CourtListener opinion 11178597

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
ASHLEIGH TAYLOR, 

 2:25-CV-00212-CCW 
 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CORY SMITH, 

 Defendant, 

 OPINION 
 Before the Court is Defendant Cory Smith's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Ashleigh Taylor's 
First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). ECF No. 15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will 
deny the Motion. 
I. Factual Background 
 This is the second case brought by Ms. Taylor arising from her arrest on February 14, 2023 
during a child support hearing in the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas. ECF No. 1; see 
also Taylor v. Lawrence Cnty. Domestic Rel. Section, No. 2:23-cv-01321-CCW, (W.D. Pa.) 
("Taylor I"), ECF Nos. 3, 4. During that hearing, Ms. Taylor was found to be in contempt of her 
domestic relations order and was taken into custody by officers of the Lawrence County Domestic 
Relations Section, including Detective Cory Smith, the Defendant in this case. ECF No. 5 at 3–4. 
Ms. Taylor alleges that she informed the arresting officers that, due to an existing shoulder injury, 
she was unable to place her hands behind her back to be handcuffed. Id. at 4. Ms. Taylor further 
alleges that the arresting officers nevertheless placed her in handcuffs with her hands behind her 
back and, while escorting her out of the courtroom, repeatedly pulled down on the handcuffs 
causing her extreme pain and injury to her shoulder. Id. at 4–5. 
 On July 24, 2023, Ms. Taylor, proceeding pro se, filed Taylor I, her first case in this Court 
related to her February 14, 2023 arrest. Taylor I, ECF Nos. 3, 4. In Taylor I, Ms. Taylor named 
the Lawrence County Domestic Relations Section ("Lawrence County DRS") as defendant and, 
bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the Lawrence County DRS used excessive 

force when taking her into custody in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Taylor I, ECF No. 3 at 3. Lawrence County DRS moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that 
it was barred by Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity and that it was not a "person" 
subject to suit under § 1983. Taylor I, ECF No. 12. On June 25, 2023, this Court ruled that the 
Lawrence County DRS was entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed 
Ms. Taylor's complaint with prejudice. Taylor I, ECF Nos. 23, 24. 
 On February 13, 2025, acting through counsel, Ms. Taylor filed the instant lawsuit in this 
Court ("Taylor II"), naming Lawrence County Domestic Relations Detective John Doe in both his 
personal and official capacities as defendant and alleging that "Detective Doe is believed to be 
Detective Cory Smith." ECF No. 1 ¶ 2. 

 Ms. Taylor then filed the FAC, naming Detective Cory Smith as defendant in both his 
personal and official capacities. ECF No. 5 ¶ 3. The parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss Mr. 
Smith as a defendant in his official capacity, ECF No. 13, and the Court entered an order doing so. 
ECF No. 14. Like the Taylor I complaint, the Taylor II FAC brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and alleges that Ms. Taylor was subject to unnecessary and excessive force while being taken into 
custody by the Lawrence County DRS on February 14, 2023. ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 12–23. As in Taylor 
I, the FAC alleges that Ms. Taylor was handcuffed with her arms behind her back over her 
objections that doing so would exacerbate an existing shoulder injury and that the arresting 
officer—Mr. Smith—repeatedly pulled down on the handcuffs while leading her out of the 
courtroom, causing extreme pain and further injuring her shoulder. Id. The FAC further alleges 
that, after injuring Ms. Taylor, Mr. Smith "refused to provide her with proper medical care." ECF 
Id. at ¶ 23. 
 Mr. Smith now moves to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, arguing this Court's prior dismissal of Taylor I bars the instant action under 
the doctrine of res judicata. ECF No. 15. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. ECF 
Nos. 16, 18, 19. 
II. Legal Standard 
 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 
sufficiency of a claim. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true a complaint's 
factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. 
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not contain detailed 
factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it cannot rest on mere labels and conclusions. 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, "a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. Accordingly, "[f]actual allegations must be enough 
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id., and be "sufficient . . . to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face,'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks 
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556). 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a three-step 
process for district courts to follow in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: 
 First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must 
 plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations 
 that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to 
 the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded 
 factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for 
 relief." 

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster 
Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). That said, under Rule 8's notice pleading standard, even 
after the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only "allege sufficient 
facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims." Connolly 
v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788–89 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that "at least for purposes of 
pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion 
to dismiss"). 
III. Legal Analysis 
 In his Motion, Mr. Smith asserts that Taylor II is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
ECF No. 16 at 3–6. Ms. Taylor contends that res judicata is not applicable. ECF No. 18 at 2–3. 
Because the Court agrees with Ms. Taylor that the dismissal of Taylor I was not a final adjudication 
on the merits, it finds that res judicata does not preclude the instant action. The Court will therefore 
deny the Motion. 
 The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a plaintiff from "initiating a second 
suit against the same adversary based on the same ‘cause of action' as the first suit." Duhaney v. 
Att'y Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 
(3d Cir. 2008)). The party invoking res judicata "must establish three elements: (1) a final 
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a 
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action." Duhaney, 621 F.3d at 347. 
 Mr. Smith argues Ms. Taylor "has already filed a lawsuit that included the claim set forth 
within the Amended Complaint," that the prior lawsuit "was dismissed on the merits," and that 
"[p]rivity exists between the sole Defendant . . . in this matter and the Defendant . . . in the initial 
litigation." ECF No. 15 ¶ 9. Ms. Taylor contends that none of the three elements necessary to 

invoke res judicata are present. ECF No. 18 at 2–4. Specifically, Ms. Taylor argues that the two 
lawsuits involve "different causes of action," that Mr. Smith "was not a party or in privity" with 
any of the Taylor I parties, and that the dismissal of Taylor I on Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity grounds was "jurisdictional and not on the merits for res judicata purposes." ECF No. 
18 at 2–4. The Court will consider each of the three elements necessary to invoke res judicata in 
turn. 
 A. Taylor II is Based on the Same Cause of Action as Taylor I. 

 Mr. Smith asserts that the FAC "raise[s] the same claim" that this Court dismissed in Taylor 
I. ECF No. 16 at 4–5. Ms. Taylor argues that Taylor I and Taylor II involve "[d]ifferent [c]auses 
of [a]ction" because, while "[t]he prior suit was against a governmental entity . . . the claims in 
this case arise from Defendant's personal conduct during Plaintiff's arrest[.]" ECF No. 18 at 4. 
 The Court agrees with Mr. Smith that Taylor I and Taylor II are based on the same cause 
of action. This analysis "does not depend on the specific legal theory invoked, but rather ‘the 
essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.'" Elkadrawy v. 
Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 
F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir.1982)); United States v. Althlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 
1984) ("[T]he focal points of our analysis are whether the acts complained of were the same, 
whether the material facts alleged in each suit were the same and whether the witnesses and 
documentation required to prove such allegations were the same."). Put differently, "res judicata 
bars not only claims that were brought in the previous action, but also claims that could have been 
brought." Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 In both Taylor I and the FAC, Ms. Taylor complains of the excessive force Lawrence 
County DRS officers allegedly deployed when taking her into custody on February 14, 2023. 

Taylor I, ECF Nos. 2, 4; ECF No. 5. In both lawsuits, Ms. Taylor alleges that an arresting officer 
handcuffed her behind her back over her objections that doing so would exacerbate an existing 
shoulder injury and that the officer proceeded to pull down on the handcuffs in a manner that 
caused her serious pain and injury while escorting her out of the courtroom. Taylor I, ECF Nos. 
4–5; ECF No. 5. Ms. Taylor correctly points out that her "prior suit was against a governmental 
entity barred by immunity" while the instant action "is against Smith in his personal capacity for 
his own conduct." ECF No. 18 at 4. But that distinction has no bearing on whether the two 
lawsuits are based on the same cause of action. Because both Taylor I and Taylor II are based on 
the same underlying events—the excessive force that Ms. Taylor alleges was used to arrest her at 
the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas on February 14, 2023—the Court finds that both 

lawsuits are based on the same cause of action. 
 B. Privity Exists Between the Taylor I and Taylor II Defendants. 

 Taylor I named the Lawrence County DRS as defendant, while the FAC names Mr. Smith 
as defendant in both his personal and official capacity. Nevertheless, "res judicata may be invoked 
against a plaintiff who has previously asserted essentially the same claim against different 
defendants where there is a close or significant relationship between successive defendants." 
Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1972). Mr. Smith argues there is privity 
between the parties because Lawrence County DRS employed Mr. Smith. ECF No. 16 at 5. Ms. 
Taylor contends that "[p]rivity requires a substantive legal relationship or significant control over 
the prior litigation, not mere employment." ECF No. 18 at 4. 
 The Court finds that privity exists between Mr. Smith and the Lawrence County 
Domestic Relations Section. Courts have regularly found privity between employers and their 

employees when a plaintiff, after unsuccessfully bringing suit against an employer-defendant, 
asserts the same claim in a new suit against the employer-defendant's employee. Russomanno v. 
Dugan, No. CV 20-12336, 2021 WL 1748135, at *3 (D.N.J. May 4, 2021) (finding privity 
between employer-defendant in first lawsuit and employee-defendant in second lawsuit brought 
by same plaintiff asserting same claim), aff'd, No. 21-2004, 2021 WL 4075790 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 
2021). The Court is also mindful that "a lesser degree of privity is required for a new defendant 
to benefit from claim preclusion than for a plaintiff to bind a new defendant in a later action." 
Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court finds 
that both of Ms. Taylor's lawsuits involve the same parties or their privies. 

 C. The Dismissal of Prior Lawsuit on Sovereign Immunity Grounds Was Not a 
 Final Judgment on the Merits. 

 Turning to the third factor in the res judicata analysis, Mr. Smith argues that this Court's 
dismissal of Taylor I was a final adjudication on the merits of Ms. Taylor's claim. ECF No. 16 at 
5. Ms. Taylor contends that the dismissal of Taylor I on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds 
was jurisdictional and therefore not on the merits for res judicata purposes. ECF No. 18 at 3. 
 Courts are divided as to whether a prior dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment state 
sovereign immunity operates as a final judgment on the merits sufficient to preclude a subsequent 
lawsuit based on the same claim. Adams v. Bosco, No. 98 CV 8737 (RO), 1999 WL 165691, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1999) ("[T]he case law has some divergence on whether a dismissal for 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment constitutes a final judgment on the merits, it 
is not clear that res judicata is applicable here.") A closely related question on which Courts also 
diverge is whether a dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity is 
jurisdictional. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schact, 524 U.S. 381, 391 (1998) (whether 
"Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction [is] a question we have 

not decided"); compare Douglas v. California Dep't of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 821 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment is more appropriately considered an affirmative defense 
than a jurisdictional bar"), with Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 683 n. 12 (4th Cir. 
2000) ("Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional in nature."). If dismissals based on 
Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity are jurisdictional, then such dismissals are not 
final adjudications on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 ("Unless the dismissal order states 
otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule—except one 
for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 —operates as an 
adjudication on the merits.") (emphasis added). 
 While the Third Circuit has not addressed whether a dismissal based on state sovereign 

immunity is a final adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata, this Court is persuaded 
that such dismissals are jurisdictional and therefore not final adjudications for purposes of res 
judicata. In Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., the Third Circuit considered an appeal of the 
District Court's order granting summary judgment to Defendants based on Eleventh Amendment 
Sovereign Immunity. 77 F.3d 690, 694 (1996). In affirming the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment, the Court expressly noted that, "[a]lthough defendants brought their Eleventh 
Amendment objection by way of a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b), the 
Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the motion may properly be considered a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)." Blanciak, 77 F.3d 
at 693 n.2 (internal citation omitted). Because the Third Circuit has said that Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, this Court concludes that dismissals based on Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity are not final adjudications on the merits. 

 This approach is consistent with a "number of federal appellate courts [that] have 
concluded that a dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a dismissal on the 
merits for res judicata purposes." Leftridge v. Matthews, No. CIV.A. ELH-11-3499, 2012 WL 
1377060, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 18, 2012) (citing Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1064 (5th Cir. 
1987) ("[T]he dismissal was on eleventh amendment grounds. We affirm this dismissal, expressly 
noting that it does not constitute a judgment on the merits.")); see also, Burrell v. Armijo, 456 
F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[U]nder Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Tenth Circuit precedent, a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (such as sovereign immunity) did not operate as a final 
adjudication on the merits under res judicata principles.") (emphasis added); In re Elias, 216 F.3d 
1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A dismissal for sovereign immunity, however, is based on jurisdictional 

grounds; therefore, it is not a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes, at least as to parties 
other than the state."). Because the dismissal of Taylor I was not a final adjudication on the merits, 
res judicata does not preclude Taylor II. Accordingly, the Court will deny Mr. Smith's Motion. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED, as further set 
forth in the accompanying order. 

DATED this 27th day of October, 2025. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand 
 CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND 
 United States District Judge 

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