CourtListener opinion 11203817

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

ANGELIINA LAWSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 25-1179-JWB 

ERIC GODDERZ, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Out of District Judge and Complex 
Case Designation (Doc. 4); Rule 59(e) Motion: Court's Replication of Alleged Predicate Acts 
Warrants 3 Panel Out-Of-District Reassignment (Doc. 15); Emergency Motion for Protective 
Order and Restoration of Parental Access (Doc. 18); Motion for Judicial Referral to Chief Judge 
Under 28 U.S.C. 292(b) (Doc. 27); Motion Under Rule 60(d)(3) to Vacate Void Orders and Correct 
Fraud on the Court Based on Misrepresentation of Judicial Assignment Authority (Doc. 28); and 
Renewed Motion to Vacate Void Orders Under Rule 60(d)(3) and Opposition of Order Striking 
Second Amended Complaint and Order Denying Disqualification (Doc. 34). The motions are 
DENIED for the reasons stated herein. 
On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed this federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations ("RICO") action. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff has several pending actions in this court 
including an action against most of the defendants in this case that was recently dismissed. See 
Lawson v. Godderz, Case No. 25-2199-JWB. 
I. Motion for Out of District Judge and Complex Case Designation (Doc. 4) 
Plaintiff seeks assignment of a visiting judge from outside the District of Kansas pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) and "requests internal designation under the District of Kansas coding 
practices as COMPLEX, MULTI, 3JUDGE, and TRANSFER." (Doc. 4.) She argues that because 
multiple defendants are Kansas judicial officers, assignment to an in-district judge creates 

"potential conflicts of interest" and undermines "public confidence in impartial adjudication." 
(Id.) Plaintiff requests that the Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit designate an out-of-district judge 
with "prior experience in complex civil and criminal RICO proceedings" to preside over her 
eighteen-defendant action. (Id.) The motion asserts that § 455(a) mandates recusal because the 
undersigned's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." (Id.) 
The motion presumes systemic bias without identifying any specific conflict involving the 
assigned judge.1 Plaintiff invokes statutory provisions governing voluntary assignment and 
recusal as if they were mandatory reassignment mechanisms triggered by merely filing claims 
against state judicial officers. Overall, this motion very closely resembles one of Plaintiff's 
previously denied motions in a different case filed with this court.2 

As the Tenth Circuit has summarized: 
Disqualification is required both when a judge has "a personal bias or prejudice" 
against a party, § 144; see also § 455(b)(1) (same), or when presiding over the case 
would create an appearance of bias, see § 455(a). Recusal for an appearance of bias 
is required when "sufficient factual grounds exist to cause an objective observer 
reasonably to question the judge's impartiality." [United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 
985, 992 (10th Cir. 1993).] The party seeking a judge's disqualification must show 
that "a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about 
the judge's impartiality." Id. at 993 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because this 

1 For what it's worth, the undersigned does not know, and to the undersigned's knowledge, has never even met any of 
the named defendants except Defendant Kriegshauser, who is the United States Attorney for this district, and whom 
the undersigned has only met in Mr. Kriegshauser's performance of his official duties as United States Attorney. Thus 
any assertions of bias are utterly baseless. 
2 See Lawson v. Godderz, Case No. 25-2199-JWB. In that case, the undersigned denied Plaintiff's motion for reasons 
nearly identical to the reasons used to deny Plaintiff's motion for reassignment in the instant case. Id. at Doc. 33. 
standard is an objective one, "[t]he inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Id. 

United States v. Walker, 838 F. App'x 333, 337 (10th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff ‘s motion is devoid of 
any fact that could provide a basis for recusal under these standards. Second, to support her motion 
to transfer this case to an out-of-district judge because of its "complexity," Plaintiff states that 
"[a]ssignment to an out-of-district judge with prior experience in complex civil and criminal RICO 
proceedings will promote judicial efficiency and bolster public confidence in the outcome." (Doc. 
4 at 2.) The court finds this bare assertion unpersuasive. Thus, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 4) is 
denied. 
II. Rule 59(e) Motion: Court's Replication of Alleged Predicate Acts Warrants 3 Panel 
Out-Of-District Reassignment (Doc. 15) 
Next, Plaintiff again seeks reassignment. Plaintiff claims the court "abandoned the 
required order of adjudication" by addressing her motion for reassignment (Doc. 7) before 
resolving her reassignment request and complex case designation (Doc. 4). Plaintiff argues that 
the undersigned "[e]ntrapped the Plaintiff in a [v]icious [c]ircle" by addressing documents "out of 
sequence." (Doc. 15.) Further, Plaintiff takes issue with being instructed by Magistrate Judge 
James that she may not obtain discovery until summons have issued. As for relief, she demands 
that "the matter should be referred to the Chief Judge Jerome Holmes of the Tenth Circuit under 
§§ 292(b) and 294 for designation of out-of-district judges." (Id.) 
First, this court has considerable latitude in addressing motions in an order deemed 

appropriate to properly manage its own dockets. See Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colorado, Inc. v. 
Bluegreen Corp., 296 F.3d 982, 985 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 
1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that courts have "the inherent power to . . . regulate the 
docket."). Second, Magistrate Judge James correctly noted that Rule 26(d)(2) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure only allows for early discovery requests for production of documents more than 
21 days after service of the summons and complaint. (Doc. 14 at 1.) Therefore, as no service has 
been authorized, discovery is premature. As such, it is not a basis for some sort of bias and 
reassignment is not warranted. Thus, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 15) is denied. 
III. Emergency Motion for Protective Order and Restoration of Parental Access (Doc. 18) 

Plaintiff seeks an emergency protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 to "immediately 
restore Plaintiff's access to her disabled minor child" and prevent enforcement of state court 
custody orders she characterizes as "void or retaliatory." (Doc. 18 at 1.) She requests that this 
court enjoin her ex-husband and "all agents or third parties (therapists, court providers, school 
personnel) from excluding Plaintiff unless ordered by a federal judge," invalidate state custody 
orders from Leavenworth County case LV-2025-CV-000070, and appoint "a neutral CASA 
through the Leavenworth CASA Center" to monitor the child. (Id. at 4.) In support, Plaintiff 
alleges that her exclusion from medical appointments and school communications constitutes 
"retaliatory interference with protected parental rights" and "an ongoing denial of ADA-related 

accommodations." (Id. at 3.) She incorporates exhibits including state court filings and argues 
that "the underlying state court orders are void" and that "the state judiciary has failed to provide 
redress." (Id. at 5.) 
This motion—which mimics allegations previously adjudicated3—seeks to convert this 
federal court into an appellate tribunal for state domestic relations proceedings. Such a role has 
been steadfastly declined by federal courts under the domestic-relations exception. See Alfaro v. 
County of Arapahoe, 766 F. App'x 657, 660 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that the domestic-relations 
exception applied where the plaintiff asked the federal court to "scrutinize[ ]" the "legal merits" 

3 See Lawson v. Godderz, Case No. 25-2199-JWB. 
of "each order" in the state court divorce and child-custody proceedings). Thus, as Plaintiff seeks 
this court to review or overrule the state court custody and other domestic relations orders, such 
actions are barred by the domestic-relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. Id. 
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that overcome the well-established principle that "divests 
the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Ankenbrandt v. 

Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). While rare instances exist in which a substantial federal 
question exists apart from the family law issue, see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–
434 (1984), Plaintiff has made no such argument. Thus, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 18) is denied. 
IV. Motion for Judicial Referral to Chief Judge Under 28 U.S.C. 292(b) (Doc. 27) 
Plaintiff again moves for referral to the Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit under § 292(b), 
asserting that "this Court lacks authority under 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) to decide its own reassignment 
eligibility" and that "any ruling" is void. (Doc. 27.) She argues that her reassignment request "has 
never been forwarded to the appropriate Article III authority" and claims the Court's October 20, 
2025, text order "describing the misconduct complaint as ‘frivolous'" constitutes retaliation 

against "a pro se litigant with a documented communication disability." As relief, Plaintiff 
requests nearly identical relief to her prior motion previously discussed. (See Doc. 15.) 
Plaintiff misunderstands the statutory framework she cites. Section 292(b) authorizes the 
Chief Judge to assign visiting judges "in the public interest." See 28 U.S.C. § 292(b). Section 292 
does not provide litigants a mechanism to have a motion heard by the Chief Judge. Id.; see United 
States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1989) (chief judge has "broad discretion" to 
determine reassignment). The statute vests discretion in the Chief Judge, not the parties. Thus, 
and for the reasons stated supra Section II, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 27) is denied. 
V. Motion Under Rule 60(d)(3) to Vacate Void Orders and Correct Fraud on the Court 
Based on Misrepresentation of Judicial Assignment Authority (Doc. 28) 
Plaintiff moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) to vacate the court's October 20, 2025, denial 
of her reassignment motion, along with the prior August 21, 2025 order, arguing that "the Court 
has committed fraud upon the court by ruling on its own eligibility for reassignment, in violation 

of 28 U.S.C. § 292(b)." She claims that the undersigned "unilaterally denied Plaintiff's 
reassignment request" without "forwarding the matter for external review [with the Chief Judge 
of the Tenth Circuit]." Plaintiff argues this "constitutes fraud on the court" in violation of § 292(b) 
and Rule 60(d)(3). This motion distorts the concept of fraud on the court. 
The Tenth Circuit has summarized: 
Fraud on the court ... is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and 
is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or 
perjury.... It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced 
or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial 
function—thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly 
corrupted. 

Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation 
omitted). Plaintiff argues that the undersigned's decision to deny Plaintiff's reassignment request 
constitutes fraud on the court. (Doc. 27 at 2–3.) As Plaintiff was previously informed,4 "judicial 
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). A judge's decision to deny a reassignment motion is not fraud; 
it is the ordinary exercise of case management authority. Rule 60(d)(3) provides no basis for 
reassignment. Thus, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 28) is denied. 

4 See Doc. 11 at 2. 
VI. Renewed Motion to Vacate Void Orders Under Rule 60(d)(3) and Opposition of 
Order Striking Second Amended Complaint and Order Denying Disqualification (Doc. 34) 
This time, Plaintiff moves under Rule 60(d)(3) to vacate Magistrate Judge James's October 
29, 2025, orders (Docs. 32, 33) striking her second amended complaint ("SAC") (Doc. 29) and 
denying her disqualification motion (Doc. 20). She characterizes these orders as "retaliatory in 

nature, and fraudulently entered by a judicial officer whose authority was already under formal 
challenge." (Doc. 34.) Plaintiff argues that because she had filed a motion to disqualify Magistrate 
Judge James under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, that Magistrate Judge James lacked authority to 
issue subsequent orders. She claims that striking her SAC "without review, without hearing, and 
by a disqualified judge" constitutes "extrinsic fraud, defamation, and constructive denial of all 
constitutional rights to be heard." Plaintiff requests that this court reinstate Plaintiff's SAC (Doc. 
29) and disqualify Magistrate Judge James "from issuing further orders in this case." (Doc. 34 at 
5.) 
First, the magistrate judge struck Plaintiff's SAC because "Plaintiff failed to file a proper 

motion and obtain leave of court to file another amended complaint." (Doc. 32 at 2.) This court 
agrees for the reasons stated in Doc. 32. 
Second, the mere filing of a disqualification motion5 does not divest a judge of authority 
to proceed; the motion must be granted first. See Willner v. Univ. of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1023, 1028 
(10th Cir. 1988). Moreover, following the court's review of Plaintiff's disqualification motion 
(Doc. 20), she merely offers unsubstantiated suggestions of personal bias, which are insufficient 
to mandate recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Thus, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 34) is denied. 

5 The court notes that Plaintiff's disqualification motion (Doc. 20) has been denied (Doc. 33). 
VII. Conclusion 
THEREFORE, Plaintiff's Motions (Docs. 4, 15, 18, 27, 28, 34) are DENIED. Should 
Plaintiff continue to file similar, frivolous motions, they will be summarily denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 14th day of November, 2025. 
 _s/ John W. Broomes_________________ 
 JOHN W. BROOMES 
 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE