CourtListener opinion 11193786

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FIRST DIVISION
 BARNES, P. J.,
 BROWN and HODGES, JJ.

 NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
 physically received in our clerk's office within ten
 days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
 https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

 February 6, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A22A1377. BROOKS v. BROOKS.

 HODGES, Judge.

 This appeal arises from a dispute over what, if any, alimony is owed by

appellant Charles R. Brooks ("Charles") to his ex-wife, Vinci C. Brooks ("Vinci").

The superior court granted Vinci's motion to confirm an arbitration award and denied

Charles' competing motion to vacate the arbitration award. The order also awarded

attorney fees to Vinci pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11. This Court granted Brooks'

application for discretionary review, and this appeal followed. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

 As we review this case, we bear in mind that

 [w]hether a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement exists is a
 question of law for the court. We therefore review a trial court's order
 granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo. [Vinci], as
 the part[y] seeking arbitration, bear[s] the burden of proving the
 existence of a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate. And the
 validity of an arbitration agreement is generally governed by state law
 principles of contract formation.

(Citation omitted.) Jhun v. Imagine Castle, LLC, 358 Ga. App. 627 (856 SE2d 24)

(2021). Moreover, "[i]n reviewing a trial court's order confirming an arbitration

award, this Court will affirm unless the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous."

(Citation omitted.) Wells v. Wells-Wilson, 360 Ga. App. 646, 647 (860 SE2d 185)

(2021). However, we review the trial court's resolution of questions of law de novo.

Adventure Motorsports Reinsurance, Ltd. v. Interstate Natl. Dealer Svcs., 313 Ga. 19,

25 (1) (867 SE2d 115) (2021).

 So viewed, the record shows that Charles and Vinci divorced in 2013. In the

settlement agreement which was incorporated into their divorce decree, the parties

agreed to arbitrate any future disputes which might arise over the calculation of

alimony owed by Charles to Vinci. Eventually, the parties disagreed over what, if any,

alimony Charles owed once he retired. Charles filed a petition for declaratory

judgment in the superior court which sought to have that court resolve the issue of

alimony as opposed to an arbitrator. Vinci responded by filing an answer and a

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 counterclaim seeking to compel arbitration. The trial court granted Vinci's motion to

dismiss the petition for declaratory judgment and compelled the parties to arbitration.

 An arbitration occurred before a senior superior court judge previously chosen

by the parties to serve as an arbitrator, but no transcript of this proceeding is in the

record. The parties do not dispute, however, that Charles argued that he no longer

owed alimony to Vinci once he retired, while Vinci asserted that Charles continued

to owe alimony post-retirement. The arbitrator entered an award, discussed in more

detail below, which awarded Vinci continued alimony and ordered Charles to pay the

arrearage that had accrued since his retirement. The award also ordered Charles to pay

Vinci's attorney fees.

 Vinci applied to confirm the arbitration award in the superior court, while

Charles moved to vacate the award. In Vinci's application, she sought attorney fees

pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11. Following a hearing, the superior court granted Vinci's

application to confirm, denied Charles' motion to vacate, made the arbitration award

the final judgment, and awarded Vinci attorney fees for the preparation and

prosecution of the application to confirm. Charles applied for discretionary review

of that order, which this Court granted, and he timely appealed.

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 1. Charles first argues that the trial court erred by compelling arbitration. We

are not persuaded.

 At the outset, Vinci contends that this issue was not properly preserved because

Charles failed to directly appeal the order compelling arbitration. We disagree. "The

grant of an application to compel arbitration is not directly appealable pursuant to

OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4), but is instead an interlocutory matter reviewable pursuant to

OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Goshayeshi v. Mehrabian,

232 Ga. App. 81 (501 SE2d 265) (1998). Here, instead of seeking an interlocutory

review, Charles participated in the arbitration and filed a petition for discretionary

review once the arbitration award was confirmed. Once his petition was granted and

he timely appealed, the procedure in this case was the same as any other appeal.

OCGA § 5-6-35 (g). At that point,

 all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on
 appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed
 and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the
 appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and
 without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from
 was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law
 contained in this Code section, or elsewhere.

OCGA § 5-6-34 (d).

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 Thus, we turn to the merits of Charles' enumeration. The arbitration provision

at issue is contained within the parties' settlement agreement which was incorporated

into their divorce decree.

 [A] settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is construed
 according to the same rules that govern contractual interpretation in
 general, with the cardinal rule being to ascertain the intention of the
 parties. Where any contractual term of a settlement agreement
 incorporated into a decree is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only
 one interpretation as written, the provision's plain meaning must be
 strictly enforced.

(Citation omitted.) Coppedge v. Coppedge, 298 Ga. 494, 496-497 (1) (783 SE2d 94)

(2016). More specifically,

 arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to
 submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.
 Therefore, the question of arbitrability, i.e., whether an agreement
 creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance, is
 undeniably an issue for judicial determination. The construction of an
 arbitration clause in a contract is subject to the ordinary rules of contract
 construction.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) South Point Retail Partners v. North American

Properties Atlanta, 304 Ga. App. 419, 421 (1) (696 SE2d 136) (2010).

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 As to the scope of what issues are arbitrable, the arbitration clause the parties

agreed to provides:

 Binding Arbitration; In the event that the parties disagree on the
 calculation of alimony to be paid by [Charles] to [Vinci] each year
 beginning on February 15, then and in that event, the parties will submit
 the issue to binding arbitration. The arbitration will be conclusive and
 binding upon the parties in any court of competent jurisdiction.
 (Emphasis supplied.)

 Charles argues that this dispute arises not from a disagreement about the

calculation of alimony, but rather concerns resolution of an ambiguity in the portion

of the divorce decree providing for alimony. Specifically, Charles claims an

ambiguity exists in the document as to how much alimony he owes following his

retirement. The divorce decree provides:

 1. Alimony

 (a) While [Charles] is employed by INPO: Alimony will be paid by
 [Charles] to [Vinci] in an amount equal to fifty (50%) percent of
 [Charles'] W-2 earnings from INPO, less federal income tax
 withholding, state income tax withholding, Social Security, and
 Medicare.

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 (b) Upon retirement by [Charles] from INPO: Alimony will be paid by
 [Charles] to [Vinci] in an amount equal to fifty (50%) percent of
 [Charles'] W-2 earnings less federal income tax withholding, state
 income tax withholding, Social Security, and Medicare, plus 32.5% of
 all Form 1099 and Schedule K-1 income.

 In his brief, Charles frames the dispute as whether he is "required to pay

alimony to [Vinci] at all since retiring from his employment with INPO, not how

much does he owe her now that he is retired." Charles' attempt to create a distinction

between the legal claim he seeks to be addressed and the one the parties agreed to

arbitrate is mere semantics, not substance. For reasons that will be discussed more

fully below, Charles contends that he owes no alimony to Vinci post-retirement, while

Vinci contends he owes a significant amount of alimony post-retirement. This is,

indeed, a disagreement about the calculation of alimony. Pursuant to the plain

language of the arbitration agreement, the claim is arbitrable and the trial court did

not err in compelling arbitration.

 2. Charles next contends that the trial court erred in confirming the arbitration

award. Again, we disagree.

 As our Supreme Court has recently stated

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 Georgia's Arbitration Code was designed to preserve and ensure the
 efficacy and expediency of arbitration awards. A primary advantage of
 arbitration is the expeditious and final resolution of disputes by means
 that circumvent the time and expense associated with civil litigation.
 Arbitration is a unique procedure that exists in Georgia due to legislative
 fiat, and it is conducted in accordance with the rules established by the
 legislature. By agreeing to arbitrate grievances, contracting parties
 express their intent to by-pass the judicial system and thus avoid
 potential delays at the trial and appellate levels.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Adventure Motorsports, 313 Ga. at 25 (1). For

that reason

 [t]he scope of a court's review of an arbitration award is among the
 narrowest known to the law. Under the Arbitration Code, the grounds
 for vacating an arbitration award are severely limited. The Code sets out
 five exclusive grounds for vacating an award:

 (1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;

 (2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;

 (3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such
 imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the subject
 matter submitted was not made;

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 (4) A failure to follow the procedure of this part, unless the party
 applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice
 of this failure and without objection; or

 (5) The arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law.

 OCGA § 9-9-13 (b). Unless one of the statutory grounds for vacating an
 award as set forth in OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) is found to exist, a trial court
 in reviewing an award is bound to confirm it.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Magnum Contracting v. Century Communities

of Ga., 362 Ga. App. 755, 759 (A) (870 SE2d 75) (2022). Charles raises two

arguments in support of his position that the trial court erred in confirming the

arbitration award: the evidence did not support the award and the arbitrator

overstepped his authority. We will address them in turn.

 (a) The Evidence

 Charles argues that the arbitrator ignored the intention of the parties in

interpreting the divorce decree because the award allows Vinci to "double dip" into

his pension. Specifically, Section 4 (a) of the settlement agreement, incorporated into

the divorce decree, provides that "[t]he INPO Pension arises out of [Charles']

employment and will be divided 50/50 between [Charles] and [Vinci] effective

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 [December 10, 2013] via Qualified Domestic Relations Order. . . ." A Form 1099 is

issued for Charles' pension payments, however, and pursuant to Section 1 (b) of the

settlement agreement, following his retirement, Vinci is entitled to 32.5 percent of all

Form 1099 income. According to Charles, awarding Vinci 82.5 percent of his pension

income leaves him with very little remaining income while providing Vinci with

considerable income, which he states was clearly not the intention of the parties.

 As argued, however, Charles does not actually assert a statutory basis for

vacating the arbitration award because sufficiency of the evidence is not a ground for

vacatur.

 [C]ourts cannot inquire into the merits of an arbitrable controversy;
 arbitrators are free to award on the basis of broad principles of fairness
 and equity; and an arbitrator need not make findings or state the reasons
 in support of the award. When reviewing a motion to vacate, appellate
 courts cannot make determinations as to the sufficiency of the evidence,
 as such judicial intervention would only frustrate the purpose of
 arbitration. The prohibition against considering the sufficiency of the
 evidence as grounds for vacating an arbitration award is unconditional.
 Therefore, a reviewing court is prohibited from weighing the evidence
 submitted before the arbitrator, regardless of whether the court believes
 there to be sufficient evidence, or even any evidence, to support the
 award.

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 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wells, 360 Ga. App. at 647.

 To the extent we were to construe Charles' argument to be that the arbitrator

manifestly disregarded the law, such an argument also fails. With regard to manifest

disregard of the law, the

 disregard must be both evident and intentional. That is, to manifestly
 disregard the law, one must be conscious of the law and deliberately
 ignore it. Therefore, to prove that a manifest disregard of the law has
 occurred, a party wishing to have an arbitration award vacated must
 provide evidence of record that, not only was the correct law
 communicated to an arbitrator, but that the arbitrator intentionally and
 knowingly chose to ignore that law despite the fact that it was correct.

 In the arbitration context, the concept of manifest disregard has never
 been the equivalent of insufficiency of the evidence or a misapplication
 of the law to the facts. This showing is "an extremely difficult one to
 make" and requires evidence in the transcript of the arbitration
 proceeding (if the hearing is transcribed) or in the arbitrator's written
 findings (if made) or other "concrete evidence" in the record that would
 indicate "a specific intent" of the arbitrator to disregard the appropriate
 law. For example, if an arbitration award were to make an explicit recital
 of the winning party's argument that the correct law should be ignored
 rather than followed, there would be sufficiently clear evidence on the
 face of the award showing the arbitrator's intent to purposefully
 disregard applicable law to vacate the award.

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 On the other hand, an arbitrator who incorrectly interprets the law has
 not manifestly disregarded it. The arbitrator has simply made a legal
 mistake. Mere error in law or failure on the part of the arbitrator to
 understand or apply the law does not amount to deliberately
 disregarding the law in order to reach the result the arbitrator reached.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Adventure Motorsports, 313 Ga. at 26-27 (1).

Here, we do not need to consider if the arbitrator made a legal mistake, because

Charles has not demonstrated manifest disregard of the law as required. There is no

transcript of the arbitration proceedings in the record and there is nothing in the

arbitration award on which this Court could rely to find manifest disregard of the law.

Accordingly, this provides no basis for vacating the arbitration award.

 (b) Overstepping

 In this portion of his enumeration, Charles argues that the arbitrator

overstepped his authority in two regards: by calculating and awarding an arrearage

amount and setting a deadline for it to be paid; and by awarding attorney fees to

Vinci.

 (i) Arrearage

 The arbitrator determined that Vinci was owed alimony after Charles'

retirement, calculated how much alimony was past due, and ordered Charles to pay

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 the arrearage within 30 days. Charles argues that the arbitrator overstepped his

authority by awarding an arrearage and scheduling its payment because the

arbitrator's authority was limited to mere calculation of alimony due. He contends

that determining an arrearage was tantamount to a finding of contempt without the

requisite finding of wilfulness on his part. We are not persuaded.

 "‘Overstepping,' like the other grounds for vacating arbitration awards, is very

limited in scope. ‘Overstepping' has been described as addressing issues not properly

before the arbitrator." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) A&M Hospitalities v.

Alimchandani, 359 Ga. App. 271, 279 (3) (856 SE2d 704) (2021). We do not find that

the arbitrator overstepped in giving effect to his alimony calculation by awarding past

due sums.

 In the context of remedies given by an arbitrator, the Supreme Court of
 Georgia has stated: An arbitrator has inherent power to fashion a remedy
 as long as the award draws its essence from the contract or statute.
 Additionally, the Georgia Arbitration Code specifically states that
 merely because the relief granted in the arbitration award could not or
 would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for
 vacating or refusing to confirm an award.

(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Wells, 360 Ga. App. at 666 (5) (a).

We find that establishing the amount of and requiring timely payment of past due

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 alimony sums owed is a remedy which draws its essence from the settlement

agreement. Moreover, even assuming without deciding that a trial court would be

required to first make a contempt finding, our law is clear that an arbitrator may grant

relief that a trial court would not be allowed to grant. We find that the arbitrator did

not overstep his authority in this regard.

 (ii) Attorney Fees

 Here, the settlement agreement clearly permitted the arbitrator to award

attorney fees. Specifically, the settlement agreement provides that

 [i]n the event of an actual arbitration resulting in a written award signed
 by the arbitrator, the prevailing party will be entitled to recover the
 attorney fees and expenses of litigation incurred in prosecuting or
 defending the case in arbitration, plus all fees paid to the arbitrator. This
 right to recover fees by the prevailing party will be adjudicated by the
 arbitrator after the entry of a written arbitration award. (Emphasis
 supplied.)

 Charles does not dispute that the issue of attorney fees was properly before the

arbitrator. Instead, he argues that the arbitrator overstepped his authority by awarding

attorney fees in the same order in which he decided the merits because the settlement

agreement required such fees to be adjudicated after an award on the merits. He also

takes issue with the manner in which Vinci's counsel proved attorney fees and a

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 purported lack of a hearing on the matter. On appeal, Charles contends his counsel

objected to the consideration of fees at the same time as the merits, but there is no

transcript of the arbitration hearing in the record. There are, however, email

exchanges between the parties and the arbitrator. In those exchanges, Charles'

counsel took issue with the inclusion of fees concerning the motions practice in the

trial court prior to arbitration, but the email indicated no complaint about the issue of

fees being decided in a single order including the merits. Indeed, Charles' counsel

specifically stated that if those particular fees were removed, he had "no objection to

the form of the proposed Arbitration Award, but obviously [his] client was not

approving the substantive Findings and Award sections." Vacatur of an arbitration

award is available only "if the court finds that the rights of [the moving] party were

prejudiced by" one of the statutory grounds. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-9-13

(b). Even assuming without deciding that the arbitrator overstepped by not bifurcating

the determination on the merits from fees, Charles cannot show prejudice given that

he either acquiesced to the procedure or, due to the absence of a transcript, failed to

demonstrate that he objected to it.

 3. Lastly, Charles contends that the trial court erred in awarding Vinci attorney

fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11. We find that he has failed to show reversible error.

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 OCGA § 13-6-11 provides that "[t]he expenses of litigation generally shall not

be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and

has made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been

stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the

jury may allow them." Here, the trial court awarded Vinci attorney fees pursuant to

OCGA § 13-6-11 for the "preparation and prosecution of her application" to confirm

the arbitration award, but did not specify which statutory basis it relied on to justify

the award.

 Charles' sole argument that these attorney fees were impermissible is on the

basis that OCGA § 13-6-11 only authorizes fees in contract actions and that, although

the arbitration agreement was contained in a settlement agreement, the agreement was

incorporated into the divorce decree, and thus this case is not a breach of contract

action. Charles' premise is fundamentally flawed, however, because OCGA § 13-6-11

is not only available in contract cases. See, e.g., Candler v. Wickes Lumber Co., 195

Ga. App. 239, 242 (1) (a) (393 SE2d 99) (1990) ("Attorney fees are allowable under

OCGA § 13-6-11 in equity cases."); U-Haul Co. of Western Ga. v. Ford, 171 Ga.

App. 744, 746 (4) (320 SE2d 868) (1984) ("Expenses of litigation are recoverable

under OCGA § 13-6-11 in both tort and contract actions. The plaintiff need not show

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 that all three provisions of the statute are present, but only that one of the three

conditions exists."). Charles has not asserted any other reason OCGA § 13-6-11

attorney fees should not be available in an arbitration confirmation proceeding

generally or on the facts of this case specifically, and it would be inappropriate for us

to consider any basis for this enumeration other than the one advanced by Charles.

See Harmon v. Innomed Techs., Inc., 309 Ga. App. 265, 270 (1) (b) (709 SE2d 888)

(2011) ("We will not speculate or make arguments on [Charles'] behalf; to do so

would improperly change this court's role from disinterested decision-maker to

appellate advocate.") (citation omitted).

 Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.

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