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NUMBER 13-24-00256-CV

 COURT OF APPEALS

 THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

 IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF
 AMY MORGAN AND PETER MORGAN

 ON APPEAL FROM THE 360TH DISTRICT COURT
 OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
 Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

 Appellant/cross-appellee Peter Morgan (appellant) and appellee/cross-appellant

Amy Morgan (appellee) appeal a final divorce decree. By two issues, appellant contends

that the trial court improperly ordered him to reimburse appellee for the costs of electing

to receive disability payments, and alternatively, even assuming the trial court had

authority to divide disability retirement payments, "it could not do so in the absence of an

agreement to do so in the [Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA)]." Appellee contends
 that the MSA is not enforceable due to a lack of a meeting of the minds, and we must

remand the MSA to the trial court because it is ambiguous. We affirm as modified.1

 I. BACKGROUND

 On May 11, 2023, the parties signed an MSA agreeing, in pertinent part, that

appellee would receive "50% of the community portion of [appellant's] net disposable

retired pay." Appellant asked the trial court to enter the MSA as the final divorce decree.

Appellee argued the MSA was unenforceable because as written the MSA allowed

appellant to waive his retirement pay to receive disability pay.

 At a hearing on October 20, 2023, appellee requested that the trial court include

language in the final divorce decree prohibiting appellant from waiving his military

retirement pay to receive military disability, which is not divisible in a divorce. On January

12, 2024, the hearing on the parties' motions to sign the final divorce decree continued.

Again, appellee argued that appellant could waive his retirement pay at any time and

therefore unilaterally determine how long appellee received retirement payments.

Appellee therefore again requested language in the final divorce decree stating that

appellant must reimburse her any amount she loses if appellant decided to waive his

retirement pay and collect military disability. Appellant opposed such language.

 The trial court agreed with appellee and stated in the final divorce decree that the

parties agreed to divide appellant's military retirement and "stipulate and agree [that

appellant] shall not convert, buy civil service retirement or otherwise modify the terms or

payment structure of his military retirement pay in any manner that will negatively impact"

 1 This appeal was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth, Texas pursuant to

an order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001.

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 appellee's payments, and if appellant did any act that reduced appellee's "share of

appellant's military retirement pay" by waiving his military pay for disability pay, appellant

"shall make [appellee] whole by paying [her] directly that amount that [her] monthly

payment is reduced by such action." This appeal followed.

 II. DISABILITY PAYMENTS

 By his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court improperly prohibited him

from converting his military retirement payments into disability payments and ordered that

he reimburse appellee "for the costs of electing to receive disability retirement payments."

 Trial courts are permitted to divide military retired pay in a divorce proceeding "in

accordance with the law of the jurisdiction." Gillin v. Gillin, 307 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.). However, the trial court may only divide disposable

retired pay, which "excludes disability pay, including retirement benefits that may be

waived in order to collect disability benefits." Id. at 397–98. "A divorce court cannot

apportion military retirement pay which has been waived to receive Veterans

Administration disability benefits." Id. at 398. A trial court cannot expressly or impliedly

prohibit a retired military member from electing to waive his retirement pay to receive

Veteran's Affairs disability benefits in the future. Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 196

(Tex. 1981); Gillin, 307 S.W.3d at 398.

 In Freeman v. Freeman, the San Antonio court of appeals determined that the

divorce decree was erroneous because it limited the retired military member's right to

waive some of his retirement pay and elect to receive VA disability benefits. 133 S.W.3d

277, 280 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). The court reasoned that "a Texas court

cannot expressly or impliedly prohibit a retired service member from unilaterally waiving

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 some or all of his disposable retired pay after divorce in exchange for VA disability

benefits." Id. (first citing Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d at 196; and then citing Limbaugh

v. Limbaugh, 71 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.)).

 Here, the trial court prohibited appellant from converting or modifying the terms of

his retirement pay in a manner that would harm appellee, including waiving his retirement

pay in exchange for non-divisible disability payments. Thus, the final divorce decree is

erroneous because the trial court improperly prohibited appellant from unilaterally waiving

some or all his retirement pay to collect disability. See id. at 280; Gillin, 307 S.W.3d at

398 (providing that "[a] divorce decree cannot restrict a service member's future right to

waive retirement and elect disability Veteran's Administration benefits" and explaining that

the order was therefore erroneous because it "provides that any election of benefits that

may be made by [the retired military member] ‘shall' not reduce the amount of retired pay

awarded to [the ex-spouse], and specifically prohibits [the retired military member] from

waiving military retired pay in order to receive disability benefits").

 Next, in Limbaugh, the trial court attempted to prevent the retired military member

"from unilaterally reducing his ‘disposable retired pay' in the future by waiving" his

retirement pay and electing to receive disability benefits by stating in the decree that if the

retired military member should reduce his retirement pay, he would be required to pay his

ex-spouse "the difference between the monthly payments she received at the time of the

decree and the payments as reduced because of [the retired military member's] post-

divorce election to receive additional VA disability benefits." Limbaugh, 71 S.W.3d at 17.

The Limbaugh court concluded that the trial court could not require the retired military

member to reimburse the payment amount to his ex-wife if he waived his retirement pay

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 and elected to receive disability pay because federal law properly gave the retired military

member the right to do so. Id.

 Here, the trial court included similar language requiring appellant to reimburse

appellee if he modified his retirement pay by electing to receive non-divisible disability

benefits. This language limits appellant's right to waive his retirement pay to receive

disability and is therefore erroneous. See id.; see also Ghrist v. Ghrist, No. 03-05-00769-

CV, 2007 WL 1372690, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 11, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(determining that even though the parties agreed that the retired military member would

reimburse his ex-wife if he elected to waive his retirement pay and receive disability

benefits, the ex-wife was not entitled to reimbursement under federal law because she

sought to directly or indirectly obtain a portion of the retired military member's "VA

disability benefits, or to effectively prevent him from waiving his military retirement to

obtain such benefits"). Appellee argues that other state courts have already concluded

that the military member spouse can agree to reimburse the ex-spouse if he waives

retirement pay to take disability. However, no Texas court has made this determination.

See Freeman, 133 S.W.3d at 280; Gillin, 307 S.W.3d at 398 ("The first provision of the

domestic relations order provides that any election of benefits that may be made by Kevin

‘shall' not reduce the amount of retired pay awarded to Lori, and specifically prohibits

Kevin from waiving military retired pay in order to receive disability benefits. The trial court

erred in restricting Kevin's right to elect disability."); Loria v. Loria, 189 S.W.3d 797, 799

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (determining that divorce decree was

erroneous because it stated that the military spouse agreed "not to take any action by

merger so as to cause a limitation in the amount of the total disposable retired pay in

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 which member has a vested interest" which had "the impermissible effect of precluding

appellant from choosing, as is his right, to waive a portion of his retirement pay for

disability"); see also Ghrist, 2007 WL 1372690, at *3. Therefore, we decline to make such

a conclusion. See Loria, 189 S.W.3d at 799 ("The Texas Supreme Court has recognized

that a servicemember has the right, by federal law, to waive military retirement pay for

disability pay, even though this means that the servicemember can effectively unilaterally

modify a divorce decree insofar as it allocates income attributable to prior military service."

(citing Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d at 195–96)).

 We sustain appellant's first issue. 2 Accordingly, we modify the judgment by

omitting the following language:

 The parties further stipulate and agree that the Respondent shall not
 convert, buy civil service retirement or otherwise modify the terms or
 payment structure of his military retirement pay in any manner that will
 negatively impact the payment amounts to the Petitioner. Should the
 Respondent do an act that has the effect of reducing the Petitioner's share
 of the Respondent's military retirement pay received under Concurrent
 Retirement and Disability Pay (CRDP), Respondent shall indemnify and
 reimburse Petitioner for any such losses and consequential damages.

See Limbaugh, 71 S.W.3d at 18 (ordering that the divorce decree be modified by deleting

the provision that required the husband to make direct payments to the wife if he waived

his Navy retirement payments in exchange for an increase in veterans' disability benefits);

Gillin, 307 S.W.3d at 398 (modifying the divorce decree by removing language that

prohibited the retired military spouse from waiving his retirement pay to receive disability).

 2 Having sustained appellant's first issue, we need not address his second alternative issue as it

is not dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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 III. IRREVOCABLE MSA

 By her first cross-issue, appellee contends that there was no meeting of the minds

when the parties signed the MSA.

A. Applicable Law

 Divorcing spouses may agree to the division of their community property by either

executing a settlement agreement "which ‘may be revised or repudiated before rendition

of the divorce,'" or they "may choose to execute a settlement agreement" pursuant to

§ 6.602 of the Texas Family Code that is binding on the parties as soon as it is executed,

and each party is "entitled to judgment on the agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law." Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 165.

166 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); see In re Joyner, 196 S.W.3d

883, 890–91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (noting that "the parties elect to

make their agreement binding at the time of execution rather than at the time of rendering,

thus creating a procedural shortcut for the enforcement of those agreements"). The Texas

Family Code "does not authorize a court to modify an MSA, to resolve ambiguities or

otherwise, before incorporating it into a decree." Toler v. Sanders, 371 S.W.3d 477, 480

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (concluding that the trial court's

modifications to the MSA were reversable error where modifications "add terms,

significantly alter the original terms, or undermine the intent of the parties"). "A[n MSA]

under [§] 6.602 is ‘more binding than a basic written contract' because, except when a

party has procured the settlement through fraud or coercion, nothing either party does will

modify or void the agreement ‘once everyone has signed it.'" Id.

B. Discussion

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 The MSA in this case meets the requirements of § 6.602. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 6.602. The record shows that there is a prominent notice on the last page of the

agreement in bold face underlined capital letters stating that the MSA is not subject to

revocation, and the agreement is signed by both parties and their attorneys.3 See id.

§ 6.602(b)(1)–(3). Because the agreement complied with § 6.602, appellee's unilateral

attempt to revoke the MSA was ineffective, and both §§ 6.602(b) and 6.602(c) required

the trial court to enter judgment on it despite appellee's attempted repudiation. See id.

§ 6.602(b), (c); Mullins, 202 S.W.3d at 876; Cayan, 38 S.W.3d at 165.

 Moreover, the trial court did not allow the parties to present evidence regarding

whether there had been a meeting of the minds. See Wells v. Hoisager, 553 S.W.3d 515,

522 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) ("Every contract requires a meeting of the minds,

so the ‘meeting' necessarily is a question of fact."). Whether a meeting of the minds

occurs is determined objectively by examining what the parties said and did rather than

measuring the parties' subjective state of mind. Id. ("[M]eeting of the minds is measured

by what the parties said and did and not on their subjective state of mind."); Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 556 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)

("The determination of a meeting of the minds, and thus offer and acceptance, is based

 3 The MSA states:

 THIS MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT OT REVOCATION
 PURSUANT TO TFC §6.601-6.602 TPRC §154.021-154.073.

 THE PARTIES SHALL BE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT ON THE MEDIATED
 SETTLEMEN AGREEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING RULE 11, TRCP OR ANY OTHER
 RULE OF LAW.

 EACH PARTY STIPULATED[] AND AGREES THAT THEY HAVE ENTERED
 INTO THIS AGREEMENT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY. THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT
 SUBJECT TO REVOCATION AND IS ENFORCEABLE AS A CONTRACT.

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 on the objective standard of what the parties said and did—and not on their subjective

state of mind." (first citing Adams v. H & H Meat Prods., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 762, 771 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.); and then citing Angelou v. African

Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.))).

The trial court must consider "the communications between the parties and the acts and

circumstances surrounding those communications." Id. (first citing Komet v. Graves, 40

S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.) and then citing Angelou, 33

S.W.3d at 278). Accordingly, because the trial court did not hear evidence regarding a

meeting of the minds, we are unable to conclude that the judgment should be reversed

on that basis. See Wells, 553 S.W.3d at 522 ("Every contract requires a meeting of the

minds, so the ‘meeting' necessarily is a question of fact."). We overrule appellee's first

cross-issue.4

 IV. AMBIGUITY

 By her second cross-issue, appellee contends the MSA is ambiguous. Appellee

does not explain with citation to pertinent legal authority why the language in the MSA is

ambiguous, she does not state which language results in two reasonable interpretations,

and she does not state what those interpretations may be.5 See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

 4 We note that the Texas Supreme Court has disagreed with a lower court's determination that the

MSA should be set aside simply because there was not a meeting of the minds. Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d
615, 623 (Tex. 2012); see also Matter of Marriage of Penafiel, 633 S.W.3d 36, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) (explaining that an MSA may be set aside if it "is illegal in nature or procured
by fraud, duress, coercion, or other dishonest means.").
 5 Appellee states: (1) "If the MSA is ambiguous, then the MSA should be set aside, and the case

remanded to the trial court; (2) "Trial court noted that grammar of the sentence is confusing to the court and
that might have a little bit of ambiguity"; and (3) "In this case, if the language used in the MSA gives rise to
two reasonable interpretations, then the MSA is ambiguous, and the case should be remanded to the trial
court and the parties could again attend mediation or proceed to trial." This is the extent of appellee's
argument. Appellee does not state which sentence the trial court referenced when it made this comment.
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 We overrule appellee's second cross-issue.

 V. CONCLUSION

 The trial court's judgment is affirmed as modified.

 JAIME TIJERINA
 Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
18th day of December, 2025.

Additionally, the trial court made a finding that the MSA is not ambiguous.

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