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24CA1918 McBride v Johnson 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1918
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CV32302
Honorable J. Steven Patrick, Judge

Steven R. McBride d/b/a McBride QDRO Services,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Maurice A. Johnson,

Defendant-Appellant.

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART
 AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

 Division V
 Opinion by JUDGE YUN
 Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

 NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
 Announced November 13, 2025

Richard K. Rufner, Maineville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Maurice A. Johnson, Centennial, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
 ¶1 The defendant, Maurice A. Johnson, appeals the trial court's

 judgment and order (1) dismissing his deceptive trade practices

 counterclaim; and (2) awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff,

 Steven R. McBride. We affirm the dismissal of Johnson's

 counterclaim, reverse the award of attorney fees, and remand the

 case for a hearing on McBride's fees request.

 I. Background

¶2 The factual background of this case is taken from a prior

 opinion of a division of this court. See McBride v. Johnson, (Colo.

 App. No. 22CA1074, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant to

 C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶3 Johnson is a licensed Colorado attorney who specializes in the

 preparation of qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs). Id., slip

 op. at ¶ 3. McBride, who is not a licensed attorney, is trained and

 experienced in preparing, filing, and obtaining approval of QDROs.

 Id.

¶4 In November 2016, Johnson filed a complaint with the Office

 of Attorney Regulation Counsel alleging that McBride was engaged

 in the unauthorized practice of law by preparing QDROs on behalf

 of clients. Id. at ¶ 4. In April 2017, regulatory counsel concluded

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 that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law

 when preparing QDROs. Id. Specifically, regulatory counsel

 determined,

 [W]hile [McBride's] preparation of QDROs
 involves some exercise of legal discretion, he
 has caused no harm. Rather, it appears his
 work benefits the family law bar and divorcing
 parties. He charges modest fees, increasing
 access to justice. Under these circumstances,
 we decline to investigate further.

 Id. at ¶ 15.

¶5 In 2019, Johnson contacted several individuals, including a

 client who had hired McBride to prepare QDROs for a dissolution of

 marriage, to tell them that McBride was an "unlicensed QDRO

 template salesman" engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

 Id. at ¶¶ 5-8. McBride filed a lawsuit against Johnson, claiming

 that Johnson had defamed him, and Johnson filed (as relevant

 here) a counterclaim alleging that McBride had violated the

 Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) by engaging in deceptive

 trade practices. Id. at ¶ 10. After a jury trial that was converted

 into a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of McBride on both

 claims. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Johnson then appealed.

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 ¶6 On appeal, a division of this court upheld the trial court's

 findings that (1) Johnson had received regulatory counsel's April

 2017 letter determining that McBride was not engaged in the

 unauthorized practice of law, and (2) Johnson's statements that

 McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law were

 defamatory per se. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. But the division held that the

 trial court had erred by granting McBride's motion in limine to

 exclude evidence of Johnson's deceptive trade practices

 counterclaim, and it remanded the case for the court to resolve the

 counterclaim. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 57.

¶7 On remand, the trial court held a second bench trial at which

 only McBride and Johnson testified. Following this trial, the court

 ruled that McBride was not engaged in a deceptive trade practice.

¶8 Johnson now appeals.

 II. Deceptive Trade Practices Counterclaim

¶9 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his

 deceptive trade practices counterclaim. We disagree.

 A. Additional Background

¶ 10 At the start of the second trial, Johnson attempted to argue

 that McBride's work preparing QDROs on behalf of clients was a

 3
 deceptive trade practice because it constituted the unauthorized

 practice of law. Specifically, Johnson argued that McBride's QDRO

 work violated section 6-1-105(1)(z), C.R.S. 2025, which provides

 that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the

 course of the person's business, the person "[r]efuses or fails to

 obtain all governmental licenses or permits required to perform the

 services . . . as agreed to or contracted for with a consumer."

 "[P]racticing law without a license," he argued, "is a deceptive trade

 practice."

¶ 11 McBride objected, noting that regulatory counsel, the trial

 court, and a division of this court had already determined that

 McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The

 trial court sustained the objection, ruling that "we're not going to

 revisit the issue of whether there's an unauthorized practice of law."

 B. Governing Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 To prove a private claim for relief under the CCPA, a plaintiff

 must establish

 (1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or
 deceptive trade practice; (2) that the
 challenged practice occurred in the course of
 defendant's business, vocation, or occupation;
 (3) that it significantly impacts the public as

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 actual or potential consumers of the
 defendant's goods, services, or property;
 (4) that the plaintiff suffered injury in fact to a
 legally protected interest; and (5) that the
 challenged practice caused the plaintiff's
 injury.

 Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. 2006) (citation omitted).

¶ 13 "When a court enters a judgment following a bench trial, that

 judgment presents a mixed question of law and fact." May v.

 Petersen, 2020 COA 75, ¶ 10 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

 Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, ¶ 12). "While we review the court's

 application of the governing legal standards de novo, we review the

 court's factual findings for clear error." Id.

 C. Discussion

¶ 14 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by ruling that he

 could not revisit the issue of whether McBride was engaged in the

 unauthorized practice of law, which limited his ability to prove that

 McBride was engaged in a deceptive trade practice in violation of

 section 6-1-105(1)(z).

¶ 15 The trial court did not err. Regulatory counsel determined in

 2017 that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of

 law when preparing QDROs and that, in fact, "his work benefits the

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 family law bar and divorcing parties" and "increas[es] access to

justice." McBride, No. 22CA1074, slip op. at ¶ 15. After the first

trial, the court found that Johnson's statements claiming that

McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law were

"untrue," and a division of this court upheld that finding.1 Id. at

¶ 67. The trial court thus had no discretion on remand to revisit

the question of whether McBride was engaged in the unauthorized

practice of law. See Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condo.

Ass'n, 2021 COA 114, ¶ 24 ("‘Conclusions of an appellate court on

issues presented to it as well as rulings logically necessary to

sustain such conclusions become the law of the case,' which the

1 "To be actionable, an allegedly defamatory statement must contain

a material falsehood." Fry v. Lee, 2013 COA 100, ¶ 50. The
McBride division reversed the trial court's judgment in McBride's
favor on his defamation claim only because the trial court had not
ruled on the legal issue of whether Johnson's statements "about
[McBride] being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
involved a matter of public concern." McBride v. Johnson, slip op.
at ¶ 44 (Colo. App. No. 22CA1074, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The division instructed that, "[i]f the
court concludes that the unauthorized practice of law was not a
matter of public concern in the context of this case, the court shall
reinstate its judgment in favor of [McBride]." Id. at ¶ 67. On
remand, the trial court determined that Johnson's statements did
not involve a matter of public concern. Accordingly, it reinstated its
judgment in McBride's favor on his defamation claim.

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 trial court must follow on remand." (alteration and citation

 omitted)).

¶ 16 Because Johnson's claim that McBride was engaged in a

 deceptive trade practice was premised on his argument that

 McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we

 conclude that the record supports the trial court's finding that

 McBride's activities "do not constitute a deceptive trade practice."2

¶ 17 Johnson further argues that the trial court erred by finding

 that McBride's activities had a minimal impact on the public at

 large and that Johnson had not established any damages. But

 because Johnson failed to prove the first element of a private

 consumer protection claim under the CCPA — namely, that the

 defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice — we

 2 During oral argument, Johnson argued that his deceptive trade

 practices counterclaim went beyond the allegation that McBride
 was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when preparing
 QDROs. However, the deceptive trade practices counterclaim
 alleged in his answer, as well as his opening and closing arguments
 at the bench trial on that counterclaim, referred only to McBride's
 QDRO work. The theme of his closing argument at trial was that
 "the preparation of QDROS . . . is the practice of law" and that
 "McBride's deceptive trade practices are intended to divert business
 from others who do QDROs."

 7
 need not address his arguments concerning other elements. See

 Crowe, 126 P.3d at 201.

¶ 18 We thus conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing

 Johnson's deceptive trade practices counterclaim.

 III. Attorney Fees

¶ 19 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by granting

 McBride's motion for attorney fees without a hearing. We agree.

 A. Additional Background

¶ 20 On May 17, 2022, after he prevailed in the first trial, McBride

 filed a motion seeking $4,270.50 in attorney fees as a sanction for

 Johnson's "significant and serious failures to properly submit

 timely jury instructions" — behavior that ultimately led the trial

 court to dismiss the jury on the second day of trial and proceed

 with a bench trial. In his response, filed on June 7, 2022, Johnson

 defended his actions regarding the jury instructions, challenged the

 reasonableness and necessity of McBride's claimed fees, and

 requested a hearing. The trial court did not rule on McBride's

 motion for attorney fees or Johnson's request for a hearing.

¶ 21 Two years later, after McBride prevailed in the second trial, the

 trial court invited him to submit a bill of costs and ordered that

 8
 Johnson would have fifteen days to respond thereto. On

 September 12, 2024, McBride submitted a document titled

 "Plaintiff's Bill of Costs." He requested $2,028.93 in costs for the

 first trial and $570 in costs for the appeal and second trial, totaling

 $2,598.93. On the second page of the same document, he noted

 that he had previously requested $4,270.50 in attorney fees "as a

 sanction for [Johnson's] malfeasance related to his aborted jury

 demand" in the first trial but that the court had never ruled on his

 motion. He thus requested an "award of costs in the amount of

 $2598.93 and an award of attorney fees in the amount of

 $4270.50."

¶ 22 Johnson did not respond, and, on October 1, 2024, the trial

 court entered an order with McBride's "Plaintiff's Bill of Costs"

 attached, stating, "The motion/proposed order attached hereto:

 APPROVED."

 B. Law and Discussion

¶ 23 "If a party requests a hearing concerning an award of fees, the

 trial court must hold a hearing." Walker v. Women's Pro. Rodeo

 Ass'n, 2021 COA 105M, ¶ 81 (quoting Shyanne Props., LLC v. Torp,

 210 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo. App. 2009)); see C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(c)

 9
 ("When required to do so by law, the court shall grant a party's

 timely request for a hearing" on a motion for attorney fees). "When

 a hearing is requested to determine the reasonableness and

 necessity of attorney fees, due process requires that the trial court

 hold such a hearing." Walker, ¶ 81 (quoting Roberts v. Adams,

 47 P.3d 690, 700 (Colo. App. 2001)).

¶ 24 In its written order dismissing Johnson's deceptive trade

 practices counterclaim, the trial court invited McBride "to submit a

 bill of costs." Although McBride submitted a document titled

 "Plaintiff's Bill of Costs," he also included in that document a

 renewal of the motion for attorney fees he had filed two years

 earlier. Because Johnson had already requested a hearing on

 McBride's original motion for attorney fees, the court erred by

 granting the renewed motion without a hearing. See id.

¶ 25 We are not persuaded otherwise by McBride's argument that,

 because Johnson did not respond to McBride's "Plaintiff's Bill of

 Costs" within fifteen days, as ordered by the trial court, he waived

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 any right to object to McBride's renewed motion for attorney fees.3

First, Johnson had already filed a response opposing the motion for

sanctions and specifically requested a hearing. As a result, he was

entitled to a hearing. See id. Second, because McBride's motion for

costs and fees was simply titled "Plaintiff's Bill of Costs," it was not

obvious that the document also included a renewed motion for

attorney fees. See Denner Enters., Inc. v. Barone, Inc., 87 P.3d 269,

274 (Colo. App. 2004) (When a party "did not file a separate motion

for the additional attorney fees," the division was "unable to

ascertain from the record whether the [trial] court intended to deny

the request or merely overlooked it."). And third, the trial court did

not explain the basis for the attorney fees award, nor did it make

any findings regarding the reasonableness of those fees. See

3 Johnson also argues that the trial court erred by permitting him

only fifteen days, instead of twenty-one days, to respond to
McBride's "Plaintiff's Bill of Costs." We are not persuaded. C.R.C.P.
121, section 1-22(2)(b), provides that any response to a motion for
attorney fees "shall be filed within the time allowed in practice
standard [section] 1-15." C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(1)(b), in turn,
provides that "[t]he responding party shall have 21 days after the
filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may
allow in which to file a responsive brief." (Emphasis added.) The
court thus did not err by permitting Johnson fifteen days to
respond.

 11
 Yaekle v. Andrews, 169 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. App. 2007) (reversing

 an attorney fees award when "the trial court did not identify the

 basis for awarding fees [and] made no factual findings supporting

 its determination of the reasonableness of defendants' fees"), aff'd

 on other grounds, 195 P.3d 1101 (Colo. 2008).

¶ 26 We thus reverse the award of attorney fees and remand the

 case for a hearing on McBride's fees request.

 IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 27 Both parties request an award of their attorney fees incurred

 on appeal. Although neither party cites legal authority, we interpret

 both fees requests as alleging that the other party's arguments were

 frivolous. See § 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025 (permitting an award of

 attorney fees if we find that a party brought or defended an action

 lacking substantial justification, meaning it was substantially

 frivolous, groundless, or vexatious). McBride has not shown that

 Johnson's appeal, as filed or argued, was frivolous. Johnson

 prevailed on one of his claims, see Andres Trucking Co. v. United

 Fire & Cas. Co., 2018 COA 144, ¶ 62 (declining to award appellate

 attorney fees when the other party prevailed on appeal), and while

 he did not prevail on the other, we do not agree that an award of

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 fees is warranted, see Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77,

 ¶ 70 (noting that the court awards appellate attorney fees only in

 clear and unequivocal cases of egregious conduct when no rational

 argument is presented). And Johnson has not demonstrated that

 McBride's arguments in defending against the appeal were frivolous

 since McBride prevailed on the CCPA counterclaim. Accordingly,

 we decline to award appellate attorney fees to either party.

 V. Disposition

¶ 28 The trial court's judgment dismissing Johnson's CCPA

 counterclaim is affirmed. The portion of its order awarding attorney

 fees to McBride is reversed, and the case is remanded for a hearing

 on McBride's attorney fees request.

 JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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