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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
 WESTERN DIVISION 

DERRICK L. BEVERLY, Case No. 1:25-cv-00402 

 Plaintiff, Dlott, J. 
 Bowman, M.J. 
v. 

HIGHLAND COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (CSEA), 

 Defendant. 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Derrick L. Beverly initiated this pro se lawsuit in the Highland County Court 
of Common Pleas against the Highland County Child Support Enforcement Agency 
("CSEA"). Defendant Highland County CSEA removed the case to this federal court.1 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, asserting improper 
removal based in part on a lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 3.) After Defendant filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's motion to remand, (Doc. 7), Plaintiff moved for 
leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 11.) In addition, Plaintiff has moved to strike 
three affirmative defenses contained in Defendant's answer to his original complaint. 
(Doc. 10.) For the reasons that follow, the undersigned now recommends that Plaintiff's 
motion to remand to state court be GRANTED, without ruling on any other pending 
motions. 

1Plaintiff filed a virtually identical complaint in the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas against the Clinton 
County Child Support Enforcement Agency. Defendant Clinton County, who is represented by the same 
counsel who represents Highland County in the above-captioned case, removed Plaintiff's lawsuit to federal 
court. See Beverly v. Clinton County CSEA, No. 1:25-cv-00404-JPH-SKB. For the reasons stated, the 
undersigned also has recommended remand to state court in that case. 
I. Background 
Plaintiff's initial complaint and the 33 pages of exhibits attached thereto make clear 
that Plaintiff seeks reimbursement from Defendant Highland County CSEA for 
Defendant's prior seizure of Plaintiff's assets in support of child support obligations. The 
child support obligations arise from a state court support order entered on January 23, 

2007, and/or a default judgment entered on March 2, 2007.2 (Doc. 2, PageID 66.) Plaintiff 
alleges that beginning in July 2007 until "[c]urrent," Defendant "wrongfully seized or 
caused to be seized [$] 28,000 and Counting to a sum over $41,896.34" from Plaintiff's 
"[b]ank accounts, wages, tax returns, etc." (Doc. 2, ¶ 5.) He generally alleges (without 
providing factual details) that in collecting the referenced payments, Defendant violated 
his federal due process rights under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 
Along with his federal claims, Plaintiff alleges conversion and "gross negligence or willful 
misconduct." (Id., PageID 56.) 
Defendant timely filed a Notice of Removal to this Court on grounds that Plaintiff 

asserts violations of his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
permits this Court to exercise federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331. (See 
Doc. 1, citing to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441, and 1446.) At first, Plaintiff objected to 
removal and moved to remand. But after Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to 
remand, Plaintiff moved to file an amended complaint in this Court in which he alleges 

2Defendant has asserted multiple defense in its Answer, including but not limited to the statute of limitations 
in light of the date of the alleged violations of Plaintiff's due process rights. 
3Plaintiff appears to allege that his due process rights were violated in 2007 at the time the state court 
entered judgment against him. (See Doc. 2, PageID 85 (Plaintiff's 2/28/25 letter to Defendant) and PageID 
65 (Plaintiff's 3/28/25 letter complaining that Highland County CSEA lacked personal jurisdiction over him 
and that the child support order reflects a "rush to judgment into a default judgment."); see also id., PageID 
66 (Defendant's 3/7/25 response to Plaintiff); id., PageID 87 (Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's report of 
his obligations to various credit reporting agencies.)) 
that jurisdiction is proper in this federal Court after all, "because this action arises under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States." (Doc. 11-1, ¶ 2.) 
II. Analysis 
The fact that Plaintiff's tendered amended complaint newly asserts the existence 
of federal question jurisdiction suggests that he no longer objects to removal or seeks 

remand to state court. But Plaintiff has not withdrawn his motion to remand. And his 
change of heart about proceeding in federal court does not settle the matter. Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a), Defendant's removal of this case was proper only if this Court could 
exercise original jurisdiction over the subject matter. The existence of federal jurisdiction 
depends on the facts as they exist when a complaint is filed, or – in this case – at the time 
of removal. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1)(A) (permitting removal if a civil action 
"arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" within the meaning 
of § 1331). If this Court lacked jurisdiction at the time of removal, then it remains without 
power to proceed on any other pending motions, including Plaintiff's recent motion to 
amend his complaint.4 

In his motion to remand, Plaintiff expressly challenges this Court's jurisdiction on 
multiple grounds, including the Defendant's sovereign immunity and/or Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, the domestic relations exception, and the Younger abstention 

4The tendered amended complaint does not include exhibits or other information that identifies the exact 
date of the alleged default judgment on child support. In fact, the amended complaint contains no dates at 
all. But Plaintiff confirms in his motion to amend that the amended complaint is intended to "clarify" his 
original factual allegations regarding the 2007 default child support judgment. Thus, Plaintiff alleges he 
fathered a child at age 16, and at age 18, attended "what he believed was a paternity hearing in Highland 
County," but that "[i]nstead of a paternity hearing, a default child support judgment was entered" against 
him in violation of Plaintiff's due process rights. (Id., ¶¶ 6-8.) Since entry of that judgment, he alleges that 
Defendant has "wrongfully seized over $41,896.34" from Plaintiff's bank accounts, wages, and tax returns. 
(Id., ¶ 9.) As explained, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the motion to amend. But even if the amended 
complaint were to be considered, it would not alter the conclusion that remand is required. 
doctrine. Plaintiff also argues that he has failed to state any federal claim against 
Defendant because it is not a "person" under § 1983. 
Defendant does not entirely disagree with Plaintiff's challenges to his own claims, 
but awkwardly suggests that the Court should deny the motion to remand and await 
consideration of Defendant's future motion for judgment on the pleadings before 

considering those challenges.5 (See Doc. 7, PageID 134, asserting that "immunity will be 
one of the issues raised in Defendant's upcoming motion for judgment on the pleadings.") 
Alternatively, Defendant suggests that this Court could dismiss Plaintiff's case sua sponte 
on the basis of sovereign immunity. (Id., PageID 135.) But Defendant has two problems: 
(1) it has likely waived any possible defense of sovereign immunity; and (2) remand of a 
removed case is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) when a court lacks jurisdiction 
over "even if it appears that remand would be futile." Mallory v. Cnty. of Wayne, No. 09-
cv-14358, 2010 WL 2632196, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2010) (quoting Coyne v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir.1999)). 

A. Sovereign Immunity is Arguably Waived 
The undersigned first considers sovereign immunity. Plaintiff asserts that 
Defendant is an "arm of the state" and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity 
when performing child support enforcement functions. See, generally, Gamble v. Ohio 
Dept. of Job and Family Services, No. 1:03-cv-452, 2006 WL 38996, at *11 (S.D. Ohio 
Jan 5, 2006) (holding that county agency that collected child support payments and 

5Plaintiff's motion to remand presents a number of arguments against the existence of federal jurisdiction 
more commonly presented by defendants in a motion to dismiss a case that has been improperly filed in 
federal court. 
transmitted them to the state was entitled to state sovereign immunity for plaintiff's claims 
of retrospective monetary relief). 
There is considerable overlap between the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign 
immunity – so much so that "courts have often treated Eleventh Amendment immunity 
and sovereign immunity as interchangeable concepts." WCI, Inc. v. Ohio Department of 

Pub. Safety, 18 F.4th 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio trying to 
sue what he alleges to be a state agency, so sovereign immunity is the operative doctrine. 
Id. at 514 ("Because the parties are not diverse, sovereign immunity applies, and the 
Eleventh Amendment, by its plain terms, does not.") The distinction is important because 
sovereign immunity is waivable. And on the record presented, Defendant appears to have 
waived any claim to sovereign immunity that it might otherwise have asserted by first 
removing this case to federal court, and then opposing Plaintiff's motion to remand. See 
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002). Defendant does not explicitly invoke 
sovereign immunity in its answer to the complaint,6 and admits in its opposition to remand 

that "the defense of [sovereign] immunity has not yet been asserted by Defendant." (Doc. 
7, PageID 135; but see id. at PageID 134, expressing an intent to invoke some version of 
"immunity" in a future motion for judgment on the pleadings.) Because Defendant 
arguably has waived any sovereign immunity that it might have asserted as a threshold 
issue, sovereign immunity does not support remand. 

6Defendant's Answer to the complaint includes only a general assertion of "immunity, including statutory, 
absolute, and qualified immunity, as well as immunity from punitive damages," and cross-references Ohio 
Revised code Chapter 2744 et seq. (Doc. 6, ¶ 8, PageID 107.) Curiously (and contradictorily), Plaintiff's 
motion to strike Defendant's affirmative defenses includes an argument that this Court should strike 
Defendant's "assertion of sovereign immunity" as "legally insufficient" on grounds that Defendant is not an 
arm of the state entitled to assert that defense. (Doc. 10, PageID 144.) 
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Lacking for Other Reasons 
Although sovereign immunity does not preclude subject matter jurisdiction, remand 
is still required based on other jurisdictional defects.7 For instance, Plaintiff also seeks 
remand on grounds that his claims are "inextricably linked to ongoing or prior state 
proceedings related to domestic relations (Child Support), which fall outside the 

jurisdiction of Federal Courts…." (Doc. 3, PageID 95.) Plaintiff specifically argues that 
resolution of this lawsuit "would require the Court to evaluate the propriety of support 
enforcement proceedings - a matter properly reserved to the state courts." (Id.) 
The "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction precludes the exercise of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship and the plaintiff is seeking to obtain a divorce, alimony, or child custody. See 
Allah v. Child Support Enf't Agency, No. 1:18 CV 872, 2018 WL 3752244, at *5 (N.D. Ohio 
Aug. 7, 2018) (quoting Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 794-98 (6th Cir. 
2015)). As the court pointed out in Allah, traditional application of the domestic relations 

exception is limited to cases involving diversity, rather than federal question jurisdiction. 
But recent Sixth Circuit case law supports application of the domestic relations exception 
in this case. In Edelstein v. Flottman, Case No. 1:23-cv-754-MWM-SKB, 2023 WL 
8004722 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2023), the undersigned recommended sua sponte dismissal 

7Aside from being irrelevant to analysis of other jurisdictional defects, the apparent waiver of sovereign 
immunity has no impact on whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Plaintiff concedes that his allegations "do not state a valid § 1983 claim" against the Defendant because 
"claims against state agencies …are barred unless the agency is a ‘person' under § 1983." (Doc. 3-1, 
PageID 100-101). See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Plaintiff concedes 
that his § 1983 claims against Defendant fail because the CSEA does not appear to be a "person" subject 
to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ewing v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Office of Child Support Services, 2024 WL 
4252565, at *2 (N.D. Ohio, 2024) (defendant is a department or agency of Cuyahoga County and is not sui 
juris); Messiah v. Hamilton Cnty. Child Support Enf't Agency, No. 1:19-cv-35-SJD-SKB, 2019 WL 3227907, 
at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2019) (R&R adopted 2019 WL 3501533 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2019) (granting 
Hamilton County CSEA's motion to dismiss in part on grounds that it is not a person capable of being sued). 
for lack of jurisdiction based in part on the domestic relations exception under Burrus8 
and the Rooker-Feldman9 abstention doctrines, notwithstanding the assertion of federal 
question jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. See Edelstein v. Flottman, No. 24-3156, 
2025 WL 609487 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025). 
On the one hand, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged a split in the case law on whether 

the domestic relations exception applies to all federal question cases10 and stated that it 
"need not expressly decide" that issue. Id., at *2. But, citing a 2003 case in which the Sixth 
Circuit had held that the exception was "appropriately applied" to another federal question 
case, the appellate court held that the exception should apply "where the constitutional 
claims [are] conclusory and ‘a pretense to obtain federal review of domestic relations 
matters.'" Id. (quoting Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 Fed. Appx. 615, 617 (6th Cir. 2003) (per 
curiam)). The court reasoned that the claims fell "within the domestic relations exception, 
rendering abstention under Burrus and its progeny appropriate," because the substance 
of the claims revolved around the state courts' underlying domestic-relations decisions, 

and the relief requested would require the district court "to modify or nullify state-court 
domestic relations orders on their merits." Id. at *3 (citing Greenberg v. Slatery, No. 22-
5886, 2023 WL 2771640, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023)). 
Consistent with Edelstein and Danforth, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
based on the Burrus abstention doctrine and its progeny. Plaintiff freely admits that the 
"relief sought would necessarily require the Court to review or interfere with the 

8In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). 
9Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983). 
10See Deem v. Dimella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 623 (2d Cir. 2019) (collecting cases and holding that the 
"domestic relations exception" applies only to diversity suits, but that domestic relations "abstention" applied 
to federal question case). 
administration of a child support matter…." (Doc. 3-1, PageID 100.) In order to grant 
Plaintiff the reimbursement of child support payments that he seeks, this Court would 
need to modify or terminate the 2007 child support order and/or to stop ongoing child 
support collections arising from the 2007 default judgment in Highland County. See also 
Johnson v. Hutcheson, No. 3:15-cv-320, 2015 WL 5679637, at *4 (S.D .Ohio Sept. 28, 

2015) (dismissing § 1983 suit on initial screening in part based on Burrus abstention 
doctrine.) 
In addition to abstention under Burrus and its progeny, the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine also precludes this Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims.11 See, e.g., Rouse 
v. Nessel, No. 21-1630, 2022 WL 13631916, at *2 (6th Cir. July 11, 2022) (federal claims 
that require the district court to reject state child-support orders are barred under the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Danforth, 76 Fed. Appx at 616 (same); Raymond v. Moyer, 
501 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that no exception applies to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine for procedural due process violations); West v. Berkman, No. 19-cv-

12674, 2019 WL 12054757, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2019) (attack on child support 
enforcement orders barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also, generally, Ewing v. 
Cuyahoga Cnty. Office of Child Support Services, No. 1:24-cv-997, 2024 WL 4252565, 
at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2024) (dismissing case in which the plaintiff sought to relitigate 
his state court child support obligations as barred by res judicata). The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine provides an independent basis for concluding that this Court lacks jurisdiction, 
regardless of whether the domestic relations exception applies.12 Having determined that 

11See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
12Although Plaintiff raises the Younger abstention doctrine as yet another jurisdictional bar, that doctrine 
does not apply in the absence of any ongoing state court proceedings. 
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the next issue is to determine whether 
dismissal or remand is required. 
C. Remand is Required Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
Had this case been filed in federal court, the undersigned would not hesitate to 
recommend dismissal. But given that Defendant improperly removed the case to this 

Court, the Court must remand. "[A]ll doubts as to the propriety of removal are resolved in 
favor of remand." Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999). Pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a district court must remand a removed case to state court "[]ff at 
any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction." See also, generally, Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 
(2025) (holding that district court could not retain jurisdiction over a properly removed 
case if the plaintiff later amends her complaint to eliminate the only asserted federal 
claims). 
The irony is not lost on the undersigned that the recommendation to remand this 

case to state court is a recommendation that no one wants. With the filing of Plaintiff's 
motion to amend his complaint to newly assert federal subject matter jurisdiction, and 
Defendant's opposition to remand, both parties now appear to favor litigation in this Court 
rather than in state court. And the interests of judicial economy generally favor dismissal 
of futile claims rather than remand. But it is the job of this Court to enforce the law rather 
than to make it. And 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) affords no discretion to a federal court to ignore 
its mandate that an improperly removed case "shall be remanded." Id. (emphasis added); 
see also Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Admins. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 89 
(1991) (holding that remand rather than dismissal is required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
if removal was improper due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Coyne, 183 F.3d at 
496; Jordan v. Carter, 739 F. Supp. 3d 647, 653 (S.D. Ohio 2024) (on reconsideration, 
amending Jordan v. Carter, 719 F. Supp. 3d 775 (S.D. Ohio 2024), but reaffirming its 
conclusion "that § 1447(c) admits of no futility exception[] to remand when the court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed cause."); Mallory, 2010 WL 2632196, at *5 

(holding that remand rule still applies in cases involving the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 
III. Conclusion and Recommendation 
Because this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case from the 
moment of removal, it should remand to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) without 
ruling on Plaintiff's pending motion to amend his complaint and motion to strike 
Defendant's affirmative defenses.13 For the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED 
THAT Plaintiff's motion to remand to state court (Doc. 3) be GRANTED and that this case 
be remanded to the Highland County Court of Common Pleas. 

 s/Stephanie K. Bowman 
 Stephanie K. Bowman 
 United States Chief Magistrate Judge 

13If the presiding district judge disagrees with the above analysis and finds some basis for jurisdiction, the 
undersigned alternatively would grant the unopposed motion to amend and deny the motion to strike as 
moot. 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
 WESTERN DIVISION 

DERRICK L. BEVERLY, Case No. 1:25-cv-00402 

 Plaintiff, Dlott, J. 
 Bowman, M.J. 
v. 

HIGHLAND COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (CSEA), 

 Defendant. 

 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 
objections to this Report and Recommendation ("R&R") within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of 
the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely 
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of 
the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of 
the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent's objections within FOURTEEN (14) 
DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in 
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).