CourtListener opinion 11181649

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In The

 Court of Appeals

 Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

 __________________

 NO. 09-25-00331-CV
 __________________

 IN RE MARK CAHILL

__________________________________________________________________

 Original Proceeding
 Probate Court No. 1 of Montgomery County, Texas
 Trial Cause No. 12-29187-P
__________________________________________________________________

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

 In a petition for a writ of mandamus, Relator Mark Cahill contends the trial

court abused its discretion by ordering Cahill to return seized funds to his judgment

debtor, Real Party in Interest Caroldene Cahill. Mark argues Caroldene failed to

provide any credible, admissible, or legally sufficient evidence to support her

claimed property exemption. He contends he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal

because the funds will be permanently lost before any appeal can be heard. We

temporarily stayed the trial court's enforcement of the trial court's Order on

Creditor's Motion to Retain Funds while we considered the petition, and we obtained
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 a response from the Real Party in Interest and a reporter's record of the August 29,

2025, hearing. We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.

 Background

 In 2020, Mark and the Successor Dependent Administratrix of the Estate of

Aletha Wolf obtained a judgment against Caroldene, the former Independent

Executrix of the Estate. See Cahill v. Cahill, No. 09-20-00206-CV, 2022 WL

318452, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 1 On

February 5, 2025, the trial court signed an Amended Turnover Order. In the order,

the trial court ordered Caroldene and any third party in possession of the judgment

debtor's property to turn over nonexempt property to Mark. The order provided that

if Caroldene asserted an exemption, Mark could only disburse or sell property with

Caroldene's written consent or with a court order.

 On June 13, 2025, Caroldene filed a Protected Property Claim Form with the

Montgomery County Clerk. Caroldene claimed, "Some of my money or property

has been frozen or taken. It is protected and should be returned to me because it is:

. . . Tax-deferred retirement accounts, like 401(k) and IRA accounts." She requested

a hearing and asked that the money or property be returned to her. The mandamus

 The distribution of assets and closing of the estate is the subject of Appeal
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Number 09-25-00167-CV, In the Estate of Aletha Cahill Wolf.
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 record contains an Account Statement dated May 1-31, 2025, for a Contributory IRA

of Caroldene M. Cahill.

 On June 17, 2025, Mark filed a Creditor's Motion to Retain Funds. Mark

alleged Caroldene had failed to provide verifiable documentation substantiating the

existence of a 401(k) or an IRA account, and she had failed to demonstrate the source

of the funds.

 After extending the Turnover Order on July 30, 2025, on August 13, 2025, the

trial court vacated its order extending the Amended Turnover Order.

 On August 25, 2025, Mark filed a Creditor's Objection to Debtor's Claim of

Exempt Property and Motion to Strike Debtor's Sworn Statements. Mark argued that

under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 the documents offered by Caroldene are

inadmissible due to her failure to disclose them. Mark argued Caroldene failed to

trace the funds to a protected source and failed to provide evidence that the funds

are held in a tax-qualified account.

 On August 29, 2025, the trial court held a hearing attended by Mark and

Caroldene, with both appearing pro se. Caroldene stated that she had a 401(k) that

she rolled into an IRA when she left her job, "and it's been in an IRA ever since."

Mark argued the Contributory IRA statement was inadmissible because Caroldene

failed to include it in an initial disclosure under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2.

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 Mark argued that proof the funds in the Contributory IRA Account were exempt

required a year-by-year paper trail tracing the funds to a tax-exempt source.

 On August 29, 2025, the trial court denied Mark's Creditor's Motion to Retain

Funds and ordered Mark to return the funds taken from Caroldene's IRA

Contributory Account by September 7, 2025.

 Mandamus Review

 We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). "A trial

court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." Walker, 827

S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion

if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion

in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See Prudential,

148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

 The cases Cahill cites to support his mandamus petition are distinguishable

from the issue presented here. In Beaumont Bank, N. A. v. Buller, the administrator

of her deceased husband's estate was a person in possession of the judgment debtor's

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 non-exempt property. 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). She transferred the funds

to her lawyer's trust account, and she admitted to personally authorizing the transfers

from the lawyer's trust account for the express purpose of thwarting the seizure of

the "C.D. monies" by Beaumont Bank. Id at 225. Over a two-year period, the lawyer

disbursed a total of $103,661.24 pursuant to Buller's instructions. Id. The Supreme

Court held the trial court acted within its discretion when it disbelieved Buller's

unsubstantiated claim that she had spent all the cash she received from the $100,000

certificate of deposit that was directly traceable to her in her representative capacity

and that $250,000 she deposited in an account in the Cayman Islands were proceeds

from an unspecified life insurance policy. Id. at 225-26. Here, the trial court believed

Caroldene when she stated the account was an IRA account.

 Mark cites Jones v. American Airlines, Inc. to support his argument that

Caroldene failed to meet her burden of proof that the funds in her IRA account were

a direct rollover of exempt 401(k) funds that had not been comingled with non-

exempt funds. See 131 S.W.3d 261, 270 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). In

Jones, the administrator for the employer of Jones's ex-husband mistakenly paid

Jones funds she was not entitled to under the QDRO. Id. at 268. After obtaining a

judgment against Jones in federal court, the employer applied for a turnover order in

state court. Id. at 264. In the trial court Jones conceded she knew the overpayment

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 did not belong to her and that she was obligated to pay American Airlines in

accordance with the federal court's judgment. Id. at 270. The trial court required

Jones to turn over the funds to the registry of the court. Id. at 264. On appeal, Jones

argued the funds she had rolled over from her ex-husband's retirement account to

her IRA accounts were exempt from seizure pursuant to section 41.0021 of the Texas

Property Code. Id. at 269. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's turnover

order. Id. at 263. The appellate court held Jones failed to prove the funds were

exempt because the funds were not an eligible rollover distribution qualifying as a

nontaxable rollover contribution and thus were excess contributions that were not

exempt from seizure under the exemption in section 42.0021 then in effect. Id. at

265-66, 270.

 Section 42.0021 provides that "qualified savings plan" includes an individual

retirement account. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 42.0021(a)(4). A person's interest

in a qualified savings plan is exempt from seizure for the satisfaction of debts. Id. §

42.0021(b). The trial court believed Caroldene's statements about the origin of her

Contributory IRA. "With respect to resolution of factual issues . . . the reviewing

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." Walker, 827 S.W.2d

at 839.

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 We conclude that the relator has not established a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court. Accordingly, we lift our stay order of September 6, 2025, and we deny

the petition for a writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8.

 PETITION DENIED.

 PER CURIAM

Submitted on September 24, 2025
Opinion Delivered October 30, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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