry – or [Wife's counsel] and I
 will submit an agreed to entry for today that will not require clients'
 signatures – it will just be an agreed to entry.

Id. at 65. Wife's counsel stated:

 I think that covers everything. I think that [Husband] has also
 determined that he'll just make even payments over a year on the
 $5,600. I'm going to assume that we'll also want to add a
 provision that if it's not paid within a year, it would then at that
 point become a judgment and statutory interest would accrue on
 any balance that's not owed (sic).

Id. at 65-66. Husband's counsel said, "we do not have any dates. These are

just numbers we've agreed to because that is the best way to resolve this case,"

and the court stated, "[w]ell, whatever the parties can come up with is better

[than] what I can come up with." Id. at 66. The court asked the parties if they

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 3 of 15
 heard and agreed to the terms of the agreement, Wife stated "Yes, I do," and

 Husband stated, "Good to go, sir. Agreed." Id. The court stated: "The Court,

 having found it has jurisdiction over the parties and of the marriage, does now

 hereby find that the marriage of the parties has suffered an irretrievable

 breakdown, it shall be dissolved and the parties shall be restored to the status of

 unmarried persons." Id. at 67. The court requested Wife's counsel to submit

 "the proposed decree and whatever additional decree or orders are necessary to

 divide the military pension" and stated, "[u]pon receipt of those documents, I

 will sign those and counsel will receive those through our e-filing system." Id.

 at 67-68. Husband's counsel stated, "September 1 is the first date that the

 pension's divided 50/50 because we agreed to back pay [for] the four months

 since April." Id. at 68. On September 7, 2023, Husband's counsel filed a

 motion to withdraw appearance.

[4] On October 6, 2023, counsel for Wife submitted a proposed order. An entry

 dated October 9, 2023, in the chronological case summary ("CCS") states:

 The Court is in receipt of a proposed Decree of Dissolution filed
 by counsel for [Wife]. [Husband] is given to and including
 October 23, 2023, to file a written objection. Absent written
 objection, the Court will sign the proposed Decree of Dissolution
 as tendered.

 Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 17.

[5] On October 20, 2023, Husband, by new counsel, filed a "Verified Notice of

 Repudiation of Agreement" stating that he wished to repudiate the agreement

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 4 of 15
 made on August 21, 2023. Id. at 96. He asserted that he "felt pressured and

 forced by his counsel to agree to the terms that were read into the record in

 open court," he "was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the last

 hearing," and his "ability to make decisions was impaired." Id. He argued that

 he "cannot agree to provide [Wife] with ½ of his military pension," he "is

 disabled and not employed," "eleven years of [his] time in the Army and

 contribution toward his pension benefit were earned prior to the date of the

 parties' marriage," and "a coverture fraction should be applied in this matter."

 Id. at 97. Husband requested the court to set aside the agreement read into the

 record and schedule a new hearing on the issue of the military pension. Wife

 filed a response arguing "[t]he parties each approved the details of the terms to

 be included in a decree." Id. at 102. She argued that she and her counsel did

 not detect, and the court bailiff did not report, an issue related to Husband's

 sobriety. Husband filed a reply asserting that the court did not approve the

 settlement agreement at the August 21, 2023 hearing.

[6] On February 8, 2024, the court issued an order denying Husband's request to

 repudiate the settlement agreement. It found the parties, under oath, assented

 to the terms of the agreement which had been recited in open court and had

 agreed that the agreement was effective August 21, 2023. It noted that, at the

 August 21 hearing, it found that "the marriage had suffered an irretrievable

 breakdown, it shall be dissolved and the parties would be restored to the status

 of unmarried persons," "[t]here was nothing left for the Court to take under

 advisement, to consider or approve," and "[t]he Court clearly approved the

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 5 of 15
 parties' agreement and was waiting to sign the decree/orders upon receipt from

 [Wife's counsel]." Id. at 162. The court further stated: "Giving Husband until

 October 23, 2023 to file a written objection was in no way an indication that the

 Court had not already approved the agreement. The Court simply wanted to

 provide [Husband] with an opportunity to make sure there were no

 typographical errors as he was no longer represented by counsel." Id. The

 court also stated that it gave no weight to Husband's assertion that he felt

 pressured and forced by his counsel to agree to the terms read into the record or

 to any insinuation that Husband was under the influence of alcohol, it viewed

 Husband's demeanor and actions, and there was no indication he was under

 any influence of alcoholic beverages.

[7] Also on February 8, 2024, the trial court signed a decree of dissolution

 providing in part:

 The parties appeared on August 21, 2023, for final hearing on the
 issue of the division of [Husband's] military pension. . . . After the
 presentation of some evidence, by way of testimony elicited from
 [Wife], and after a brief recess, the parties reported that an agreement
 had been reached as to the division of [Husband's] military pension.

 The COURT DOES NOW APPROVE as the Court's findings the
 parties' stipulations and agreement as to the division of [Husband's]
 military pension.

 *****

 The COURT FURTHER FINDS that [Husband's] entire military
 pension (and the terms attendant thereto, such as COLA) shall be
 divided equally between the parties and that a separate order entitled

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 6 of 15
 Military Retired Pay Division Order shall be entered which provides
 for the equal division of [Husband's] military retirement pension.

 The COURT FURTHER FINDS that [Husband] shall pay the sum
 of $36,500 which represented [his] share of net proceeds from the sale
 of the former marital residence to [Wife] in order to compensate [her]
 for her share of the pension benefits paid to [Husband] during the
 pendency of this action as well as the sum of $5,600 which shall be
 paid by [Husband] to [Wife] in equal installments over a one year
 period commencing with the entry of the decree of dissolution.

 *****

 SIGNED: February 8, 2024; EFFECTIVE August 21, 2023.

 Id. at 153-154.

 Discussion

[8] Husband argues the trial court erred in incorporating the settlement agreement

 regarding the division of his military pension into its dissolution decree because

 he timely repudiated the agreement. He argues the court gave him until

 October 23, 2023, to file an objection and he filed his notice of repudiation on

 October 20, 2023. He argues he had a right to repudiate the agreement under

 Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17, Akers v. Akers, 849 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),

 and McClure v. McClure, 459 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Wife argues

 "[t]he written decree was only a formality since the parties had agreed on

 everything," Appellee's Brief at 15, and cites Sanders v. Sanders, 105 N.E.3d

 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 7 of 15
 [9] Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17(a) provides that, "[t]o promote the amicable settlements

 of disputes that have arisen or may arise between the parties to a marriage

 attendant upon the dissolution of their marriage, the parties may agree in

 writing to provisions for . . . the disposition of any property owned by either or

 both of the parties[.]" Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17(b) provides "the terms of the

 agreement, if approved by the court, shall be incorporated and merged into the

 decree and the parties shall be ordered to perform the terms[.]"

[10] In Akers, the husband filed a petition to modify child custody, child support,

 and parenting time. 849 N.E.2d at 774. The wife and husband, their attorneys,

 and the judge discussed a settlement in the judge's chambers. Id. A few days

 later, the wife filed a motion asking the court to reject the agreement and

 schedule a hearing, and one week before the scheduled hearing she filed a

 notice stating that she wished to repudiate the agreement. Id. The husband

 submitted a proposed order, to which the wife objected, and the court signed

 the order. Id. On appeal, the wife argued the trial court erred in approving the

 alleged settlement agreement as she had already repudiated it. Id. This Court

 referred to Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17 and held:

 This Court has concluded that the statute envisions a "simple two-
 step process necessary to bring a valid . . . settlement agreement into
 existence[.]" McClure[,] 459 N.E.2d [at] 401 [] (addressing Indiana
 Code § 31-1-11.5-10 . . . , the predecessor to Indiana Code § 31-15-2-
 17, in context of property settlement agreement). First, the plain
 language of the statute requires a written agreement. Id. at 400.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 8 of 15
 Second, "once there is such an agreement between the parties, it is
 not effective until approved by the court[.]"[3] Id.

 *****

 We believe that the writing requirement of Indiana Code § 31-15-2-17
 can be satisfied in two ways. First, and most obviously, the parties
 can produce and sign a written document containing the terms of
 their agreement. The second way was suggested by Judge Sullivan,
 writing in concurrence in McClure. He wrote: "While the agreement
 may not have been reduced to writing in a separate document and
 signed by the parties as well as by counsel, the agreement became
 binding upon the parties when it was stipulated into the record."
 McClure, 459 N.E.2d at 401 (Sullivan, J., concurring). We agree with
 Judge Sullivan that the writing requirement of Indiana Code § 31-15-
 2-17 can be satisfied by orally stipulating the terms of the settlement
 agreement into the court record. The parties themselves, their
 attorneys, or the trial court can recite the terms of the agreement in
 open court, and the parties can then acknowledge, under oath, their
 assent to those terms. Placing the agreement on the trial court record
 by way of a voice recording and/or the court reporters' transcript is
 tantamount to composing a written settlement document in that both
 procedures produce tangible proof of the terms of the agreement.
 Under Indiana Code § 31-15-2-17, until the parties' agreement is
 memorialized either in writing or on the trial court record, there is
 nothing for the trial court to approve, and either party is free to
 repudiate the alleged agreement. See Eddings [v. Eddings], 437 N.E.2d
 [493,] 494 [(Ind. Ct. App. 1982)].[4]

3
 In McClure, this Court found that the trial judge's comments at a hearing made "the existence of a signed
agreement a condition precedent to his approval of the agreement" and that the wife repudiated the agreement
before the two-step process was complete. 459 N.E.2d at 401.
4
 In Eddings, the wife signed a document which purported to divide the marital estate, "[l]ater, after securing
counsel to contest the dissolution, she clearly and unequivocally repudiated the document both prior to and
during the trial," and this Court held "the alleged agreement was not eligible to be approved and
incorporated into the dissolution decree." 437 N.E.2d at 494.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 9 of 15
 Id. at 775-776 (footnote omitted). We observed that the parties' agreement was

 neither presented to the trial court in written form nor orally recited in open

 court, found that, by the time the husband's attorney presented the agreement

 to the trial court, the wife had already repudiated it and therefore there was

 nothing for the court to approve, and reversed the court's decision to

 incorporate the alleged agreement into its modification order. Id. at 776.

[11] In Sanders, at a final hearing in a dissolution proceeding, the terms of a property

 settlement agreement were read into the record after which both parties agreed

 to the terms. 105 N.E.3d at 1103. The trial court granted the dissolution

 petition that day and directed the preparation of a dissolution order that

 incorporated the terms of the agreement. Id. About a month later, the wife

 moved to repudiate the settlement, which the court denied. Id. at 1103-1104.

 On appeal, the wife asserted the court's adoption of the oral agreement into its

 dissolution decree was erroneous because, among other reasons, the agreement

 was not reduced to writing before approval by the court, and she timely

 repudiated the agreement. Id. at 1106. With respect to the writing requirement,

 this Court cited the discussion in Akers related to the ways in which the writing

 requirement of Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17 can be satisfied. Id. at 1107. We

 concluded that the recitation of the terms of the agreement read in open court,

 followed by the wife's assent under oath to the terms, satisfied the writing

 requirement in Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17(a). Id.

[12] With respect to the whether the wife timely repudiated the agreement, we held:

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 10 of 15
 As we noted in McClure, there is a "simple two-step process necessary
 to bring a valid property settlement agreement into existence[,]"
 namely that (1) the parties must come to a valid agreement and (2)
 the trial court must approve it. McClure, 459 N.E.2d at 401. Until a
 property settlement agreement is approved by the trial court, it can be
 repudiated by a party. See id. ("[O]ur decision is grounded solely on
 error by the trial court in approving an agreement that was timely
 repudiated.").

 Here, the terms of the Agreement were read in open court and the
 parties agreed to them, after which the trial court explicitly approved
 it, stating on the record that "[a]ll property and debts are divided in
 accordance with the agreement[.]" The trial court also made it
 abundantly clear that its judgment was to be effective immediately,
 stating that the parties "are restored to the status of unmarried
 persons effective immediately" and, "In other words, the divorce is
 granted today." The trial court's CCS entry indicating that [the
 husband's] counsel was to prepare a dissolution decree to be
 submitted later but dated . . . the date of the final hearing . . . further
 indicates that it considered the matter settled. [The wife's]
 repudiation came over one month after the trial court approved the
 Agreement at the final hearing, which is too late.

 We acknowledge that some of our precedent indicates that the cutoff
 for repudiation is not when the property settlement is approved by
 the trial court but when the dissolution decree is issued. See, e.g.,
 Anderson v. Anderson, 399 N.E.2d 391, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
 ("Hence, a settlement agreement that has not been approved by the
 dissolution court and incorporated and merged into the decree has no
 legal efficacy.").[5] Under the circumstances of this case, at least, the

5
 In Gabriel v. Gabriel, this Court noted that "[o]ur meaning" in Anderson was that "a party is not bound to
comply with a settlement agreement unless and until it is accepted by the dissolution court and made a part
of the decree" and that "[n]either Anderson nor Eddings confer on parties to a settlement agreement an
absolute right of repudiation prior to trial court approval of the agreement," "[w]ere it otherwise, the public
policy favoring the amicable settlement of disputes by written agreement would be thwarted," and "[a]s
would be the case here, one party might reap all the benefit from the substantial performance of an agreement

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 11 of 15
 actual issuance of the decree was little more than a formality, as the
 trial court made it clear that its judgment was to take effect
 immediately with a decree detailing the judgment to be issued later.
 Granting relief to [the wife] on the basis that the terms of the
 Agreement had not yet been incorporated into the decree when she
 objected would elevate form over substance in this case. [The wife]
 has failed to establish that she timely repudiated the Agreement.

 Id. at 1108 (citations to record omitted).

[13] Here, with respect to the writing requirement of Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17, the

 record reveals that Husband's counsel recited the parties' agreement related to

 the division of Husband's military pension and that Husband and Wife, who

 were under oath, indicated in open court that they agreed to the recited terms.

 Based on Akers and Sanders, we find that the writing requirement of Ind. Code §

 31-15-2-17 was satisfied.

[14] We next address whether Husband timely repudiated the agreement. At the

 August 21, 2023 hearing, Husband's counsel stated that the parties had reached

 an agreement "to resolve all pending matters before the Court," when asked

 about the entry of the final decree Husband's counsel stated the "entry of the

 final decree is today," and the court replied, "Okay." Transcript Volume II at

 65. The terms of the parties' agreement related to the pension were recited in

 open court, the parties expressly agreed to the terms, and the trial court stated

 yet repudiate it to the other party's detriment prior to court approval." 654 N.E.2d 894, 898 (Ind. Ct. App.
 1995), trans. denied.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 12 of 15
 "[t]he Court, having found it has jurisdiction over the parties and of the

 marriage, does now hereby find that the marriage of the parties has suffered an

 irretrievable breakdown, it shall be dissolved and the parties shall be restored to

 the status of unmarried persons." Id. at 67. The court asked Wife's counsel to

 submit "the proposed decree and whatever additional decree or orders are

 necessary to divide the military pension" and stated, "[u]pon receipt of those

 documents, I will sign those[.]" Id. The transcript of the August 21, 2023

 hearing shows that the trial court and the parties considered the matter of the

 division of Husband's pension to be settled and that the subsequently-signed

 decree would merely reflect the terms of the parties' agreement. 6

[15] As for the court's October 9, 2023 CCS entry stating that Husband had until

 October 23 to file an objection to the proposed decree, in light of the comments

 by the court, the parties, and counsel at the August 21, 2023 hearing, we cannot

 conclude that the trial court by its entry provided Husband with the option to

 reconsider and withdraw his assent to the substantive terms of the settlement

 agreement which he entered on the record. Rather, we read the entry as giving

 Husband the opportunity to object to the extent the proposed decree did not

 correctly reflect the terms of the parties' agreement in court or there was some

 other misstatement or error in the proposed decree. On this record, it is clear

 that the entry of the decree was merely a formality to reflect the parties'

 6
 Indeed, the dissolution decree provided "the marriage of the parties is dissolved as of August 21, 2023,"
 and indicated that, while the court signed the decree on February 8, 2024, it was "EFFECTIVE August 21,
 2023." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 154.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 13 of 15
 settlement agreement and the court's order of dissolution effective on August

 21, 2023.

[16] Based on the record, and in light of the case law above, we find that the trial

 court did not err in denying Husband's request to repudiate his agreement

 regarding the division of his pension and in entering the decree of dissolution of

 marriage. 7

[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

 May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
 Bryan L. Ciyou
 Ciyou & Associates, P.C.
 Indianapolis, Indiana
 Anne Medlin Lowe
 Fugate Gangstad Lowe, LLC
 Carmel, Indiana

 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
 David W. Stone IV
 Stone Law Office & Legal Research
 Anderson, Indiana

 7
 Because we affirm the decree of dissolution and its terms related to the division of Husband's pension based
 on the parties' settlement agreement, we do not address Husband's arguments that the trial court abused its
 discretion in dividing the pension and in not applying a coverture fraction.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 14 of 15
 Joanne M. Kolbe
Law Offices of Joanne M. Kolbe
Attorney at Law, P.C.
Warsaw, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-DN-580 | August 7, 2024 Page 15 of 15