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CourtListener opinion 11151481

Citation: domestic relations order · Date unknown · US

Extracted case name
pending
Extracted reporter citation
domestic relations order
Docket / number
pending
QDRO relevance 5/5Retirement relevance 2/5Family-law relevance 5/5gold label pending
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Machine-draft public headnote: CourtListener opinion 11151481 is included in the LexyCorpus QDRO sample set as a public CourtListener opinion with relevance to QDRO procedure / domestic relations order issues. The current annotation is conservative: it identifies source provenance, relevance signals, and evidence quotes for attorney/agent retrieval. It is not a Willie-approved legal headnote yet.

Retrieval annotation

Draft retrieval summary: this opinion has QDRO relevance score 5/5, retirement-division score 2/5, and family-law score 5/5. Use the quoted text and full opinion below before relying on the case.

Category: QDRO procedure / domestic relations order issues

Evidence quotes

domestic relations order

in discovery matters and in determining the appropriate spousal support award, see State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 692 N.E.2d 198, 201 (discovery), and Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028, 1030 (domestic relations orders), an extraordinary writ will not issue to control her judicial discretion, even if that discretion is abused. See State ex rel. Thomson v. Court of Claims (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 495, 497, 687 N.E.2d 456, 458. {¶ 9} Further, any errors committed by Judge Dezso will be remediable on appeal. Neither prohibition nor mandamus will issue as a substitute to revie

Source and provenance

Source type
courtlistener_qdro_opinion_full_text
Permissions posture
public
Generated status
machine draft public v0
Review status
gold label pending
Jurisdiction metadata
US
Deterministic extraction
reporter: domestic relations order
Generated at
May 14, 2026

Related public corpus pages

Deterministic links based on shared title/citation terms and QDRO / retirement / family-law retrieval scores.

Clean opinion text

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 86 Ohio St.3d 257.]

 BERTHELOT, APPELLANT, v. DEZSO, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES.
 [Cite as Berthelot v. Dezso, 1999-Ohio-100.]
Writs of mandamus and prohibition are appropriate to require lower courts to
 comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a superior court—
 Court of appeals does not err in dismissing relator's claims for
 extraordinary relief in mandamus and prohibition when there is no evidence
 that domestic relations judge has proceeded contrary to the mandate of the
 court of appeals involving spousal support in a divorce action.
 (No. 99-359—Submitted July 28, 1999—Decided September 1, 1999.)
 APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 19349.
 __________________
 {¶ 1} In October 1996, appellee Summit County Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division Judge Carol J. Dezso, granted a divorce to appellant,
Maureen A. Berthelot, and her husband, appellee Michael J. Berthelot. Judge
Dezso awarded Maureen spousal support of $6,000 per month for a period of forty-
seven months. In April 1998, the Court of Appeals for Summit County reversed
the spousal support award by holding:
 "This case involves a marriage of long duration. The court found Michael
to be highly educated and earning an annual income in excess of one-half million
dollars. The court found the family had experienced ‘the highest quality standard
of living' during the marriage. Despite these facts and despite Maureen's complete
lack of income and slight earning potential, largely if not entirely due to her marital
responsibilities, the court awarded her spousal support in an amount equivalent of
$72,000 per year for a duration of less than four years. We cannot determine from
the lower court's findings that it properly considered R.C. 3105.18 or Kunkle [v.
Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 554 N.E.2d 83] in fashioning this award. For
 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

this reason, we find the award constitutes an abuse of discretion and we reverse
and remand the issue for further consideration." Berthelot v. Berthelot (Apr. 15,
1998), Summit App. No. 18331, unreported, 1998 WL 178561.
 {¶ 2} In May 1998, Maureen served Michael with requests for discovery.
In June 1998, Maureen filed several motions in the common pleas court, including
a motion to modify child support and temporary spousal support. Maureen
contended that the court of appeals' judgment voided Judge Dezso's spousal
support order. Michael filed a motion to dismiss Maureen's motions and a motion
to quash her discovery requests. Michael claimed that in order to comply with the
court of appeals' mandate, Judge Dezso needed only to make additional findings
supporting her original spousal support award.
 {¶ 3} In August 1998, Maureen's counsel advised Judge Dezso of the
dispute between the parties about the court of appeals' remand and requested that
Judge Dezso provide "guidance as to whether [she] intend[ed] to have a new
hearing regarding the issues of spousal support or whether [she] merely plan[ned]
to issue additional findings of fact in support of [her] prior order * * *." Judge
Dezso promptly advised Maureen's counsel that she would like to stay the
proceedings until the parties indicated whether they would be willing to engage in
settlement negotiations. The parties agreed to attempt to settle the case, and a
settlement conference took place on October 6, 1998. The parties later advised
Judge Dezso that they had reached an impasse in their attempt to settle the case.
By letters dated October 14 and 20, 1998, Maureen's counsel requested that Judge
Dezso provide immediate guidance on the remand procedures and an immediate
hearing on Maureen's motion to compel discovery and for sanctions.
 {¶ 4} On October 30, 1998, Maureen filed a complaint in the court of
appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Dezso "to follow the remand of
[the] court [of appeals] in its Journal Entry and Opinion of April 15, 1998, by
scheduling an evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of spousal support and

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 January Term, 1999

appellate attorney's fees and ordering that the Respondent permit the Relator to
conduct sufficient pretrial discovery regarding her former husband's income and
assets," and a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Dezso "from proceeding in the
Relator's case in derogation of [the court of appeals'] April 15, 1998 order of
remand, such as merely attempting to provide additional facts in support of her prior
spousal support award and not permitting the Relator to conduct sufficient pretrial
discovery." Judge Dezso and Michael, who was permitted to intervene as a
respondent, filed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for
relief upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals granted appellees'
motions and dismissed Maureen's complaint.
 {¶ 5} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.1
 __________________
 Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., and Robert I. Zashin, for appellant.
 Michael T. Callahan, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara
Crouse Babbit, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Judge Carol J. Dezso.
 Lieberth & Anderson, L.P.A., and Dreama Anderson; Maistros & Loepp,
Ltd., and Thomas C. Loepp, for appellee Michael J. Berthelot.
 __________________
 Per Curiam.
 {¶ 6} Maureen asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing her
claims for extraordinary relief in mandamus and prohibition. She claims that Judge
Dezso has no discretion to deny her discovery and an evidentiary hearing to
redetermine spousal support following the court of appeals' reversal and remand of
the original spousal support award. For the following reasons, Maureen's
assertions lack merit.

1. We deny appellant's request for oral argument. She has established none of the factors that
warrant oral argument. None of the issues raised is so complex that oral argument would be
beneficial. State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 205, 699 N.E.2d 83, 84.

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 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 {¶ 7} Writs of mandamus and prohibition are appropriate to require lower
courts to comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a superior court.
State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 394, 678 N.E.2d
549, 553. Here, however, there is no evidence that Judge Dezso has proceeded
contrary to the mandate of the court of appeals. As the court of appeals concluded,
it "did not give specific instructions concerning additional discovery, evidence, or
proper procedure" in its prior mandate, so Judge Dezso possesses discretion to
"choose the appropriate procedure and decide, guided by [the court of appeals']
opinion, the appropriate spousal support award." Certainly, the court of appeals
was in the best position to determine if Judge Dezso had violated its remand order.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Bitter v. Missig (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 249, 252, 648 N.E.2d
1355, 1357. It did not so find.
 {¶ 8} Moreover, given the discretionary authority vested in Judge Dezso in
discovery matters and in determining the appropriate spousal support award, see
State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 692 N.E.2d
198, 201 (discovery), and Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541
N.E.2d 1028, 1030 (domestic relations orders), an extraordinary writ will not issue
to control her judicial discretion, even if that discretion is abused. See State ex rel.
Thomson v. Court of Claims (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 495, 497, 687 N.E.2d 456, 458.
 {¶ 9} Further, any errors committed by Judge Dezso will be remediable on
appeal. Neither prohibition nor mandamus will issue as a substitute to review mere
errors in judgment. See State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d
104, 109, 637 N.E.2d 319, 324.
 {¶ 10} Finally, to the extent that Maureen's mandamus claim could be
construed as a challenge to Judge Dezso's alleged failure to promptly rule on her
pending motions, Judge Dezso did not unnecessarily delay in ruling on the motions.
Maureen agreed to the judge's suggestions that the motions be held in abeyance
while the parties attempted to settle the case. When the parties reached an impasse,

 4
 January Term, 1999

only two to three weeks had elapsed from the time Maureen requested that Judge
Dezso act immediately on her pending motions until Maureen filed her complaint
for writs of mandamus and prohibition. See State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty.
Court of Common Pleas (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462, 650 N.E.2d 899, 900
(procedendo action to compel judge to rule on postconviction relief petition and
motions was properly dismissed because petition and motions had been pending for
only two to three weeks when complaint for writ of procedendo was filed); State ex
rel. Dehler v. Sutula (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 33, 35-36, 656 N.E.2d 332, 333-334
(mandamus will not lie to compel court to rule on postconviction relief petition,
which had been pending for ten months, where relator had filed other related
requests on and after date he filed petition). And significantly, Maureen asserts in
her reply brief that she is not requesting the same relief in this case as she did in a
procedendo action to compel Judge Dezso to promptly rule on her pending motions;
instead, she claims that she merely wants the judge to comply with the court of
appeals' mandate. Berthelot v. Dezso (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1426, 707 N.E.2d 516.
We do note, however, that Judge Dezso should now proceed to promptly rule on
the pending motions.
 {¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed the
complaint for extraordinary relief in mandamus and prohibition. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.2
 Judgment affirmed.
 MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
 __________________

2. In view of this holding, appellant's motion to remand the cause to the court of appeals, in order
that it can consider a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, as well as Judge Dezso's motion
to strike appellant's reply brief, is rendered moot.

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