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25CA0072 Marriage of Kinning 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0072
City and County of Denver District Court No. 18DR30212
Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jon Lynn Kinning,

Appellee,

and

Aimee Suzanne Kinning,

Respondent,

and

Samuel J. Stoorman and Associates, P.C.,

Attorney-Appellant.

 APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
 AND ORDER AFFIRMED

 Division VI
 Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
 Sullivan and Martinez*, JJ., concur

 NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
 Announced October 30, 2025

Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Mechelle Y. Faulk, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee

No Appearance for Respondent
 Haeberle Law, PLLC, William A. Haeberle, Englewood, Colorado, for Attorney-
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
 ¶1 In this proceeding involving Samuel J. Stoorman and

 Associates, P.C. (the firm) and Jon Lynn Kinning (husband), the

 firm appeals the district court's order concerning the enforcement of

 its statutory attorney's lien against its former client, Aimee Susanne

 Kinning (wife). We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the order.

 I. Relevant Facts

¶2 In 2014, husband and wife entered into a marital agreement

 (MA) providing that any equity in their jointly titled Vail residence

 would be treated as marital property subject to equal division.

¶3 Four years later, the district court dissolved the marriage. In

 the permanent orders, the court allocated the Vail residence to

 husband and set aside the $500,000 down payment as his separate

 property. On appeal, a division of this court vacated the judgment

 and remanded, instructing the district court to classify the down

 payment as marital property and to split it equally as required

 under the MA. See In re Marriage of Kinning, slip op. at 15-16 (Colo.

 App. No. 19CA0123, Apr. 23, 2020) (not published pursuant to

 C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶4 The district court on remand, however, again allocated the

 down payment to husband as his separate property. Another

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 division of this court reversed and remanded with directions,

 making it clear that the down payment must be included in the

 marital estate. See In re Marriage of Kinning, slip op. at 22 (Colo.

 App. No. 22CA1121, Dec. 14, 2023) (not published pursuant to

 C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶5 Thereafter, the firm withdrew as wife's counsel. The firm then

 initiated a foreclosure on its statutory attorney's lien against her,

 seeking a judgment for $110,338.

¶6 On May 2, 2024, the district court enforced the firm's lien,

 entering judgment against wife and in favor of the firm in the

 amount of $110,338 to be paid from the "monies and property

 awarded to [wife]," plus 1.5% monthly interest. The court added

 that the firm was "entitled to its costs and fees incurred in

 collecting upon the judgment."

¶7 At the second remand hearing ten days later, husband was

 present with counsel; wife, still unrepresented, chose not to appear.

¶8 On June 13, 2024, the district court ordered that husband

 could satisfy wife's $250,000 share of the down payment by

 transferring to her an equivalent amount of his 401(k) funds via a

 2
 qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). No one appealed the

 judgment.

¶9 On June 27, 2024, the firm then filed a forthwith motion

 urging the district court to modify the QDRO so that its lien would

 be satisfied directly from the transferred funds:

 What need[s] to be addressed . . . is the
 method by which [husband] should satisfy the
 May 2 and June 13 [o]rders. The May 2, 2024
 [o]rder directs that $110,338.31 (plus interest)
 of after-tax monies be paid to the [f]irm. The
 June 13, 2024 [o]rder directs that [husband]
 pay to [wife] the sum of $250,000 in pre-tax
 monies. The QDRO should and may be
 carefully crafted to accomplish both of the
 court's orders. Accordingly, the [f]irm requests
 that . . . the QDRO . . . require that the
 principal and interest ordered May 2, 2024 be
 paid directly to the [f]irm from [husband's]
 account or from the transfer agent after the
 funds are beneficially owned by [wife], yet
 delineated in any instance as paid to the [f]irm
 by [wife] (to avoid any liability to [husband];
 thus any taxes owing will be the sole obligation
 of [wife]) and the balance paid to [wife] as she
 directs.

¶ 10 On December 2, 2024, the district court issued an order,

 reiterating the lien's validity but declining to alter the QDRO. The

 court required wife to satisfy the $110,338 judgment within sixty

 3
 days and stated that the firm could "use the full range of creditors'

 remedies."

¶ 11 On January 16, 2025, the firm filed its notice of appeal,

 challenging the December 2, 2024, order.

 II. Discussion

 A. June 13 Judgment

¶ 12 The firm contends that the June 13, 2024 judgment

 (1) contravened the mandates of the two prior appeals by allowing

 husband to pay wife $250,000 of pretax funds; (2) denied its

 procedural due process rights as it received no notice of the second

 remand hearing; and (3) violated the attorney's lien statute, section

 13-93-114, C.R.S. 2025, by "[c]hanging the character and value of

 the property previously adjudicated to be encumbered."

¶ 13 Even assuming the firm has standing to seek appellate review

 of the June 13, 2024 judgment — and we are dubious that it

 does — we lack jurisdiction to review it. This is because the

 deadline to appeal that judgment was August 1, 2024, and the

 notice of appeal was filed on January 16, 2025. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1)

 (in a civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed within forty-nine

 days after entry of the order being appealed); In re Marriage of

 4
 James, 2023 COA 51, ¶ 8 ("The timely filing of a notice of appeal is

 a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review."). As a result, we

 must dismiss this portion of the appeal. See In re Marriage of

 Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 12 (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to

 review issues resolved in orders not appealed).

 III. December 2 Order

¶ 14 The firm also contends that the December 2, 2024, order is

 unfair. To get there, it says that "if a QDRO is to be used as the

 [district] court directed, neither [w]ife nor [the] [f]irm will get paid,

 as [the] [f]irm cannot be an alternate payee under the QDRO, and

 [h]usband will happily sit back and smile as the years continue to

 slip by without having to pay anyone." The firm gives us no

 supporting legal analysis. So, we decline to address the issue. See

 In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court

 may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal

 authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff'd, 2021 CO 12; see

 also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Homes,

 Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (an appellate court will "decline to assume

 the mantle" when parties offer no supporting arguments for their

 claims). To the extent that the firm expands on its contention in

 5
 the reply brief, we do not address those new arguments either. See

 In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

¶ 15 Next, the firm asserts that the district court erred by not

 charging husband 8% statutory interest for wrongfully withholding

 its "Vail [condominium] money" in disregard of section 5-12-

 102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 16 The firm first raised this issue in its reply brief to its forthwith

 motion, so husband was deprived of the opportunity to respond.

 And the court made no findings or conclusions as to the firm's

 assertion. Thus, this issue wasn't properly preserved and isn't

 properly before us. See Grohn v. Sisters of Charity Health Servs.

 Colo., 960 P.2d 722, 727 (Colo. App. 1998) ("Arguments raised for

 the first time in a reply brief before a [district] court are not properly

 before an appellate court where the opposing party was unable to

 respond, and the [district] court made no findings or conclusions

 with respect to that contention."); see also Flagstaff Enters. Constr.

 Inc. v. Snow, 908 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo. App. 1995) (issue not

 preserved for appellate review when raised for first time in a reply in

 support of a C.R.C.P. 59 motion). Accordingly, we won't address it.

 6
 ¶ 17 Similarly, the firm's claim for attorney fees in collecting on its

 lien was first raised in its reply brief to its forthwith motion, never

 ruled on by the district court, and is thus likewise unpreserved.

 See Grohn, 960 P.2d at 727.

 IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 18 The firm seeks an award of appellate attorney fees under

 C.A.R. 39.1 and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, alleging that

 husband expanded the proceedings by repeatedly taking frivolous

 and groundless positions contrary to the MA and the prior

 mandates from this court. We deny the request for two reasons.

 First, the firm's arguments concern the permanent orders

 judgment, and it doesn't specifically explain how they relate to the

 December 2, 2024, order. Second, the firm identifies no district

 court finding of frivolous, groundless, or vexatious conduct by

 husband during the proceedings.

¶ 19 Husband, for his part, asks for his appellate attorney fees

 under section 13-17-102, maintaining that the appeal lacks

 substantial justification. We exercise our discretion and deny the

 request. See C.A.R. 39.1.

 7
 V. Disposition

¶ 20 We dismiss the part of the firm's appeal challenging the June

 13, 2024, judgment and affirm the December 2, 2024, order.

 JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.

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