CourtListener opinion 11225987

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Filed 12/16/25 Lin v. Lin CA2/1
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

 DIVISION ONE

 JULIE LIN, B340097

 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
 Super. Ct. No. 20STFL08152)
 v.
 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
 JEFFREY LIN, AND DENYING REHEARING

 Defendant and Appellant. NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

 THE COURT:

 It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 20,
2025, be modified as follows:

 1. On page 11, footnote 11 is deleted in its entirety. This
 will require renumbering of all subsequent footnotes.

 There is no change in the judgment.
 Respondent's petition for rehearing is denied.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

____________________________________________________________
M. KIM, J. BENDIX, Acting P. J. WEINGART, J.

 2
 Filed 11/20/25 Lin v. Lin CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

 DIVISION ONE

 JULIE LIN, B340097

 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
 Super. Ct. No. 20STFL08152)
 v.

 JEFFREY LIN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Anne Kiley, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with directions.
 Law Office of Peter Gold and Peter Gold for Defendant and
Appellant.
 Cuneo & Verano, J. Nicholas Cuneo, and Janina A. Verano
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 __________________________________
 In 2024, appellant Jeffrey Lin and respondent Julie Lin
settled their divorce.1 Their attorneys recited the terms of the
settlement agreement in open court, agreeing to later reduce the
settlement to a stipulated judgment the court could sign. Two of
the terms the parties agreed on were: (1) "as to property
allocation and confirmation, the parties agree that they can both
be confirmed all property and assets debts contained on Exhibit
240 [sic]"; and (2) "any accounts, retirement accounts, that have
been allocated to the parties in the balance sheet that need to be
QDRO[ed] will be QDRO[ed]."2 The parties also asked the trial
court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.
 At issue in this appeal is how the settlement agreement
disposed of three retirement accounts listed on Exhibit 240, each
of which comprised at least some community property. In the
proceedings below, Jeffrey contended the provisions of the
settlement agreement discussed above meant two of the
retirement accounts—those in his name—were his to keep, with
no distribution to Julie, and one of the accounts—in Julie's
name—was hers to keep, with no distribution to him. Julie

 1 Because the parties shared a surname, we refer to them

by their first names.
 2 "A QDRO is defined, in part, as a ‘ "domestic relations

order" ' relating ‘to the provision of . . . marital property rights'
that creates ‘the existence of an alternate [retirement plan]
payee.' " (In re Marriage of DeBenedetti & Ensberg (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 1035, 1039; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) ["the
term ‘qualified domestic relations order' means a domestic
relations order . . . [¶] . . . which creates or recognizes the
existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an
alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the
benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan"].)

 2
 disagreed, arguing the provisions meant the parties would evenly
divide the community property portions of each of the retirement
accounts as directed by a QDRO.
 The trial court concluded the parties intended to evenly
divide the community property portions of the retirement
accounts and entered a judgment to that effect. On appeal,
Jeffrey argues the trial court erred in interpreting the parties'
agreement both because the terms unambiguously directed each
party to keep their own accounts, and because any ambiguity
resolved in favor of such an interpretation. We agree the terms
unambiguously direct each party to keep their own accounts and
therefore reverse.

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 A. The Parties' Counsel Recite Settlement Terms
 Jeffrey and Julie married in January 2003. In August
2020, Julie filed for divorce. In March 2024, the parties informed
the court (Judge Lawrence P. Riff) they had reached a global
settlement, the terms of which the court ordered them to place on
the record.
 Among other provisions, Julie's counsel stated: "[A]s to
property allocation and confirmation, the parties agree that they
can both be confirmed all property and assets debts contained on
Exhibit 240 [sic] and that's -- respondent's binders, but there will
be no offsets or reimbursements due related to that allocation."3
She added: "In addition, as it relates to property, all Watts
claims, all Epstein claims, all retroactive support claims and

 3 Hereafter, we refer to this as the "allocation provision."

 3
 arrearages are mutually waived. And there are no offsets or
reimbursements due to either party as it relates to those issues."
When Jeffrey's counsel echoed, "all reimbursements and claims
against each other are waived including Epstein, Watts, retro
support, everything," Julie's counsel confirmed, "Any sort of
reimbursement; correct?" Jeffrey's counsel agreed.
 Julie's counsel also informed the court, "any accounts,
retirement accounts, that have been allocated to the parties in
the balance sheet that need to be QDRO[ed] will be QDRO[ed]
and that the parties will share the fees equally to do so."4
Jeffrey's counsel responded, "That's correct." When the court
asked to confirm there was "no dispute as to personal property
division," Jeffrey's counsel replied, "It's all according to the
balance sheet." Julie's counsel did not state there were any
exceptions to that statement.5
 In response to the court's inquiry, both Jeffrey and Julie
stated they had listened carefully to their counsel's recitation of
the settlement, confirmed it was an accurate representation of
their agreement, and stated they had no questions of their
counsel or the court.
 The parties stated they intended to submit a stipulated
judgment for the court to sign and asked the court to retain

 4 Hereafter, we refer to this as the "QDRO provision."

 5 In discussing what percentage of Jeffrey's bonus would be

paid for child support and spousal support, Julie's attorney
stated, "[T]he percentage of his bonus, for purposes of an Ostler-
Smith calculation, is ten percent" and for spousal support,
"petitioner is entitled to 17 percent." There was no discussion
regarding the monetary or percentage division of any retirement
accounts.

 4
 jurisdiction to enforce the settlement under Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6.6

 B. Exhibit 240
 Exhibit 240 is a five-page document, entitled "Marriage of
Lin [¶] Community / Separate Property - [¶] Known
Assets/Liabilities for All Properties [¶] & Proposed Division."7
(All caps and boldface omitted.) The document contains two main
columns—"Respondent (H)" and "Petitioner (W)"—and several
sub-columns. Of relevance to this appeal are columns for the
"DESCRIPTION" of various assets, Jeffrey's proposal for how the
community property portion of each asset would be distributed
between him and Julie, and Julie's proposal regarding the same
question.
 For example, on the second page of Exhibit 240, Jeffrey
valued the couple's home at $3,700,000, claimed $311,439 of that
amount was his separate property, and proposed to distribute the
remaining $3,388,561 of community property by giving Julie

 6 (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a) ["If the parties to the

settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or
orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the
settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the
parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the
terms of the settlement"].)
 7 Two versions of this document are in the appellate record,

one included in Jeffrey's appendix and one in Julie's. Julie states
that, for purposes of this appeal, it does not matter which version
we review. We therefore review the version in Jeffrey's appendix.

 5
 $1,694,281 and taking the remaining $1,694,280 himself.8 Julie
agreed with the valuation but claimed it was all community
property and proposed distributing half the value to each spouse.
On the same page, both parties claimed a 2019 BMW was
community property. Each spouse valued the car differently, but
both agreed it should be distributed to Julie. A 2008 BMW—also
community property—was allocated to Jeffrey.
 Listed under "RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS" on page 5 of
Exhibit 240 are (among other accounts): "Brightsphere 401K
Plan," "TCW P/S & Savings Plan," and "Charles Schwab IRA."
Under the columns indicating how the parties proposed to
distribute the community property portion of these assets, both
Jeffrey and Julie stated the entirety of the "Brightsphere 401K
Plan" and "TCW P/S & Savings Plan" would be distributed to
Jeffrey, with nothing distributed to Julie, and the entirety of
Charles Schwab IRA would be distributed to Julie with nothing
distributed to Jeffrey.9 The parties also noted that a payment of
$311,792 (according to Jeffrey) or $338,415 (according to Julie)

 8 Jeffrey also noted, under the entry for the house, that he

had an "FC2640 claim" for $311,439, the amount he claimed was
his separate property. (Fam. Code, § 2640, subd. (b) ["In the
division of the community estate under this division, unless a
party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement or
has signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party
shall be reimbursed for the party's contributions to the
acquisition of property of the community property estate to the
extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property
source"].)
 9 In the stipulated judgment, the parties agreed the

Brightsphere and TCW accounts were in Jeffrey's name, and the
Charles Schwab account was in Julie's name.

 6
 from Jeffrey to Julie would be required to "equalize" the
retirement accounts.
 In an April 2024 pleading to the court regarding attorneys'
fees, Julie represented that "the parties clearly agreed that
Exhibit 240 would serve as a kind of inventory of all assets and
debts for award/confirmation purposes only—not values."

 C. Jeffrey and Julie Disagree on How to Interpret
 the Settlement Terms
 On May 21, 2024, the parties appeared before the court to
report they could not agree on a stipulated judgment due to two
main issues: whether there would be a "cap" on the spousal
support Jeffrey would pay Julie and how to divide the parties'
retirement accounts.
 Jeffrey's counsel argued the parties agreed all assets and
properties were to be split as stated in Exhibit 240, wherein "the
retirement plans are clearly allocated in the respective columns
of the parties." Specifically, Jeffrey's counsel cited the lines on
Exhibit 240 that delineated the Brightsphere, TCW, and Charles
Schwab accounts and pointed out both parties had allocated those
accounts to the parties in whose name the accounts were held.
Counsel added that changing the allocation of the retirement
accounts to what Julie's counsel was advocating "would have
changed the whole deal," stating "my client waived his [Family
Code] 2640 [claim]. There's all different things that would fall
because of this."
 Regarding the QDRO provision, Jeffrey's counsel explained
the parties added that language "only pursuant to discussions we
had, which I believe is frequently the case -- there's an article
about it -- but the retirement plans or ERISA government plans
sometimes require QDRO's either to confirm a retirement plan to

 7
 the employee spouse so that they're insulated from the
unemployee [sic] spouse coming back after them." He added, "it
was no harm, no foul to include that provision."
 Julie's counsel countered that, had the parties intended for
each spouse to keep the contents of the retirement accounts in
their name, there would be no need to have any accounts
submitted to an expert to prepare a QDRO, and that parties "only
hire a QDRO attorney when you're dividing the separate and
community elements in a retirement plan." In responding to the
court's question on what she meant when she had said the
accounts were "allocated to the parties," Julie's counsel
responded, "By allocated what I think I was trying to say is are
they community or are they separate. What is the
characterization? I think that's what I meant. And we agreed on
that characterization." And that by saying certain accounts
needed to be "QDRO[ed]," she meant the portion of the
retirement accounts that were community property would be
"divided equally" between the parties.
 The court held that "based on the entirety of the record, the
petitioner [Julie] has the better of the argument." The court
found that when Julie's attorney had stated all property, assets,
and debts contained in Exhibit 240 would be allocated and
confirmed, that was "a general and broad statement of property
allocation and confirmation." But when the attorney stated any
retirement accounts allocated to the parties in the balance sheet
that needed to be subject to a QDRO would be, those were "more
specific words concerning the retirement accounts" and those
were the words the court "think[s] need to be enforced, not the
more general language." The court found significant that, when
discussing the accounts to be subject to a QDRO, Julie's counsel

 8
 had discussed retirement accounts that were "allocated to the
parties," but not accounts "allocated and confirmed to the
parties," and opined the use of the word "allocated" was
"imprecise." The court concluded the parties had agreed that "the
community interest portion of those retirement accounts need to
be QDRO[e]d so that they can then be allocated, and the parties
agree to split the cost of the QDRO."

 D. The Court Enters Judgment
 In June 2024, the court entered a stipulated judgment.10
Among other terms, the judgment specified "the community
interests in the following retirement accounts shall be subject to
equal division pursuant to a QDRO(s): The Brightsphere 401k
plan in Respondent's name; the TCW 401(k) in Respondent's
name; and the Charles Schwab IRA Plan in Petitioner's name. In
dividing the aforementioned plans, each party shall be assigned
her/his respective separate property interest and one-half
community interest in such retirement accounts." The judgment
also provided that "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set
forth in this Stipulated Judgment, Respondent objects to this
Court's rulings made at the hearing in this case on May 21, 2024,
and inclusion of the provisions set forth in this section of the
Stipulated Judgment relating to Division of Retirement Accounts
shall not be deemed to be Respondent's stipulation or consent to
the division of the parties' retirement accounts as ordered by the
Court on May 21, 2024, and shall not constitute a waiver of either
parties' rights to challenge this Court's rulings on appeal or as
otherwise permitted by law." Jeffrey timely appealed.

 10 The judgment was signed by Judge Anne Kiley.

 9
 DISCUSSION

 A. The Settlement Agreement Unambiguously
 Awards Each Party's Retirement Accounts to
 That Party
 Both parties agree that "[w]hen the trial court's
construction of a written agreement is challenged on appeal, . . .
and no extrinsic evidence is necessary to resolve any ambiguity or
uncertainty, interpretation of the contract is subject to de novo
review." (In re Marriage of Lafkas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 921,
932.) They further agree such a situation exists here.
 " ‘Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a
dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory rules
governing the interpretations of contracts generally.' " (In re
Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 687–688.) "The
primary object of contract interpretation is to ascertain and carry
out the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract
was formed, determined from the writing alone, if possible." (Id.
at p. 688.) "When the language of a contract is ‘clear, explicit,
and unequivocal, and there is no ambiguity, the court will enforce
the express language.' " (Ibid.) " ‘The whole of a contract is to be
taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably
practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.'
[Citation.] This means that ‘[c]ourts must interpret contractual
language in a manner which gives force and effect to every
provision' [citation], and avoid constructions which would render
any of its provisions or words ‘surplusage.' [Citation.] Put
simply, ‘[a] contract term should not be construed to render some
of its provisions meaningless or irrelevant.' " (Ibid.)
 Here, the transcript of the oral recitation of the settlement
states: "as to property allocation and confirmation, the parties

 10
 agree that they can both be confirmed all property and assets
debts contained on Exhibit 240 [sic]." Exhibit 240 expressly
allocates the Brightsphere and TCW retirement accounts to
Jeffrey and the Charles Schwab retirement account to Julie. We
discern no ambiguity. The transcript reflects that the settlement
agreement expressly incorporated the allocation of property and
assets as reflected in Exhibit 240. Exhibit 240 itself
unambiguously allocates the value of the community portion of
retirement accounts to the person in whose name the account was
held. In other sections of Exhibit 240, such as the sections
allocating the value of the home and the vehicles, the parties
demonstrated they knew how to divide community assets
between Jeffrey and Julie when they so intended. Neither the
orally recited settlement agreement, nor Exhibit 240 makes any
mention of any agreement to divide (let alone equally divide) the
community property portions of the three retirement accounts at
issue.11

 11 We note also that: (a) if an equalization of retirement

accounts were required, Jeffrey claimed he would need to pay
Julie $311,792, and Julie estimated he would need to pay her
$338,415; and (b) as part of the settlement agreement, Jeffrey
waived a Family Code section 2640 claim for $311,439. Although
we resolve this dispute using a plain language analysis, the near
equal exchange supports the argument Jeffrey's counsel made
that Jeffrey waived his Family Code section 2640 claim because
each party would keep their own retirement accounts, with no
equalization payment.

 11
 B. Julie's Arguments to the Contrary Are
 Unavailing

 1. The Provisions Are Not Inconsistent, and
 the QDRO Provision Is Not Meaningless
 Julie argues the allocation provision was a "general"
provision, and interpreting the agreement this way ignores the
more "specific" QDRO provision, and when general and specific
versions in an agreement are inconsistent, the specific version
controls. She adds that Jeffrey's interpretation "renders the
QDRO provision meaningless." We reject the premise of Julie's
arguments because the provisions are not inconsistent.
 The QDRO provision states that "any accounts, retirement
accounts, that have been allocated to the parties in the balance
sheet that need to be QDRO[ed] will be QDRO[ed] and that the
parties will share the fees equally to do so." (Italics added.) The
settlement agreement therefore provides that the retirement
accounts were to be allocated as indicated in Exhibit 240, and if
any account required a QDRO to effect this allocation, the parties
would equally split the costs to obtain such a QDRO. The
agreement did not state such an account existed. The use of the
word "any" demonstrates there were no accounts known at the
time that required a QDRO, and reveals the contingent nature of
the provision. Had the parties agreed there was a retirement
account that required a QDRO, we would expect, for example, the
parties would have specifically mentioned which account(s) those
were or, at a minimum, referred to "the" account(s) that required
a QDRO instead of "any" accounts that required a QDRO.
 Moreover, were we to interpret the agreement in the
manner Julie suggests, we would be prioritizing the general
statement about retirement accounts that may require a QDRO

 12
 over the specific allocation of the Brightsphere, TCW, and
Charles Schwab accounts set forth in Exhibit 240, rendering the
specific allocations in Exhibit 240 meaningless.

 2.Jeffrey's Interpretation Does Not Ignore
 the Definition of QDRO
 Julie also argues that mention of a QDRO necessarily
means the parties intended for the other spouse to receive a
portion of the retirement plan because a QDRO is an order that
"clearly specif[ies] . . . [¶] The amount or percentage of the
participant's benefits to be paid to each alternate payee or the
manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined"
and an "alternate payee" can only be a "spouse, former spouse,
child or other dependent of the participant."
 As explained above, the QDRO provision provided only
that, should an account require a QDRO to effect the division
specified in Exhibit 240, the parties would obtain a QDRO expert
to fashion such an order, and equally split the costs of doing so.
Whether or not a QDRO can be used to effectuate a waiver of all
benefits, we see no reason why the inclusion of the QDRO
provision necessarily requires we accept Julie's argument. Even
assuming Julie is correct that a QDRO necessarily means the
benefits will be divided according to some percentage, here, the
condition precedent of the QDRO provision—that there were "any
accounts . . . that need to be QDRO[ed]"—was unmet, and thus no
QDRO expert would be needed.12

 12 Moreover, Julie argues that a QDRO must "clearly

specify," among other terms, "[t]he amount or percentage of the
participant's benefits to be paid to each alternate payee or the
manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined."
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

 13
 3. Jeffrey Did Not Forfeit His Argument
 Finally, Julie contends Jeffrey forfeited his argument the
QDRO was conditional and likely superfluous because he failed to
raise those arguments below. While it is true Jeffrey's counsel
did not use the words "conditional" or "superfluous," he expressly
argued the parties inserted the QDRO provision because "the
retirement plans or ERISA government plans sometimes require
QDRO's either to confirm a retirement plan to the employee
spouse so that they're insulated from the unemployee spouse [sic]
coming back after them" and that "it was no harm, no foul to
include that provision." First, the word "any" as used by the
parties here is conditional on its face, and Julie provides no
authority stating Jeffrey must preserve an argument based on
the plain language of the agreement where both parties agree
that our review is de novo. Second, while we do not consider the
substance of these statements because they go beyond the plain
language of the agreement, they sufficiently preserved his
argument on appeal that the QDRO provision was conditional.

 DISPOSITION
 The portions of the judgment providing that the community
interests of the Brightsphere, TCW, and Schwab accounts
discussed above would be divided equally between the parties is
reversed. On remand, the court shall enter a new judgment

(Bold, italics omitted.) Julie does not address why, if the parties
intended to divide the retirement accounts, there was no
settlement term regarding what percentage would be allocated to
each party. The parties made such provisions, for example,
regarding how much of Jeffrey's bonus would be paid as child and
spousal support (10 percent and 17 percent, respectively).

 14
 providing that the entirety of the Brightsphere and TCW
accounts are awarded to Jeffrey and the entirety of the Charles
Schwab account is awarded to Julie. All other portions of the
judgment are affirmed. Appellant shall recover his costs on
appeal.
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

 M. KIM, J.

We concur:

 BENDIX, Acting P. J.

 WEINGART, J.

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