CourtListener opinion 11166646

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
 ATHENS DIVISION 
AARON KYLE WEISENBURG THOMAS, 
 Plaintiff, 
 CIVIL ACTION NO. 
v. 
 3:25-cv-00153-TES 
DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., 
 Defendants. 

 ORDER 

 Pro se Plaintiff Aaron Kyle Weisenburg Thomas commenced this civil action on 
September 30, 2025, by filing a Complaint [Doc. 1] and moving for leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis ("IFP"). [Doc. 2]. Because the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave 
to Proceed IFP [Doc. 2] and waives the filing fee, the Court must review his Complaint. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 
 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
 Authority for granting a plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit without prepayment 
of fees and costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides as follows: 
 [Generally], any court of the United States may authorize the 
 commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, 
 civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security 
 therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of 
 all assets such prisoner possesses1 that the person is unable to pay such fees 
 or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, 
 defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). A plaintiff's application is sufficient to warrant a waiver of filing 
fees if it "represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the 
court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his 
dependents." Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004). After 
reviewing Plaintiff's application, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to 
Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 2] or, stated differently, grants him IFP status. 

 FRIVOLITY REVIEW 
 A. Legal Standard 
 Since Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, § 1915(e) requires the Court to review his 
Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim for 

which relief may be granted.2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). The proper contours of the 
term "frivolous," have been defined by the Supreme Court to encompass complaints 
that, despite their factual allegations and legal conclusions, lack an arguable basis either 

in law or in fact. Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). These types of complaints 

1 "Despite the statute's use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,' the affidavit requirement applies to all 
persons requesting leave to proceed [in forma pauperis]." Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 
1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). 
2 The Eleventh Circuit has determined that "28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which governs proceedings in forma 
pauperis generally . . . permits district courts to dismiss a case ‘at any time' if the complaint ‘fails to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted.'" Robinson v. United States, 484 F. App'x 421, 422 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
are subject to sua sponte dismissal by a district court. Id. at 324 (noting that dismissals 
under § 1915(e) "are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to 

spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such 
complaints[]"). 
 More specifically, to survive this initial screening, a claim must contain 

"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face." 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
"authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). Such dismissal 
procedure—operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint 
are true—streamlines litigation by dispensing with unnecessary discovery and 
factfinding. Id. "Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are 

obviously unsupportable." Id. at 327. To the contrary, if it is clear, as a matter of law, 
that no relief could be granted under "any set of facts that could be proven with the 
allegations," a claim must be dismissed. Id. (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73). 

 Frivolity review under § 1915(e), on the other hand, has a separate function. 
Section 1915(e) is designed to discourage the filing of—and waste of judicial and private 
resources upon—baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate due to 
filing costs and the potential threat of sanctions associated with filing such a lawsuit. Id. 

"To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based 
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil 
of [a] complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions 

are clearly baseless." Id. Even though Rule 12 and § 1915(e) both counsel dismissal and 
share "considerable common ground" with each other, one dismissal standard does not 
invariably encompass the other. Id. at 328. "When a complaint raises an arguable 

question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against [a] 
plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of 
frivolousness is not." Id. 

 B. Frivolity Review 
 In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged violations of his "right to be 
heard, [his] right to equal protection[,] and due process in Athens[-]Clarke County." 
[Doc. 1, p. 4]. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Danielle Huff and the Department of 

Human Resources have violated his rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments 
as well as under several state laws and rules. [Id. at p. 3]. Ultimately, Plaintiff seems to 
assert that this lawsuit arises from several occasions of insufficiency of process in what 

appears to be related to a domestic relations order. [Id. at pp. 4–5]. 
 Plaintiff lists the "Department of Human Resources" as a defendant in this 
action. The Court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to what used to be known as the 
Georgia Department of Human Resources. However, the Georgia Department of 

Human Resources has not existed by that name since 2009. As such, Plaintiff seemingly 
seeks relief from an agency that no longer exists. The Court will surmise that Plaintiff 
meant, instead, to refer to the Georgia Department of Human Services. Although it is 

now apparent that Plaintiff has sued the wrong party, the Court may not dismiss his 
claims for misjoinder alone. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Instead, the Court must add the 
proper party since the Georgia Department of Human Services is essential to Plaintiff's 

claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). But the Court declines to do so in this case because 
Plaintiff's claims—regardless of who has been named as a Defendant—are nonetheless 
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 

 To begin, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private cause of action that allows 
individuals to seek damages for deprivations of federal constitutional or statutory 
rights by persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 To state a claim for 
relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a 

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or a federal 
statute; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a state actor or a person acting 
under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). 

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual 
allegations, it does require "more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

3 Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
harmed-me accusation[s]." McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (alteration in original). 

 In this case, Plaintiff has levied claims against a state agency, including claims for 
violation of his Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment rights via § 1983. The Eleventh 
Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be 

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Accordingly, the amendment precludes actions 

against an unconsenting State brought in federal court. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 
159, 167–69 (1985); see also Green v. Waystack, No. 5:18-cv-00042-TES, 2018 WL 3097019, 
at *5–6 (M.D. Ga. June 22, 2018). The Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of suits against 
an unconsenting State expends equally to state agencies. Ga. Dept. of Nat. Res. v. Ctr. for a 

Sustainable Coast, Inc., 755 S.E.2d 184, 188-90 (Ga. 2014) (citing to Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. 
II, Par. IX(e)). The State of Georgia has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
and therefore has not consented to suit in federal courts. See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b) 

("The state does not waive any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts 
of the United States."). In other words, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims 
brought against state agencies. Spillers v. Crawford Cnty., Ga., No. 5:11-CV-324 MTT, 
2011 WL 5910738, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2011). Therefore, Plaintiff may not bring his 

claims against the state agency in federal court. 
 Furthermore, Plaintiff presumably may not bring the same claims against 
Defendant Danielle Huff. Based on the facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, it is not 

exactly clear who Danielle Huff is or what her connection to this case is. The Court is 
therefore forced to once again fill in the blanks left in Plaintiff's Complaint. Without any 
facts showing that Defendant Huff acted under color of law, Plaintiff may not sustain a 

claim under § 1983 against her. To maintain a cause of action under § 1983, the conduct 
complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law 
and must result in a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States. Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th 
Cir. 1990). This well-established principle of law defeats Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 
against Defendant Huff as nothing in Plaintiff's Complaint shows that she acted under 
color of state law. As such, the Court DISMISSES any such claim brought under § 1983 

against Defendant Huff without prejudice. 
 Additionally, Plaintiff has included 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1443 as statutes at issue 
in this case. [Doc. 1, p. 3]. However, § 1442 deals specifically for removal of cases from 

state courts when federal officers or agencies are sued or prosecuted. 28 U.S.C. § 1442. 
This statute does not create a separate "cause of action" against a defendant. The same 
can be said for claims brought under § 1443, as it deals primarily with a defendant's 
ability to remove a civil rights case from state courts to the pertinent district court. Id. at 

§ 1443. This section, like § 1442, does not provide for a private right of action against an 
individual. As such, any claim brought by Plaintiff under §§ 1442 and 1443 are 
DISMISSED. 

 Having disposed of Plaintiff's federal claims, all that remains are her state law 
claims, and the Court is not required to decide them. Federal courts may exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims "in any civil action of which [they] have 

original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). "[D]istrict courts may," however, "decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim" if "the district court has dismissed all 
claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "[S]tate courts, not 

federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law," and when a federal court "has 
dismissed all federal claims from a case, there is a very strong argument for dismissal, 
especially where the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial." Ingram v. Sch. Bd. of 
Mia.-Dade Cnty., 167 F. App'x 107, 108 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank 

of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997)). "[D]istrict courts may not exercise 
jurisdiction absent a statutory basis." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 
546, 552 (2005). Recognizing this hard-and-fast rule, the Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims in accordance with the 
considerable discretion afforded to it by § 1367(c)(3), and it DISMISSES them without 
prejudice.4 [Doc. 1, p. 7]. 
 C. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP 
[Doc. 2]. Then, upon review of Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. 1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), 
the Court DISMISSES it without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 SO ORDERED, this 9th day of October, 2025. 
 S/ Tilman E. Self, III 
 TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

4 If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue her state law claims, she must refile them in the appropriate state court. 
See Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 77 (2018) ("If a district court declines to exercise jurisdiction 
over a claim asserted under § 1367(a) and the plaintiff wishes to continue pursuing it, she must refile the 
claim in state court.").